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Abstract  
This   thesis   undertakes   a   critical   analysis   of   the   history  management   of   the  
East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility.   Its  central  hypothesis   is   that  noble  families   throughout  
the   second   half   of   the   twentieth   century   deliberately   sought   to   steer   and  
control  the  public  commemoration  of  their  caste.      
These  efforts  were  a  concerted  assault  on  widely  held  views  about  the  place  
of  the  nobility  in  recent  history,  and  specifically,  about  their  culpability  in  the  
disasters  that  brought  about  war,  defeat  and  moral  shame  to  Germany.  The  
first  phase  of  noble  history  management  concerned  an  expressed  ‘resistance  
against   Hitler’   alignment   and   self-­‐‑distancing   from   the   regime.   The   second  
phase   of   history  management   strategically   employed   autobiographical   and  
family   chronicles   to   construct   an   image   of   a  modest   and   industrious   elite,  
deeply   rooted   in   the   ancient   traditions   and   virtues   of   an   apolitical   East-­‐‑
Elbian  estate  society.    
This  dissertation   argues   that   the  process   of   history  management   continued  
after  German  reunification  in  1989-­‐‑1990,  when  many  former  refugee  families  
returned  to  their  old  estates  in  East  Elbia.    
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In  an  article  in  Die  Zeit  newspaper  in  1952,  Marion  Countess  Dönhoff  stated  
that:  “every  nation  has   its  own  specific  way  of   transforming  historic  events  
into  legends  or  symbols,  and  surely  in  the  end,  the  legend  often  significantly  
deviates   from   the   actual   events.”1  What   Dönhoff   attributed   to   nations  was  
also  true  for  her  own  social  class.  In  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  
noble  writers  embarked  on  a  journey  to  alter  and  reconstruct  the  narrative  of  
the  nobility’s   role  during   the  Third  Reich,   a   journey   that  we  might   call   the  
‘history  management’  of  the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility.  
Up  until   the   eve  of   the  First  World  War,   the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility  had  been  
remarkably   successful   in   preserving   its   traditional   power   status   within  
German  society.  This  power  was  maintained  through  a  series  of  very  robust  
networks,  with   the  most   important   being   the  military.  Although   the   noble  
share  of  the  Prussian  officer  corps  declined  from  65  per  cent  in  1860  to  30  per  
cent  in  1914,  all  of  the  imperial  army’s  eight  army  commanders  and  twenty-­‐‑
five  corps  commanders,  and  the  majority  of  officers  from  the  rank  of  colonel  
upward,   were   noble.2  The   leading   posts   among   the   bureaucracy  were   also  
firmly   in   the  hands   of   the  nobility.   This  was   especially   true   of   the   Foreign  
Office.   In   1914,   the   Reich’s   ambassadors   comprised   eight   princes,   twenty-­‐‑
nine   counts,   twenty   barons,   fifty-­‐‑four   lesser   nobles,   and   a   mere   eleven  
                                                                                                 
1  Marion  Dönhoff,  Auflehnung  gegen  den  Helden,  Die  Zeit,  17.07.1952.  
2  Macgregor  Knox,  To  the  threshold  of  power,  1922/1933.  Origins  and  Dynamics  of  the  Fascist  and  
National  Social  Dictatorships,  Volume  I  (Cambridge,  2007),  p.  73;  see  also:  Detlef  Bald,  Vom  
Kaiserheer  zur  Bundeswehr.  Sozialstruktur  des  Militärs.  Politik  der  Rekrutierung  von  Offizieren  und  




Furthermore,  the  nobility  showed  an  astonishing  perseverance  economically.  
At  the  end  of  the  19th  century,  the  landed  nobility  in  East  Elbia  still  held  more  
than   70   per   cent   of   the   large   estates   exceeding   1,000   hectares,   as  well   as   a  
staggering   97   per   cent   of   the   estates   spanning  more   than   10,000   hectares.4  
Even   though   the   high   protective   tariffs   for   German   agricultural   products,  
which   had   shielded   the   profitability   of   these   estates   under   Bismarck,  were  
gradually   abandoned   at   the   turn   of   the   century,   strong   agrarian   pressure  
groups   such   as   the   Agrarian   League   (Bund   der   Landwirte),   which   was  
effectively  dominated  by  the  noble  estate  owners,  continued  to  ensure  high  
state   subsidies,  massive   tax   reliefs   and   high   prices   for   agricultural   goods.5  
Thus,   although   contemporaries   like   Max   Weber   spoke   of   the   nobility   as  
being   in   ‘economic   agony’6,   “the   Junkers   nevertheless   gripped   firmly   their  
backward  quarter  of  Germany  east  of  the  Elbe”.7      
The  end  of  the  First  World  War,  however,  marked  a  sharp  caesura.  The  entire  
system  that  had  sustained  the  nobles’  political  power  was  torn  apart.  In  1918,  
the  Kaiser  fled  to  Holland,  and  Germany  became  a  republic.  The  army  was  in  
a  shambles;  officers  had  their  epaulettes   torn  off,  and  the  navy  mutinied   in  
                                                                                                 
3  Knox,  Threshold,  p.  73.  
4  Johannes  Conrad,  Die  Latifundien  im  preußischen  Osten,  in:  Johannes  Conrad  (ed.),  
Jahrbücher  für  Nationalökonomie  und  Statistik,  Volume  16  (n.a.,  1888),  pp.  141–145.  
5  Walter  Demel  und  Sylvia  Schraut,  Der  Deutsche  Adel:  Lebensformen  und  Geschichte  (Munich,  
2014),  p.  102.  
6  Max  Weber,  Der  Nationalstaat  und  die  Volkswirtschaftspolitik.  Akademische  Antrittsrede,  in:  
MWG  I/4,  p.  567,  quoted  from:  Cornelius  Torp,  Max  Weber  und  die  Preussischen  Junker  
(Tuebingen,  1998),  p.  100.  
7  Knox,  Threshold,  p.  73.  
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Kiel.8  The  Treaty  of  Versailles  cut  back  the  officer  corps  to  a  mere  4,000  men,  
and   Article   109   of   the   new   Weimar   constitution   formally   abolished   the  
nobility   as   a   privileged   class.9  In   the  Weimar  Republic,   the   horizons   of   the  
nobility  narrowed.  They  became  involved  in  insular  interest  politics,  focused  
on  securing  the  remnants  of  their  power  by  finding  right  wing  partners  with  
whom  to  destroy  the  influence  of  the  political  left.    
In   1932-­‐‑33,   the  nobility  played  a   conspicuous   role   in   the  destruction  of   the  
Weimar  Republic  and  entered  into  a  fateful  alliance  with  Hitler.  As  a  result  
of  their  deepening  relationship  with  the  extreme  right,  in  particular,  the  Nazi  
party,   the   nobility   emerged   profoundly   damaged   from   the   collapse   of   the  
Third   Reich   in   1945.   If   1918   had   disrupted   the   historical   continuity   of   the  
noble  networks,   1945  brought   a   fundamental   rupture  with   the  past.     Large  
parts   of   the   nobility   had   been   drawn   into   the   leadership   apparatus   of   the  
regime,   thus   their   reputations  were  deeply  contaminated.  Conversely,  even  
those  who   had   remained   politically   uncompromised   faced   the   reprisals   of  
the   Soviets.   The   Russians   made   no   distinction   between   ‘good’   and   ‘bad’  
members  of  the  nobility.  In  East  Elbia,  all  members  of  the  nobility  were  either  
killed   or   expelled,   and   their   estates   were   expropriated.   Stunned,   broken,  
fragmented,  displaced  and  no  longer  occupying  their  traditional  positions  of  
                                                                                                 
8  These  revolutionary  attacks  on  the  officers’  insignia  of  power  became  one  of  the  leitmotifs  
of  noble  recollections  of  the  revolutionary  upheavals  in  1918-­‐‑19.  See:  Stephan  Malinowski,  
Vom  König  zum  Führer.  Sozialer  Niedergang  und  politische  Radikalisierung  im  deutschen  Adel  
zwischen  Kaiserreich  und  NS-­‐‑Staat  (Berlin,  2003),  p.  204.  
9  Christoph  Franke,  Der  sächsische  Adel  im  19.  Und  20.  Jahrhundert.  Soziales  Verhalten  und  
soziale  Strukturen,  in:  Silke  Marburg  und  Josef  Matzerath  (eds),  Der  Schritt  in  die  Moderne  –  
Sächsicher  Adel  zwischen  1763  und  1918  (Cologne,  2001),  pp.  201,  202.  
4  
  
social   leadership,   the   nobility   were   forced   to   regroup   in   the   West   under  
entirely  new  conditions  and  find  a  way  to  re-­‐‑establish  themselves.  
State  of  Research  
Despite   the   immense   social   and   political   importance   of   the   nobility  
throughout  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries,  the  class  has  not  attracted  
the  deserved  degree  of  scholarly  attention  afforded  to  the  labour  force  or  the  
bourgeoisie.   Two   early   post-­‐‑war   publications   established   opposing  
approaches  to  the  subject  between  which  would  fall  much  of  the  subsequent  
literature.    Francis  L.  Carsten’s  overview  of  the  history  of  the  Junkers  was  a  
swingeing  critique  of  an  elite  that  had  always  misused  the  power  it  refused  
to  relinquish.10    In  contrast,  Walter  Görlitz’  early  post-­‐‑war  study  on  the  East-­‐‑
Elbian  nobility  combined  masses  of  statistical  information  with  an  idealised  
collective  portrait.  It  was  spiced  with  insider  information,  and  reminiscent,  in  
some   respects,   of   the   novels   of   Theodor   Fontane.11     Neither   study   was  
successful  in  stimulating  much  further  scholarly  enquiry.      
Since  the  late  1980s,  however,  there  has  been  growing  interest  in  the  German  
nobility   of   the   nineteenth-­‐‑century   and   early   twentieth-­‐‑century,   driven  
mainly  by  a  group  of  scholars  working  around  Heinz  Reif,  the  first  historian  
of  the  Bielefeld  School  to  focus  his  attention  primarily  on  the  nobility,  rather  
                                                                                                 
10  Francis  L.  Carsten,  Geschichte  der  preußischen  Junker  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1988).  
11  Walter  Görlitz,  Die  Junker,  Adel  und  Bauer  im  deutschen  Osten:  Geschichtliche  Bilanz  von  7  
Jahrhunderten  (Glücksburg,  1957).  
5  
  
than   the   bourgeoisie   or   the   working   class.   Reif’s   study   of   the   Westphalia  
nobility,  based  on  twenty-­‐‑five  noble  families  in  the  archbishopric  of  Münster,  
focused  on  the  decades  between  1770  and  1860,  and  showed,  by  means  of  a  
multi-­‐‑generational   collective   biography,   how   a   nobility   anchored   in   semi-­‐‑
feudal   institutions  of   the  old   regime  overcame   the   challenges  of   revolution  
and   refashioned   itself   as   a   regional   elite   whose   elevated   social   status  
commanded  the  respect  of  large  parts  of  society.12    
An   interest   in   the   strategies   adopted  by  noble  networks   in   response   to   the  
challenges  of  political,   economic  and  social   change  has   remained  central   to  
the  literature.  Dominic  Lieven’s  comparative  analysis  of  the  British,  Prussian  
and  Russian  nobilities  explores  how  the  ruling  classes  of  Europe  confronted  
and   managed   processes   of   modernisation.   He   suggests   that   in   southern  
Germany,   expropriations   and   the   loss   of   seigniorial   powers   led   to   the  
marginalisation   and  political   irrelevance   of   the   regional   nobilities,  whereas  
the  nobilities  of  Prussia  proved  highly  successful  at  managing  the  transition  
from  manorial  lordship  to  agribusiness,  despite  shedding  land  in  the  process  
of   peasant   emancipation.13       Wolfram  G.   Theilemann’s   account   of   Prussian  
noble  country  life  in  the  Kaiserreich  focuses  on  noble  management  of  forest  
reserves  to  argue  that  the  landed  nobility  of  the  Prussian  provinces  entered  
into   a  partial   amalgam  with  other   elites   of  property   and   capital   in   the   late  
nineteenth  century.  Here,  as   in  the  studies  by  Reif  and  Lieven,   the  research  
                                                                                                 
12  See:  Heinz  Reif,  Westfälischer  Adel  1770–1860:  vom  Herrschaftsstand  zur  regionalen  Elite  
(Göttingen,  1979);  Idem,  Adelserneuerung  und  Adelsreform  in  Deutschland  1815–1874,  in:  
Elisabeth  Fehrenbach  (ed.),  Adel  und  Bürgertum  in  Deutschland  1770–1884  (Munich,  1994),  pp.  
203–230;  Idem,  Adel  im  19.  und  20.  Jahrhundert  (Munich,  1999).  
13  Dominic  Lieven,  The  Aristocracy  in  Europe,  1815–1914  (London,  1992).  
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method   adopted   combined   social,   economic   and   cultural   perspectives   and  
was   focused   on   the   strategies   adopted   by   the   nobility   to   secure   collective  
survival.14    
Hartwin  Spenkuch’s  study  of   the  Prussian  House  of  Lords  uses  an  analysis  
of  a  noble-­‐‑dominated  parliamentary  body  to  explore  the  relative  influence  of  
the  Prussian  nobility,  the  state  bureaucracy,  and  the  bourgeois  middle  class.  
Spenkuch   argues   that   the   Herrenhaus   remained,   throughout   its   history,   a  
stronghold   of   aristocratic   power,   and   thus   a   bulwark   against   the  
‘bourgeousification’  of  politics  and  public  life.15  An  important  compilation  of  
articles   edited   by   Hans-­‐‑Ulrich   Wehler   illuminate   how   certain   parts   of  
nobility   used   the   processes   of   professionalisation   and   acclimatisation   to  
market   conditions   to   merge   with   a   broader   elite   of   ‘notables’,   while  
paradoxically,  other  nobles  used  exactly  the  same  techniques  to  secure  their  
status   as   a   caste   separate   from   bourgeois   society.16  Elisabeth   Fehrenbach’s  
edited   volume   on   the   nobility   and   the   bourgeoisie   in   early   nineteenth-­‐‑
century  Germany  reached  a  slightly  different  verdict,  suggesting  that,  for  the  
most   part,   the   amalgamation   of   noble   and   bourgeois   elites   remained  
contingent  and  incomplete;  there  was  no  ‘symbiosis  of  elites’.17      
Many   of   the   contributions   to   the   important   volume   edited   by   Heinz   Reif  
explore  how  the  nobilities  (of  Prussia  in  particular)  succeeded  in  staying  ‘on  
                                                                                                 
14  Wolfram  G.  Theilemann,  Adel  im  grünen  Rock.  Adliges  Jägertum,  Großprivatwaldbesitz  und  die  
preußische  Forstbeamtenschaft  1866–1914  (Berlin,  2011).  
15  Hartwin  Spenkuch,  Das  Preußische  Herrenhaus,  Adel  und  Bürgertum  in  der  ersten  Kammer  des  
Landtages  1854–1918  (Düsseldorf,  1998).  
16  Hans-­‐‑Ulrich  Wehler  (ed.),  Europäischer  Adel  1750–1950  (Göttingen,  1990).  
17  Elisabeth  Fehrenbach  (ed.),  Adel  und  Bürgertum  in  Deutschland  1770–1884  (Munich,  1994).  
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top’,   despite   the   loss   of   seigniorial   privileges,   while   others   focus   on   the  
experiences  of   rupture  and  corporate   failure   that  were  also  a   feature  of   the  
nobility’s   path   to   modernity. 18      The   tension   between   the   successful  
maintenance   of   a   position   of   dominance,   and   the   repeated   shocks   to   the  
societal   structures   of   noble   privilege,   are   also   at   the   centre   of   Monika  
Wienfort  and  Eckart  Conze’s  collection  Adel  und  Moderne.19    
These   studies   are   concerned   above   all   with   illuminating   the   contours   of  
social   change.      The   study   of   how   noble   networks   mobilised   as   collective  
actors  is  far  less  well  developed.  Shelly  Baranowski’s  The  Sanctity  of  Rural  Life  
underscores   the   close   affinities   between   Junkerdom  and  Nazism,   focussing  
on   collaboration   between   members   of   the   Pomeranian   nobility   and   the  
ascendant  NSDAP   in   the  Weimar  Republic.     The  book   thus  offers   a  partial  
refutation  of  those  studies  that  sought  to  merge  the  modern  Prussian  nobility  
into  a  modern  composite  elite.20  Iris  von  Hoyningen-­‐‑Huene’s  analysis  of  the  
nobility   during   the   Weimar   Republic   also   shows   how   the   possession   of  
landed   property   protected   the   provincial   nobilities   from   the   pressure   to  
modernise.21  Further  works  on  specific  families  and  regions  contribute  to  our  
understanding   of   the   motives   driving   noble   political   and   social   networks  
                                                                                                 
18  Heinz  Reif  (ed.),  Adel  und  Bürgertum  in  Deutschland,  Bd.  1,  Entwicklungslinien  und  
Wendepunkte  im  19.  Jahrhundert  (Berlin,  2000);  Idem  (ed.),  Adel  und  Bürgertum  in  Deutschland,  
Bd.  2,  Entwicklungslinien  und  Wendepunkte  im  20.  Jahrhundert  (Berlin,  2002).  
19  Eckart  Conze  und  Monika  Wienfort  (eds)  Adel  und  Moderne,  Deutschland  im  europäischen  
Vergleich  im  19.  Und  20.  Jahrhundert  (Cologne,  2004).  
20  Shelley  Baranowski,  The  Sanctity  of  Rural  Life.  Nobility,  Protestantism  and  Nazism  in  Weimar  
Prussia  (NY,  1995);  Idem,  East  Elbian  Landed  Elites  and  Germany’s  Turn  To  Fascism:  The  
Sonderweg  Controversy  Revisited,  in:  European  History  Quarterly,  2/1996,  pp.  209–240.  




between   the   First   and   the   Second   World   War.   This   is   especially   true   of  
studies   on   the   members   of   the   military   resistance.22   However,   the   pre-­‐‑
eminent  work  in  this  field  is  Stephan  Malinowski’s  prodigiously  researched  
study   of   the   nobility’s   role   in   German   politics   between   1918   and   1945.    
Drawing  on  material   from   the   archive   of   the  Deutsche  Adelgenossenschaft  
(DAG),   NSDAP   depositories,   and   numerous   collections   of   private   papers,  
Malinowski   highlights   the   synergies   between   noble   political   mobilisation  
and   the   rise  of   the  NSDAP,   identifying  not  only  moments  of   collaboration,  
but  also  a  fundamental  concordance  in  values  and  outlook.23    
Furthermore,   there   exists   a   large   quantity   of   literature   which   treats   the  
nobility  as  an  object  of  historiographical  critique,  holding  it  accountable  for  
Germany’s   fateful   role   in   the   twentieth  century.  Hans-­‐‑Ulrich  Wehler  places  
central   focus   on   the   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility   in   his   writings   about   Germany’s  
Sonderweg.  According  to  him,  the  maintenance  of  noble  influence  in  Weimar  
politics   ultimately   led   to   the   destruction   of   the   republic.   Not   only   did   the  
nobility  succeed  in  building  up  a  unified  anti-­‐‑republican  army  in  anticipation  
for  a  revisionist  war  under  an  authoritarian  regime,  but  it  also  set  the  course  
for  a  formal  alliance  between  the  nobility  and  National  Socialism  as  early  as  
                                                                                                 
22  See:  Eckart  Conze,  Von  deutschem  Adel:  die  Grafen  Bernstorff  im  zwanzigsten  Jahrhundert  
(Stuttgart,  2000);  Mario  Niemann,  Mecklenburgischer  Großgrundbesitz  im  Dritten  Reich.  Soziale  
Struktur,  wirtschaftliche  Stellung  und  politische  Bedeutung  (Cologne,  2000);  Bodo  Scheurig,  
Ewald  von  Kleist-­‐‑Schmenzin.  Ein  Konservativer  gegen  Hitler  (Oldenburg,  1968);  Idem,  Henning  
von  Tresckow.  Ein  Preuße  gegen  Hitler  (Hamburg,  2004);  Ulrich  Heinemann,  Ein  Konservativer  
Rebell.  Fritz-­‐‑Dietlof  Graf  von  der  Schulenburg  und  der  20.  Juli  (Berlin,  1990);  Peter  Hoffmann,  
Claus  Schenk  Graf  von  Stauffenberg  und  seine  Brüder  (Stuttgart,  1992);  Detlef  Graf  von  
Schwerin,  'ʹDann  Sind'ʹs  Die  Besten  Ko ̈pfe,  Die  Man  Henkt'ʹ:  Die  Junge  Generation  Im  Deutschen  
Widerstand  (Munich,  1991).  
23  Malinowski,  Vom  König  zum  Führer.  
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the  winter   of   1932-­‐‑33.24  Wehler   thus   argues   that  due   to   a   failure   to  destroy  
the   paramount   political   and   social   influence   of   the   reactionary   Junkers,  
Germany   was   prevented   from   achieving   the   social   and   political   reforms  
necessary   for   the   introduction   of   liberal   and   democratic   progress.  
Conversely,   the   Junkers  not  only  destroyed   the  development  of  democracy  
during   the   Weimar   Republic,   but   also   directly   supported   Hitler’s   rise   to  
power,  and  may  therefore  be  considered  partly  culpable  for  the  catastrophes  
of  the  Second  World  War.  
Hans  Rosenberg  adopts  a  similar  view  in  his  essay  Die  Pseudodemokratisierung  
der  Rittergutsbesitzerklasse,  in  which  he  argues  that  even  in  their  self-­‐‑inflicted  
downfall,   the   old   elites   played   a   crucial,   albeit   predominantly   catastrophic  
role,   in   the   Weimar   Republic.   Nobility   were   partly   responsible   for   the  
destruction   of   the   parliamentary   democracy,   and   the   restoration   and  
sanction  of  authoritarian  and  dictatorial  forms  of  government,  while  during  
the  Third  Reich,  they  assumed  roles  of  beneficiaries,  followers,  tools,  dupes,  
persecutees   and   heroic   resistance   fighters. 25   Similarly,   Heinrich   August  
Winkler   claims   “that   no   other   elite   worked   as   early,   as   actively   and   as  
successful   on   the   destruction   of   the  Weimar  Democracy   as   the   East-­‐‑Elbian  
Junkertum.”26  
                                                                                                 
24  Hans-­‐‑Ulrich  Wehler,  Deutsche  Gesellschaftsgeschichte,  Volume  4  (Munich,  1987),  pp.  326–
332.  
25  Hans  Rosenberg,  Die  Pseudodemokratisierung  der  Rittergutsbesitzerklasse,  in:  Hans  
Rosenberg  (ed.),  Machteliten  Und  Wirtschaftskonjunkturen:  Studien  Zur  Neueren  Deutschen  
Sozial-­‐‑  Und  Wirtschaftsgeschichte,  Kritische  Studien  zur  Geschichtswissenschaft  31  (Go ̈ttingen,  
1978),  p.  84.  
26  Heinrich  August  Winkler,  Requiem  für  eine  Republik.  Zum  Problem  der  Verantwortung  
für  das  Scheitern  der  ersten  deutschen  Demokratie,  in:  Peter  Steinbach  und  Johannes  Tuchel  
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However,  while  attention  towards  the  history  of  the  nobility  up  until  the  end  
of   the   Second   World   War   has   recently   increased,   it   seems   as   though   the  
period   after   the   withdrawal   of   the   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility   from   the   political  
stage   in  1945  has  not  garnered  considerable  academic   interest.  The  body  of  
source  material   concerning   nobility   post-­‐‑Second  World  War   appears   to   be  
very   sparse.   There   is   one   outstanding   study   of   note:   in   his   book   Von  
deutschem  Adel,  Eckart  Conze  examines  the  history  of  three  landed  houses  of  
the  Counts  Bernstorff  between  1890  and  1960.    The  focus  is  placed  not  on  the  
nobility  as  a  social  stratum,  but  on  the  struggle  of  individuals  to  compensate  
for  the  erosion  of  their  privilege  and  the  loss  of  revenues.    What  is  interesting  
about  Conze’s  investigation  from  the  perspective  of  this  dissertation  is  that  it  
examines,   among   other   things,   the   mutations   in   “noble   mentality   and  
patterns  of  cultural  interpretation”  by  means  of  which  the  nobility  sustained  
a  sense  of  subjective  cohesion,  even  at  times  when  its  objective  standing  was  
under   existential   threat.27  Further,   Stephan  Malinowski   and  Markus   Funck  
touch  upon  the  importance  of  noble  autobiographies  in  post-­‐‑war  Germany  in  
their   article   Masters   of   Memory. 28   Walter   Demel   also   offers   a   short   and  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
(eds),  Widerstand  gegen  den  Nationalsozialismus  (Bonn,  1994),  S.  54–67;  Also  see:  Heinrich  
August  Winkler  (ed.),  Die  Deutsche  Staatskrise  1930–1933:  Handlungsspielra ̈ume  Und  
Alternativen  (Munich,  1992);  also  see:  Wolfgang  Zollitsch,  Adel  und  adlige  Machteliten  in  der  
Endphase  der  Weimarer  Republik:  Standespolitik  und  agrarische  Interessen,  in:  Heinrich  
August  Winkler,  Die  Deutsche  Staatskrise  1930–33:  Handlungsspielra ̈ume  und  Alternativen  
(Munich,  1992),  pp.  239–256.  
27  Conze,  Von  deutschem  Adel;  also  see:  Eckart  Conze,  Edelmann  als  Bürger?,  in:  Manfred  
Hettling  und  Bernd  Ulrich  (eds),  Bürgertum  nach  1945  (Hamburg,  2005);  Eckart  Conze,  
Aufstand  des  preußischen  Adels  –  Marion  Gräfin  Dönhoff  und  das  Bild  des  Widerstands  
gegen  den  Nationalsozialismus  in  der  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland,  in:  Vierteljahreshefte  für  
Zeitgeschichte,  51:4  (2003).  
28  Marcus  Funck  and  Stephan  Malinowski,  Masters  of  Memory:  The  Strategic  Use  of  
Autobiographical  Memory  by  the  German  Nobility,  in:  Alon  Confino  and  Peter  Fritzsche  
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superficial  account  of  the  nobility’s  post-­‐‑war  history  in  his  contribution  to  a  
jointly   authored   study.29  Michael   Seelig’s   important   recent   study   builds   on  
the  work  of  Conze  to  explore  how  noble  identity  reconstituted  itself  after  the  
existential   crisis   of   1945.      Seelig’s   book   is   particularly   relevant   to   this  
dissertation,   because   it   touches   on   the   forms   of   communication   through  
which   families   rebuilt   a   sense  of   collective  purpose  after  expropriation  and  
expulsion.    Seelig  is  more  interested  in  the  processes  of  social  and  ideological  
self-­‐‑positioning   than   in   the   techniques   of   history   management   analysed  
herein,   however   his   work   exemplifies   how   to   approach   phenomena  
pertaining   to   the   consciousness   of   a   large   and   diverse   social   group   in   the  
absence  of  a  single,  concentrated  body  of  sources.30    
Methodology  
After   the   Second  World  War,   East-­‐‑Elbian   noblemen   and   -­‐‑women   adopted  
strategies   to  manage   the   legacy   of   the   Nazi   era.   It   was   partly   a  matter   of  
processing   trauma   and   partly   of   decontaminating   the   past   –   and   by  
consequence,   the   present   –   through   a   process   of   retrospective   distancing  
from   the   regime.   There  was   nothing   particularly   unusual   about   this.  West  
German   society  underwent   a   long  and  complex  process   after   1945   that  has  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
(eds),  The  Work  Of  Memory.  New  Directions  in  the  Study  of  German  Society  and  Culture  (Chicago,  
2002).  
29  Walter  Demel  und  Sylvia  Schraut,  Der  Deutsche  Adel:  Lebensformen  und  Geschichte  (Munich,  
2014).  
30  Michael  Seelig,  Alltagsadel.  Der  ehemalige  ostelbische  Adel  in  der  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland  
1945/49-­‐‑1975  (Cologne,  2015).  
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sometimes   been   referred   to   as   “coming   to   terms   with   the   past”.31     More  
recently,  some  historians  have  criticised  the  term  “coming  to  terms  with  the  
past”   for   its  nebulosity.  As  Norbert  Frei  has  argued,   the   thematic  spectrum  
covered  by  this  diffuse  concept   includes  –   to  name  only  a   few  –  “the  social  
history   of   compensation   and   the   policy   towards   the   victims   of   National  
Socialism,   engagement  with   the   past   in   schools,   science   and   the  media,   as  
well  as  an  examination  of  judicial  policy”.32    
A   further   problem   with   the   concept   of   “coming   to   terms   with   the   past”  
relates   to   the   nebulosity   of   the   process   it   describes.      The   term   implies  
(without  explicitly  defining)  a  specific  and  definitive  outcome  of  some  kind,  
a  point  at  which  the  past  will  have  been  ‘mastered’.    Yet,  it  is  very  difficult,  if  
not   impossible,   to   assess   whether   or   when   an   individual   or   group   has  
actually  ‘come  to  terms’  with  the  past.  It   is  a  figure  of  speech  that  mystifies  
rather   than  clarifies   society’s   relationship  with  history  and  past   experience.  
And   there   are   problems   with   the   transferability   of   psychic   processes   of  
trauma   recovery   in   individuals   to   large   groups   or,   a   fortiori,   to   complex  
societies   whose   members   do   not,   as   a   general   rule,   participate   in   shared  
psychic  states.      
                                                                                                 
31  See:  Peter  Reichel,  Vergangenheitsbewältigung  in  Deutschland.  Die  Auseinandersetzung  mit  der  
NS-­‐‑Diktatur  von  1945  bis  heute  (Munich,  2001);  Richard  Matthias  Müller,  Norma-­‐‑Null  und  die  
Zukunft  der  deutschen  Vergangenheitsbewältigung  (Schernfeld,  1994);  Klaus  Sühl  (ed.),  
Vergangenheitsbewältigung  1945  und  1989.  Ein  unmoeglicher  Vergleich?  (Berlin,  1994);  Armin  
Mohler,  Vergangenheitsbewältigung  (Krefeld,  1980);  Eckhard  Jesse  und  Konrad  Löw  (eds),  
Vergangenheitsbewältigung  (Berlin,  1997);  Meinhard  Adler,  Vergangenheitsbewältigung  in  
Deutschland  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1990);  Gary  Schaal  und  Andreas  Wöll  (eds),  
Vergangenheitsbewältigung.  Modelle  der  politischen  und  sozialen  Integration  in  der  bundesdeutschen  
Nachkriegsgeschichte  (Berlin,  1997).  
32  Norbert  Frei,  Vergangenheitspolitik.  Die  Anfänge  der  Bundesrepublik  und  die  NS-­‐‑Vergangenheit  
(Munich,  1996),  p.  12.  
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In  order  to  escape  the  diffuseness  of  “coming  to  terms  with  the  past”  and  the  
moral   (and  moralising)   debates   associated  with   it,  Norbert   Frei   coined   the  
term  Vergangenheitspolitik   to  describe  a  more   compact   and  practice-­‐‑oriented  
process.  This  political  process   took  place   in   the   first  half  of   the  1950s,  with  
the  West  German  government  catering  to  widespread  popular  demands  and  
giving  mass   amnesty   to  war   criminals,  minor   offenders   and   compromised  
civil   servants   to   integrate   former   Nazis   into   a   functioning   democracy   and  
strengthen  the  inner  unity  of  the  German  population.33  
Another   interpretative   category   that   has   received   a   lot   of   attention   in   this  
context   is   the   ‘politics   of   memory’,   a   rather   approximate   translation   of  
Geschichtspolitik.      First   used   by   the   political   scientists   Klaus   Leggewie   and  
Erik  Meyer  to  analyse  the  controversy  around  a  proposed  monument  to  the  
Holocaust   in   Berlin,   Geschichtspolitik   was   about   the   policies   developed   to  
address  “the   legacy  of  past  atrocities   -­‐‑  primarily  prosecutions,   truth-­‐‑telling,  
memorialization,  and  reparations.”34     In  a  series  of  essays  and  books,  Edgar  
Wolfrum  expanded   the   scope  of   the   term,  which  he  defined   as   “a  political  
field   of   action   in   which   different   political   actors   try   to   lade   the   past   with  
special  interests  and  contend  for  its  approval  in  the  public.”35    
                                                                                                 
33  Frei,  Vergangenheitspolitik,  p.  13.  
34  Katherine  Hite,  Cath  Collins  and  Alfredo  Joignant,  The  Politics  of  Memory  in  Chile,  in:  
Cath  Collins,  Katherine  Hite  and  Alfredo  Joignant  (eds.),  The  Politics  of  Memory  in  Chile:  From  
Pinochet  to  Bachelet,  (Boulder,  2013),  p.  1.  
35  Edgar  Wolfrum,  Geschichtspolitik  in  der  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland  1949-­‐‑1989  –  Phasen  
und  Kontroversen,  in:  Edgard  Wolfrum  und  Petra  Bock  (eds.),  Umkämpfte  Vergangenheit:  
Geschichtsbilder,  Erinnerung  und  Vergangenheitspolitik  im  europäischen  Vergleich,  (Göttingen,  
1999),  p.  58.  
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The   politics   of   memory,   Wolfrum   argued,   ultimately   turned   on   a   set   of  
questions   about   which   individuals   or   agencies   possessed   the   power   or  
authority   to   shape  public   discourse   by   excluding   some  memories   from   the  
public  sphere  and  promoting  others.    From  this  it  followed  that  the  culture  of  
memory  was  highly  sensitive  to  political  change.  Wolfrum’s  influential  study  
of   the   years   1949   to   1989   was   in   effect   a   political   history   of   the   Federal  
Republic   as   reflected   through   public   discourses   of   memory.      In   the  
immediate   post-­‐‑war   era,  Wolfrum   argued,   debates   around   public  memory  
did   not   focus   on   the   atrocities   of   the   Nazi   era,   about   which   there   was   a  
relatively  muted  discussion,  but   rather  around   the  question  of  whether   the  
Federal  Republic  would  strive  for  a  reunited  Germany  within  the  borders  of  
1937  or  evolve  into  a  post-­‐‑national  province  of  a  united  western  Europe.    
The   focus   shifted   in  1953,  when  a  major  uprising  broke  out   in   the  German  
Democratic   Republic   triggering   a   range   of   competing   interpretations   from  
the  major  West  German  political  parties,  each  of  which  sought  to  situate  the  
uprising  vis-­‐‑a-­‐‑vis  a  specific   tradition  or  political  memory.  The  SPD  saw  the  
revolt  as  an  expression  of  a  continuing  popular  attachment   to   the  vanished  
German  nation-­‐‑state  and  simultaneously  as  a  twofold  revolution  against  the  
socialist  dictatorship  in  the  east  and  the  western-­‐‑oriented  policies  of  Konrad  
Adenauer,  which  were  seen  as  purchasing  a  future  in  close  association  with  
the  west,  at  the  expense  of  the  national  past.  The  FDP,  by  contrast,  read  the  
uprising  as  a  continuation  of  the  German  liberal  movement  of  the  nineteenth  
century.  The  CDU  rejected  these  mnemonic  strategies,  insisting  on  the  fresh  
start  of  1945/1949  and   the  urgency  of  pursuing  a  policy  of   integration  with  
the  West.  In  the  following  years  the  SPD  and  the  unions  tried  to  keep  alive  
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the  idea  of  a  united  Germany  in  the  borders  of  1937  by  staging  symbolic  fires  
from   Helgoland   to   the   Zugspitze   and   organising   relays   to   the   German  
borders.   The   strong   electoral   wins   of   the   CDU,   however,   encouraged  
Adenauer   to   increase   the   westernisation   of   German   politics   and   expedite  
European   integration.36  In   these   political   struggles,   memory   was   refracted  
through  the  lens  of  political  influence  and  interest.  
Only  in  the  1960s,  Wolfrum  argues,  did  the  politics  of  public  memory  begin  
to  focus  on  moral  issues  arising  from  the  criminality  of  the  Nazi  regime.  But  
here,  too,  there  was  an  intimate  connection  with  contemporary  politics.  With  
the   construction   of   the   Berlin   Wall,   hopes   of   an   imminent   reunification  
receded.  The  Fischer  controversy  called  into  question  the  carefully  nurtured  
division   between   a   good   Kaiserreich   and   an   evil   Third   Reich   and   instead  
emphasised   the   continuity   of   German   nationalism,   militarism   and  
aggression.   The   Eichmann   and   Auschwitz   trials   began   to   sensitise   the  
German  public  to  the  crimes  committed  in  Germany’s  name.  The  Ostpolitik  of  
Chancellor   Willy   Brandt   marked   the   final   break   with   the   old   German  
Empire.   His   genuflection   before   the   monument   to   the   victims   of   Nazi  
atrocities   in  the  aftermath  of  the  Warsaw  Ghetto  Uprising  symbolised  West  
Germany'ʹs  acceptance  of  its  responsibility  for  war  crimes  and  genocide.  And  
the   treaties   with   Poland,   which   settled   the   Oder-­‐‑Neisse   boundary   as   the  
permanent  German  border   in   the  east,   finalised   the   territorial  discontinuity  
with   the  old  Reich.  This   in   turn   led,  Wolfrum  suggests,   to  a   realignment  of  
public   memory   and   new   historical   positioning   (Verortung)   of   the   Federal  
                                                                                                 
36  Wolfrum,  Geschichtspolitik  in  der  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland,  pp.  62,  63.  
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Republic.   Liberal   achievements   of   the   nineteenth   century   such   as   the  
Hambacher  Fest  (1832)  or  the  German  Revolutions  of  1848  became  tradition-­‐‑
building  symbols  of  the  Federal  Republic  and  encouraged  the  emergence  of  a  
specifically   West   German   identity   founded   on   specifically   West   German  
traditions  and  memories.37    
But  the  return  of  the  CDU  to  power  in  1982  brought  a  new  turn  in  the  politics  
of   memory.   There   were   efforts   from   conservative   circles   to   normalise  
German   history   and   to   relativize   the   public   focus   on   Germany’s   special  
burden  of  guilt  for  the  atrocities  during  the  war.  The  ensuing  Historikerstreit  
was   really   about   how   the   Nazi   era   should   be   remembered.      Hence   the  
commotion  around  the  title  of  Andreas  Hillgruber’s  book  Zweierlei  Untergang  
which   triggered   the   opening   salvos   in   the   controversy:      Hillgruber’s   title  
appeared   to   imply  an  equivalence  between   the  holocaust   and   the  defeat  of  
Germany   at   the   hands   of   the   Red   Army.     Was   it   admissible   to   remember  
German  troops  on  the  eastern  front  during  the  apocalyptic  final  phase  of  the  
war  as  in  some  respects  positive  figures  who  had  given  or  risked  their  lives  
in  order  to  stop  or  slow  the  advance  of  a  Red  Army  whose  conquest  would  
bring   ruin,   death   and   rape   upon   the   German   population?      (This   was   the  
question  Hillgruber  posed.)    Or  should  the  horrors  of  the  holocaust  and  the  
immense  destruction  wrought  by   the  Hitler   regime  upon   the  population  of  
the   Soviet   Union   militate   against   adopting   the   subject   positions   of   troops  
locked   in   a   losing   war   in   the   east   as   the   yardstick   for   memory   and  
                                                                                                 
37  Ibid,  pp.  68-­‐‑70.  
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understanding?38        
With   the   fall   of   the   Wall   the   situation   changed   once   again.   Under   the  
watchful  eyes  of  the  global  public  Germany’s  political  elite  aligned  itself  with  
the   open   and   visible   acceptance   of   German   guilt   and   responsibility,   best  
expressed   in   the  Holocaust  memorial   in  central  Berlin   inaugurated   in  2005.  
This   acknowledgement   of   the   centrality   of   the   holocaust   in  German  public  
memory   has   since   been   the   dominant   articulation   of   Germany’s   new  
Geschichtspolitik.39    
Wolfrum’s  is  a  powerful  reading  of  the  place  of  memory  in  German  politics  
since  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War.    From  the  perspective  of  this  enquiry  
it   has   the   merit   that   it   focuses   not   just   on   the   practical   measures   and  
legislative   initiatives   that   were   at   the   centre   of   Norbert   Frei’s  
Vergangenheitspolitik,  but  connects  politics  with  the  management  of  memory,  
of  what  is  seen  and  valued  in  the  past  and  what  is  occluded  from  view.    The  
relevance  of  this  approach  to  my  thesis   is  obvious,  since  the  struggle  of  the  
East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility  to  re-­‐‑establish  themselves  in  the  post-­‐‑war  West  German  
state   focused  precisely  on   the   effort   to  build   serviceable  memories   for  new  
generations.    As  we  shall  see,  the  sea-­‐‑change  in  German  memory  cultures  in  
the   1960s   and   again   in   1990s,   driven   both   by   political   change   and   by  
                                                                                                 
38  See:  Ernst  Reinhard  Pieper  (ed.),  Historikerstreit.  Die  Dokumentation  der  Kontroverse  um  die  
Einzigartigkeit  der  nationalsozialistischen  Judenvernichtung,  (Munich,  1987);  Ernst  Nolte,  Das  
Vergehen  der  Vergangenheit.  Antwort  an  meine  Kritiker  im  sogenannten  Historikerstreit,  (Berlin,  
1987);  Richard  J.  Evans,  Im  Schatten  Hitlers?  Historikerstreit  und  Vergangenheitsbewältigung	  in	  
der	  Bundesrepublik,	  (Frankfurt	  a.	  M.,	  1991).	  
39  Aleida  Assmann,  Der  lange  Schatten  der  Vergangenheit  –  Erinnerungskultur  und  




generational  succession,  can  also  be  discerned  in  the  noble  efforts  to  manage  
their  own  history  and  reputation.      
On   the   other   hand,   there   are   also   limits   to   the   applicability   of   the   term  
Geschichtspolitik  to  the  phenomena  analysed  in  this  thesis.    As  the  word  itself  
suggests,   it   is   a   concept   focused   on   the   actions   of   governments,   political  
parties  and  their  agents.    The  politics  of  memory  is  about  power  and  political  
influence.      Memory,   by   this   reading,   is   a   tool   of   power   and   a   dependent  
variable  of  political  history.     Power  is  of  course  implicated  in  the  history  of  
how  the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility  rebuilt  their  reputation  and  social  position  after  
1945.     But   the  polarities   are  here   to   some  extent   reversed.     Memory,   in   the  
context   of   this   thesis,  was   not   the   expression   or   instrument   of   a   regime   of  
power   or   of   competing   political   interests,   but   rather,   as   we   shall   see,   the  
means  by  which  a  specific  social  group  sought  to  recuperate  part  of  the  social  
power  it  had  lost.      
My   main   focus   is   the   means   by   which   the   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility   deployed  
representations  of  the  recent  past  after  1945  in  order  not  only  to  compensate  
for   its   collectively   experienced   trauma   of   expulsion,   but   also   build   its  
reputation  in  the  present,  and  renew  its  claim  to  an  elevated  social  position.  I  
intend,   furthermore,   to   determine   by   which   techniques   the   nobility  
presumed   to   achieve   these   goals,   how   successful   these   techniques   proved,  
and  how  they  changed  when  the  generation  who  had  actively  engaged  in  the  
war  was  replaced  by  those  whom  were  born  after  the  expulsion.  
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This   thesis  will   therefore   follow  Frei   in   focussing   not   on   states   of  mind   or  
political   ‘instrumentalization   of   the   past’ 40   but   rather   on   the   material  
strategies   adopted   by   a   social   group   in   order   to   construct,   legitimise   and  
defend   a   specific   narrative   of   that   group’s   past.      It   draws   from   the  
Geschichtspolitik   literature   the   insight   that   memory   and   political   or   social  
power   are   intertwined   and   that   public   memories   are   as   mutable   as   the  
political   environments   in   which   they   take   root.   But   neither  
Vergangenheitspolitik   nor   Geschichtspolitik   will   serve   as   the   hermeneutic  
devices  driving  this  enquiry.    In  their  place,  I  propose  ‘history  management’,  
a  fairly  transparent  and  methodologically  modest  phrase  denoting  the  efforts  
of  an  individual  or  group  to  shape  perceptions  of  that  group’s  or  individual’s  
past.    History  management  can  take  many  forms:  it  may  mean  intervening  in  
public   discourses;   it   may   involve   cultivating   collective   memories   and  
traditions   of   a   specific   network   or   social   groups;   it   may   involve  
manufacturing   historical   narratives;   or   it   can   entail   restricting   access   to  
problematic  information.      
Thus  this  thesis  will  ultimately  deal  with  several  intertwined  strands  of  past-­‐‑
oriented   behaviour.   I   deal   first   with   the   construction   of   compensatory  
narratives   as   a  means   of   heroising   the   past   and   sustaining   trans-­‐‑historical  
identities.   I   then   turn   to   the   reputation-­‐‑building   narratives   designed   to  
exculpate   the  nobility  and  elevate   their   standing   in   the  present.  Lastly,   this  
thesis  engages  with  interventions  in  the  domain  of  historical  knowledge  and  
debate.  
                                                                                                 




This   dissertation   is   structured   chronologically.   Its   main   focus   is   directed  
towards   the  era  between   the  end  of   the  Second  World  War  and   the  partial  
return  of  noble  families  to  East  Elbia  after  German  reunification  in  1990.    
The  crucial  point  of  departure  of  the  nobility’s  post-­‐‑war  history  management  
is   its   strategic   association   with   the   military   resistance.   The   gradual  
transfiguration  of  the  20  July  Plot  into  a  noble  revolt  allowed  the  nobility  to  
deviate  attention   from   its   fateful  alliance  with  Hitler,  and   instead,  entrench  
the  nobility  on  the  right  side  of  history.  At  the  end  of  the  war,  however,  the  
nobility’s  purported  resistance  against  Hitler  was  still  tainted  by  treason  and  
therefore,   did   not   qualify   as   a   suitable   tool   with   which   to   rebuild   their  
shattered  reputation.    
The  first  chapter  of  the  dissertation  therefore  deals  with  the  efforts  launched  
by   individuals,   as   well   as   government   agencies,   to   rehabilitate   the  
commemoration   of   the   military   resistance,   detach   it   from   other   forms   of  
resistance   –   notably   that   of   the   communists   –   and   incorporate   it   into   the  
founding  myth  of   the  newly  established  Federal  Republic.  Building  on  this,  
the   second   chapter   will   assess   how   noble   writers   made   use   of   this  
revaluation  of   the  military   resistance  and   remodelled   it   into  a   revolt  of   the  
nobility.   The   third   chapter   examines   the   nobility’s   widespread   use   of   the  
autobiography   as   a   tool   for   retrospectively   shaping   and   constructing   a  
favourable  public  perception  of  their  role  as  an  indulgent  elite  in  an  archaic  
and  nostalgic  land  east  of  the  Elbe  River.  Chapter  Four  deals  with  the  great  
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importance   the   nobility   assigned   (and   still   assigns)   to   the   cultivation   of  
memory.  The   family  chronicles   reviewed  here  not  only  give  an   insight   into  
how   skeletal   and   fabricated   the   official   infra-­‐‑corporate   narratives   of   noble  
families   are,   but   also   how   these   accounts   are   used   strategically   to   de-­‐‑
legitimise   the   post-­‐‑war   settlement   and   sustain   a   continued   habitus   of  
superiority.  Chapter  Five  is  concerned  with  the  partial  return  of  the  nobility  
to  East  Elbia   after  German   reunification.   It   critically   assesses  how   returned  
nobles   make   use   of   their   long   family   history   to   succeed   socially   and  
economically   in   the   present.   The   final   chapter   is   a   case   study   of   a   specific  
noble  family’s  history  management.  It  not  only  illustrates  how  noble  families  
in   certain   circumstances   are   charged  with  managing   their  own  history,  but  
also  examines  the  dangers  that  may  arise  should  a  family  lose  control  of  the  
process  of  history  management.    
Terms  and  Problems  
For  a  number  of  reasons,  this  thesis  has  explicitly  opted  to  use  the  term  ‘East-­‐‑
Elbian’   rather   than   ‘Prussian’   nobility.   It   is   immensely   difficult,   if   not  
impossible,   to   give   a   comprehensive   definition   of   the   Prussian   nobility.  
Unlike  France  or  England,  Prussia  was  never  really  a  nation  state,  but  rather,  
an  artificial  amalgam  of  provinces  held  together  by  the  Hohenzollern  family.  
Within   this   conglomeration   of   territories  were   numerous   very   distinct   and  
powerful   regional   noble   elites,   such   as   the   East-­‐‑Prussian,   Pomeranian   and  
Silesian   nobilities,   or   after   1815,   the   nobilities   of   the   Rhineland   and  
Westphalia.  Their  one  shared  trait  was  their  supposed  loyalty  to  the  Prussian  
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king.   Yet,   they   never   formed   any   sort   of   homogenous,   national   elite   that  
could  be  defined  as  ‘Prussian  nobility’.  
More  importantly,  however,  the  time  period  covered  by  this  thesis  dictates  a  
restriction   to   a   specific   region,   as   the   breakup   of   Prussia   in   1947   had  
significantly   different   ramifications   on   the   various   regional   noble   elites.  
Whereas  western  provinces  such  as  Westphalia,  the  Rhineland  or  Schleswig-­‐‑
Holstein   remained   part   of   the   Federal   Republic   of   Germany,   Prussia’s  
eastern  territories  fell  under  communist  rule.  Therefore,  the  post-­‐‑war  history  
of  the  nobility  in  the  west  differs  so  significantly  from  its  counterpart  in  the  
east   that   it   is   inexpedient   to   include   the   entirety   of   the   formerly   Prussian  
noble  elites  in  one  sample.    
The  term  East  Elbia,  conversely,  not  only  refers  to  a  specific  region  east  of  the  
river  Elbe  but  also  to  the  socio-­‐‑political  peculiarities  of  a  larger  region  within  
Prussia.      For   centuries,   large   estates,   Protestantism   (with   a   strong   pietistic  
fringe)  and  staunch  political  conservatism  dominated  this  region  and  by  the  
turn   of   the   century   its   powerful   nobility   was   widely   perceived   as   a  
reactionary,   narrow-­‐‑minded   and  politically   retrograde   elite.41  At   the   end  of  
the   Second  World  War,   this   region   collectively   experienced   the   trauma   of  
expropriation   and   expulsion.   This   expulsion   makes   the   East-­‐‑Elbian  
noblemen  and  -­‐‑women  somewhat  unique  among  the  German  nobility,  since  
it   created   a   kind   of   noble   displacement   similar   to   that   experienced   by   the  
Russian  nobility  in  1918.  It  is  exactly  this  common  denominator  of  a  specific  
                                                                                                 
41  See  the  section  “State  of  Research”  in  the  introduction  of  this  thesis.    
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reputation   and   collective   expulsion   that   makes   a   study   of   their   history  
management  so  interesting.          
On  rare  occasions  the  author  has  opted  also  to  include  examples  of  noblemen  
who   are   not,   at   first   glance,   typical   East-­‐‑Elbians   but   who   have   all   been  
strongly   socialised   by   the   East-­‐‑Elbian   networks,   in   particular   for   example  
through   their  maternal   families   or   education   in   a   Prussian   cadet   school   or  
regiment. 42   Families   like   the   Schulenburgs   or   Bernstorffs   whose   landed  
interest  was  mainly   situated   just  west   of   the   river   Elbe  were   incorporated  
into   this   thesis   because   they   were   heavily   intermarried   with   East   Elbian  
families   and   because   their   lifestyle,   outlook   and   values   largely   coincided  
with   those  of   the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility.  On  top  of   that   those   families  equally  
shared  the  experience  of  expulsion  in  1945.    
All   expressions,   organisations   and   quotations   have   as   far   as   possible   been  
translated   into   English.   The   remaining   italicised   German   expressions   are  
either  absorbed  into  current  English  usage  (such  as  Freikorps),  or  could  not  be  
translated  (such  as  Heimat)  and  are  explained  in  the  text  or  in  the  footnotes.  
Some   of   the   most   important   German   terms   used   (such   as   Ständestaat,  
                                                                                                 
42  Exemplary  in  this  context  is  Leo  Geyr  von  Schweppenburg.  Born  in  Potsdam,  von  
Schweppenburg,  on  his  maternal  side,  belonged  to  the  old  Prussian  noble  family  of  von  
Hülsen.  Two  of  his  forefathers  had  been  Prussian  field  marshals  and  for  years  he  had  been  
socialized  in  the  royal  war  colleges  in  Potsdam  and  Berlin.  See:  Peter  Caddick-­‐‑Adams,  Monty  
and  Rommel  –  Parallel  Lives,  (London,  2012),  pp.  338-­‐‑339;  Also  see  Enno  von  Rintelen,  the  son  
of  an  ennobled  Prussian  Lieutenant-­‐‑General.  Rintelen  was  born  in  Stettin,  Pomerania  and  
spent  the  first  decade  of  his  military  career  with  the  1st  Pomeranian  grenadier  regiment  
“König  Friedrich-­‐‑Wilhelm-­‐‑IV”.  See:  www.lexikon-­‐‑der-­‐‑
wehrmacht.de/Personenregister/R/RintelenEnnov.htm;  Franz  von  Papen  had  also  been  
educated  in  a  Prussian  cadet  school  at  Berlin  Groß-­‐‑Lichterfelde.  See:  Henry  and  Robin  
Adams,  Rebel  Patriot,  (Santa  Barbara,  1987),  p.  1.    
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translated   as   corporative   state)   have   been   translated   but   also   provided   in  
German  in  brackets.    
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The  Establishment  of  20  July  1944  in  Public  Memory  
Introduction  
20  July  1944  was  the  darkest  day  in  the  history  of  the  German  army.  Men  who  wore  the  soldier’s  coat  
of  honour  became  criminals  and  cold-­‐‑blooded  assassins.  They  tried  to  launch  a  stab  in  the  back,  which  
–  had  they  prevailed  –  would  have  led  to  Germany’s  total  destruction.  
Deutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  Nr.  229,  20.  August  1944    
  
20   July  1944  was  a   turning  point   in  German  history.  Officers   risked   the   ‘revolt   of   conscience’   and  
gave   their   lives.  They  restored  Germany’s  honour  and  dignity,  which  had  been  robbed  by   the  Nazi-­‐‑
criminals.  The  courageous  act  of  20  July  was  the  essential  prerequisite  for  Germany’s  return  into  the  
community  of  civilised  nations.1    
Volker  Rühe  (Germany’s  Defence  Secretary)  
  50-­‐‑year  anniversary  of  the  failed  coup,  1994  
  
Within   the   span  of   50   years,   the  German  national   historical   consensus  had  
radically   changed.   The  military   resistance   against  Hitler,   once   vilified,   had  
been   transformed   into   one   of   the   few   beacons   of   light   to   emerge   from  
Germany’s  darkest  days.  This  change  in  the  national  story  was  instigated  by  
many  players,  from  all  sides  of  the  political  and  academic  spectrum;  whether  
                                                                                                 
1  Volker  Rühe,  Aufstand  des  Gewissens,  Rede  des  Bundesministers  der  Verteidigung  
anlässlich  der  Eröffnung  der  Ausstellung  “Aufstand  des  Gewissens”  am  19.  Juli  1994  im  




from   resistance   fighters   themselves,   politicians   such   as   Theodor   Heuss,  
journalists   such   as   Marion   Countess   Dönhoff,   or   academics   such   as   Hans  
Rothfels  and  Gerhard  Ritter.    As  the  number  of  such  voices  grew,  so  too  did  
the  involvement  of  nobility  in  this  discourse.    
This  chapter  focuses  primarily  on  the  groups  and  protagonists  who  played  a  
role   in   rehabilitating   the   resistance   as   an   object   of   public   discourse.  
Understanding   this   process   of   rehabilitation   is   absolutely   crucial,   since  
without   the  positive  spin  put  on   the  military   resistance,   the  nobility  would  
lack  the  single  most  important  factor  in  the  restoration  of  their  reputation.  
The  Regime’s  Reaction  to  the  Coup  
Immediately  after  the  failed  coup,  the  regime’s  propaganda  machine  went  to  
work  to  discredit  not  only  the  motives  of  the  military  resistance,  but  also  to  
defame  and  demonise   the   conspirators.   In   a  newsreel  on   the   evening  of   20  
July  1944,  only  hours  after  the  attempted  coup,  Hitler  set  the  tone  by  blaming  
a   very   small   clique   of   “conscienceless   and   criminal   officers  who  plotted   to  
liquidate   [him]”.2  In   the   following  days,   Joseph  Goebbels,  Reich  minister  of  
propaganda,  initiated  a  campaign  to  destroy  any  possible  sympathies  for  the  
plot   among   the  German   people.   The  German   public  was   bombarded  with  
articles   throughout   the   following   weeks.   The   party   newspaper   Völkische  
                                                                                                 
2  Max  Domarus,  Hitler.  Reden  und  Proklamationen  1932–1945.  Kommentiert  von  einem  
Zeitgenossen,  Volume  2:  Untergang  1939–1945  (Würzburg,  1963),  p.  2128.  
27  
  
Beobachter   published   its   tirades   day   in   and   day   out.3  Additionally,   other  
newspapers,  such  as  the  Münchner  Neueste  Nachrichten,  quickly  followed  suit,  
condemning   the   conspirators   of   ‘high   treason’   and   of   opening   up   “a   fifth  
front,  a  front  of  murder,  perfidy  and  shame”.4    
Even  at  this  very  early  stage,  the  regime  linked  the  plot  –  albeit  in  a  negative  
sense  –  with  the  values  of  the  social  elite  whose  representatives  had  played  
such  a  prominent  role.     A  week  after  the  attempted  coup,  Goebbels  himself  
published   an   article   in   the   Münchner   Neueste   Nachrichten   accusing   the  
conspirators   of   being   ensnared   in   the   feudal   traditions   of   the   seventeenth  
century,   and   thus   unable   to   accept   social   change.5  This   diagnosis,   which  
established   a   strong   link   between   the   conspirators   and   the   supposedly  
obsolete  and  effete   traditions  of   the  nobility,  was  reinforced  by  Robert  Ley,  
head  of  the  German  Labour  Front,  who  described  the  conspirators  as  a  small  
‘noble  clique’  whom  “should  be  exterminated  root  and  branch”.6  At  the  same  
time,   the   regime   used   the   assassination   attempt   strategically   to   settle   its  
scores  once  and  for  all  with   the  old  elites.      In  order   to   try   the  conspirators,  
both   civilian   and  military,   in   a   civil   court,  Hitler   ordered   the   heads   of   the  
Wehrmacht   to   give   the   conspirators   a   dishonourable   discharge   from   the  
                                                                                                 
3  Bombenattentat  der  Gruppe  um  Oberst  von  Stauffenberg  auf  Hitler  am  20.  Juli  1944  
scheitert,  Völkischer  Beobachter  (VB),  21.07.1944;  Adolf  Hitlers  Ansprache  an  das  deutsche  
Volk.  Die  Hintergründe  des  Mordplans.  Kleine  Generalsclique  als  Handlanger  des  Feindes,  
VB,  22.07.1944;  Rede  des  Gauleiters  von  Berlin  Dr  Joseph  Goebbels,  VB,  27.07.1944;  
Todesurteile  gegen  die  Männer  vom  20.  Juli  1944,  VB,  09.08.1944;  Das  Volk  hat  sie  gerichtet,  
VB,  09.08.1944.  
4  Münchner  Neueste  Nachrichten,  22/23  Juli  1944.  
5  Ibid.  




army.  In  a  process  presided  over  by  Field  Marshall  Gerd  von  Rundstedt  and  
assisted   by   Field   Marshall   Wilhelm   Keitel   and   Colonel-­‐‑General   Heinz  
Guderian,   twenty-­‐‑two   officers   –   out   of   which   ten   were   noblemen   –   were  
expelled   from   the   army   and   thus   deprived   of   their   right   to   be   court-­‐‑
martialled   on   4   August   1944.7  Consequently,   the   Volksgerichtshof,   set   up  
specifically   in   1934   to   handle   crimes   committed   against   the   state,   assumed  
responsibility   for   the  conspirators.8  Its  president,  Roland  Freisler,  a   ruthless  
National  Socialist,  was  expressly   instructed  by  Hitler   to  ensure   the  plotters  
would  “be  hung,  [and]  strung  up  like  cattle  in  the  slaughterhouse”.9    
Very   few   of   the   conspirators   tried   to   deny   their   involvement   in   the   plot.  
Some,   such   as   Tresckow   and   Plettenberg,   committed   suicide,   while  
Hardenberg  attempted  suicide,   in  order   to  avoid  giving  away  the  names  of  
others  under  torture.  Yet  the  large  majority,  certain  among  them  still  naively  
believing   in   a   fair   trial,   accepted   their   capture   not   only   to   protect   their  
families,  but  also  to  bear  witness  before  the  general  public.10  They  hoped  to  
use  the  Volksgerichtshof  as  a  stage  for  a  final  concerted  effort  to  expose  the  
criminality  of   the  regime.  As  a  result,   these  representatives  of   the  old  elites  
                                                                                                 
7  Gerd  R.  Ueberschär,  Der  “Ehrenhof”  nach  dem  Attentat  auf  Hitler  vom  20.  Juli  1944,  in:  
Bengt  von  zur  Mühlen  und  Andreas  von  Klewitz  (eds),  Die  Angeklagten  des  20.  Juli  vor  dem  
Volksgerichtshof  (Berlin,  2001),  p.  23;  For  a  detailed  list  of  the  officers  expelled  see:  Amtliche  
Mitteilung  über  die  Ausstoßung  von  Offizieren  aus  dem  Heer,  4.  August  1944,  in:  Herbert  
Michaelis  und  Ernst  Schraepler  (eds),  Ursachen  und  Folgen.  Vom  deutschen  Zusammenbruch  
1918  und  1945  bis  zur  staatlichen  Neuordnung  Deutschlands  in  der  Gegenwart.  Eine  Urkunden-­‐‑  
und  Dokumentensammlung  zur  Zeitgeschichte,  Volume  21  (Berlin,  1985),  pp.  471,  472.  
8  Joachim  Fest,  Staatsstreich  –  Der  lange  Weg  zum  20.  Juli  (Berlin,  1997),  pp.  298–299.  
9  Dieter  Ehlers,  Technik  und  Moral  einer  Verschwörung.  20.  Juli  1944  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1969),  p.  
113.  
10  Aufgehängt  wie  Schlachtvieh,  Joachim  Fest  über  den  Rachefeldzug  des  Nazi-­‐‑Regimes  
gegen  die  Männer,  die  Hitler  beseitigen  wollten,  SPIEGEL,  11.07.1994.  
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inevitably   –   yet   unconsciously   –   contributed   to   the   ‘nobiliarisation’   of   the  
resistance   by   accepting   their   fate   and   acting   as   witnesses   to   the   plot.   The  
regime   passed   judgement   on   many   of   the   grand   old   names   of   Prussia,  
including  Moltke,  Witzleben,  Dohna,  Lehndorff  and  Yorck  von  Wartenburg,  
thereby   inexorably  connecting   the  remembrance  of   the  plot  with   the   feudal  
elites  of  East  Elbia.    
The   willingness   of   the   nobility   among   the   conspirators   to   openly   declare  
their   allegiance   to   the   plot   against   Hitler   reflected   the   habitus   of   a  
marginalised   social  group  who  considered  demonstrative  behaviour  of   this  
kind   as   a  means   of   reasserting   its   etiolated   corporate   identity.   Though   the  
plot  was  driven  by  the  desire  to  put  an  end  to  the  annihilation  of  the  Jewish  
people,  stop  the  war  crimes  in  the  East,  and  prevent  the  complete  downfall  of  
the   Reich11,   for   many  members   of   the   traditional   elite   –   and   this   becomes  
especially  apparent  in  their  behaviour  during  the  collapse  of  the  plot  –  it  was  
also   a   final   attempt   to   preserve   the   remnants   of   a   corporative   state  
(Ständestaat)   and   thereby  maintain,   if  not   regain,   their  pre-­‐‑eminence.  Along  
these   lines,   Martin   Broszat   has   argued   that   “similar   to   the   fanatic,   self-­‐‑
sacrificing   resistance-­‐‑activism   of   the   communists   at   the   beginning   of   the  
Third   Reich,   the   [nobility’s   involvement   in   the]   conservative   conspiracy  
towards   the   end   of   the   Third   Reich   stemmed   from   their   socio-­‐‑political  
outsider   position,   accompanied   by   various   self-­‐‑deceptions   about   their   own  
role,   as  well   as  misjudgements   of   realistic   chances,   inspired   by   illusionary  
                                                                                                 
11  See:  Gerd  R.  Ueberschär,  Auf  dem  Weg  zum  20.  Juli  1944,  Motive  und  Entwicklung  der  
Militäropposition  gegen  Hitler,  in:  Aus  Politik  und  Zeitgeschichte  (B27/2004),  pp.  20,  21.  
30  
  
utopian  dreams  or  by  an  excess  of  passionate  hatred,  and  also  nurtured  by  
disappointments  and  the  wounded  dignity  of  a  social  class”.12  
By  the  autumn  of  1944,  the  regime  had  begun  to  grasp  the  real  magnitude  of  
the  conspiracy.    Contrary  to  early  expectations,  the  conspiracy  proved  to  be  a  
widespread   and   complexly   layered   phenomenon   that   incorporated  
representatives   of   almost   all   parts   of   society.   The   realisation   that   the   coup  
had  not  only  been  the  work  of  a  small,  conservative  and  military  clique,  but  
rather,  that  it  had  also  been  supported  by  representatives  of  the  unions,  the  
labour   force   and   the   churches,   among   others,   caused   widespread   concern  
among   the   Nazi   elite.   In   the   wake   of   the   attempted   coup,   Hitler   had  
envisaged   a   public   show   trial,   believing   that   widespread   media   coverage  
would  ensure  that  his  message  of  revenge  was  sent  to  the  far  corners  of  the  
Reich.13  Under   the   influence   of   Himmler,   however,   who   seemed   to   more  
accurately   grasp   the   possibly   dangerous   impact   of   show   trials   on   popular  
opinion14,  Hitler  decided  to  exclude  the  public.  “You  are  right,  Himmler,  if  I  
stage  a  public  show  trial,  I  am  forced  to  let  them  speak  publicly.  Maybe  one  
of  them  will  speak  well  and  present  himself  as  a  ‘peace  bringer’.  That  could  
become  dangerous.”15  Soon  after  the  first  trials  had  begun,  these  fears  proved  
                                                                                                 
12  Martin  Broszat,  Zur  Sozialgeschichte  des  deutschen  Widerstands,  in:  Vierteljahreshefte  für  
Zeitgeschichte,  34:3  (1986),  p.  308.  
13  Eberhard  Zeller,  Der  Geist  der  Freiheit,  Der  zwanzigste  Juli  (Munich,  1957),  p.  304.  
14  More  cautious  circles  within  the  regime  feared  that  a  public  humiliation  of  various  former  
high  representatives  of  the  Reich,  such  as  Witzleben,  Goerdeler,  etc.,  might  actually  lead  to  a  
swing  in  opinion  and  raise  questions  as  to  why  such  prolific  individuals  had  all  of  a  sudden  
turned  into  enemies  of  the  state.  A  public  debate  along  these  lines,  it  was  feared,  might  be  
very  difficult  to  control.  
15  Helmut  Ortner,  Der  Hinrichter:  Roland  Freisler,  Mörder  im  Dienste  Hitlers  (Vienna,  1993),  p.  
235;  Gert  Buchheut,  Richter  in  roter  Robe  –  Freisler  –  Präsident  des  Volksgerichtshofes  (Munich,  
1968),  p.  126.  
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to   have   been   well-­‐‑founded.   Kaltenbrunner’s 16   daily   reports   regarding  
popular   opinion   suggested   that   the   “cheap   manner”   in   which   Freisler  
berated   and   ridiculed   the   defendants  was   perceived   as   failing   to  meet   the  
standards   of   Germany’s   highest   court   of   justice.   Many   citizens,   especially  
“members   of   the   intelligentsia”,   were   appalled   by   his   conduct,   which  
reminded  them  of  “earlier  Soviet  show  trials”.17    
It   gradually   dawned   on   the   leadership   that   their   ruthless   reaction   to   the  
coup,  and  their  concerted  propaganda  campaign  against  the  old  elites,  might  
backfire.   An   opinion   poll   conducted   by   the   SS   Security   Service   suggested  
that,   “the   speech18  of   Dr   Ley   was   widely   met   with   sharp   rejection.   The  
[regime’s]   categorical   assault   on   the   nobility   in   general   is   perceived   to   be  
dangerous   for   the   unity   of   the   German   people”. 19   Following   these  
developments,   the  Reich  ministry   of  Propaganda   even   felt   obliged   to   issue  
guidelines   about   how   party   officials   were   to   deal   with   the   old   elites’  
involvement   in   the   coup.   It   advised   cadres   to   speak   of   “a   camarilla   of  
treacherous  elements”,  driven  by  a  conceited  ‘caste  spirit’  that  had  long  been  
making  a  concerted  effort  to  block  promotions  of  National  Socialist  soldiers  
into  the  officer  corps  of  the  Wehrmacht.  However  “under  no  circumstances”,  
                                                                                                 
16  Ernst  Kaltenbrunner  was  the  head  of  the  Reich  Security  Main  Office  and  in  charge  of  the  
persecution  of  the  conspirators.  His  daily  communiqués  about  the  trials  and  its  implications  
for  Bormann  and  Hitler  became  known  as  the  “Kaltenbrunner  Reports”.  
17  Ortner,  Der  Hinrichter,  p.  246.  
18  See  footnote  6  of  this  chapter.  
19  Stimmungs-­‐‑  und  Meinungsbild,  Sicherheitsdienst  des  RF-­‐‑SS  an  den  Gauleiter  




the  guidelines  warned,   “should   speakers   succumb   to   the   temptation   to   rail  
against  the  nobility  in  general”.20    
Deeply  afraid  of  losing  control  over  public  debate  and  of  a  possible  swing  in  
public   opinion,   the   executions  were   not   publically   exploited   anymore.   The  
regime  altered  its  approach  entirely  and  was  working  to  obliterate  the  coup  
and   its  protagonists   from  public   life  and  memory.  Their   relatives  had  been  
sent   to   jail,   and   their   children   force-­‐‑transferred   to   orphanages   to   deprive  
them   of   their   identity   and   remove   them   from   society.21  Himmler   had   even  
suggested,   inspired   by   old   Germanic   custom,   exterminating   the   entire  
Stauffenberg  family.22    
Allied  Popular  Reaction  to  the  Coup  
In  the  first  instance,  the  Allies  largely  reinforced  the  regime'ʹs  reading  of  what  
had  transpired.    The  reaction  of  the  Allies  to  20  July  1944  was  unambiguous.  
Two   days   after   the   failed   coup,   the   conspirators   were   denounced   as   “an  
underground   of   Junkers”23  that   had   “attempt[ed]   to   replace   the   swastika  
with   the   jack-­‐‑boot”.24  The   New   York   Times   spoke   of   the   conspirators   as  
“merely   another   brand   of   champions   of   militarism   who   merely   believe  
                                                                                                 
20  Informationsbericht  Nr.  3,  Ereignisse  des  20.  Juli  1944,  Reichspropagandaamt  
Osthannover,  in:  Jacobsen  (ed.),  Spiegelbild  einer  Verschwörung,  p.  625.  
21  Die  Frauen  des  20.  Juli  1944  –  Die  Schicksale  der  Attentäter  Familien,  ZDF,  19.07.2013;  Attentat  
vom  20.  Juli  1944:  Blutrache  an  den  Kindern  der  Verschwörer,  SPIEGEL,  13.07.2004.  
22  Malinowski,  Es  war  kein  Aufstand  des  Adels,  Cicero,  01.07.2004;  Zeller,  Der  Geist  der  
Freiheit,  p.  299.  
23  The  Revolt,  Manchester  Guardian,  22.07.1944.  
24  Patricia  Meehan,  The  Unnecessary  War  –  Whitehall  and  the  German  Resistance  to  Hitler  
(London,  1992),  p.  336.  
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themselves   better   able   to   rescue   the   Reich   from   disaster   than   the   present  
Nazi   leaders”.25  The   Herald   Tribune   claimed   that   Americans   did   not   regret  
that  Hitler  survived  and  finished  off  his  generals.  America  did  not  care  about  
aristocrats,  especially  not  about  those  who  stabbed  their  leaders  in  the  back.26  
“Let  the  general  kill  the  corporal  or  vice-­‐‑versa,  preferably  both.”27  
The  politicians   followed   suit.  On   2  August   1944,  Winston  Churchill   placed  
the   conspirators   on   the   same   level   as   the   Nazi   rulers:   “the   highest  
personalities   in   the  German  Reich  are  murdering  one  another,  or   trying   to,  
while   the   avenging   armies   of   the   Allies   close   upon   the   doomed   and   ever  
narrowing   circle  of   their  power”.28  These   comments,   in   effect,   conflated   the  
conspirators   with   the   Nazi   regime,   denying   them   the   right   to   present   the  
world  with  an  alternative  to  Hitler;  an  alternative  the  Allies  might  not  be  able  
to  control.   In  an  internal  communiqué,  British  Baron  Oliver  Harvey,  Acting  
Assistant  Secretary  of  State,  formulated  it  more  bluntly:  “I  am  convinced  that  
it  was  to  our  interest  that  the  coup  failed.  If  Hitler  had  died,  we  would  have  
had  a  surge  to  make  peace  with  the  generals.  The  rot  must  proceed  further  
yet.  Our  enemies  are  both  the  Nazis  and  the  generals.  We  should  make  peace  
with   neither”. 29   Allied   geopolitical   strategy   was   focused   on   destroying  
Germany   as   a   power   base   rather   than   on   negotiating   a   settlement  with   its  
current  government  or  any  alternative  formation.    
                                                                                                 
25  British  Label  Hitler  Attack  Rivals’  Bid  for  False  Peace,  New  York  Times,  22.07.1944.  
26  Hans  Rothfels,  The  German  Opposition  to  Hitler,  An  Appraisal  (Hinsdale,  1948),  p.  160.  
27  International  Swine,  New  York  Herald  Tribune,  09.08.1944.  
28  Charles  Eade  (ed.),  The  War  Speeches  of  the  Rt.  Hon.  Winston  S.  Churchill,  Volume  3  (London,  
1964),  p.  203.  
29  Baron  Oliver  Harvey,  in:  John  Harvey  (ed.),  The  War  Diaries  of  Oliver  Harvey  1941–1945  
(London,  1978),  p.  368.  
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By   the   summer  of   1944,   the   aim  of  unconditional   surrender  had   long  been  
agreed   upon. 30   Negotiations   with   a   German   opposition   group,   which  
ultimately  sought  a  separate  peace  with  the  Western  Allies,  might  have  put  
fatal   strains   on   relations   with   the   Soviet   Union.   As   early   as   1942,   British  
diplomat,  Sir  Geoffrey  Harrison,   reported   that   the  British  War  Cabinet  had  
already   ordained   that   all   rumours   of   a   possible   peace  were   to   be   ignored,  
partly   so   as   not   to   arouse   suspicions   of   ‘our  Russian   allies’.31  Only  months  
later,   the   Permanent   Under-­‐‑Secretary   for   Foreign   Affairs,   Sir   Alexander  
Cadogan   “reminded   his   colleagues   of   the   doctrine   that   any   resistance  
movement  would  have  to  seize  power  and  carry  out  a  convincing  anti-­‐‑Nazi  
purge  before  Britain  would  even  negotiate  with  it”.32  Thus  the  reaction  of  the  
Allies  does  not  really  come  as  a  surprise.  Such  reluctance  to  support  any  kind  
of   German   resistance   not   only   reduced   the   conspirators’   chances,   but   also  
deterred  them  from  acting  swiftly,  since  it  encouraged  them  to  wait  as  long  
as  possible  to  see  whether  the  Wehrmacht  might  after  all  find  a  way  to  force  
any  of  the  Allies  into  a  military  settlement.    
The   Allies’   efforts   to   downplay   the   impact   of   the   German   resistance  
movement   in   the   immediate   aftermath   of   the   coup   ensured   that   there  was  
little  public  acknowledgement  of  the  movement  in  their  respective  countries  
after  the  war.  In  occupied  Germany,  as  well,   the  Allies  cast  a  veil  of  silence  
                                                                                                 
30  Donald  E.  Schmidt,  The  Folly  of  War,  American  Foreign  Policy,  1898–2005  (New  York,  2005),  
pp.  189,  190;  Also  see:  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt’s,  Address  to  the  White  Hourse  
Correspondents’  Association’  on  12.02.1943,  in  which  he  laid  out  his  plans  for  unconditional  
surrender,  in:  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt,  Public  Papers  of  the  Presidents  of  the  United  States,  Volume  
12  (1943),  pp.  71–81.  
31  Victor  Rothwell,  Britain  and  the  Cold  War  1941–1947  (London,  1982),  pp.  29,  30.  
32  Ibid,  p.  30.  
35  
  
over  the  existence  of  the  military  resistance.  In  their  eyes,  the  men  of  20  July  
1944  had  been  too  heavily  entangled  with  the  Third  Reich  to  all  of  a  sudden  
serve   as   role   models   for   the   re-­‐‑founding   of   German   democracy. 33   As  
displayed   in   the   commentary  of   the  Manchester  Guardian   and   the  New  York  
Times,  the  Western  Allies  regarded  the  military  resistance  as  opposition  from  
the   old   elites,   “an  underground  of   Junkers”.   This   characterisation  drew  on  
stereotypes  associated  with  the  stigmatisation  of  ‘Prussianism’  from  the  First  
World   War.   At   that   time,   Germany’s   detour   into   authoritarianism,  
dictatorship  and  war  was  attributed  to  the  country’s  lopsided  economic  and  
social   modernisation   and   their   failure   to   dislodge   a   powerful   traditional  
social   elite   who   held   a   vested   interest   in   military   adventurism. 34  
Incorporating   these  alleged   traditional   enemies  of  Germany’s  path   towards  
peace   and   democracy   into   a   reformed   and   refined   constitutional   state  was  
not  on  the  western  Allied  agenda.    
Furthermore,   the  Allies  were  concerned   that  any  reference   to   the  resistance  
might   vindicate   German   claims   that   there   existed   a   ‘better’   Germany  
opposed  to  the  regime,  and  thus  appear  to  diminish  Germany’s  culpability.35  
This   fear   proved   to   be  unfounded.   In   the   immediate   aftermath   of   the  war,  
                                                                                                 
33  Lothar  Kettenacker,  Die  Haltung  der  Westalliierten  gegenüber  Hitlerattentat  und  
Widerstand  nach  dem  20.  Juli  1944,  in:  Gerd  R.  Ueberschär  (ed.),  Der  20.  Juli,  Das  andere  
Deutschland  in  der  Vergangenheitspolitik  nach  1945  (Berlin,  1998),  p.  29.  
34  See:  A.  Whitney  Griswold,  The  Junkers:  Hostages  to  the  Past,  Virginia  Quarterly  Review,  
University  of  Virginia,  19:3  (1943),  online  at:  www.vqronline.org/essay/junkers-­‐‑hostages-­‐‑
past;  Alexander  Gerschenkron,  Bread  and  Democracy  in  Germany  (New  York,  1966);  Sydney  L.  
W.  Mellen,  The  German  People  and  the  Postwar  World,  in:  The  American  Political  Science  
Review,  37:4  (1943),  pp.  601–625.  
35  Peter  Steinbach,  Widerstand  im  Dritten  Reich  –  Die  Keimzelle  der  Nachkriegsdemokratie?,  
in:  Ueberschär  (ed.),  Der  20.  Juli,  Das  andere  Deutschland,  p.  104.  
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German  popular  opinion  remained  sceptical  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  the  military  resistance  
and   there  were   no   signs   that   the   public   intended   to   exploit   the   attempted  
coup   in   order   to   exculpate   itself.   Far   from   relativising  German   culpability,  
the   20   July   conspiracy   confronted   the   majority   of   Germans   with   an  
inconvenient   truth.  As  Peter  Steinbach  has  pointed  out,   the  action   taken  by  
the  conspirators  revealed  that  obedience  as  a  consequence  of  fear  and  terror  
could   no   longer   suffice   to   explain   compliance   with   the   regime’s   criminal  
objectives.36  The   argument   that   resistance   was   impossible   was   powerfully  
invalidated.37  This,  in  turn,  had  the  perverse  consequence  of  rendering  many  
Germans  embarrassed  by  the  bravery  of  the  resistors.38    
First  Literary  Accounts  
By   the   summer   of   1945,   the   memory   of   the   military   resistance   had   been  
strategically   suppressed.   Although   the   regime   had   originally   focused   its  
outrage   on   the   old   elites,   and   specifically   the   nobility,   the   propaganda  
campaign   against   the   July   Plot   was   soon   wound   down   in   order   to   avoid  
stimulating   critical   speculation   about   the   reasons   and   motives   of   the  
conspirators.   The   Allies   proceeded   in   a   similar   fashion.   After   initially  
condemning   the   plot   for   geopolitical   concerns,   the   western   governments  
downplayed   the   resistance   so   as   not   to   offer   the   Germans   a   favourable  
                                                                                                 
36  Ibid.  
37  Jörg  Hillmann,  Der  20  Juli  und  die  Marine,  Ein  Beitrag  zu  Ereignis  und  Rezeption  (Bochum,  
2004),  p.  9.  
38  Peter  Steinbach,  Der  Widerstand  gegen  den  Nationalsozialismus  und  der  20.  Juli  1944,  in:  




platform  from  which  to  stage  a  belittlement  of  their  collective  guilt.  The  US-­‐‑
government   even   issued   a   directive   from   the   president,   antedating   the  
cessation  of  hostilities  in  the  European  Theatre  of  War,  stating  “there  is  to  be  
no  mention   in  print  of   the  German  Resistance”.  Even  after   the   cessation  of  
hostilities,  the  American  occupation  authorities  continued  to  enforce  the  ban  
on  such  publications.39        
Nevertheless,  by  such  time,  the  perception  that  the  nobility  had  largely  been  
responsible   for   20   July   had   already   anchored   itself   in   public  memory.   The  
anti-­‐‑noble  tirades  of  the  regime  that  followed  the  uncovering  of  the  plot  and  
the  concentration  of  old  noble  names  among  the  conspirators  had  inculcated  
the   belief.   This   perception   was   further   reinforced   by   the   prominent   role  
members  of   the  famous  Infantry  Regiment  9   (IR  9)  had  played  in   the  coup.  
The   IR   9   was   the   successor   regiment   of   the   Prussian   1st   Foot   Guard  
Regiment,   which   had   once   considered   itself   the   “noblest   regiment   of  
Christendom”.40  Ever   since   its   formation   in   1806,   the   officer   corps   of   the  
regiment  had  comprised  predominantly  of  members  of  the  old  nobility.  This  
tradition   was   largely   maintained   in   the   Reichswehr   and   the   Wehrmacht.  
Although   the   proportion   of   nobility   in   the   ranks   was   declining,   it   still  
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1945  (Oxford,  1992),  p.  386;  See  also:  Louis  Lochner,  Always  the  Unexpected:  A  Book  of  
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amounted  to  47  per  cent  in  1933,41  and  the  regiment  was  popularly  known  as  
“Count  Nine’s  Regiment”  (Regiment  Graf  9).42  In  all,  twenty  officers  of  IR  9  –  
of   whom   seventeen   were   noblemen   –   were   involved   in   the   July   1944  
conspiracy.43  The   Hitler   regime   responded   by   dissolving   the   regiment   and  
incorporating   it   into   the   Infantry   Regiment   67.   It   was   assumed   that   the  
regiment  would  “vanish  into  thin  air”.44  
The  view  that  the  attempt  on  Hitler’s  life  was  the  work  of  traitorous  elements  
of   a   decadent   and   outmoded   elite   was   initially   widely   propagated.    
However,  this  consensus  would  soon  to  be  challenged.  Shortly  after  the  war,  
competing  concepts  emerged,  all  attempting  to  use  the  commemoration  of  20  
July  to  construct  a  narrative  that  would  allow  Germany  to  re-­‐‑establish  itself  
as   a   viable   and   integral   partner   of   the   western   community   of   states.   The  
intention  was  to  portray  the  conspiracy  as  a  movement  deeply  rooted  in  all  
parts  of  German  society,  and  thereby,  build  a  bridge  between  the  values  of  
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1944,  in:  Sigrid  Grabner  und  Knut  Kiesant  (eds),  1000  Jahre  Potsdam.  Das  Buch  zum  
Stadtjubiläum  mit  dem  Festprogramm  (Berlin,  1993),  pp.  190–192.  
43  See:  Paul,  Das  Potsdamer  Infanterie  Regiment  9,  pp.  544–551;  Kurt  Finker,  Das  Potsdamer  
Infanterieregiment  9  und  der  konservative  militärische  Widerstand,  in:  Bernhard  R.  Kroener  
(ed.),  Potsdam.  Staat,  Armee,  Residenz  in  der  preußisch-­‐‑deutschen  Militärgeschichte  (Berlin,  1993),  
p.  454.  
44  Ekkehard  Klausa,  Preussische  Soldatentradition  und  Widerstand  –  Das  Potsdamer  
Infanterieregiment  9  zwischen  dem  Tag  von  Potsdam  und  dem  20.  Juli  1944,  in:  Jürgen  
Schmädeke  und  Peter  Steinbach  (eds),  Der  Widerstand  gegen  den  Nationalsozialismus.  Die  




Stauffenberg’s   ‘other   Germany’   and   a   new,   western-­‐‑oriented   German  
democracy.    
The   key   figure   in   this   process   was   Allen  W.   Dulles,   the   head   of   the   OSS  
(Office   of   Strategic   Services)   in   Switzerland,   who   was   later   to   become  
director   of   the   CIA.   During   the   war,   Switzerland   had   been   the   pivot   of  
clandestine  operations.  With  the  help  of  his  German-­‐‑born  assistant,  Gero  von  
Schulze-­‐‑Gaevernitz,   Dulles   had   been   in   regular   contact   with   numerous  
members   of   the  military   resistance   who   had   repeatedly   tried   to   secure   an  
undertaking   from   the  Western  Allies   that   they  would   support   a   successful  
plot.   Constrained   by   the   Allies’   rigid   policy   of   attaining   unconditional  
surrender,   Dulles   was   unable   to   offer   substantial   assistance   to   the  
conspirators.  However,  in  the  months  following  the  failed  coup,  he  came  to  
understand   that   the   conspiracy   had   actually   been  much  more  widespread  
and   substantial   than   he   had   initially   envisaged.   At   the   same   time,   the  
establishment   of   the   Moscow   funded   Lublin   Committee   and   the   growing  
influence  of  the  National  Committee  for  a  Free  Germany  stirred  suspicion  as  to  
Stalin’s   plans   for   post-­‐‑war   Europe. 45   The   complete   annihilation   by   the  
Gestapo  of   the  military  resistance,  whom  had   favoured  an  association  with  
the   Western   Allies,   led   to   growing   concerns   within   the   OSS   about   future  
American   influence   on   Germany   in   the   event   of   a   growing   post-­‐‑war  
estrangement  between  the  West  and  the  Soviet  Union.  Hans  Bernd  Gisevius,  
a   former  member  of   the  Gestapo  and  surviving  conspirator,  reaffirmed  this  
view  in  his  report  to  the  OSS,  which  was  smuggled  out  of  Berlin  in  January  
                                                                                                 
45  See:  Heike  Bungert,  Das  Nationalkomitee  und  der  Westen:  Die  Reaktion  der  Westalliierten  auf  
das  NKFD  und  die  Freien  Deutschen  Bewegungen  1943–1948  (Stuttgart,  1997),  pp.  158,  159.  
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1945,   stating   that   if   the   US   “go   into   Germany   without   any   plans   […]  
something   like   the   Seydlitz   committee   will   eventually   be   imposed   on  
them”.46  From  there  on,  Dulles  and  Gaevernitz  were  convinced  that  the  battle  
for   the   hearts   and   minds   of   the   Germans   had   begun.      They   no   longer  
believed  in  a  permanent  alliance  of  the  Allies,  and  wanted  to  ensure,  in  case  
the  Soviet  Union  were  to  become  the  main  enemy,  that  Germany  would  be  
ideologically  aligned  with  the  West  rather  than  the  East.47    
In  order  to  align  what  remained  of  the  resisting  networks  with  the  west,  and  
to   prevent   their   drifting   into   the   orbit   of   the   Soviet   Union,   the  Americans  
took   steps   towards   a   rehabilitation   of   the   circles   close   to   Stauffenberg.   By  
allowing  the  narrative  to  surface  that  “it  had  been  Germans  within  the  Reich  
who  attempted  to  free  the  world  from  Hitler”  Dulles  and  Gaevernitz  hoped  
to  establish  a  positive  and  lasting  memory  of  the  military  resistance  and  offer  
the  Germans  an  example  to  identify  with;  an  example  which  might  provide  
“hope  for  Germany”.48  Only  against  this  background  can  one  make  sense  of  
Dulles’  and  Gaevernitz’  attempts,  in  the  summer  of  1945,  to  gather  as  many  
reports   and   statements   from   survivors   as   possible,   and   to   assist  with   their  
publication.49  Gaevernitz,  himself  a  Silesian  nobleman,  therefore  travelled  to  
                                                                                                 
46  Telegram  from  Allen  W.  Dulles  (OSS  Bern)  to  OSS  Washington:  How  should  the  United  
States  React  to  the  Russian  Free  German  Committee,  05.02.1945,  in:  Jürgen  Heideking  and  
Christof  Mauch  (eds),  American  Intelligence  and  the  German  Resistance  to  Hitler,  A  Documentary  
History  (Oxford,  1996),  p.  376.  
47  Jürgen  Heideking,  Politisches  Kalkül  und  Menschlichkeit:  Allen  W.  Dulles,  Gero  von  
Schulze-­‐‑Gaevernitz  und  der  deutsche  Widerstand  nach  dem  20.  Juli  1944,  in:  Michael  Wala  
und  Reinhard  Doerries  (eds),  Gesellschaft  und  Diplomatie  im  transatlantischen  Kontext  
(Stuttgart,  1999),  p.  238.  
48  Allen  W.  Dulles,  Verschwörung  in  Deutschland  (Zürich,  1948),  p.  235.  
49  Heideking,  Politisches  Kalkül  und  Menschlichkeit,  in:  Wala  und  Doerries  (eds),  Gesellschaft  
und  Diplomatie,  p.  238.  
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Kreisau,  the  family  estate  of  the  von  Moltkes  in  Silesia,  to  take  charge  of  the  
hidden   correspondence   of   Freya   von   Moltke   and   her   husband   Helmuth  
James,   a   leading  member   of   the  Kreisau  Circle.50  This   correspondence   later  
formed  the  basis  of  Freya’s  book  –  Letters  to  Freya  1939-­‐‑1945  –  regarding  her  
husband’s  involvement  in  the  resistance.51  Gaevernitz  also  met  with  widows  
of  other   leading  noble  members  of   the  Kreisau  Circle   to  gather   information  
about  their  husbands’  role  in  the  July  conspiracy.  Among  them  were  Marion  
Yorck   von   Wartenburg,   and   Clarita   von   Trott   zu   Solz,   the   widow   of  
Gaevernitz’s   long-­‐‑time   friend,   Adam   von   Trott   zu   Solz,   who   had  
continuously  fed  information  about  the  activities  of  the  Kreisau  Circle  to  the  
OSS  throughout  the  war.52    
Gaevernitz  also  encouraged  Hans  Bernd  Gisevius  to  set  out  his  views  of  the  
plot  in  a  major  literary  account,  published  in  two  volumes  in  1946,  under  the  
title  To  the  Bitter  End.53  Gisevius,  who  had  continuously  informed  the  OSS  of  
the  intentions  of  the  military  resistance  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  war,  
had  already  left  Germany  for  Switzerland  with  the  assistance  of   the  OSS  in  
                                                                                                 
50  The  Kreisau  circle  was  a  group  of  dissidents  circled  around  Helmuth  James  Graf  von  
Moltke  and  was  named  after  the  Moltke  family  estate,  Kreisau,  in  Silesia  where  the  group  
held  its  meetings.  See:  Freya  Gräfin  von  Moltke,  Erinnerungen  an  Kreisau,  1930–1945  (Munich,  
1997);  Ger  van  Roon,  German  resistance  to  Hitler:  Count  von  Moltke  and  the  Kreisau  Circle  
(London,  1971).  
51  Encouraged  by  the  work  of  her  friend,  Annedore  Leber,  who  published  a  book  about  her  
husband’s  involvement  in  the  resistance  in  1956  under  the  title  Das  Gewissen  steht  auf,  Freya  
von  Moltke  also  began  to  give  lectures  in  West  German  schools  to  preserve  the  memory  of  
the  men  of  20  July  1944.  See:  Frauke  Geyken,  Freya  von  Moltke.  Ein  Jahrhundertleben  1911–2010  
(Munich,  2011),  p.  169.  
52  Geyken,  Freya  von  Moltke,  p.  169;  Freya  von  Moltke,  Memories  of  Kreisau  and  the  German  
Resistance  (Lincoln,  2003),  pp.  65,  66;  Clarita  von  Trott  zu  Solz,  Adam  von  Trott  zu  Solz  –  Eine  
Lebensbeschreibung  (Berlin,  1994),  p.  184.  
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January   1945.   Due   to   an   Allied   print   prohibition   in   Germany,   Gaevernitz  
organised  its  publication  in  Zürich.54  
Gaevernitz   also   approached   Fabian   von   Schlabrendorff,   one   of   the   key  
figures  of  the  military  branch  of  the  conspiracy.  Born  into  an  old  noble  family  
in  1907,  Schlabrendorff  studied  law  and  went  on  to  become  the  assistant  of  
Herbert   von   Bismarck,   permanent   secretary   in   the   Prussian   Home   Office.  
Both  men  had  been  resolute  opponents  of  the  Nazi  regime  from  an  early  age.  
In   1941,   Schlabrendorff   became   the   adjutant   of   Colonel   Henning   von  
Tresckow,  who  was  his   cousin  and  mastermind  of   the  military   resistance.55  
Over   the   following   years,   he   was   involved   in   numerous   attempts   to   kill  
Hitler.  Following  the  failed  coup  in  July  1944,  Schlabrendorff  was  arrested  by  
the   Gestapo   and   imprisoned   in   Berlin.   Yet   despite   severe   and   protracted  
torture,   he   did   not   reveal   the   names   of   fellow   co-­‐‑conspirators.   Although  
formally   acquitted   in   March   1945,   Schlabrendorff   remained   in   various  
concentration   camps   until   the   end   of   the   war.   As   part   of   a   convoy   of  
prominent  political  prisoners,  he  was   finally   liberated   in  northern   Italy   just  
before   the   end   of   the   war.56  It   was   there   that   Gaevernitz   approached   and  
induced  him  to  write  down  his  experiences  as  an  actor  in  the  July  conspiracy.  
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Offiziere  gegen  Hitler  was  also  published   in  Zürich   in  1946.  Building  on   this  
body  of  information,  Gaevernitz  and  Dulles  eventually  published  their  own  
account  of  the  events  of  20  July  in  1948  in  which  they  meticulously  laid  out  
the   plans   of   the   July   conspirators   and   attempted   to   solidify   the   view   that  
despite  the  ascendancy  of  Nazism  and  the  criminality  of  the  regime,  morally  
righteous  forces  in  Germany  had  never  entirely  vanished.57    
In   short,   the   literary   rehabilitation   of   the   military   resistance,   and   its  
elaboration   into  a   foundation  myth,  began  as  part  of  a  plan  by   the  head  of  
the  OSS  to  facilitate  the  ideological  integration  of  Germany  into  the  western  
world.  The  early  commemoration  of  the  conspiracy  was  influenced  more  by  
strategic   than   moral   and   humanitarian   motives.   Thanks   to   the   contacts  
provided  by  Gero  von  Schulze  Gaevernitz,  noblemen  and  -­‐‑women  played  a  
crucial  role  in  the  early  post-­‐‑war  management  of  the  memory  and  reputation  
of  the  anti-­‐‑Hitler  resistance.    
This  is  not  to  say  that  the  early  authors,  although  encouraged  and  assisted  by  
the  OSS,   did   not   have   their   own   axes   to   grind.  As   a   staff   officer   of   Army  
Group   Centre,   Schlabrendorff   directed   his   focus   towards   the   officers  
involved   in   the   plot.   In   this  way,   he   unintentionally   supported   the  widely  
accepted  notion,  domestically  and  abroad,  that  the  coup  had  been  the  work  
of   a   small   group   of   Wehrmacht   officers,   motivated   by   their   horror   at   the  
regime’s  war   crimes   in   the   East.  A   detailed   portrayal   of   the   various   social  
and   ideological   facets   of   the   conspiracy  movement   is   not   described   in   his  
book.  Gisevius,   for  his  part,  was  eager   to  portray  himself  as  one  of   the  key  
                                                                                                 
57  Dulles,  Verschwörung  in  Deutschland,  p.  275.  
44  
  
members   of   the   conspiracy,   and   significantly   enhanced   his   personal  
involvement.58  Because   of   his   early   engagement   in   the   Gestapo,   various  
leading   figures  of   the  conspiracy  remained  suspicious  of  Gisevius,  denying  
him   access   to   privileged   information   about   the   planning   of   the  
assassination.59    
Also   of   note   were   the   diaries   of   Ulrich   von   Hassel,   the   former   German  
ambassador  to  Rome.  Regarded  by  many  as  one  of  the  most  able  diplomats  
of   the   Third   Reich,   and   highly   respected   domestically,   as   well   as   abroad,  
Hassel  was  designated  to  become  Foreign  Minister  in  the  event  of  the  coup  
proving   successful.   Although   deeply   involved   in   the   conspiracy   from   the  
very  beginning,  he  continued  to  render  services  to  the  regime.  His  diaries  are  
written  from  the  viewpoint  of  a  diplomat,  closely  aligned  to  the  civil  service,  
the   generals   and   the   intellectual   elite   of   Germany.   The   resistance,   as  
described  by  Hassell   –  himself   the  descendant  of   an  old  Pomeranian  noble  
family   –   is   a   movement   driven   by   the   old   elites;   ‘ordinary   people’   of   the  
lower   orders  make  no   appearance.  Nevertheless,   his   account   shed   light   on  
the  inner  structure  of  the  conspiratorial  networks  and  thereby  became  a  key  
document   in   the   history   of   the   resistance.   Yet   a   clear   assessment   of   his  
intentions  was   impeded  by   the   fact   that  his  wife  edited   the  diaries  prior   to  
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their  publication   in  Zürich   in  1947   to  prevent  any  sort  of  misinterpretation,  
which  might  have  linked  her  husband  too  closely  to  the  Nazi  regime.60    
Similarly,   influential  was  Rudolf  Pechel’s  book  Deutscher  Widerstand.  Pechel  
did   not   play   an   active   role   in   the   plot.   As   editor   in   chief   of   the  Deutsche  
Rundschau  he  had  attacked  the  Nazi  regime  right   from  the  outset.  By  using  
historical   figures,   comparisons  and  quotations   to   subtly  attack  and   ridicule  
the   excesses   of   the   Nazi   regime,   he   gradually   perfected   his   camouflaged  
critique  of  the  Third  Reich.  A  story  published  January  1942  attacking  Joseph  
Goebbels  was  the  last  straw,  and  the  regime  had  him  arrested.  Although  he  
was  interned  in  various  concentration  camps,  it  was  not  until  the  events  of  20  
July   1944   that   Pechel   was   finally   brought   before   a   court.   Although   the  
Gestapo  was   aware   of   his   connections   to   Carl   Goerdeler,   the   link   did   not  
constitute   proof   of   Pechel’s   connivance.61  His   account   of   the   events   was  
published  in  Zürich  in  1947  and,  unlike  the  others,  proved  to  be  much  more  
detailed,   avoiding   focus   on   any   single   subgroup   of   the   conspiracy.   Pechel  
vividly  portrayed   the   involvement  of   the  officers,   the   communists,   the  Red  
Orchestra,  the  White  Rose,  and  the  Kreisau  Circle,  as  well  as  the  struggle  of  
the   churches,   thereby   providing   the   first   comprehensive   overview   of   the  
diversity   of   the   German   resistance.   He   also   openly   attacked   the   Allies   for  
their  inactivity  and  their  failure  to  strategically  support  the  various  German  
resistance   groups.   Along   the   lines   of   Goerdeler’s   attempts   during   his  
interrogations,  Pechel  tried  to  portray  the  German  resistance  as  a  movement  
of  the  people,  firmly  anchored  in  all  parts  of  society.  As  a  result  of  this  and  
                                                                                                 
60  Widerstand  ohne  Wenn  und  Aber,  Die  Zeit,  24.03.1989.  
61  Bücher  zum  deutschen  Widerstand,  SPIEGEL,  11.09.1947.  
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other  accounts,   the   initially  strong  noble  connotations  of   the  coup  began   to  
fade.  The  noble  dimension  was  not  denied,  but  it  appeared  less  dominant  in  
accounts  that  emphasised  the  social  diversity  of  the  plot.  
A  few  years  later,  the  first  academic  accounts  of  the  German  resistance  were  
published.  Among  them  were  the  influential  works  The  German  Opposition  to  
Hitler   by   Hans   Rothfels   and   Carl   Goerdeler   und   die   Deutsche  
Widerstandsbewegung   by   Gerhard   Ritter.   Both   works   pursued   the   same  
objective,  and  were  firmly  anchored  in  national  and  right-­‐‑liberal  convictions,  
and  before   the  war,  both  authors  had  shared   the  same  doctoral   supervisor.  
Rothfels   admired   the   supra   national,   self-­‐‑regulatory   and   neo-­‐‑conservative  
principles   of   the   Kreisau   Circle.   Soon   after   the   war,   Rothfels   and   Ritter  
reassured   each   other   of   their   political   convictions   in   an   extended  
correspondence   in   which   they   also   informed   each   other   of   their   desire   to  
publish  works  about  the  German  resistance  movement.62    
The   fundamental   idea   of   their  works  was   to   counter   the   prevailing  Allied  
critique   that   National   Socialism   had   inevitably   resulted   from   disastrous  
German  traditions  such  as  blind  obedience  and  militarism.  They   fought   for  
the   acknowledgement   of   the   resistance’s   “moral   self-­‐‑assertion”   during   the  
darkest  hour  of  German  history  and  thereby   intended  to  build  bridges   to  a  
new  democratic  society.63  Hence  Ritter  portrayed  National  Socialism  not  as  a  
German  creation,  but  rather  the  German  variant  of  a  European  phenomenon;  
                                                                                                 
62  Christoph  Cornelißen,  Hans  Rothfels,  Gerhard  Ritter  und  die  Rezeption  des  20.  Juli  1944,  
in:  Johannes  Hürter  und  Hans  Woller  (eds),  Hans  Rothfels  und  die  Deutsche  Zeitgeschichte  
(Munich,  2005),  pp.  101–103.  
63  Ibid,  p.  109.  
47  
  
“a   crisis   of   liberal   society   and   the   system   of   government”.64  Whether   he  
intended  to  or  not,  Ritter,  in  a  sense,  came  to  the  rescue  of  the  nobility  –  the  
pre-­‐‑eminent   traditional   elite   whose   connivance   in   National   Socialism   was  
seen   as   crucial   to   the   failure   of   democracy   –   by   pinning   Germany’s  
culpability   on   liberal   bourgeois   society,   rather   than   on   the   ‘old   elites’   and  
their  corporate  malformations.  
Rothfels  argued  that  large  parts  of  German  society  had  remained  immune  to  
National   Socialism   and   that   the   majority   of   the   population   had   never  
identified   with   the   sort   of   anti-­‐‑Semitism   the   Nazis   propagated. 65   The  
underlying  objective  of  both  works,  as  Christoph  Cornelißen  has  pointed  out,  
was  to  transform  the  motives  and  convictions  of  the  20  July  conspirators  into  
the   “constitutive   elements   of   [a   new]   system   of   government”,   of   a   newly  
founded  democratic  Germany.66  Ultimately,  one  must   regard  both  books  as  
strategic  attempts  at  a  conservative  policy  of  self-­‐‑exculpation,  aiming  both  to  
establish  the  resistance  as  a  foundational  myth  and  to  counter  the  concept  of  
German  collective  guilt  by  insisting  on  the  non-­‐‑collusion  of  the  greater  part  
of   society.   There   was   a   marked   convergence   in   this   respect   with   the  
perspectives  of  Allen  W.  Dulles  and  the  OSS.      
Allied   print   censorship  meant   that   all   these   early   literary   appraisals   of   the  
German   resistance   movement   had   to   be   published   abroad.   Yet   the   media  
were  not  systematically  prevented  from  covering  the  subject.  A  ban  on  media  
                                                                                                 
64  Gerhard  Ritter,  Carl  Goerdeler  und  die  deutsche  Widerstandsbewegung,  (Stuttgart,  1954),  p.  94.  
65  Hans  Rothfels,  Deutsche  Opposition  gegen  Hitler  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1978),  pp.  38–55.  
66  Christoph  Cornelißen,  Gerhard  Ritter  –  Geschichtswissenschaft  und  Politik  im  20.  Jahrhundert  
(Düsseldorf,  2001),  p.  560.  
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coverage   was   not   necessary,   since   the   unpopularity   of   the   coup   largely  
discouraged   editors   and   journalists   from   covering   the   topic. 67   In   the  
immediate  post-­‐‑war  years,  we  find  very  few  articles  honouring  the  motives  
and   achievements   of   the   conspirators   in   the   German   press.   There   were,  
however,   sporadic   pieces   on   the   “freedom   fighters   against   Hitler”,   “the  
reasons   why   the   conspirators   failed”   and   “Christian   reflections   on  
tyrannicide”,  especially  around  the  time  of  the  anniversary  of  the  plot.68    
The  Hamburg  based  newspaper  Die  Zeit   took  a   leading  role   in   this  process  
and   devoted   itself   to   the   commemoration   of   the   military   resistance.   This  
engagement   was   mainly   driven   by   its   deputy   editor   in   chief,   Ernst  
Friedländer,  a  German  émigré  to  Liechtenstein  during  the  Third  Reich,  and  
the   aspiring   young   journalist   Marion   Countess   Dönhoff.   Friedländer,   a  
staunch  proponent  of  European   integration,  was  convinced  of   the   idea   that  
pacification  of  Germany  could  only  be  achieved  by  means  of   reintegration.  
As   a   prerequisite,   he   claimed,   it  was   vital   that   the  world   recognised   “that  
                                                                                                 
67  At  the  beginning  of  the  1950s,  more  than  50  percent  of  the  German  population  were  
convinced  that  National  Socialism  had  in  itself  been  a  good,  yet  badly  executed  concept.  See:  
Anna  J.  Merritt  and  Richard  L.  Merritt,  Public  Opinion  in  Occupied  Germany.  The  OMGUS  
Surveys  (Urbana,  1970),  p.  33;  By  1951,  30  percent  still  strongly  disapproved  of  the  
assassination  attempt  on  ‘their  Führer’,  with  another  40  percent  unwilling  to  give  their  
opinion.  See:  Erich-­‐‑Peter  Neumann  and  Elisabeth  Noelle,  Jahrbuch  der  öffentlichen  Meinung  
1947–1955  (Allensbach,  1957),  p.  138;  By  1956,  49  percent  still  refused  to  name  a  school  after  
members  of  the  plot.  Erich-­‐‑Peter  Neumann  and  Elisabeth  Noelle,  Jahrbuch  der  öffentlichen  
Meinung  1957  (Allensbach,  1957),  p.  145. 
68  Freiheitskämpfer  gegen  Hitler,  Die  Zeit,  22.07.1948;  Ein  Kilo  Dynamit  zu  wenig  –  20  Juli  
1944,  Die  Tragödie  der  deutschen  Widerstandsbewegung,  Süddeutsche  Zeitung,  19.07.1949;  
Das  Opfer  ist  Schuld,  Die  Zeit,  23.07.1953;  Das  Attentat,  Die  Zeit,  18.07.1946.  
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there   had   been   people   in   Nazi-­‐‑Germany   who   were   willing   to   sacrifice  
everything  to  atone  for  German  guilt”.69    
Marion  Dönhoff,  offspring  of  one  of  the  major  noble  families  of  East  Prussia,  
had  been  close  friends  with  several  of  the  conspirators.  From  the  summer  of  
1945,  she  had  vividly  fought  for  the  remembrance  of  these  men.  In  July  1946,  
she  published  her  first  extended  article  Das  heimliche  Deutschland  der  Männer  
des  20.  Juli  in  which  she  hailed  “the  best  men  of  all  parts  of  society  […]  who  
risked  their  lives  to  free  Germany  from  the  gang  of  criminals  that  ruled  the  
Reich”.70  Over   the   following  years,  Dönhoff  published  numerous  articles   to  
fight  the  odium  of  treason  that  still  surrounded  the  memory  of  the  resistance  
movement,  and  thereby  undoubtedly  became  the  most  prominent  post-­‐‑war  
proponent  of   the  military   resistance.71  The  Zeit   thus   joined  Dulles,  Rothfels,  
Ritter  and  other  like-­‐‑minded  publicists  in  their  attempts  to  establish  the  July  
conspiracy  as  a  point  of  departure  for  Germany’s  return  into  the  community  
of  civilised  nations.    Operating  from  her  platform  in  Die  Zeit,  Dönhoff  would  
later  play  a  crucial  role  in  re-­‐‑nobiliarising  the  resistance  and  in  refurbishing  
the  collective  reputation  of   the  post-­‐‑war  nobility  –   I   return   to   this   theme   in  
Chapter  Two.  
Ultimately,   it   can   be   determined   that   most   early   literary   appraisals   of   the  
German  resistance  movement  were  the  work  of  people  who  had,  at  least  to  a  
degree,   been   personally   involved   in   the   resistance.   Although   initiated   and  
                                                                                                 
69  Zum  20  Juli  –  Helden  und  Dulder,  Die  Zeit,  17.07.1947.  
70  Das  heimliche  Deutschland  der  Männer  des  20.  Juli,  Die  Zeit,  18.07.1946.  
71  See  some  of  Dönhoff’s  early  post-­‐‑war  articles:  Auflehnung  gegen  den  Helden,  Die  Zeit,  
17.07.1952;  Das  Gewissen  steht  auf,  Die  Zeit,  15.07.1954.  
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significantly  encouraged  by  Allen  Dulles  and  Gero  von  Schultze  Gaevernitz  
to   speak   out,   the   various   authors   quickly   made   use   of   this   platform   to  
promote  their  own  agendas  and  convey  personally  favourable  narratives  of  
the  resistance  movement.  By  the  beginning  of  the  1950s  –  considerably  aided  
by   noble   writers   –   the   military   resistance   was   increasingly   entrenched   in  
German  public  memory.  The  prerogative  of   interpretation  had  not  yet  been  
successfully   claimed   by   any   of   its   protagonists,   but   the   process   was   well  
under  way.    
Early  Pressure  Groups  
In  addition   to  publishing   literary  accounts,   the  surviving  representatives  of  
the  military  resistance  worked  through  pressure  groups  whose  purpose  was  
to  establish  its  moral  status  and  to  work  towards  its  commemoration.  Shortly  
after  the  war,  Carl-­‐‑Hans  Count  von  Hardenberg,  his  wife  Renate,  and  Fabian  
von   Schlabrendorff,   among   others,   set   up   the   Hilfswerk   20   Juli,   which  
initially   intended   to   provide   moral   support   and   financial   assistance   to  
survivors   of   the   20   July   1944   plot   and   their   relatives.72  Marion   Countess  
Dönhoff  joined  as  deputy  member  of  the  board  of  trustees  soon  after,  thereby  
turning  the  foundation  into  a  heavily  noble-­‐‑dominated  affair.73  As  the  name  
suggests,  the  founding  members  had  a  clear  understanding  of  whom  should  
be   included   and   benefit   from   the   work   of   the   foundation;   namely,   only  
                                                                                                 
72  Geschichte:  Gründung  und  Nachkriegsjahre,  Stiftung  20.  Juli  1944,  online  at:  
www.stiftung-­‐‑20-­‐‑juli-­‐‑1944.de/stiftung-­‐‑20-­‐‑juli-­‐‑1944/geschichte/.  
73  Hereto  see  footnote  26  in:  Eckart  Conze,  Aufstand  des  preußischen  Adels  –  Marion  Gräfin  
Dönhoff  und  das  Bild  des  Widerstands  gegen  den  Nationalsozialismus  in  der  
Bundesrepublik  Deutschland,  in:  Vierteljahreshefte  für  Zeitgeschichte,  51:4  (2003),  p.  490.  
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people   “who  had  been  directly,   consciously   and   actively   involved   in   those  
German   resistive   activities   which   were   responsible   for   the   assassination  
attempt   and   coup   of   20   July”.74  In   doing   so,   those   responsible   inevitably  
identified  the  members  of  the  July  conspiracy,  most  of  them  noblemen,  as  the  
first  and  foremost  representatives  of  German  resistance.  
Shortly  after   its   foundation,  various  members   formed  a   sub-­‐‑committee  and  
demanded   that   the  Hilfswerk  be   transformed   from  a   charitable   foundation  
into   a   strategic   pressure   group,   designed   to   preserve   and   cultivate   the  
historical   heritage   of   the   conspirators. 75   To   these   ends,   they   not   only  
demanded   the   establishment   of   a   state   funded   research   centre,   but   also  
intended   to   compile   “a   historically   true   work   about   the   preparations   that  
lead   to   20   July”. 76   The   sub-­‐‑committee   argued:   “In   light   of   the   severe  
misperception   of   the   German   resistance   movement   in   the   German   and  
foreign   press   and   in   light   of   the  many   erroneous   or   factitious   reports   that  
circulate   about   the   German   resistance  movement,   it   is   necessary   to   gather  
and  screen  all  authentic  material  that  relates  to  the  activities  of  20  July  1944  
as   soon   as   possible”. 77   Consequently,   the   Hilfswerk   commissioned   the  
historian   Gerhard   Ritter   to   write   a   comprehensive   history   of   the   military  
                                                                                                 
74  Fabian  von  Schlabrendorff  an  Renate  Gräfin  von  Hardenberg,  11.11.47  in:  BA  Koblenz,  B  
106/32005,  cited  in:  Christiane  Toyka-­‐‑Seid,  Gralshüter,  Notgemeinschaft  oder  
gesellschaftliche  Pressure  Group?  Die  Stiftung  Hilfswerk  20.  Juli  1944  im  ersten  
Nachkriegsjahrzent,  in:  Gerd  R.  Ueberschär  (ed.),  Der  20.  Juli  1944,  Bewertung  und  Rezeption  
des  deutschen  Widerstandes  gegen  das  NS-­‐‑Regime  (Cologne,  1994),  p.  199.  
75  See:  Denkschrift  der  Arbeitsgemeinschaft  20.  Juli  vom  27.01.1950,  cited  in:  Toyka-­‐‑Seid,  
Gralshüter,  Notgemeinschaft  oder  gesellschaftliche  Pressure  Group?,  p.  200.  
76  Entwurf  eines  Rundschreibens  vom  17/18  Juli  1947.  In  BAK,  NL  Ritter,  491,  cited  in:  
Christiane  Toyka-­‐‑Seid,  Der  Widerstand  gegen  Hitler  und  die  westdeutsche  Gesellschaft,  p.  577.  
77  Ibid,  p.  576.  
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resistance.   It   was   intended   that   he   should   produce   a   history   that   would  
portray   the   conspirators   as   models   of   moral   integrity,   honour   and   duty;  
answerable  only  to  their  conscience,  and  willing  to  die  in  order  to  redeem  the  
German  nation.    Ritter,  however,  soon  withdrew  from  the  project.  He  did  not  
want   to   get   entangled   in   a   moral   judgement   of   the   coup.   Countess  
Hardenberg,   the  head  of   the  Hilfswerk,  had   repeatedly  demanded   that   the  
Kaltenbrunner  reports  –   the  daily   transcripts  of   the   interrogations  prepared  
for  Bormann  and  Hitler  by  the  Reich  Security  Main  Office  –  be  excluded.  She  
feared  that  these  biased  accounts  of  the  Gestapo  might  distort  and  harm  the  
carefully   nurtured   commemoration   of   the   conspirators’   motives   and  
convictions.78  Ritter,  however,  perceived  this  intervention  as  a  “cover  up”  of  
historical   evidence   and   regarded   it   “as   not   only   intolerable   from   the  
standpoint  of  a  scholar,  but  also  as  politically  dangerous”.79  
Furthermore,  the  Hilfswerk’s  sub-­‐‑committee  wished  to  be  assigned  with  the  
official  task  of  reviewing  publications  concerning  the  20  July  plot  and  assess  
their   “eligibility   as   historic   source   material”,80  thereby   trying   to   directly  
control   and   steer   the   remembrance   of   the   conspiracy.   Ultimately,   all   these  
actions  were   not   only   designed   to   ensure   a   lasting   commemoration   of   the  
military   resistance,   but   also   to   establish   it   as   the   primary   and   only   “true”  
resistance  movement  in  Nazi  Germany.    
                                                                                                 
78  See  also  Marion  Gräfin  Dönhoff’s  attempts  to  prevent  the  publication  of  the  Kaltenbrunner  
Reports  in  the  early  1960s:  Protest  gegen  eine  Publikation,  Die  Kaltenbrunner-­‐‑Berichte  –  
Zum  Thema  verlegerischer  Verantwortung,  Die  Zeit,  20.10.1961.  
79  Gerhard  Ritter  an  Gräfin  Hardenberg  vom  22.  Dezember  1954,  in:  BAK,  NL  Ritter,  492.  
Cited  in:  Toyka-­‐‑Seid,  Widerstand  gegen  Hitler  und  die  westdeutsche  Gesellschaft,  p.  578.  
80  See:  Protokoll  der  Tagung  Hilfswerk  20.  Juli  1944  in  Hindelang  am  17/18  August  1947,  
cited  in:  Toyka-­‐‑Seid,  Gralshüter,  Notgemeinschaft  oder  gesellschaftliche  Pressure  Group,  p.  168.  
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The   influence   of   the   Hilfswerk   even   extended   beyond   the   borders   of  
Germany.  Encouraged  by  its  work,  Christabel  Bielenberg  set  up  the  20th  July  
Memorial  Fund   in  England   to  assist   the   relatives  and  survivors  of   the  plot.  
Bielenberg  had  been  a  personal  friend  of  Adam  von  Trott  zu  Solz,  a  member  
of   the   Foreign   Office   and   leading   participant   of   the   resistance.   The   go-­‐‑
between  was  once  again  Marion  Dönhoff,  who  put  Bielenberg  in  touch  with  
Hardenberg  to  synchronise  their  efforts  in  bringing  relief  to  the  victims  and  
raise  public   awareness   for   the   conspiracy  at  home  and  abroad.81  Bielenberg  
framed   the   resistance   in   a   specific   light   by   adopting   the   name   20th   July  
Memorial  Fund,  a  programmatic  title,  foregrounding  the  role  played  by  the  
officers  involved  in  the  actual  assassination  attempt  and  putting  them  at  the  
centre  of   the  commemoration  of  German  resistance.  Bielenberg  managed  to  
convince   George   Bell,   the   Bishop   of   Chichester,   to   become   the   Memorial  
Fund’s   patron   and   sign   an   appeal   for   donations   for   the   survivors.   It   was  
launched  in  The  Times  and  in  the  Observer,  which  at  that  time  was  owned  by  
David  Astor,   a   close   friend   of  Dönhoff   and   Bielenberg.82  Bell  was   a   highly  
influential   and   vocal   figure   in   Britain.   From   early   on   in   the   war,   he   had  
publically   called   for   distinguishing   between   Nazis   and   Germans   and  
branded   the   two  nations’  policy  of   area  bombing  a   “calamitous  mistake”.83  
He   argued   “it   is   barbarous   to   make   unarmed   women   and   children   the  
deliberate  object  of  attack”  and  therefore  asked  the  British  government  in  The  
Times   to   “refrain   from   night-­‐‑bombing   either   all   together   or   of   towns  with  
                                                                                                 
81  Christabel  Bielenberg,  The  Road  Ahead  (London,  1992),  pp.  97–100.  
82  Ibid,  p.  59.  
83  Ronald  C.  D.  Jasper,  George  Bell,  Bishop  of  Chichester  (London,  1967),  p.  262.  
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civilian   populations”.84  His   friendship   with   Dietrich   Bonhoeffer,   a   leading  
member   of   the   Church   resistance   in   Germany,   had   encouraged   him   to  
intervene   repeatedly   with   the   British   authorities   on   behalf   of   the   military  
resistance.   After   the   failed   coup,   he   urged   Anthony   Eden,   the   Foreign  
Secretary,  to  help  surviving  conspirators  to  escape  Germany.85    
Another  friend  of  Marion  Dönhoff,  Eric  Warburg,  helped  to  set  up  a  similar  
fund   in   the  United  States,  The  American  Committee   to  Aid  the  Survivors  of   the  
German  Resistance   in   the  USA.   Born   in  Hamburg   in   1900,   the   offspring   of   a  
famous   German-­‐‑Jewish   banking   dynasty   had   escaped   to   America   in   1938  
and  returned  as  an  American  officer  to  interrogate  high-­‐‑ranking  Nazis  such  
as  Hermann  Goering.86  The  committee  organized  exchange  programmes  for  
children   of   conspirators   and   thereby   intended   to   contribute   to   “building  
morale  and  helping  to  provide  leadership  for  a  democratic  Germany”.87  As  a  
result,   among   others,   Bernhard   von   Falkenhausen   came   to  America,   Klaus  
von   Dohnanyi   was   sent   to   Yale   University,   and   Benigna   Goerdeler   to  
Briarcliff   College.88  Yet,   unlike   the   Hilfswerk   and   the   Memorial   Fund,   the  
American  Committee  intended  to  grant  aid  to  resistance  fighters  beyond  the  
20  July  plot.  Warburg  explicitly  stated  that  “the  group  who  are  to  be  assisted  
                                                                                                 
84  George  Bell,  Bishop  of  Chichester,  The  Pope’s  Appeal,  The  Times,  17.04.1941.  
85  Jasper,  George  Bell,  Bishop  of  Chichester,  p.  281.  
86  Alfonso  A.  Narvaez,  Obituary:  Eric  Warburg,  90,  Investment  Banker  from  Germany  Dies,  
New  York  Times,  11.07.1990.  
87  Dulles,  Verschwörung  in  Deutschland,  p.  248.  
88  See  the  correspondence  between  Karl  Adler  from  Briarcliff  College  and  the  Office  for  
Military  Government  For  Germany,  03.02.1947,  in:  Leo  Baeck  Institute  Archives,  Center  for  
Jewish  History  (New  York),  Karl  Adler  Collection,  AR  7276/MF  572;  see  also,  the  letter  of  the  
“American  Committee  to  Aid  Survivors  of  the  German  Resistance”  to  Karl  Adler  of  Briarcliff  
College,  in:  Leo  Baeck  Institute  Archives,  Karl  Adler  Collection,  AR  7276/MF  572.  
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in  this  way  is  not  limited  just  to  the  survivors  of  the  20th  of  July  1944  but  is  to  
include   those  whose  relations  made   their  sacrifice  years  before”.89  However  
“participants   in   the   communist  movement”,  were  excluded   from  American  
aid,   and   the   main   focus   continued   to   remain   on   the   20   July   conspiracy.90  
Freya  von  Moltke,  the  wife  of  former  resistance  fighter  Helmuth  Count  von  
Moltke,   rendered   further   support   by   giving   a   lecture   series   in   the   United  
States   to   promote   the   cause   and   motives   of   the   resistance   movement   and  
raise  money  for  the  aid  of  its  survivors.91  
Thus,   shortly   after   the   war,   key   survivors   of   the   military   resistance   came  
together  to  organize  financial  aid  for  the  relatives  of  the  conspirators  and  to  
frame  and  direct   the  commemoration  of   the  conspiracy  in  such  a  way  as  to  
ensure   that   the   20   July   plot   emerged   as   Germany’s   primary   resistance  
movement.  Although   this  heavily  noble-­‐‑dominated  pressure  group  did  not  
yet   explicitly   seek   to   ‘ennoble’   the   military   resistance,   it   did   significantly  
contribute   to   the  moral  elevation  of   the  resistance  to  a  symbolic  status,  and  
thereby  paved  the  way  for  the  nobility’s  future  alignment  with  this  morality.  
The   go-­‐‑between   in   this   process   was   Marion   Countess   Dönhoff,   whose  
friends,   Eric   Warburg,   Christabel   Bielenberg   and   David   Astor,   worked   to  
promote  the  remembrance  of  20  July  in  Britain  and  the  United  States.  During  
times   when   the   majority   of   the   Allied   public   still   regarded   the   military  
resistance  as  a  reactionary  gang  of  officers  and  Junkers,  who  had  only  acted  
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to  preserve   their  own  privileges,   such   initiatives  were   crucial   in   rebuilding  
the  reputation  of  Germany  and  its  elite  at  home  and  abroad.    
20  July  1944  in  Court  
Literary   accounts   and   newspapers   were   two   sources   which   shaped   the  
interpretation   of   the   resistance.   Trials  were   another.   The   early   1950s   saw  a  
significant   resurgence   of   nationalism   and   intensified   public   denigration   of  
the  military  resistance.  In  this  period  in  which  control  of  the  reputation  of  the  
resistance  against  Hitler  was  as  yet  not  concentrated   in  any  player’s  hands,  
and  public   opinion  was  divided,   it   fell   to   the   courts   to   assess   its   legal   and  
moral  legitimacy.  
In   the   immediate  post-­‐‑war  years,   the  noble-­‐‑dominated  networks  associated  
with   the   military   resistance   faced   little   competition   from   other   bodies.    
However,   this   changed   when   Germany   began   to   recover   from   the  
devastation  of  the  war,  and  new  opinion-­‐‑shaping  bodies  emerged  to  contest  
the   memory   of   the   recent   past.   This   was   especially   true   in   light   of   the  
rearmament   debate   that   flared   up   after   the   foundation   of   the   Federal  
Republic  of  Germany  in  1949.  The  deepening  of  East-­‐‑West  tensions  raised  the  
question  of  a  German  contribution  to  the  defence  of  Western  Europe  against  
a  possible  Soviet  attack.  The  increasing  visibility  and  prominence  of  veterans’  
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groups  raised  once  again  the  question  of  the  military  oath  and  focused  public  
attention  on  the  actions  of  the  men  of  20  July  1944.92      
The   newly   founded   veteran   organisations   were   especially   hostile.   Hans  
Frießner,   chairman   of   the   ‘Association   of   German   Soldiers’   (Verband  
deutscher  Soldaten),  distanced  himself  and  his  organisation  from  the  military  
resistance   promptly   after   its   foundation   in   September   1951. 93   Similarly,  
Ludwig   Gümbel,   the   chairman   of   the   Bavarian   branch   of   the   association,  
even   called   for   the   survivors   of   the   coup   to   refrain   from   returning   to   the  
army  since  their  return  might  undermine  the  “soldierly  spirit”  of  the  troops  
and  consequently  render  any  future  “Wehrbeitrag”  impossible.94  In  the  eyes  of  
many  former  members  of  the  Wehrmacht,  the  conspirators  had  broken  their  
oath   and   therefore   forfeited   their   honour.   Yet,   such   defamatory   comments  
were  by  no  means   limited   to   the  veteran  organisations;   they  came   from  all  
parts  of  the  right-­‐‑wing  political  milieu,  as  the  Hedler  and  Remer  trials  in  the  
early  1950s  vividly  illustrated.  In  both  trials,  noblemen  and  -­‐‑women  played  
prominent  roles,  as  either  joint  plaintiffs  or  as  witnesses.    
Wolfgang  Hedler,   a   former  member  of   the  Stahlhelm  and   the  NSDAP,  had  
joined  the  Bundestag  for  the  Deutsche  Partei  in  1949.  Only  months  later,  he  
delivered   a   speech   at   the   Deutsche   Haus   in   Einfeld   bei   Neumünster,   in  
which,  while  repeatedly  trying  to  trivialise  Germany’s  responsibility  for  the  
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outbreak  of  the  war  and  indulging  in  hateful  tirades  against  the  Jews,  he  also  
in   passing   disparaged   the   conspirators   of   20   July   as   Landesverräter. 95  
Confronted  with  his  statements  later,  Hedler  unreservedly  admitted  to  all  of  
them,  with  the  exception  of  his  comments  about  the  Jews.  As  a  result,  Hedler  
was   charged  with   slander.   To  protect   the   interests   of   the   former   resistance  
fighters,   various   relatives   came   forward   to   serve   as   joint-­‐‑plaintiffs;   among  
them   were   Erika   von   Tresckow   and   Clarita   von   Trott   zu   Solz.96  In   the  
subsequent   trial   for   slander,   chaired   by   three   judges,   of   whom   two   were  
fellow   former   NSDAP   members,   Hedler   was   acquitted   of   all   charges.97  
According   to   the   opinion   of   the   court,   not   enough   evidence   had   been  
brought   forward   to   justify   a   conviction   of   Hedler.   Furthermore,   the   court  
stated   that   this   was   a   juristic   and   not   political   verdict   and   therefore   the  
political  opinions  of  dissenters  had  to  be  respected.98    
Public   reaction   was   divided,   but   vehement   on   both   sides.   While  
sympathisers   cheered   Hedler   as   he   was   leaving   the   court,   the   media  
response  was  critical.99  Even  though  Ernst  Friedländer  of  Die  Zeit  stated  that  
“there   are   more   pressing   issues   than   Hedler”100  and   Paul   Sethe   of   the  
Frankfurter   Allgemeine   Zeitung   cautioned   against   “demanding   that   a   court  
                                                                                                 
95  Geteilte  Meinung  eines  Abgeordneten  über  Vergasung  von  Juden,  Frankfurter  Rundschau,  
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96  Manfred  Jenke,  Verschwörung  von  rechts?  Ein  Bericht  über  den  Rechtsradikalismus  in  
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pass  judgement  on  a  man  only  because  he  has  politically  dangerous  ideas”,101  
numerous  articles  appeared  that  sharply  condemned  Hedler’s  acquittal.   Jan  
Molitor  of  Die  Zeit  called  Hedler’s  statements  a  “defamation  of  all  Germans”  
and   concluded:   “bad   enough   that  Hedler   talked;   but   it   is   even  worse   that  
there  are  people  who  rushed  to  listen  to  him;  the  worst,  however,  is  that  after  
all   that   there   are   still   people   who   believe   in   him”.102  Hans   Henrich   of   the  
Frankfurter   Rundschau   sharply   criticised   the   verdict   and   especially   the  
conduct  of  the  presiding  judge,  Otto  Paulick,  “who  literally  put  exculpatory  
statements  into  the  witnesses’  mouths  and,  without  reprimanding  anybody,  
allowed  for  provoking  Nazi  statements  to  surface”.103      
Of   the   political   parties,   the   SPD   was   especially   sharp   in   their   criticism   of  
Hedler’s   acquittal.   Erich   Ollenhauer,   as   the   representative   of   the   SPD’s  
parliamentary  group,   called   the  verdict  “another  powerful   impairment  and  
defilement   of   the   German   people”. 104   The   prosecution   also   remained  
convinced   of   Hedler’s   guilt   and   appealed   to   the   next   judicial   level,   which  
eventually  resulted  in  Hedler’s  conviction  to  nine  months  imprisonment.  The  
fact   that   he   was   found   guilty   “of   defamation   in   concomitance   with  
denigration   of   the  memory   of   the   dead”   proved   to   be   a  milestone   for   the  
rehabilitation  of  the  military  resistance.  For  the  first  time,  an  official  German  
court   had   convicted   somebody   for   denouncing   the   conspirators   and   thus  
indirectly  approved  of  the  actions  taken  against  the  regime  on  20  July  1944.  
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Yet,  it  was  not  until  the  Remer  trial  in  1952  that  a  German  court  officially  and  
legally  rehabilitated  the  20  July  resistance.    
Otto   Ernst   Remer,   like   Hedler,   had   denounced   the   conspirators   as   hired  
Landesverräter,   and   faced   charges   in   the   spring   of   1952.   Due   to   his  
prominence   as   former   commanding   officer   of   the   guards’   battalion  
Großdeutschland,  which  was   responsible   for   crushing   the   coup   on   20   July  
1944,  his  trial  received  enormous  public  attention.105  This  time,  however,  the  
prosecution   did   not   simply   settle   for   charging   an   individual  with   slander,  
but   simultaneously   used   the   case   as   a   platform   to   establish   a   legal  
rehabilitation   of   the   military   resistance.106  No   one   less   than   the   attorney  
general   of   Braunschweig   himself,   Fritz   Bauer,   represented   the   prosecution.  
Dr.  Erich  Günther  Topf,  a  former  member  of   the  SA  and  NSDAP,  who  had  
originally   been   in   charge   of   the   case,   was   unwilling   to   allow   the   charge  
against  Remer.  Fritz  Bauer,   a   social  democrat  of   Jewish  origin,  had  himself  
been  a  victim  of  the  Nazi-­‐‑regime  and  only  survived  the  war  by  escaping  to  
Denmark  in  1935.107  Bauer  quickly  realised  that  this  case  could  become  a  test  
case   for   the   rehabilitation  of   the   resistance,   and   thus  personally   saw   to   the  
transferral   of  Dr.   Topf   so   that   he   himself   could   take   over   the   case.108  Once  
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again,  prominent  nobles  such  as  Marion  Yorck  von  Wartenburg,  Alexander  
von   Hase   and   Fabian   von   Schlabrendorff   came   forward   to   serve   as   joint  
plaintiffs   and   witnesses   in   order   to   restore   the   reputation   of   the   20   July  
conspirators.  109    
The  question   the   trial   finally   sought   to   address  was  whether   the  actions  of  
the  resistance  movement  could  be  classified  as  Hoch-­‐‑  or  even  Landesverrat.110  
By   using   the   term   Landesverräter,   Remer   had   accused   the   conspirators   of  
intentionally   risking   both   external   security,   as   well   as   indeed   the   very  
existence  of  the  state  itself.  This  accusation  might  have  been  appropriate  for  
resistance   circles   such   as   the   Rote   Kapelle   or   the   Zentralkomitee   Freies  
Deutschland  who  had  maintained  close  relations  to  the  enemies  of  the  Third  
Reich,  especially   the   former  who  had  repetitively  passed  military  secrets   to  
the   Allies   with   the   intention   of   harming   the   German   war   effort.111  With  
regard  to  the  military  resistance,  however,  this  accusation  proved  to  be  more  
difficult   to   uphold.   The  men   of   20   July   clearly   intended   to   overthrow   the  
government  and  were,  therefore,  guilty  of  Hochverrat  in  a  strictly  legal  sense.  
They  did  not,  however,  intend  to  weaken  the  army,  destroy  the  state  or  plot  
                                                                                                 
109  Frei,  Vergangenheitspolitik,  p.  348.  
110  See:  Boris  Burghardt,  Vor  60  Jahren:  Fritz  Bauer  und  der  Braunschweiger  Remer-­‐‑Prozess.  
Ein  Strafverfahren  als  Vehikel  der  Geschichtspolitik,  in:  Journal  der  Juristischen  Zeitgeschichte,  
6:2  (2012),  p.  48.  
111  See:  Hans  Coppi,  Die  Rote  Kapelle  im  Spannungsfeld  von  Widerstand  und  
nachrichtendienstlicher  Tätigkeit  –  Der  Trepper  Report  vom  Juni  1943,  in:  Vierteljahreshefte  
für  Zeitgeschichte,  44:3  (1996),  pp.  431–458.  
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with   the   enemy,   which   would   have   been   necessary   to   qualify   for  
Landesverrat.112    
The   only   weak   link   in   this   argument   was   Major   General   Hans   Oster.  
Although  Oster  did  not  actively  participate  in  the  plot  of  20  July  1944,  he  had  
been   one   of   the   founding   fathers   of   the   military   resistance.   Until   he   was  
placed  under  house  detention  following  the  arrest  of  Hans  von  Dohnanyi  in  
March  1943,  Oster,  according  to  Schlabrendorff,  had  been  the  “manager”  of  
the   military   resistance. 113   During   the   phoney   war,   however,   Oster   had  
repeatedly  passed  on  the  dates  of  the  German  attack  on  the  Low  Countries  to  
Dutch  and  Belgian  sources   to  allow  the  Allies   to  halt   the  German  offensive  
and  force  Germany  into  a  negotiated  peace  to  prevent  further  hostilities.114  In  
legal   terms,   this   behaviour   could   certainly   be   classified   as   Landesverrat.  
Nevertheless,  Oster’s  independent  actions  from  early  1940  had  no  direct  link  
to  the  actual  plot  of  20  July  1944.  Consequently,  from  the  very  beginning,  the  
attorney  general  Fritz  Bauer  meticulously  tried  to  limit  the  scope  of  the  trial  
to  the  men  of  20  July  only,  enabling  him  to  obtain  a  conviction  of  Remer  for  
slander,   as   well   as   once   and   for   all   exculpating   the   conspirators   from   the  
accusation   of  Landesverrat.  The  defence’s   efforts   to   include  Oster   and   other  
                                                                                                 
112  See  the  various  comments  of  expert  witnesses  during  the  Remer  Trial:  Hans  Lukaschek  
(Kreisau  Circle):  The  conspirators  “looked  out  for  people  who  were  willing  to  oppose  Hitler  
in  order  to  save  Germany  […]  None  of  them  ever  contemplated  the  idea  of  Landesverrat.”,  
Neue  Zeitung,  11.03.1952;  Karl  Friedrich  Bonhoeffer  (Brother  of  Dietrich  Bonhoeffer):  “My  
brother  regarded  Hitler  as  the  ‘Anti-­‐‑Christ’  and  hoped  for  the  failure  of  all  his  plans.  
Germany  meant  everything  to  my  brother.”  Neue  Zeitung,  11.03.1952,  cited  in:  Claudia  
Fröhlich,  Phasen  und  Themen  der  Judikatur  zum  20.  Juli  1944,  p.  219.  
113  Fest,  Staatsstreich,  p.  204.  
114  Jean  Vanwelkenhuyzen,  Die  Niederlande  und  der  Alarm  im  Januar  1940,  in:  
Vierteljahreshefte  für  Zeitgeschichte,  8:1  (1960),  p.  23.  
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resistance   groups   such   as   the   Rote   Kapelle,   hence   generalising   the   term  
‘resistance’   to   justify   Remer’s   comments,   were   quashed   by   the   court.   Yet,  
Bauer’s  mission   to   rehabilitate   the  military   resistance  went   beyond   simply  
absolving  them  from  the  suspicion  of  Landesverrat.  His  ultimate  goal  was  to  
classify   the   Third   Reich   as   an   illegitimate   regime   (Unrechtsstaat)   and   thus  
establish  a  concept  of  ethical  Hochverrat,   some  kind  of   legitimate  resistance,  
designed  to  retrospectively  acquit  the  resistance  from  all  charges.115      
Nonetheless,   the   court   only   partly   followed   Bauer’s   argument.   While  
acknowledging   that   the   Nazi   regime   encouraged   and   committed   crimes  
against   both   the   German   and   occupied   peoples,   thus   jeopardising   the  
regime’s   legality,   the   court   failed   to   comment   on   the   Third   Reich’s  
constitutional   legality,   despite   even   using   the   term   Unrechtsstaat,   and  
therefore  failed  to  challenge  the  validity  of  laws  and  regulations  enacted  by  
the  regime.116  Thus  Bauer’s  attempt  to  obtain  a  legal  ruling  for  a  general  right  
of   resistance  did  not  materialise.  Nevertheless,   the  court  did   follow  Bauer’s  
legal   description   of   the   men   of   20   July   1944,   legalising   their   actions   by  
claiming  that  all  of  them  “driven  by  burning  love  for  their  fatherland  and  an  
altruistic   […]   sense   of   responsibility   for   their   people   had   strived   for   a  
removal  of  Hitler  and  thus  his  regime”.117  Essentially,  the  court  dictated  that  
the  convictions  against  the  military  resistance  were  ultimately  determinative  
to   legally   exculpate   their   actions.   Thus,   by   basing   the   resistance’s   acquittal  
from  Hochverrat  on  their  unique  motives,  rather  than  their  actions,  the  court  
                                                                                                 
115  See:  Remer  wird  zur  Randfigur  des  Prozesses,  Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  10.03.1952.  
116  Herbert  Kraus  (ed.),  Die  im  Braunschweiger  Remerprozeß  erstatteten  moraltheologischen  und  
historischen  Gutachten  nebst  Urteil  (Hamburg,  1953),  pp.  122–123.  
117  Ibid,  p.  128.  
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did  not  have  to  follow  Bauer’s  argument  of  classifying  the  Third  Reich  as  an  
illegal  regime,  with  all  the  legal  consequences  this  would  have  brought  with  
it.118  They   were   also   simultaneously   able   to   limit   the   concept   of   ethical  
Hochverrat  specifically  to  20  July  1944  without  having  to  set  a  precedent  for  a  
right  of  resistance  in  general.    
Yet,   for   all   the   continuing   contention,   it   is   safe   to   say   that   the  Hedler   and  
Remer   trials   were   vital   steps   towards   the   entrenchment   of   the   military  
resistance  in  public  memory.  The  sheer  publicity  the  trials  provided  marked  
the   beginning   of   a   comprehensive   public   debate   of   the   events   of   20   July  
1944.119  The   FAZ   raised   the   issue   of   whether   the   moral   assessment   of   the  
resistance  should  be  left  to  a  court  rather  than  parliament.  “One  cannot  pass  
the   task  of   the  historians   to   the   judges.   […]  The   rehabilitation  of   the  brave  
resistance   fighters   is   a   highly   pressing   affair,   which   parliament   should  
address.   This   would   enable   courts   to   pass   better   and   more   precise  
judgements.”120  The  majority  of  German  newspapers,  however,  acclaimed  the  
trial   and   the   conviction   of   Remer.   The   SZ   stated   that   “it   was   of   primary  
importance”   that   for   the   first   time,   a   German   court   had   come   to   the  
conclusion   that  patriotic   resistance  against  Hitler,  also   in   times  of  war,  was  
justified. 121   Josef   Müller-­‐‑Marein   of   Die   Zeit   drew   a   similar   conclusion,  
                                                                                                 
118  Boris  Burghardt,  Vor  60  Jahren:  Fritz  Bauer  und  der  Braunschweiger  Remer-­‐‑Prozess.  Ein  
Strafverfahren  als  Vehikel  der  Geschichtspolitik,  in:  Journal  der  Juristischen  Zeitgeschichte,  6:2  
(2012),  p.  51.  
119  Overall  thirty-­‐‑four  articles  concerning  the  Remer  trial  were  published.  FAZ  (9  articles),  
Frankfurter  Rundschau  (8),  WELT  (7),  Süddeutsche  Zeitung  (6),  Die  Zeit  (2)  and  SPIEGEL  (2),  
See:  Buschke,  Deutsche  Presse,  Rechtsextremismus  und  nationalsozialistische  Vergangenheit  in  der  
Ära  Adenauer,  p.  195.  
120  Die  Richter  in  Gewissensnot,  Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  12.03.1952.  
121  Das  Streiflicht,  Süddeutsche  Zeitung,  17.03.1952.  
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welcoming   the   fact   that   “a   German   court   finally   served   as   a   setting   for   a  
profound   rehabilitation   of   the   resistance   fighters   against  Hitler”,122  and   the  
Welt  described  the  verdict  simply  as  a  “highly  significant  political  event”.123    
Furthermore,  the  trials  not  only  spurred  a  public  debate,  but  also  solidified,  
at  least  for  the  foreseeable  future,  the  position  of  the  military  resistance  as  the  
only  true  and  morally  righteous  resistance  movement  of  the  Third  Reich.  The  
case   somewhat   led   to   “an   idealisation   of   the   political   intentions   of   the  
conspirators,  who  in  the  end  were  virtually  perceived  as  the  fathers  of  West  
German  democracy”.124  Crucial  in  this  regard  were  the  statements  of  Fabian  
von   Schlabrendorff   during   the   trial.   Due   to   his   literary   account   of   his  
involvement  in  the  plot,  Schlabrendorff  was  certainly  one  of  the  best-­‐‑known  
surviving   members   of   the   conspiracy,   and   accordingly   weighty   was   his  
word.   Just   like   Bauer,   Schlabrendorff   had   been   concerned   that   a  
generalisation  of  resistance,  and  hence  an  inclusion  of  resistance  movements  
such  as  the  Rote  Kapelle  or  the  Nationalkomittee  Freies  Deutschland,  might  
have   jeopardised   the   entire   case   against   Remer.   Consequently,  
Schlabrendorff   did   not   refrain   from   strongly   defaming   all   types   of  
leftist/communist  resistance  movements  by  insinuating  that  all  of   them  had  
                                                                                                 
122  Die  Schatten  der  Toten  vom  20.  Juli…,  Die  Zeit,  13.03.1952.  
123  Das  Urteil  im  Remer  Prozess,  WELT,  17.03.1952.  
124  Frei,  Vergangenheitspolitik,  p.  350;  see  also:  Hans  Mommsen,  Die  Geschichte  des  deutschen  




been  “motivated  by  the  hope  for  material  gains”  and  thus  were  unworthy  to  
be  mentioned  in  the  same  breath  as  the  20  July  conspiracy.125    
Hence,   by   debasing   the   achievements   of   other   resistance   groups   while  
simultaneously   portraying   the  military   resistance   as   the   only   true   form   of  
opposition   –   motivated   by   unique   “high   ethical   convictions” 126   –  
Schlabrendorff   clearly   aimed   to   monopolise   the   commemoration   of  
resistance   against   the   Nazi-­‐‑regime,   and   thus   laid   the   foundation   for   a  
positive  commemoration  of  20  July  1944.    
It  was  precisely  the  high  ethical  convictions  that  Schlabrendorff  later  ascribed  
to   the   conspirators   of   20   July,   which   formed   the   basis   of   the   nobility’s  
transfiguration   of   the   failed   coup   into   a   ‘noble   revolt’.   Once   the   dominant  
account  of  the  resistance  began  to  focus  on  individualised  portraits  of  high-­‐‑
minded   martyrs   for   a   sacred   cause,   whom   were   distinguished   by   certain  
common   attributes   –   independence,   courage,   the   call   to   leadership   and  
sacrifice  –  it  was  only  a  small  step,  as  we  shall  see,  to  frame  the  resistance  as  
the  manifestation  of   a   specifically  noble   corporate  personality.  Painting   the  
resistance   as   a   righteous   enterprise   limited   to   the   events   of   1944   helped   to  
integrate  the  nobility,  but  it  also  had  the  not-­‐‑unwelcome  effect  of  excluding  
other  groups  from  acknowledgement.  For  example,  the  communist  resistance  
was   continued   to   be   seen   as   a   Soviet-­‐‑driven   espionage   network.   Thus,   the  
Remer   trial,   as   Joachim   Göres   has   put   it,   triggered   not   only   the  
                                                                                                 
125  Johannes  Tuchel,  Vergessen,  verdrängt,  ignoriert  –  Überlegungen  zur  
Rezeptionsgeschichte  des  Widerstands  gegen  den  Nationalsozialismus  im  
Nachkriegsdeutschland,  in:  Tuchel,  Der  vergessene  Widerstand,  p.  25.  




mythologisation  of  the  military  resistance,  but  also  the  demonisation  of  leftist  
resistance  groups  such  as  the  Rote  Kapelle.127    
The  Government’s  Role  in  Commemoration  
While  German   courts  were  busy   resolving   the   legal   questions   surrounding  
the  rehabilitation  of  the  military  resistance,  various  politicians  also  expedited  
its   establishment   in   public   memory.   For   years,   however,   these   efforts  
consisted  of  individual  actions  rather  than  official  policy.  It  would  be  another  
decade   before   the   government   took   measures   to   ensure   that   all   public  
buildings   were   flagged   on   20   July   to   commemorate   the   attempted   plot.128  
Early   positive   references   to   the   military   resistance   proved   to   be   a   highly  
sensitive   balancing   act   for   the   government.   On   the   one   hand,   the  military  
resistance  movement  was   ideally  suited  to  serve  as  a   founding  myth  of   the  
new  state  by  offering  certain  values  and  traditions,  which  had  entirely  been  
forfeited   by   the   Nazi   regime.   On   the   other   hand,   for   millions   of   German  
soldiers  who  were  trying  collectively,  as  well  as  individually,  to  make  sense  
of   their   intolerable   sacrifices   during   the   war,   the   resistance   was  
predominantly   associated   with   the   breach   of   the   oath   and   hence   had   no  
majority   appeal.   Consequently,   every   attempt   by   a   German   politician   to  
honour  the  military  resistance  inevitably  proved  to  be  a  delicate  affair.  Thus,  
                                                                                                 
127  Der  Anwalt  des  Widerstands,  Die  Tageszeitung,  28.08.2012.  
128  It  was  not  until  July  1964,  twenty  years  after  the  attempted  coup,  that  all  public  buildings  
were  flagged  in  commemoration  of  20  July  1944.  See:  Regina  Holler,  Die  Funktion  des  
Widerstands  1933–1945  gegen  den  Nationalsozialismus  für  die  politische  Kultur  der  
Bundesrepublik  von  1945  bis  heute,  in:  Niedersächsisches  Kultusministerium  (ed.),  50  Jahre  




it  is  not  surprising  that  its  first  main  advocates  almost  exclusively  had  close  
ties   with   the   resistance   movement   themselves   and   were   driven   by   strong  
personal  motivations  to  rebuild  its  reputation.    
One  of  the  key  promoters  of  this  process  was  Jakob  Kaiser,  minister  for  all-­‐‑
German   affairs   in   the   first   cabinet   of   Konrad   Adenauer.   Kaiser,   a   leading  
member   of   the   Zentrum   party,   as   well   as   the   Christian   Union   until   the  
advent  of  the  Third  Reich,  had  joined  the  civil  resistance  as  early  as  1934.  His  
close  connections  to  Carl  Goerdeler,  as  well  as  representatives  of  the  military  
opposition,  put  him  in  the  focus  of  the  Gestapo  after  20  July  and  he  only  just  
managed   to   escape  by  hiding   in   a   basement   in  Potsdam   for   the   rest   of   the  
war.  These  personal  experiences  encouraged  him  to  work  deliberately  for  the  
acceptance  of  the  resistance  in  public  memory,  and  in  1947,  he  was  one  of  the  
first   important  politicians  to  publicly  take  a  stance  for  the  resistance.  On  20  
July   1947,   Kaiser   labelled   the   attempted   coup   as   “an   achievement   of   the  
German  people”   and  a   “positive   fact”  which  ought   to  be   acknowledged   in  
favour  of  Germany.129  Much  more  detailed  and  even  wider  in  scope,  was  his  
radio   speech   in   commemoration  of   the   six   year   anniversary   of   the   coup   in  
1950,  in  which  he  praised  the  resistance  as  a  role  model  for  the  “free  people  
of   the   world”   and   requested   that   “the   victims   of   20   July   may   serve   as   a  
reminder,   model   and   example   in   the   struggle   against   the   dangers   of  
dictatorships”.130  Through  these  statements,  Kaiser  deliberately  attempted  to  
elevate  the  military  resistance  to  a  general  national  liberation  movement  and  
                                                                                                 
129  Drei  Jahre  danach,  Neue  Zeit,  20.07.1947.  
130  Jakob  Kaiser,  Speech  in  Nord  West  Deutscher  Rundfunk,  20.07.1950  at  20:00  hrs,  cited  in:  
Fröhlich,  Phasen  und  Themen  der  Judikatur  zum  20.  Juli  1944,  p.  210.  
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thereby   paved   the  way   for   it   to   become   part   of   the   founding  myth   of   the  
FRG.    
Yet  Kaiser’s  commitment  to  the  cause  was  not  only  personal,  but  also  led  by  
strong  pragmatic  political  motives.  Following  the  numerous  defamations  of  
the   military   resistance   by   veteran   associations,   as   well   as   right-­‐‑wing  
politicians   throughout   1951,   the   Allied   Commission   became   increasingly  
anxious   about   a   re-­‐‑emergence   of   National   Socialist   tendencies,   and  
demanded  action  on  behalf  of  the  government.  In  reaction,  Jakob  Kaiser  gave  
a   speech   on   2   October   1951,   as   the   official   representative   of   Konrad  
Adenauer,   in  which   he   condemned   these   defamatory   outbursts.   “The  men  
and  women  of  the  20  July  proved  to  the  world  that  not  all  Germans  had  been  
taken  in  by  National  Socialism.”131  The  government  tended  to  be  very  careful  
in   taking  a  stance  about   the  resistance,  and  in   this  case,  only  came  forward  
due  to  considerable  Allied  pressure.  Furthermore,  it  was  characteristic  of  the  
ambivalence   of   the  Adenauer   administration   that  Adenauer   had   originally  
intended   to   give   the   speech   himself,   but   had   changed   his  mind   at   the   last  
moment,132  instead  passing  on  this  delicate  matter  to  one  of  his  ministers,  in  
order  to  escape  the  line  of  fire.  For  some  time,  this  speech  was  to  remain  one  
                                                                                                 
131  David  Clay  Large,  Uses  of  the  Past:  The  Anti-­‐‑Nazi  Resistance  Legacy  in  the  Federal  
Republic  of  Germany,  in:  David  Clay  Large  (ed.),  Contending  with  Hitler:  Varieties  of  German  
Resistance  in  the  Third  Reich  (Cambridge,  1995),  p.  167.  
132  Klaus  Gotto,  Hans-­‐‑Otto  Kleinmann,  Reinhard  Schreiner  (eds),  Im  Zentrum  der  Macht:  Das  
Tagebuch  von  Staatssekretär  Lenz,  1951–1953  (Düsseldorf,  1989),  p.  81.  
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of  the  very  few  official  statements  of  the  Adenauer  administration  in  support  
of  the  military  resistance.133      
Another  protagonist   in   this   context  was  Otto  Lenz,  permanent   secretary  of  
the  German  Chancellery  from  1951  to  1953  and  former  member  of  the  group  
supporting  Carl  Goerdeler.  Designated  for  the  same  position  in  Goerdeler’s  
shadow  cabinet,  Lenz  was  intended  to  occupy  one  of  the  key  roles  in  a  post-­‐‑
Nazi  government.  Imprisoned  shortly  after  20  July  1944,  he  was  sentenced  to  
four   years   in   gaol   and   remained   there   until   the   end   of   the   war.   In   the  
summer  of  1945,  Lenz  served  as  one  of  the  founding  fathers  of  the  Christian  
Democratic   Party   (CDU)   and   consequently   became   one   of   the   most  
prominent  politicians  of  the  early  Federal  Republic.134  His  position  as  head  of  
the   Chancellery   provided   him   with   enormous   influence.   Given   his  
background,  it  is  not  surprising  that  he  became  one  of  the  main  advocates  of  
the  military   resistance   in   the   immediate   post-­‐‑war   era.   Norbert   Frei   points  
him   out   as   the   key   personality   who   repeatedly   and   deliberately   tried   to  
induce   Adenauer   to   acknowledge   officially   the   actions   of   the   military  
resistance.  The  official  statement  2  October  1951  given  by  Kaiser  on  behalf  of  
the  government  was  apparently  also  initiated  and  devised  by  Otto  Lenz.135  In  
                                                                                                 
133  Peter  Steinbach,  Widerstand  im  Dritten  Reich  –  Die  Keimzelle  der  Nachkriegsdemokratie?  
Die  Auseinandersetzung  mit  dem  Widerstand  in  der  historischen  politischen  Bildungsarbeit,  
in  den  Medien  und  in  der  öffentlichen  Meinung  nach  1945,  in:  Gerd  R.  Ueberschär  (ed.),  Der  
20.  Juli  1944.  Bewertung  und  Rezeption  des  deutschen  Widerstandes  gegen  das  NS-­‐‑Regime  
(Cologne,  1994),  p.  98.  
134  See:  Kurzer  Lebenslauf  Otto  Lenz,  Kommission  für  Geschichte  des  Parlamentarismus  und  
der  politischen  Parteien  e.  V.,  online  at:  www.kgparl.de/online-­‐‑volksvertretung/pdf/mdb-­‐‑
l.pdf.  
135  Norbert  Frei,  1945  und  wir,  Erinnerungskampf:  Der  20.  Juli  in  den  Bonner  Anfangsjahren  
(Munich,  2005),  p.  139.  
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addition   to   his   continuous   clandestine   impact   on   Konrad   Adenauer,   Otto  
Lenz  also  took  a  public  stance  in  support  of  the  resistance.  Characteristic  of  
his   work   was   his   speech   at   the   nine-­‐‑year   anniversary   of   the   plot   in   the  
Bendlerblock   in   Berlin,   where   he,   alongside   Professor   Ernst   Reuter,  
extensively   praised   the   conspirators’   sacrifice   for   the   greater   good   of  
Germany.136    
While   Kaiser   and   Lenz   can   arguably   be   regarded   as   the   most   outspoken  
advocates   of   the  military   resistance   in  Adenauer’s   cabinet,   one   should   not  
forget   the  persistent  work  of  Robert  Lehr,  which  was  especially  dominated  
by   his   relentless   efforts   to   counter   the   re-­‐‑emergence   of   National   Socialist  
tendencies  in  the  Federal  Republic.  Lehr,  who  had  been  mayor  of  Düsseldorf  
during  the  Weimar  Republic,  was  removed  from  office  by  the  Nazis  in  1933  
and  subsequently  joined  the  resistance.  Unlike  Lenz,  however,  he  was  able  to  
escape  the  purges  of  the  Gestapo  following  20  July  1944.  At  the  behest  of  the  
Allies,   Lehr   occupied   several   posts   after   the   war   before   joining   Lenz   in  
becoming   a   founding   member   of   the   CDU.137  In   1950,   he   was   appointed  
Home  Secretary  and  promptly  began  to  rigorously  fight  the  re-­‐‑emerging  neo-­‐‑
National   Socialist   movement.   The   Socialist   Reich   Party   (Sozialistische  
Reichspartei),  the  self-­‐‑appointed  successor  party  of  the  NSDAP,  was  founded  
in  1949  under  the  leadership  of  former  Major  General  Otto-­‐‑Ernst  Remer,  who  
had  been  responsible  for  the  violent  suppression  of  the  attempted  coup  of  20  
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July  1944.  Alarmed  by  the  party’s  growing  popularity,  especially  in  Northern  
Germany,  Lehr  uncompromisingly  demanded  the   immediate  prohibition  of  
the   party.  At   this   time,   however,   the   Federal  Constitutional  Court   had  not  
yet  been  founded  and  the  majority  of  Lehr’s  colleagues  in  the  cabinet  refused  
to   act   without   it.   It   was   therefore   another   year   until   the   government   took  
legal   action   against   the   SRP.138  In   the  meantime,   Lehr’s   feud  with   the   SRP,  
and   especially  Remer,   continued.  When  Remer   accused   the   conspirators   of  
treason  in  May  1951,  it  was  Lehr  himself  who  pressed  charges,  and  thus  laid  
the  groundwork  for  the  Remer  trial  and  the  subsequent  legal  rehabilitation  of  
the  military  resistance.    
Strong  support  for  the  resistance  also  came  from  the  official  bulletins  of  the  
government.  Two  special  editions   in  honour  of   the   failed  coup   in  1952  and  
1954   show   how   deliberately,   although   still   not   explicitly,   the   government  
worked   for   the   commemoration   of   the   resistance.139  These   editions,   once  
again,  also  clearly  reflect  the  efforts  to  link  the  foundation  of  the  FRG  to  the  
principles  of  the  resistance  movement,  and  hence  portray  the  FRG  as  a  state  
which   had   emerged   from   the   national   liberation  movement   against  Hitler.  
Despite   the   legal   acquittal   in   1952,   increasing   support   by  politicians,   and  a  
growing   acceptance   among   the   public,   it   was   not   until   the   ten-­‐‑year  
anniversary   of   20   July   1944   that   the   government   officially   exonerated   the  
military   resistance.   Theodor   Heuss’   speech   in   the   Bendlerblock   clearly  
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marked   the   caesura   in   the   acceptance   process   of   20   July   and   the  
entrenchment  of  the  military  resistance  in  public  memory.    
As  president  of  the  FRG,  Heuss  was  seen  as  the  pinnacle  moral  authority  of  
the  republic.  Having  lost  several  friends  during  the  purges  that  followed  20  
July   1944,   Heuss   had   not   only   political,   but   also   personal,   motivations   at  
heart.  His   speech   19   July   1954   at   the   auditorium   of   the   Free  University   of  
Berlin  intended  once  again  to  draw  a  connection  between  the  resistance  and  
a   general   national   liberation   movement.   In   his   speech,   Heuss   elaborately  
addressed  the  ethical  predicament  of  the  conspirators  who  swayed  between  
the   binding   power   of   their   oath   and   the   imperatives   of   conscience.   He  
explicitly   justified  their  actions  by  reference   to   the   fact   that   the  Third  Reich  
had  been  an  “entirely  discredited  regime”.140  Heuss  claimed  that  every  oath  
included  a  bilateral  obligation  and  that  Hitler  “had  already  –  in  a  technical-­‐‑
legal,   as  well   as   a  moral-­‐‑historical   sense   –   repeatedly   broken   that   oath”.141  
Thus  Heuss  not  only  picked  up  Bauer’s  argument  from  the  Remer  trial,  but  
simultaneously   also   addressed   the   concerns   of   millions   of   former   soldiers  
who   believed   the   actions   of   the   resistance   to   have   accelerated   the  military  
downfall   of  Germany.  He   insisted   that  Hitler’s  war   against   the  world   had  
already  been  lost  by  that  time:  “surely,  there  remain  only  very  few  sensible  
people   today   who   might   dispute   this”.142   Furthermore,   Heuss   explicitly  
refrained   from   establishing   an   obligation   to   resist,   and   thereby   inculpated  
                                                                                                 
140  Theodor  Heuss,  Der  20.  Juli  1944,  Rede  des  Bundespräsidenten  Prof.  Dr.  Theodor  Heuss  
am  19.  Juli  1954  im  Auditorium  Maximum  der  Freien  Universität  Berlin,  online  at:  www.20-­‐‑
juli-­‐‑44.de/reden/.  
141  Ibid,  p.  3.  
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the  bulk  of  the  Wehrmacht  that  had  not  resisted,  but  rather  sanctioned  action  
against   a   criminal   regime.   He   delineated   the   exceptional   situation   of   the  
conspirators  and  emphasised  that  “their  behaviour  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  
universal   norm,   but   as   a   morally   legitimate   decision   in   an   extraordinary  
situation”.143  
This  successful  balancing  act  of  simultaneously  accounting  for   the  concerns  
of  the  soldiers,  as  well  as  the  deeds  of  the  resistance,  turned  out  to  be  crucial  
for  the  gradual  reconciliation  of  both  factions.  As  Ernst  Wolfgang  Becker  has  
argued,  Heuss  succeeded  not  only  in  initiating  a  turning  point  within  public  
reception,  but  also   in  establishing  a  positive   tradition  of  commemoration.144  
Nevertheless,   certain   parts   of   society   clearly   perceived   his   speech   as  
somewhat  a  provocation,   and  dozens  of   furious   letters   reached   the  Federal  
President’s  Office   in   the   following  weeks.145  The  media,  however,   generally  
responded   positively,   not   only   to   Heuss’   speech,   but   also   to   the  
commemoration   in   general.  Almost   all   the  major   newspapers   opened  with  
comprehensive   articles   on   the   failed   coup   and   various   radio   stations  
broadcasted   a   concerted  program  about   “what  happened   ten  years   ago”.146  
The   SZ   printed   the   entire   speech,   added   farewell   letters   of   executed  
resistance   fighters,  and  concluded:  “no  officer,   soldier  or  civil   servant,  who  
himself  lacked  the  moral  courage  to  take  extraordinary  decisions  due  to  their  
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145  Becker,  Theodor  Heuss,  Bürger  im  Zeitalter  der  Extreme,  pp.  328/329.  
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own  weakness   at   the   time,  nowadays  has   the   right   to  denounce   as   traitors  
those   who   had   the   courage   to   act”. 147   The   Neue   Zeitung   saw   in   the  
conspirators  “men  who,   for   the  sake  of   their  people,   risked  everything  and  
sacrificed  themselves”148  and  the  FAZ  remarked  in  reference  to  Heuss’  speech  
that  “all  we  know  is  this:  the  20th  of  July  1944  was  the  proudest  day  in  those  
murky   twelve   years”.149  Furthermore,   the   Bundestag   issued   a   cross-­‐‑party  
initiative   in  which   it  prompted   the  government   to  “publish   the  speech  and  
distribute   complimentary   brochures   to   the   youth”.   The   first   edition  
amounted   to   3.2   million   copies,   and   thereby   not   only   secured   enormous  
publicity,   but   also   characterised   the   speech   as   an   official   statement   of   the  
government.150    
Conclusion  
In  conclusion,  the  positive  establishment  of  the  military  resistance  in  public  
memory  can  be  considered  as  a  long  and  bumpy  road.  The  early  years  were  
clearly  dominated  by  individual  attempts  of  commemoration  on  the  part  of  
people  connected  to  the  coup  and  widespread  suppression  on  the  part  of  the  
general  public.  The  overcoming  of  the  immediate  post-­‐‑war  struggles  and  the  
foundation   of   the   Federal   Republic,   however,   significantly   changed   this  
situation,   and   allowed   the   resistance   to   become   a   topic   of   public   interest,  
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though  it  continued  to  be  fiercely  debated  over  the  following  years  in  court,  
as  well  as  in  public.  
Although   the   nobility   as   a   corporate   actor   did   not   dominate   or   steer   this  
process,   noblemen   and   –women   significantly   contributed   both   to   the  
rehabilitation   of   the   military   resistance   and   to   its   establishment   as   the  
primary   resistance  movement   against   the  Nazi   regime.   By   serving   as   joint  
plaintiffs  and  witnesses  in  court,  as  lobbyists  within  the  Hilfswerk  20  July  and  
as  authors  of  detailed  books  and  articles  about  the  motives  and  convictions  
of  the  conspirators,  these  nobles  helped  to  form  the  foundation  of  a  positive  
commemoration  of   the  military   resistance.  The   task  of  paving   the  way   to  a  
gradual  reconciliation  with  public  traction  ultimately  fell  to  members  of  the  
government.   The   president’s   speech   at   the   ten-­‐‑year   anniversary   tipped   the  
balance  in  favour  of  a  positive  commemoration.    
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The  ‘Ennoblement’  of  the  Military  Resistance  
Introduction  
As   imperative   as   the   rehabilitation   of   the   resistance  was   for   the   surviving  
members  and  their  relatives,  it  also  proved  to  be  of  profound  importance  for  
the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility  as  a  social  class.  Through  deliberate  association  with  
the   resistance   movement,   the   nobility   was   able   to   begin   restoring   their  
standing   in   German   society.   How   representatives   of   the   German   nobility  
established   this   association,   what   the   resulting   consequences   for   their  
reputation  were,  and  what  this  meant  for  the  legacy  of  the  resistance,  are  the  
subjects  of  this  chapter.  Before  dealing  with  this  development,  we  must  recall  
the  point  of  departure,  namely,   that   in  1945,   the  majority  of   the  population  
was  aware  that  the  nobility,  in  a  very  prominent  and  a  visible  way,  had  been  
involved   in   the  Nazi   seizure  of  power  and   the  subsequent  consolidation  of  
the  regime.  
Convergence  and  Estrangement:  the  Nazis’  Ambiguous  Relationship  with  
the  Nobility  
In   the   early   1930s,   the   Nazi   movement   and   the   old   elites   faced   similarly  
precarious   situations.   The   belief   gained   ground   that   strategic   cooperation  
between   them   could   yield   reciprocal   benefits.   Despite   their   electoral  
successes,   the  Nazis  had  not  yet   found  a  way  to  seize  control  over  German  
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politics.   The   levers   of   power   –   from   the   presidential   office   to   the   higher  
bureaucracy  and  the  officer  corps  –  were  still   in   the  hands  of   the  old  elites.  
Over   the   same   period,   however,   those   elites   had   gradually   lost   their  
influence   over   the   basis   of   German   politics   and   society.1     To   many   elite  
conservatives,  it  seemed  obvious  that  the  key  to  breaking  the  deadlock  lay  in  
collaboration  with  Hitler.  The  main  proponents  of  this  idea  were:  the  military  
leaders   connected  with  General   Kurt   von   Schleicher;   a   faction   of   the   East-­‐‑
Elbian   landowners;   the   reactionary   wing   of   heavy   industry   from   the  
Rhineland;   and   the   German   National   People’s   Party   (Deutschnationale  
Volkspartei),   led  by  Alfred  Hugenberg.2  By  the  beginning  of  1933,   they  had  
come   to   the   conclusion   that   Hitler   was   the   most   promising   candidate   not  
only   for   ensuring   a   reconnection   with   the   masses,   but   also   for   restoring  
Germany    to  its  former  hegemonic  position  in  Europe.3  Within  these  groups,  
the  nobility  still  played  a  key  role.  Based  on  their  strong  position  within  the  
army,   the   civil   service,   and   the   Gutsbezirke,   the   support   of   the   nobility  
proved   to   be   a   decisive   factor   in   the   amalgamation   of   the   Nazis   and   the  
traditional  elites  in  1933.4    
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in:  Schmädeke  und  Steinbach  (eds),  Der  Widerstand  gegen  den  Nationalsozialismus,  pp.  24–27.  
4  For  points  of  contact  between  the  Nazis  and  the  nobility  especially  see  Stephan  
Malinowski’s  chapter:  Der  deutsche  Adel  und  die  NS-­‐‑Bewegung,  in:  Malinowski,  Vom  König  
zum  Führer,  pp.  476  et  sqq.;  for  the  nobility’s  role  in  the  army  see:  Francis  L.  Carsten,  Der  
preußische  Adel  bis  1945,  in:  Hans-­‐‑Ulrich  Wehler  (ed.),  Europäischer  Adel  1750–1950  
(Göttingen,  1990),  pp.  120–123;  Albert  Grzesinski,  the  interior  minister  of  Prussia  in  the  late  
1920s,  referred  to  the  Gutsbezirke  as  “small  absolute  lordships”,  which  continued  to  
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The  prominent  and  visible  roles  many  noblemen  played  during  the  final  year  
of   the   Weimar   Republic   made   it   easy   to   hold   the   nobility   as   a   whole  
responsible   for   the   collapse   of   the   democratic   system.   Following   Heinrich  
Brüning’s  and  Wilhelm  Groener’s  resignations  as  Chancellor  and  Minister  of  
Defence   respectively,  President  Paul  von  Hindenburg  appointed  Franz  von  
Papen   and   Kurt   von   Schleicher   on   1   June   1932.   Papen   quickly   set   up   a  
staunchly  conservative  cabinet,  which  would  later  be  known  as  the  “Cabinet  
of   Barons”   due   to   its   predominant   share   of   noblemen. 5   In   doing   so,  
Hindenburg,   who   had   seen   Brüning’s   failure   to   ensure   his   re-­‐‑election   in  
spring   1932   by  means   of   a   united   conservative   front   as   a   personal   insult6,  
hoped   that   Papen   would   be   able   to   stabilise   the   political   situation   and  
achieve  a  gathering  of  all  right  wing  forces  to  reinforce  the  power  of  the  old  
elites   and   prevent   any   further   drift   to   the   left.   Papen’s,   and   subsequently  
Schleicher’s,   complete   failure   to  bring   this  about  eventually  paved   the  way  
for  Hitler’s  appointment  to  the  chancellorship  in  January  1933.    
Additionally,   numerous   noblemen   facilitated   the   rise   of   National   Socialist  
organisations  such  as  the  Sturmabteilung  (SA)  and  Schutzstaffel  (SS).  Among  
the   high-­‐‑ranking   SA   leaders   –   Stabschefs,   Obergruppenführer   and  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
guarantee  noble  power  in  the  rural  areas  of  East  Elbia.  See:  Albert  Grzesinski,  Im  Kampf  um  
die  deutsche  Republik.  Erinnerungen  eines  Sozialdemokraten  (Munich,  2001),  p.  198.  
5  Papen’s  cabinet  consisted  of  one  count,  four  barons,  two  untitled  noblemen  and  only  three  
commoners.  See:  Karsten  Steiger,  Kooperation,  Konfrontation,  Untergang,  Das  Weimarer  Tarif-­‐‑  
und  Schlichtungswesen  während  der  Weltwirtschaftskrise  und  seine  Vorbedingungen  (Stuttgart,  
1998),  p.  219.  
6  Hindenburg’s  re-­‐‑election  was  eventually  secured  by  the  votes  of  the  social  democrats  and  
the  Zentrum  who  saw  him  as  the  lesser  evil  in  comparison  to  Adolf  Hitler,  who  had  been  
able  to  gather  numerous  conservative  votes.  See:  Winkler,  Requiem  für  eine  Republik,  in:  
Steinbach  und  Tuchel  (eds),  Widerstand  gegen  den  Nationalsozialismus,  p.  61.  
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Gruppenführer   –   approximately   ten   per   cent   were   noblemen.7  Similarly,  
members  of  the  nobility  held  fourteen  per  cent  of  the  highest  SS  ranks.8  Yet,  
while   entries   into   the   lower   ranks   remained   limited,   noblemen   indirectly  
supported   the   organisations’   activities   by   providing   funds   and   facilities.  
Especially   in   Silesia   and   East   Prussia,   many   estates   were   offered   as   SA  
training  camps  –  among  them,  the  vast  estates  of  Hermann  Count  Dohna  and  
Konrad   Count   Finckenstein   –   and   hence   significantly   assisted   in   the   fine-­‐‑
tuning   of   SA’s   running   and   organisation. 9   In   such   areas,   where   the  
patrimonial  system  was  still  very  much  in  motion,  such  open  fraternisation  
of  the  landed  gentry  and  the  organisations  of  the  regime  did  have  significant  
influence  on  the  rural  population.    
Additionally,   the   symbolism   of   the   public   support   offered   by   individuals,  
such  as  Prince  August  Wilhelm  of  Prussia  and  Duke  Carl  Eduard  of  Sachsen-­‐‑
Coburg-­‐‑Gotha,  was  vital   at   the   time,   as   it   bestowed  a  degree  of   legitimacy  
upon   the   new  movement.   It   is   worth   reaffirming   that   during   this   period,  
Germany  was  still  a  class-­‐‑conscious  society.  Centuries  of   submissiveness   to  
the  aristocracy  had  not  yet  been  overcome  in   the  short  span  of   the  Weimar  
                                                                                                 
7  Bruce  B.  Campbell,  The  SA  Generals  and  the  Rise  of  Nazism  (Kentucky,  1998),  pp.  164–166.  
8  Malinowski,  Es  war  kein  Aufstand  des  Adels,  Cicero,  01.07.2004.  Also  see:  Eckart  Conze,  
Adel  unter  dem  Totenkopf.  Die  Idee  eines  Neuadels  in  den  Gesellschaftsvorstellungen  der  
SS,  in:  Eckart  Conze  und  Monika  Wienfort  (eds),  Adel  und  Moderne  –  Deutschland  im  
europäischen  Vergleich  im  19.  Und  20.  Jahrhundert  (Cologne,  2004),  pp.  151–180.  
9  Stephan  Malinowski  und  Sven  Reichardt,  Die  Reihen  fest  geschlossen?  Adlige  im  
Führerkorps  der  SA  bis  1934,  in:  Conze  und  Wienfort  (eds),  Adel  und  Moderne,  p.  140.  
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Republic.   The   emphatic   support   of   August   Wilhelm,   the   Kaiser’s   son,  
reconciled  a  certain  number  of  sceptics.10  
This   association   between   nobility   and   National   Socialism   was   further  
amplified  by  the  nobility’s  strong  position  in  the  Wehrmacht  and  especially  
the  general  staff.  Although  the  massive  expansion  of  the  officer  corps  in  the  
1930s   had   reduced   the   nobility’s   share   of   the   corps   significantly,   nobles  
nevertheless   maintained   an   immensely   strong   position   among   the   leading  
ranks   of   the   army.11  Illustrious   names   like   v.   Manstein,   v.   Rundstedt,   v.  
Kleist,  v.  Kluge,  v.  Arnim,  v.  Witzleben,  and  many  more,  became  symbols  of  
Hitler’s  war  in  the  East,  and  hence  founded  the  immediate  post-­‐‑war  popular  
perception  of  the  nobility’s  entanglement  with  the  regime.    
The  narrative  of   the  nobility’s  role   in  the  Third  Reich,  however,  has  always  
been  twofold.  “Without  the  nobility  there  would  not  have  been  a  20  July  1944  
–   but   neither   a   30   January   1933.”12  The   role   of   the   nobility   in   the   events   of  
January  1933  is  today  largely  forgotten;  by  contrast,  the  failed  coup  of  20  July  
1944   is   almost   exclusively   associated   with   one   of   the   most   important  
founding  myths  of  the  German  Federal  Republic.  Yet,  in  the  immediate  post-­‐‑
war  era,  that  was  not  the  case.    
                                                                                                 
10  Jonathan  Petropoulos,  Royals  and  the  Reich  –  The  Princes  von  Hessen  in  Nazi  Germany  (New  
York,  2006),  p.  98;  Also  see  Lothar  Machtan,  Der  Kaisersohn  bei  Hitler  (Hamburg,  2006).  
11  In  fact,  no  less  than  thirteen  out  of  twenty  Field  Marshalls  of  the  army  belonged  to  the  
nobility.  See:  Jürgen  Förster,  Die  Wehrmacht  im  NS-­‐‑Staat.  Eine  strukturgeschichtliche  Analyse  
(Munich,  2009),  p.  111.  
12  Alle  berühmten  Familien  waren  dabei,  Interview  mit  Stephan  Malinowski,  SPIEGEL  
Special  Geschichte,  1/2008,  29.01.2008.  
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By   then,   the   rampantly   anti-­‐‑noble   comments   of   Hitler   and   his   entourage,  
who   had   tried   to   destroy   the   remaining   vestiges   of   noble   power   after   the  
failed   coup,   had   found   their  way   into   public  memory.  Hitler   defamed   the  
conspirators  as  a  small  “clique  of  counts  and  reactionaries”13  and  announced  
to  a  group  of  workers  only  hours  after  the  failed  coup  that  it  was  his  “deep  
belief,  that  my  enemies  are  the  ‘vons’,  who  call  themselves  aristocrats”14  and  
thereby   associated   the   nobility   as   a   whole   with   treachery.   Robert   Ley’s  
infamous  speech  soon  after,  in  which  he  labelled  the  nobility  as  “degenerated  
to  the  bone,  blue-­‐‑blooded  to  the  point  of  idiocy,  obnoxiously  corrupt  and  as  
cowardly  as  all  mean  creatures”  did  not  improve  their  reputation.15  Christian  
von   Bernstorff   described   the   ramifications   of   this   anti-­‐‑noble   propaganda  
retrospectively   in   1949.   “Now  we   felt   the   consequences,  which,   due   to   the  
fact  that  the  coup  had  been  the  work  of  noblemen,  were  directed  against  us  
as  a  social  class.”16  Already  existing  animosities  were  now  intensified  by  an  
omnipresent  odium  of  treason.  Thus,  although  the  Nazis  did  not  succeed  in  
destroying   the   nobility   root   and   branch,   their   propaganda  during   the   final  
months   of   the   Third   Reich   significantly   contributed   to   a   hostile   public  
perception  of  this  caste  in  the  immediate  post-­‐‑war  years.  
This  negative  attitude  had  not  suddenly  emerged  during  the  final  months  of  
the  regime.  Rather,  it  was  the  product  of  a  long  process  that  dated  back  to  the  
                                                                                                 
13  Walter  Demel  und  Sylvia  Schraut,  Der  deutsche  Adel:  Lebensformen  und  Geschichte  (Munich,  
2014),  p.  119.  
14  Domarus,  Hitler.  Reden  und  Proklamationen,  p.  2127.  
15  Robert  Ley,  Gott  schütze  den  Führer,  Der  Angriff,  23.07.1944,  cited  in:  Eckart  Conze,  Adel  
und  Adeligkeit  im  Widerstand  des  20.  Juli  1944,  in:  Reif  (ed.),  Adel  und  Bürgertum  in  
Deutschland  II,  p.  269.  
16  Conze,  Von  Deutschem  Adel,  p.  203.  
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formative  years  of   the  NSDAP.  As  early  as  1924,  during  his   time   in  prison,  
Hitler  repeatedly  disparaged  the  nobility  as  a  caste  whose  “propagation  was  
based  solely  on  social  and  financial  constraint”,  a  fact  which  ultimately  led  to  
“complete   degeneration”.17  Similarly,   Walther   Darré,   the   subsequent   Reich  
Minister  of  Food  and  Agriculture,  railed  against  the  nobility  in  a  pamphlet  in  
1930,   in   which   he   claimed   that   “the   majority   of   today’s   nobility”   would  
“hardly  possess  enough  pure  blood  […]  to  rival  any  predominantly  Nordic  
peasant   boy”.18  Besides   a   genuine   contempt   for   the   old   elites,   this   violent  
language  was  most   certainly   also   inspired   by   the   snobbery   of  many   noble  
families   towards   the   National   Socialist   “upstarts”. 19   Papen’s   infamous  
comment   that   he   had   temporarily   ‘hired’   Hitler,   as   well   as   Hindenburg’s  
practice   of   referring   to   Hitler   as   the   “Bohemian   lance-­‐‑corporal”,   are   vivid  
displays  of  the  nobility’s  initial  attitude.    
These   early   populist   comments   from   dignitaries   of   the   NSDAP   were   still  
expressions   of   the   original   class   struggle   mentality   on   which   the   early  
ideology  of   the  National  Socialist  Party  was  built.  Once  Hitler  had   realised  
during   the   early   1930s   that   a   seizure   of   power   was   only   possible   in  
association  with  the  old  elites  rather  than  against  them,  this  violent  rhetoric  
soon  disappeared  and  made  way  for  a  more  co-­‐‑operative  relationship.  Their  
newly   discovered   mutual   regard   was   expressed   by   Adolf   Prince   of  
Bentheim-­‐‑Tecklenburg-­‐‑Rheda,  the  head  of  the  powerful  German  Association  of  
                                                                                                 
17  Adolf  Hitler,  Mein  Kampf,  p.  270,  cited  in:  Carsten,  Geschichte  der  preußischen  Junker,  p.  179.  
18  Georg  H.  Kleine,  Adelsgenossenschaft  und  Nationalsozialismus,  in:  Vierteljahreshefte  für  
Zeitgeschichte,  26:1  (1978),  p.  113.  
19  For  examples  of  the  nobility’s  undying  snobbery  towards  the  Nazis,  see  various  examples  
in  post-­‐‑war  autobiographies  in  chapter  III  of  this  thesis.  
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Nobles,  who  assured  Hitler   in   the   summer  of   1933  of   the   “allegiance  of   the  
German  nobility”,  adding  that  he  intended  to  carry  out  “a  large  scale  purge  
[…]  among  the  ranks  of   the  nobility”.     This   initiative  ultimately  resulted   in  
the   expulsion   of   almost   two   hundred   and   fifty   noble   members   whose  
lineage,  dating  back  to  1750,  had  included  either  Jewish  or  ‘coloured’  blood.20  
Even  the  more  leftist  Joseph  Goebbels  cautiously  took  to  the  rapprochement,  
as   his   diary   reveals.   On   31   January   1931,   an   evening   he   spent   at   the   von  
Dirksens,   he   noted:   “many   visitors   there:   a   nice   girl,   the   daughter   of   the  
Empress,  Prince  Louis  Ferdinand,  Prince  Philipp  von  Hessen,  the  son-­‐‑in-­‐‑law  
of  the  king  of  Italy  –  a  very  nice  and  inspirational  man”.21      
Post-­‐‑war  Perceptions:  Nobility  and  Nazis  as  Two  Sides  of  One  Coin    
Oddly   enough,   both   the   initial   disparagements   and   the   subsequent  
cooperation   proved   harmful   to   the   nobility’s   reputation   in   the   immediate  
post  war   years.   Parts   of   society  which   had  maintained   their   loyalty   to   the  
‘Führer’,   even   beyond   the   downfall   of   the   Third   Reich,   now   remembered  
Hitler’s   initial   reservations   towards   the   nobility   and   partly   blamed   the  
nobility,   especially   in   conjunction   with   the   events   of   20   July   1944,   for   the  
collapse  of   the   regime.  The  majority  of   sceptics,   though,   regarded  National  
Socialism   and   Junkertum   as   two   sides   of   one   coin,   and   the   nobility   as  
                                                                                                 
20  Kleine:  Adelsgenossenschaft  und  Nationalsozialismus,  in:  Vierteljahreshefte  für  
Zeitgeschichte,  p.  119.  
21  Elke  Fröhlich  (ed.),  Die  Tagebücher  von  Joseph  Goebbels,  Teil  I  Aufzeichnungen  1923–1941  Band  
2/I  Dezember  1929  –  Mai  1931  (Munich,  2005),  p.  336;  For  the  social  rapprochement  between  
the  nobility  and  the  Nazi  elites  also  see:  Fabrice  d’Almeida,  High  Society  in  the  Third  Reich  
(Cambridge,  2008),  pp.  141–171.  
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significantly   responsible   for   the   downfall   of   Germany.22  These   sentiments  
expressed   themselves   in   popular   demands   that   the   Junkers   be   held  
accountable.  This  was  especially  true  for  the  Soviet  Occupation  Zone  (SOZ),  
in   which   most   of   the   remaining   estates   of   the   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility   were  
situated.  The  vast  majority  of  the  noble  estates  had  already  been  relinquished  
during  the  final  months  of  the  war  when  the  Red  Army  had  swept  through  
East  Elbia,  looting  and  plundering  the  manor  houses  and  executing  the  few  
who  had   stayed  behind.  Among   them  were  members   of   all   the  great  East-­‐‑
Elbian   families.   In   East   Prussia,   Alexander   Count   von   Keyserlingk,   Adolf  
von   Puttkamer,   Maria   Countess   Lehndorff,   and   her   son,   Heinfried,   were  
shot.  In  Silesia,  Colonel  Hans  von  Witzendorff  and  his  wife  suffered  the  same  
fate.   In   Pomerania,   Conrad   von   Kleist   and   Wilhelm   Count   Finck   von  
Finckenstein  were  executed,   and  Henry  von  Zitzewitz  was  drowned   in   the  
lake  of  Templin.  Wilhelm  Count  von  Schlieffen,  Rüdiger  von  der  Goltz  and  
Günther  von  Puttkamer  were  deported  to  the  Soviet  Union.  Others,  such  as  
Sybille   Countess   von   Bismarck,   the   daughter   in   law   of   the   former   Reich  
Chancellor,   Cora   von   Alvensleben,   and   Gertrud   and   Irmgard   von   Knebel  
Doeberitz,  committed  suicide  to  escape  the  revenge  of  the  Soviets.23    
The   Soviet   occupational   government,   however,   went   still   further.   Only  
weeks   after   the   end   of   the   war,   the   Soviets   went   to   work   to   ensure   the  
complete   extinction   of   the   nobility   as   a   political   and   social   force,   by  
preparing  not  only  the  most  substantial  and  significant  land  reform  Germany  
                                                                                                 
22  Görlitz,  Die  Junker,  pp.  425,  426.  
23  For  the  above  and  more  examples  see:  Görlitz,  Die  Junker,  pp.  410–424.  
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had  ever  seen,  but  also  by  continuously  publicly  discrediting  the  Junkers  as  
the  ones  responsible  for  the  advent  of  Hitler  and  National  Socialism.    
As  early  as  August  1945,  the  in-­‐‑house  newspaper  of  the  Christian  Democratic  
Union   in   the   Soviet   Occupation   Zone   condemned   the   “old   reactionary  
Junkers”,   whose   “estates   had   been   the   breeding   ground   of   reaction”,   for  
“having   regularly  played   a  dangerous   role”   in  German  politics.24  A   similar  
stance  was  adopted  in  an  executive  order  from  the  provisional  government  
in  the  Soviet  Occupation  Zone  from  5  October  1945,  in  which  it  accused  the  
large   estate   owners   and   Junkers   of   “having   always   been   the   bearers   of  
militarism  and  chauvinism”,  whose  “reactionary   ideology  was   transformed  
into  the  most  radical  war-­‐‑ideology  during  the  reign  of  National  Socialism”.25  
Ultimately,  these  early  outbursts  of  anti-­‐‑Junker  sentiment  were  followed  up  
by   a   decree   which   demanded   that   “the   land   reform   must   guarantee   the  
liquidation  of  the  large  estate  owners  in  the  villages  because  this  has  always  
been   a   bastion   of   reaction   and   fascism   in   our   country   and  was   one   of   the  
main   sources   of   aggression   and   the   wars   of   conquest   against   other  
peoples”.26  
Whereas   these   comments  were  dominated  by  verbal   insults  directed  at   the  
Junkers,   and   hence   the   nobility   as   a   whole,   the   communist   brochure  
                                                                                                 
24  “Bodenreform“,  Neue  Zeit,  31.08.1945,  cited  in:  Dieter  Felbick,  Schlagwörter  der  
Nachkriegszeit  1945–1949  (Berlin,  2003),  p.  134.  
25  “Für  beschleunigte  Bodenreform  –  Aufruf  der  antifaschistischen  Parteien  und  
Gewerkschaften”  Durchführungsverordnung  45,  054,  03  vom  5.9.1945,  cited  in:  Felbick,  
Schlagwörter  der  Nachkriegszeit  1945–1949,  p.  352.  
26  Decree  on  Land  Reform  in  Land  Saxony,  Landesverwaltung  Sachsen,  Nachrichten,  24  
September  1945,  in:  Beate  Ruhm  von  Oppen  (ed.),  Documents  on  Germany  under  Occupation  
1945–1954  (London,  1955),  p.  59.  
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Junkerland   in   Bauernhand   went   even   further   by   stigmatising   individual  
families.   “Those   were   the   Kapp-­‐‑putschists:   the   Schwerins,   Brandensteins,  
Oertzens   and   Schulenburgs   […]   [who]   ever   since,   had   supplied   the  
reactionary  militarists  as  well  as,   in  our  time,   the  higher  SS-­‐‑leaders  and  the  
murderers  of  suppressed  peoples.”27  
Yet,   this   widespread   condemnation   of   the   Junkers   from   party   organs   and  
newspapers   in   the  Soviet  Occupation  Zone  did  not  come  as  a  surprise.  The  
bourgeoisie   and   landed   elites   had   always   been   the   class   enemy   of   the  
communist   ideology,   and   the   treatment   of   the   Russian   nobility   during   the  
1917  revolution  had  served  as  precedence  for  the  treatment  of  the  East-­‐‑Elbian  
nobility.   This   unique   situation   of   paramount   political   control   under   the  
auspices   of   the   Red   Army,   paired   with   an   almost   entirely   discouraged  
nobility,  encouraged  the  provisional  government  to  discredit  and  destroy  the  
remnants  of  the  old  elites  once  and  for  all.    
This  moral   condemnation   of   the   Junkers   seems   to   have   been   pervasive   in  
Western   Germany   too.   In   an   article   published   in   Die   Zeit   in   1948,   Ernst  
Friedländer   implied   that   following   the  war,   “the   Junkers   a  priori  had  been  
suspected   of   having   been   especially   closely   related   to   National   Socialism”  
and   “every  nobleman”  was   automatically  defamed   as   “Junker”.28  A   similar  
assessment  was  reported  by  a  correspondent  of  the  Manchester  Guardian,  who  
wrote  in  the  summer  of  1945  that  “there  seems  already  to  be  a  general  desire  
                                                                                                 
27  Junkerland  in  Bauernhand,  cited  in:  Görlitz,  Die  Junker,  p.  425.  
28  Der  Fehlstart,  Die  Zeit,  04.03.1948.  
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that   the   allies   should   deal   ruthlessly   with   high   party   officials,   Junkers,  
industrialists  and  diplomatists  who  escaped  to  the  West”.29    
Although  the  defamations  in  the  west  never  reached  the  dimensions  of  those  
in   the   SOZ,   the   pre-­‐‑existing   domestic   reservations,   as   shown   above,   were  
further  fuelled  by  the  prejudiced  reaction  of  the  Western  Allies.  In  a  control  
council   directive   from   January   1946,   the   Allies   specifically   demanded   the  
removal   from  office  of   all  people  who   could  be   linked   to   “Prussian   Junker  
tradition”.  “Information  as  to  any  individual,  however,  which  shows  him  to  
have   been   a   member   of   an   aristocratic   Prussian   or   East   Prussian,  
Pomeranian,   Silesian   or   Mecklenburg   family   […]   should   be   given   careful  
consideration.   Such   individuals   are   likely   to  merit   removal  by   exclusion  as  
they   are   likely   to   perpetuate   the   German   militaristic   traditions.”30  Along  
these   lines,   the  American  denazification  questionnaire   explicitly  demanded  
every  German  adult  to  “list  all  titles  of  nobility  ever  held  by  you  or  your  wife  
or  by  the  parents  or  grandparents  of  either  of  you”.31  This  practice,  as  Giles  
McDonogh   has   pointed   out,   suggested   that   antiquity   of   lineage   was  
“synonymous  with  political  unreliability”.     The   Junkers,   in  particular,  were  
accused  of  having   “helped   in  Hitler’s   rise   to  power”.32  This   conviction   also  
                                                                                                 
29  Jobs  for  Hitler’s  Opponents,  Our  Special  Correspondent,  Manchester  Guardian,  12.06.1945.  
30  Extracts  from  control  council  directive  no  24:  Removal  from  office  and  from  positions  of  
responsibility  of  Nazis  and  of  persons  hostile  to  allied  purposes,  in:  Oppen  (ed.),  Documents  
on  Germany,  p.  102.  
31  Kurt  Düwell,  War  Criminals,  Denazification  and  the  Treatment  of  SED  Functionaries:  A  
Comparative  Approach  to  Make  Some  Distinctions,  in:  Norbert  Finzsch  and  Jürgen  
Martschukat  (eds),  Different  Restorations,  Reconstruction  and  “Wiederaufbau”  in  the  United  
States  and  Germany  1865–1945-­‐‑1989  (Providence,  1996),  p.  194.  
32  Giles  McDonogh,  After  the  Reich:  From  the  Liberation  of  Vienna  to  the  Berlin  Airlift  (London,  
2007),  p.  347.  
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found  expression   in   the   severe  verdicts   of  many  early  denazification   trials.  
As   Jonathan  Petropopoulos  has  pointed  out,   the  punishments   tended   to  be  
more  severe  in  this  early  phase,  because  “both  the  Allies  and  the  indigenous  
German   authorities   in   the   West   sought   to   send   a   message   about   the  
pernicious  influence  of  the  old  elite”.33  
These  anti-­‐‑Junker  sentiments  on  the  part  of  the  Allies,  however,  were  by  no  
means  solely  a  product  of  the  Second  World  War.  On  the  contrary,  the  Allies  
could   draw   on   an   intellectually   highly   distinguished   tradition   of   anti-­‐‑
Junkerism  that  dated  back   to   the  eve  of   the  First  World  War.34  An   in-­‐‑depth  
analysis  of  this,  however,  would  exceed  the  framework  of  this  chapter.  Yet,  it  
bears   noting   that   there   were   various   key   essays   that   unequivocally  
demanded   the   elimination   of   the   Junkers   as   a   group   wielding   political  
influence,   published   years   before   the   Second   World   War   had   concluded,  
which  certainly  influenced  later  policy  making  of  the  Allies  in  Germany.    
There   are   a   few   threads   of   criticism  which  most   of   these  writings   have   in  
common,   such  as   the  allegation   that   the   Junkers  “have  been   the  authors  or  
co-­‐‑authors  of   all   the   acts   of   aggression  perpetrated  by  Germany   in   the   last  
seventy  or  eighty  years”35  culminating  in  their  conspiracy  “with  Hindenburg  
                                                                                                 
33  Petropoulos,  Royals  and  the  Reich,  p.  336.  
34  See:  especially  Thorstein  Veblen,  Imperial  Germany  and  the  Industrial  Revolution  (New  York,  
1915).  Also  see  the  numerous  speeches  of  the  American  union  leader  Eugene  Debs,  who  
frequently  condemned  the  Junkers  as  warmongers.  Eugene  V.  Debs,  The  Canton  Ohio  Anti-­‐‑
War  Speech,  16.06.1918,  reprinted  in:  Socialist  Viewpoint,  3:3  (2003),  online  at:  
http://www.socialistviewpoint.org/march_03/mar_03_26.html.  
35  Gerschenkron,  Bread  and  Democracy,  p.  173.  
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to   make   Hitler   Chancellor   of   the   Reich”.36  Furthermore   the   Junkers   were  
accused  of  being  “a  caste  imprisoned  in  its  own  archaic  economy  and  social  
system”,37  “a  group  which  always  has  been  prepared  to  sacrifice  the  peace  of  
the   world   for   ‘the   grand   agrarian   alchemy’   of   high   grain   prices”.38  As   a  
result,  these  writers  claimed,  it  was  imperative  to  prevent  the  Junkers  “from  
seizing   their   former   positions   of   strategic   political   power   in   the   German  
state”.39  If   this   crucial   warning   were   not   heeded,   there   would   be   “every  
possibility  that  the  history  of  the  Weimar  Republic  would  repeat  itself  and  a  
Vendée   in   the   east   will   again   be   found   waiting   for   an   opportunity   to  
overthrow  democracy”.40    
This   sharp   Junker-­‐‑critique  went   hand   in   hand  with   continuous   anti-­‐‑Junker  
commentaries   in   the   leading  Allied   newspapers   of   the   time,  which   further  
undermined  the  Junkers’  reputation  at  home  and  abroad.  In  March  1946,  the  
World  Federation  of  Trade  Unions’  recommendation  of  a  “prompt  breaking  up  
of  the  great  landed  estates”  to  ensure  the  “destruction  of  the  economic  basis  
of   the   Junkers”   was   given   considerable   media   attention. 41   The   Times,  
especially   concerned  with   the  demilitarisation  of  Germany,   also  demanded  
“the  breaking  up  of  […]  the  Junker  class,  from  which  the  officer  class  of  the  
                                                                                                 
36  Griswold,  The  Junkers:  Hostages  to  the  Past,  in:  Virginia  Quarterly  Review,  online  at:  
http://www.vqronline.org/essay/junkers-­‐‑hostages-­‐‑past.  
37  Ibid.  
38  Gerschenkron,  Bread  and  Democracy,  p.  173  
39  Mellen,  The  German  People  and  the  Postwar  World,  in:  The  American  Political  Science  
Review,  p.  625.  
40  Gerschenkron,  Bread  and  Democracy,  p.  176  




Reich   had   been   so   largely   drawn”. 42   Along   these   lines,   the   Manchester  
Guardian,   in  its  commentary  on  the  cession  of  East  Prussia  in  1947,  which  it  
called  “the  stronghold  of  the  Junkers,  the  most  Nazi  of  all  the  Nazi  provinces  
of   Germany”,43  explicitly   renewed   the   association   of   East   Prussia,   Junkers  
and   Nazis,   and   thus   clearly   furthered   the   pre-­‐‑existing   prejudices   and  
prejudgments  against  this  caste.    
In  1956,  Walter  Görlitz  very  eloquently  summarised  the  Junkers’  reputation  
through   his   assessment   that   “in   Germany,   they   were   accused   of   having  
ruined   the   peasantry,   having   been   advocates   of   regression   as   well   as  
militarism.  Abroad,  they  were  accused  of  having  been  the  noblest  advocates  
of   Germany’s   pursuit   of   global   power   status   and,   last   but   not   least,   for  
having  helped  Hitler  into  power  to  once  more  hazard  the  grand  gamble  for  
the   Reich’s   supremacy,   at   least   in   Europe”. 44   Considering   these   critical  
comments,  it  becomes  apparent  that  after  the  war,  the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility’s  
reputation  reached  at  an  all-­‐‑time  low.  Through  virtually  all  ranks  of  society,  
at   home   and   abroad,   the   nobility   was   seen   as   having   squandered   its  
remaining  reserves  of  legitimacy  by  entering  into  a  collaborative  relationship  
with  the  National  Socialist  regime.    
                                                                                                 
42  Germany  after  the  War,  The  Times  (London),  10.02.1945.  
43  “Polish  East  Prussia”  –  Not  One  of  Poland'ʹs  Show-­‐‑Places,  Manchester  Guardian,  21.08.1947.  
44  Görlitz,  Die  Junker,  p.  IX.  
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The  Adelsblatt:  the  Thoughts  of  a  Bewildered  Caste  
The  early  post-­‐‑war  period  saw  a  significant  withdrawal  of   the  nobility   into  
private  life.  The  majority  of  the  Prussian  landed  elites  had  not  only  lost  their  
political   influence,   but   had   also   been   expelled   from   their   estates   in   eastern  
Germany,   their   last   remaining   vestiges   of   power.   The   establishment   of   a  
workers’  and  peasants’  state   in   the  residual  heartland  of  Prussia  had   led  to  
their   complete   expropriation,   and   the   vast   majority   had   fled   to   the  
occupation  zones  of   the  Western  Allies.  Destitute  and  publicly  condemned,  
many   nobles   sought   refuge   among   their   peers.   In   these   days,   the   re-­‐‑
established   in-­‐‑house  newspaper   of   the  nobility,   the  Adelsblatt,   served   as   an  
important   tool   of   inter-­‐‑noble   communication.45  As   early   as   October   1945,  
Jürgen  von  Flotow  and  Hans  Friedrich  von  Ehrenkrook  set  up  the  newspaper  
as   an   attempt   to   channel   the   noble   refugee   lists   and   coordinate   the   re-­‐‑
conflation  of  noble  families  that  had  been  dispersed  by  the  war.46  By  the  late  
1940s,  the  newspaper  had  begun  publishing  articles  by  noble  authors.  
Since  the  Adelsblatt  was  set  up  as  a  medium  for  inter-­‐‑noble  communication  –  
and   not   as   an   instrument   for   exerting   influence   on   public   opinion   –   the  
following   testimonies   give   significant   insight   into   the   thoughts   of   a  
bewildered   social   elite.  Reading   the   articles  published   in   this   organ,   one   is  
                                                                                                 
45  Jürgen  von  Flotow  (ed.),  Deutsches  Adelsblatt,  Mitteilungsblatt  der  Vereinigung  der  deutschen  
Adelsverbände  (Marburg).  
46  Initially  Flotow  and  Ehrenkrook  called  the  newspaper  “Adelsarchiv”,  presumably  to  
distance  themselves  from  the  former  in-­‐‑house  newspaper  of  the  staunchly  pro-­‐‑Nazi  
“Adelsgenossenschaft”.  In  1962,  it  was  eventually  renamed  “Deutsches  Adelsblatt”.  In  the  
text  of  this  thesis,  I  will  refer  to  it  simply  as  “Adelsblatt”.  See:  Institut  Deutsche  




struck  by  the  intensity  of  the  self-­‐‑deception,  the  delusions  of  grandeur,  and  
the   immunity   to   self-­‐‑doubt.   Although   it   is   difficult   to   assess   how  
representative   these   accounts   are   of   the   nobility   as   a  whole,   they   certainly  
suggest   a   widespread   misapprehension   of   the   actual   realities.   Widely  
ignoring  the  fact  that  their  centuries-­‐‑old  supremacy  was  not  just  in  jeopardy,  
but   had   in   reality,   come   to   a   definitive   end,   the   articles   are   animated   by   a  
determination   to   retrieve   lost   status,   and   the   appeal   to   fellow-­‐‑noblemen   to  
maintain  the  collective  claim  to  social  leadership.    
Pointing   to   the   century-­‐‑old   history   of   the   nobility,   Otto   von   Harling  
remarked,  “ever  since  the  late  middle  ages,  the  nobility  again  and  again  had  
to  master   crises   in  which   its   existence  was   threatened  or   appeared   to  have  
become  superfluous.  Nevertheless,   there  always   followed  a  new  generation  
which  thrived  especially  as  a  result  of  the  changed  conditions”.47  Kurt  Rüdt  
von  Collenberg  also  appealed  to  the  historic  endurance  of  the  nobility  when  
he  declared,  “one  can  observe  with  pride,  that  the  majority  of  the  displaced  
nobility   of   the   east,   defied   fate   with   clenched   teeth   and   survived   the  
extremely   difficult   challenges   they   faced.   Innumerable   are   the   examples   of  
heroic   self-­‐‑assertion”.48  The   journalist   Hans   Georg   von   Studnitz   not   only  
praised   inter-­‐‑noble   solidarity   during   the   aftermath   of   the   war,   but   also  
claimed   that   the   horrors   of   war   and   expulsion   had   led   to   a   new   noble  
awareness  of  life.  At  the  same  time,  however,  he  repeatedly  demanded  of  his  
peers   an   incessant   “consciousness   of   our   uniqueness”;   a   uniqueness   he  
                                                                                                 
47  Otto  von  Harling,  Adel  und  Elite,  Deutsches  Adelsblatt,  Juni  1955,  p.  105.  
48  Kurt  Freiherr  Rüdt  von  Collenberg-­‐‑Bödigheim,  Der  Adel  im  heutigen  Westdeutschland,  
Deutsches  Adelsblatt,  April  1955,  p.  64.  
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ascribed   to   the   nobility   due   to   their   purportedly   being   the   traditional   and  
sole  remaining  stronghold  of  moral  values  and  cultural  traditions.49      
Leadership,   righteousness,   modesty   and   self-­‐‑criticism   were   also   attributes  
Hans-­‐‑Joachim  von  Merkatz  demanded  from  his  peers.  According  to  him,  all  
these   traditionally  noble   virtues  had  vanished   from  modern   society,   and   it  
was   thus   once  more   the   nobility’s   task   to   ensure   the   survival   of   a   “moral  
Germany”. 50   Freiherr   von   B.   drew   a   similar   conclusion   by   indirectly  
suggesting  that  the  complete  downfall  of  Germany  in  1945  was  owed  to  the  
disempowerment  of  the  nobility  in  1918.  To  him,  the  absence  of  strict  social  
hierarchies  were  the  roots  of  the  eventual  catastrophe.  Without  the  nobility,  
he   claimed,   the   German   population   was   inevitably   transformed   into  
“animalistic  masses”  and  hence  could  only  survive  if  the  nobility  once  again  
aspired  to  leadership.51    
The   authors   of   the   noble   in-­‐‑house   newspaper   seemed   to   have   utterly  
misunderstood   the  developments  of   the  previous  decade.  Still   entangled   in  
their  belief   in  noble   superiority,   they  attempted   to   reassert   an   entirely  out-­‐‑
dated  and  supposedly  hereditary  claim  for  leadership.  The  collapse  of  1945,  
however,   in   a   sense   represented   the  debacle   of   the   effort   launched   in   both  
world   wars   to   establish   –   albeit   under   very   different   auspices   –   German  
hegemony.  In  both  these  wars,  the  nobility  had  been  a  prominent  constituent  
of  the  decision-­‐‑making  elite.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  nobility’s  reputation,  
                                                                                                 
49  Hans  Georg  von  Studnitz,  Was  wir  uns  bewahrt  haben,  Deutsches  Adelsblatt,  Dezember  
1950,  p.  4.  
50  Hans-­‐‑Joachim  von  Merkatz,  Die  Aufgabe  des  europäischen  Adels  in  unserer  Zeit,  
Deutsches  Adelsblatt,  Juli  1955  pp.  122–125.  
51  Freiherr  von  B.,  Leserbrief,  Deutsches  Adelsblatt,  February  1951,  p.  20.  
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there  was   thus   a   cumulative  dimension   to   the  predicament   of   1945.  Under  
these   conditions,   simply   reasserting   the   traditional   claim   to   leadership   or  
pressing   for   a   return   to   'ʹtraditional'ʹ   social   values   was   inexpedient,   if   not  
obsolete.    In  order  to  regenerate  self-­‐‑belief  and  rebuild  the  respect  of  others,  
the  nobility  was  now  challenged  to  focus  on  its  image  management  skills  and  
become  “masters  of  memory”.52  After  all,  as  Heinrich  Heine  put  it,  “God,  the  
Devil  and  the  nobility  only  exist  if  they  are  believed  in”.53      
The  Minting  of  a  New  Coin:  Nobility  and  Resistance  
The  deep  and  inherent  desire  to  survive  this  reputational  slump  and  remain  
at  the  apex  of  society  required  the  nobility  to  make  strategic  use  of  the  entire  
spectrum  of  its  social,  cultural  and  symbolic  capital  to  compensate  as  much  
as  possible  for  the  irrevocable  loss  of  its  political,  social  and  material  power.54  
The  most  evident  opportunity  to  reinforce  the  nobility’s  claim  to  leadership  
and   uniqueness   in   the   post-­‐‑war   years   was   a   close   association   with   the  
growing   myth   of   the   military   resistance.   The   indisputably   high   share   of  
noblemen  involved  in  the  conspiracy  offered  a  unique  chance  to  firmly  locate  
the  nobility  on  the  right  side  of  history,  far  removed  from  the  criminality  of  
the  regime.    
                                                                                                 
52  The  term  is  borrowed  from  the  eponymous  article  by  Stephan  Malinowski  and  Markus  
Funck,  Masters  of  Memory:  The  Strategic  Use  of  Autobiographical  Memory  by  the  German  
Nobility,  in:  Alon  Confino  and  Peter  Fritzsche  (eds),  The  Work  Of  Memory.  New  Directions  in  
the  Study  of  German  Society  and  Culture  (Chicago,  2002),  pp.  86–89.  
53  Malinowski,  Vom  König  zum  Führer,  p.  47.  
54  Hans-­‐‑Ulrich  Wehler,  Deutsche  Gesellschaftsgeschichte,  Volume  5  –  Bundesrepublik  und  DDR  
1949–1990  (Munich,  2008),  p.  168.  
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The  initial  popular  identification  of  nobility  and  resistance  had  already  been  
established  by  the  anti-­‐‑noble  tirades  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  failed  
plot.  In  a  way,  this  narrative  –  albeit  under  reverse  auspices  –  found  its  way  
into  the  post-­‐‑war  era,  and  the  odium  of  treason  was  gradually  replaced  by  an  
odium  of  heroism.55  As  consequence,  the  anti-­‐‑Nazi  resistance  that  culminated  
in  the  attempted  coup  of  20  July  1944  has  been,  and  largely  still  is,  perceived  
as  a  noble  revolt.56    
The  nobility  itself,  or  rather  individual  noblemen  and  -­‐‑women,  significantly  
contributed   to   this   perception.   As   early   as   1948,   Otto   Heinrich   von   der  
Gablentz,   a   former  member  of   the  Kreisau  Circle   and   founding  member  of  
the   Christian   Democratic   Union   (CDU)   after   the   war,   stated   somewhat  
consternated   in   his   manifesto   about   the   Tragedy   of   Prussiandom   that   “the  
nobility  had  been  pressured  so  far  that  only  one  solution  remained  feasible,  a  
solution   which,   given   its   posture   and   traditions,   seemed   to   be   entirely  
inappropriate:   coup   and   assassination”.57   In   a   memorial   service   for   the  
victims   of   the   failed   coup   in   1954,   Paul   Graf   Yorck   von   Wartenburg  
especially  highlighted	  “the  numerous  bearers  of  old  historic  names  […]  who  
were   driven   by   the   desire   to   atone   through   self-­‐‑sacrifice”.	  58  Similarly,  Kurt  
                                                                                                 
55  For  the  transformation  of  the  military  resistance’s  reputation  in  post-­‐‑war  Germany,  see  
chapter  I  of  this  thesis.  
56  Conze,  Adel  und  Adeligkeit  im  Widerstand,  in:  Reif  (ed.),  Adel  und  Bürgertum  in  
Deutschland  II,  p.  269.  
57  Otto  Heinrich  von  der  Gablentz,  Die  Tragik  des  Preußentums,  in:  Rudolf  Pechel  (ed.),  
Deutsche  Rundschau,  69,  2:5  (1946),  p.  119.  
58  Paul  Graf  Yorck  von  Wartenburg,  Erbe  und  Verantwortung,  Rede  am  20.  Juli  1954  in  der  
Universität  Heidelberg,  online  at:  www.20-­‐‑juli-­‐‑44.de/reden/.  
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Rüdt   von   Collenberg   emphasised   the   “exceptional   dimensions   of   the  
nobility’s  involvement  in  the  coup”.59    
At   another   large   memorial   service   in   Munich,   Walter   von   Cube,   the  
provisional   director   of   the   Bavarian   Broadcasting   Corporation,   went   even  
further  when   he   transfigured   the   conspiracy   into   “the   last   rebellion   of   the  
German  nobility”.60	  The  revolt  of  20  July  was  not  carried  out  by  the  masses,  
but   rather  by  –  and   it   is  here  where   the  word  evokes   its   full  potential  –  an  
‘elite’.  An  elite,  which  had  once  determined  what  –  in  the  best  sense  –  should  
be  labelled  “Prussian”.  Its  list  is  a  distressing  and  proud  collection  of  historic  
families:  Bernstorff,  Dohna,  Kleist,  Moltke,  Oertzen,  Schulenburg,  Schwerin,  
Tresckow,  Uexküll,  and  Yorck.61    
Most   influential   among   noble   writers,   however,   was   the   publicist   Marion  
Gräfin  Dönhoff.  Born  into  one  of  the  most  prominent  and  powerful  families  
of   East   Prussia,   Dönhoff   received   the   traditional   education   of   a   privileged  
and  wealthy  member  of  the  Prussian  nobility.  Following  her  Abitur  in  Berlin  
in  1928,  she  went  on   to  study  economics   in  Frankfurt.  Deeply  disturbed  by  
the   anti-­‐‑Semitic   excesses   of   the   regime   after   the   seizure   of   power,   she   left  
Frankfurt   for   Basel   and   received   her   doctorate   in   1935.   Following   the  
outbreak  of   the  war  and   the  draft  of  her  brothers,   she  effectively   took  over  
                                                                                                 
59  Kurt  Freiherr  Rüdt  von  Collenberg-­‐‑Bödigheim,  Der  Adel  im  heutigen  Westdeutschland,  
Deutsches  Adelsblatt,  April  1955,  p.  64.  
60  Walter  von  Cube,  Rebellion  des  deutschen  Adels,  Rede  von  Rundfunkintendant  Walter  von  





the  management  of  the  paternal  estates  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.62  During  
those  days,  she  maintained  close  relations  with  many  future  members  of  the  
coup   against   Hitler.   Although   she   was   never   actively   engaged   in   the  
conspiracy  itself,  she  had  been  in  close  contact  with  members  of  the  military  
resistance,   as  well   as   the  Kreisau  Circle,   of  whose   ideas  Peter  Count  Yorck  
von   Wartenburg   closely   informed   her.   She   also   occasionally   acted   as   a  
courier  for  sensitive  information  between  the  Goerdeler  Circle  in  Berlin  and  
her  close  childhood  friend,  Heinrich  Count  Lehndorff,  who  served  as  liaison  
officer  of  the  military  resistance  in  East  Prussia.63    
The   fact   that   she,   however,   never   appeared   on   any   list   for   any   future  
deployment,  ultimately   saved  her   life   in   the  aftermath  of  20   July  1944.  The  
invasion   of   the   Red   Army   in   early   1945,   and   the   subsequent   wave   of  
expulsions  from  East  Prussia,  brought  an  end  not  only  to  the  war,  but  also  to  
her  life  as  an  East  Prussian  squiress.  Her  experience  of  loss  was  twofold.  On  
the  one  hand,  she  had  lost  numerous  close  friends  from  within  the  resistance  
movement.   On   the   other,   she   had   also   lost   her   cherished   East   Prussian  
Heimat,64  which   she   was   forced   to   flee   by   horseback   in   January   1945.   This  
                                                                                                 
62  Christian  Graf  von  Krockow,  Porträts  berühmter  deutscher  Frauen:  Von  Königin  Luise  bis  zur  
Gegenwart  (Munich,  2001),  p.  357.  
63  There  has  been  some  debate  over  the  years  as  to  her  level  of  involvement  and  how  much  
she  actually  knew.  See:  Fritz  J.  Raddatz,  Unruhestifter  (Munich,  2003),  p.  359;  Haug  von  
Kuenheim,  Marion  Dönhoff  (Hamburg,  1999),  pp.  26–37;  Eckart  Conze,  Aufstand  des  
preußischen  Adels  –  Marion  Gräfin  Dönhoff  und  das  Bild  des  Widerstands  gegen  den  
Nationalsozialismus  in  der  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland,  in:  Vierteljahreshefte  für  
Zeitgeschichte,  51:4  (2003),  pp.  488,  489;  Paul  Stauffer,  “Sechs  furchtbare  Jahre  ...”:  auf  den  Spuren  
Carl  Jakob  Burckhardts  durch  den  Zweiten  Weltkrieg  (Zürich,  1998),  pp.  304–310.  
64  The  word  Heimat  is  used  to  explain  a  place  (sometimes  also  a  landscape)  where  a  person  is  
born.  A  place  which  shapes  a  person’s  identity,  character,  mentality,  attitude  and  general  
approach  towards  life.  
99  
  
twofold  experience  of   loss  was   to  become   the  dominant   theme  of  her  post-­‐‑
war  career  in  journalism.65  
Marion  Dönhoff’s  first  attempts  to  transfigure  the  conspiracy  into  a  revolt  of  
the  Prussian   landed  elites   came   in   close   conjunction   to   similar   attempts  by  
her  former  Professor  and  long-­‐‑time  family  friend,  Edgar  Salin.  “Like  a  well-­‐‑
trained  ‘Pas  de  deux’”,  as  the  historian  Ulrich  Raulff  has  described  it,  “they  
flew  over  the  terrain  of  an  only  just  awakening  Geschichtspolitik”.66  As  a  result  
of  a  series  of  articles  published  within  the  span  of  a  few  years,  the  idea  that  
20  July  1944  had  in  fact  been  a  revolt  of  the  nobility  was  carefully  planted  in  
the  public  mind.  Born   in  Frankfurt   in  1892   to   Jewish  parents,  Salin   studied  
economics   and   philosophy   before   starting   an   academic   career   at   the  
University  of  Heidelberg.  There  he  became  a  member  of  the  George  Circle,  a  
loose   organisation   of   young   aspiring   intellectuals   gathered   around   the  
prophetic   poet   Stefan  George,  who   had   propagated   the   establishment   of   a  
“New  Reich”   ruled  by  a  hierarchical   system  of  a  new  “spiritual  nobility”.67  
Through   this   experience,   Salin  was   also   closely   acquainted  with  Claus   and  
Berthold  von  Stauffenberg,  two  of  the  key  figures  of  the  plot.  Both  men  had  
been   ardent   disciples   of   George,   and   allegedly   often   referred   to   the  
conspiracy  movement  –  in  honour  of  Stefan  George’s  eponymous  poem  –  as  
“Secret  Germany”.68    
                                                                                                 
65  Conze,  Aufstand  des  preußischen  Adels,  in:  Vierteljahreshefte  für  Zeitgeschichte,  p.  489.  
66  Ulrich  Raulff,  Kreis  ohne  Meister  –  Stefan  Georges  Nachleben  (Munich,  2009),  p.  420.  
67  See:  Stefan  George,  Das  neue  Reich,  Volume  9  (Stuttgart,  2001).  
68  Edgar  Salin  firstly  made  this  claim  in  the  second  edition  of  his  memoirs  of  the  George  
Circle  in  1954:  Edgar  Salin,  Um  Stefan  George.  Erinnerung  und  Zeugnis  (Munich,  1954),  p.  324.  
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Inspired   by   these   close   friendships   and   the   desire   to   transfigure   the  
conspiracy   into   a   movement   based   on   George’s   idea   of   “a   revolt   of   the  
German  spirit”,  Salin  came  to  the  literary  rescue  of  the  plot  as  early  as  April  
1945.69  Therein   he   informed   his   readers   that   not   all   Germans   had   been  
willing   executioners;   numerous   people,   from   all   parts   of   society,   had   been  
persecuted  because  of  resistant  activities.  However,  he  felt  further  obliged  to  
particularly   emphasise   the   exceptional   resistance   of   the   old   nobility,  
specifically  the  East-­‐‑Prussian  nobility,  thereby  openly  paying  homage  to  his  
close  friend,  Marion  Dönhoff.  “The  old  heartland  –  East  Prussia  –  contained,  
throughout  the  Third  Reich,  an  upright  and  cohesive  opposition.”70    
In  this  context,  one  might  recall   that  Salin  was  speaking  of  the  nobility  of  a  
region  in  which  the  NSDAP  had  gained  56  percent  of  the  popular  vote  in  the  
last  semi-­‐‑free  elections  of  1933,71  and  whose  ranks  were  heavily  interspersed  
with  vehement  National  Socialists  like  Hermann  Count  Dohna-­‐‑Finckenstein,  
Konrad  Count  Finckenstein-­‐‑Schönberg,  and  even  Marion  Dönhoff’s  brother,  
Christoph  Count  Dönhoff.72  Particularly   in   predominantly   agricultural   East  
Prussia,   where   the   loyalty   between   peasant   and   landlord   had   hardly  
diminished   despite   the   official   abolition   of   the   nobility   in   1919,   the   public  
association  of  powerful  nobles  with  the  emerging  new  regime  proved  to  be  a  
crucial  factor  in  the  National  Socialist  ascent  to  power.  Hence,  to  speak  of  an  
“upright  and  cohesive”  opposition  in  East  Prussia  either  betrayed  complete  
                                                                                                 
69  Edgar  Salin,  Die  deutschen  Katakomben,  in:  Schweizer  Annalen,  2  (1945),  p.  89.  
70  Ibid,  p.  88.  
71  Heinrich  August  Winkler:  Der  Weg  in  die  Katastrophe.  Arbeiter  und  Arbeiterbewegung  in  der  
Weimarer  Republik  (Bonn,  1990),  pp.  884–888.  
72  Malinowski  und  Reichardt,  Die  Reihen  fest  geschlossen?  Adelige  im  Führerkorps  der  SA  
bis  1934,  in:  Conze  und  Wienfort  (eds),  Adel  und  Moderne,  p.  142.  
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ignorance,   which   is   unlikely   in   the   case   of   this   highly   distinguished  
academic,  or  represented  a  deliberate  effort  to  exculpate  an  entire  social  class  
by  means  of  enhancing  its  public  image,  an  effort  reinforced  by  the  author'ʹs  
close  friendship  with  Dönhoff.    
Only  months  later,  Marion  Dönhoff  picked  up  on  Salin’s  efforts  to  place  the  
nobility   at   the   centre   of   the   plot.   In   her   account   In  Memoriam   20   Juli   1944,  
which  she  wrote  in  the  summer  of  1945,  Dönhoff  concluded  that  “the  actual  
spiritual  initiative  and  volitional  leadership  had  been  placed  in  the  hands  of  
a   younger   generation   such   as   Count   Stauffenberg,   Fritzi   von   der  
Schulenburg,  Adam  von  Trott  zu  Solz,  Peter  Count  York  and  Helmuth  Count  
Moltke  who  all  descended  from  the  landed  nobility”.73  
Only   a   year   later,   Edgar   Salin   once   again   picked   up   the   ball.   In   an   article  
published  in  1946  under  the  title  Die  Tragödie  der  deutschen  Gegenrevolution,  he  
elevated   the   noble   conspirators   to   actors   of   collective   atonement:   “all   the  
historic   guilt   that   had   accrued   to   the   nobility   throughout   the   Bismarckian  
and  Wilhelmine   era   as   well   as   in   the   early   years   of   the   Third   Reich”,   he  
argued,   was   overshadowed   by   the   “atoning   sacrifice   of   men   like  
Stauffenberg,  Yorck,  Schulenburg,  Lehndorff,  Schwerin,  Moltke  and  many  of  
their   friends”.74  To   put   the   icing   on   the   cake,   Salin   continued   his   praise,  
stating,   “ever   since   the   famous   night   in  August   1789,   in  which   the   French  
                                                                                                 
73  Marion  Dönhoff,  In  Memoriam  20.  Juli  1944,  private  print  1946;  also  published  in  Pechel,  
Deutscher  Widerstand,  pp.  183–198,  for  above  citation  see  pp.  191,192.  
74  This  article  for  the  first  time  appeared  in  Switzerland  in  1946:  Edgar  Salin,  Die  Tragödie  
der  deutschen  Gegenrevolution,  in:  Schweizer  Annalen,  12  (1946),  pp.  719–729;  In  1948,  it  was  
published  in  Germany:  Edgar  Salin,  Die  Tragödie  der  deutschen  Gegenrevolution,  in:  Hans-­‐‑
Joachim  Schoeps  (ed.),  Zeitschrift  für  Religion  und  Geistesgeschichte,  3  (1948),  pp.  193–206,  for  
above  citation  see  p.  206.  
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nobility  renounced  its  hereditary  rights,  no  social  class  in  its  entirety  has  ever  
proven   a   comparable,   heroic   power   of   sacrifice”.75  Hence,   these   writings  
serve  not  only  as  an  attempt  to  monopolise  the  military  resistance  as  a  noble  
revolt,  but  also  as  a  conspicuous  effort  to  use  the  act  of  a  few  to  exculpate  an  
entire  class.  Certainly,  one  must  recognise  the  traditional  and  unquestionable  
will   to   sacrifice   among   the   Prussian   nobility,   which   once   again   was   fully  
displayed  during   the  downfall   of   the  Wehrmacht   at   the   end  of   the   Second  
World  War,  with  more   than  8000  victims  among  the  nobility.76  The  nobility  
clearly   rose   to   the  occasion  and,   as  practised   throughout   centuries,  did  not  
hesitate  to  honour  its  oath  to  its  ruler.  This  time,  however,  this  ruler  was  not  
the   Prussian   king,   but   Adolf   Hitler,   whose   reign   had   not   only   led   to  
immeasurable   war   crimes,   but   also   to   crimes   against   humanity   on   a   scale  
previously  unheard  of.    
Had  Salin  merely  referred  to  the  nobility’s  willingness  to  sacrifice  itself  for  its  
country,  he  would  have  been  describing  something  approximating  historical  
reality.  But  the  notion  that  the  resistance  represented  a  heroic  act  of  sacrifice  
in  the  name  of  “an  entire  social  caste”  was  not  only  far-­‐‑fetched,  but  rather,  a  
direct  distortion  of  history.  Perhaps  Salin  had  forgotten  the  words  of  Prince  
Adolf  zu  Bentheim-­‐‑Tecklenburg,  Marshal  of   the  German  Noble  Association  
(DAG)  at  the  time  of  the  plot  –  and  thus  much  more  a  representative  of  the  
‘entire’   nobility   than   Stauffenberg,   Moltke   and   Schulenburg   –   who  
                                                                                                 
75  Salin,  Die  Tragödie  der  deutschen  Gegenrevolution,  in:  Religion  und  Geistesgeschichte,  p.  
206.  
76  Görlitz,  Die  Junker,  p.  408.  
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immediately   after   the   failed   coup,   felt   obliged   to   express   his   deepest  
abhorrence  for  the  “ruthless  felony”  of  the  conspirators.77  
By  the  time  Salin  published  his  second  article   in  1946,  Marion  Dönhoff  had  
already  joined  the  new  aspiring  newspaper,  Die  Zeit,  in  Hamburg,  which  was  
to   become   the   principal   outlet   of   her   literary   defence   of   the   military  
resistance.  At  the  time,  however,  Die  Zeit  was  staunchly  conservative,  “right  
of   centre,   right   of   the   CDU   and   ostentatiously   national”. 78   Its   layout  
displayed   striking  parallels  with   the  Reich,   the  principal   former   intellectual  
newspaper   of   the   Third   Reich.   Following   the   spirit   of   the   time,   there   was  
hardly  any  critical  engagement  with  National  Socialism.  Instead,  the  Die  Zeit  
became  prominent  for  resolutely  railing  against  the  occupational  authorities.  
Authors   like   Hans-­‐‑Georg   von   Studnitz,   “a   staunch   advocate   of   National  
Socialism  until  the  very  end  of  the  Third  Reich,  member  of  the  press  corps  of  
the   Foreign   Office,   employee   of   the   Security   Service   (SD)   and   author   of  
vehemently   anti-­‐‑Semitic   articles”,79  especially   shaped   the   perception   of   the  
newspaper  in  those  days.  In  the  late  1940s  and  early  1950s,  Die  Zeit  became  
something  of   a   refuge   for   authors   compromised  by   their   involvement  with  
the  Nazi  regime.80    
                                                                                                 
77  Adolf  Fürst  zu  Bentheim-­‐‑Tecklenburg-­‐‑Rheda,  Stellungnahme  der  Deutschen  
Adelsgenossenschaft  zum  Attentat  vom  20  Juli  1944,  Deutsches  Adelsblatt,  Juli  1944,  p.  50.  
78  Axel  Schildt,  Immer  mit  der  Zeit,  in:  Christian  Haase  und  Axel  Schildt  (eds),  Die  Zeit  und  
die  Bonner  Republik  (Göttingen,  2008),  p.  14.  
79  Ibid,  p.  18.  
80  See:  Der  Mann  der  bei  der  Zeit  Ernst  Krüger  war,  Die  Zeit,  26.04.2012.  
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In  those  early  years  as  a   journalist,  Dönhoff  only  occasionally  intervened  in  
the   public   debate   surrounding   the  military   resistance.81  Yet,  when   she   did,  
nurturing  the  narrative  of  a  noble  plot  was  almost  always  at  the  centre  of  her  
argument.   In   the   light   of   the   Hedler   and   Remer   trials   in   1952,   the   public  
debate   centred   on   the   question   of   whether   or   not   the   conspirators   had  
committed   high   treason.82  From  Dönhoff’s   perspective,   this   debate   led   to   a  
perception   which   was   too   narrowly   focused   on   the   military   aspect   of   the  
conspiracy.  “People  pretend  as  if  the  whole  thing  was  exclusively  an  affair  of  
career   officers.”83  Such   a   view,   she   feared,   detracted   the   attention   from   the  
ones  who,  in  her  eyes,  were  really  responsible,  and  hence  she  reproachfully  
remarked:   “who   still   remembers   today   that   almost   all   grand   names   of  
Prussian  history  were  represented  among  the  executed  men  –  not  as  soldiers  
but  as  high-­‐‑ranking  civil  servants  or  independent  civilians?  Nobody!”84    
In   1954,   Dönhoff,   after   explicitly   criticising   the   increasingly   nationalist  
approach  of  the  newspaper,  left  her  desk  to  join  the  Observer  in  London.85  By  
the  time  she  returned  in  1955,  the  publisher  Gerd  Bucerius  had  forced  out  the  
majority  of   the  politically   compromised   journalists.  Dönhoff  was  promoted  
                                                                                                 
81  Auflehnung  gegen  den  Helden,  Die  Zeit,  17.07.1952;  Das  Bild  des  Menschen,  Die  Zeit,  
23.07.1953;  Das  Gewissen  steht  auf,  Die  Zeit,  15.07.1954.  
82  See  the  section  20  July  1944  in  Court  in  chapter  I  of  this  thesis.  
83  Auflehnung  gegen  den  Helden,  Die  Zeit,  17.07.1952.  
84  Ibid.  
85  In  the  summer  of  1954,  the  staunchly  nationalistic  editor  in  chief  of  Die  Zeit,  Richard  
Tüngel,  published  an  article  from  the  former  NS  expert  in  constitutional  law,  Carl  Schmitt.  
This  was  too  much  for  Marion  Dönhoff.  “Who  preached  the  spirit  of  National  Socialism  or  
controlled  the  terminology  of  the  press,  shall  forever  be  excluded  from  a  political  newspaper  
such  as  ours.”  Tüngel,  however,  did  not  respond  to  Dönhoff’s  request,  which  in  return  
prompted  her  immediate  departure.  See:  Der  Mann  der  bei  der  Die  Zeit  Ernst  Krüger  war,  
Die  Zeit,  26.04.2012. 
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to   deputy   editor-­‐‑in-­‐‑chief   and   began   to   reshape   and   reposition   the  
newspaper,   transforming  it   into  one  of  the  most  reputable  venues  of   liberal  
journalism  in  Germany.  She  used  the  anniversaries  –  not  only  the  round  ones  
–  to  cement  the  legacy  of  the  men  of  20  July  1944,  and  turned  Die  Zeit  into  the  
primary  journalistic  voice  of  the  commemoration  of  the  military  resistance.86  
Her  articles  were  often  prominently  placed  on  the  front  cover  or  the  political  
section  of  the  paper.    
In  the  middle  of  the  1960s,  Dönhoff’s  commitment  to  the  commemoration  of  
the  resistance   intensified  even  further.  Now  she  also  addressed  the  topic   in  
various  publications  beyond  Die  Zeit.  What  is  striking  about  her  work  is  that  
all   these   biographical   or   personal   descriptions   were   exclusively   limited   to  
nobles.  In  1952,  she  accounted  for  Albrecht  Graf  von  Bernstorff’s  role  in  the  
resistance  against  Hitler.87  In  1957,   she  published  a   long  report  about  Claus  
Graf   von   Stauffenberg.88  Her   first   bestseller,  Namen  die   keiner  mehr  nennt,   in  
1962,   included   a   lengthy   portrayal   of   her   childhood   friend,   Heinrich   Graf  
von   Lehndorff.89   The   involvement   of   her   good   friend,   Peter   Yorck   von  
Wartenburg,  also  received  individual  treatment  in  a  lengthy  article  in  1976.90  
Most   prominent   among   her   pieces   focussing   on   the   noble   elements   of   the  
conspiracy,   however,   featured   in   her  memorial   book  Um   der   Ehre  Willen   –  
                                                                                                 
86  Der  Name  Stauffenberg,  Die  Zeit,  25.07.1957;  Heusingers  Tagesbefehl,  Die  Zeit,  17.07.1959;  
Es  fehlt  nicht  an  Vorbildern,  Die  Zeit,  17.07.1964;  Die  Botschaft  des  Gewissens.  Dreißig  Jahre  
danach:  Gedenken  an  die  Männer  des  20.  Juli,  Die  Zeit,  19.07.1974;  Verschwörer  gegen  das  
Unrecht.  Gedanken  zum  20.  Juli  1944,  Die  Zeit,  20.07.1984.  
87  Marion  Dönhoff,  De  nobilitate,  in:  Elly  Gräfin  von  Reventlow  (ed.)  Albrecht  Bernstorff  zum  
Gedächtnis  (Altenhof,  1952).  
88  Der  Name  Stauffenberg,  Die  Zeit,  25.07.1957.  
89  Marion  Gräfin  Dönhoff,  Namen  die  keiner  mehr  nennt  (Düsseldorf,  1962),  pp.  81–94.  
90  Marion  Gräfin  Dönhoff,  Menschen,  die  wissen,  worum  es  geht  (Hamburg,  1976),  pp.  15–36.  
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Erinnerungen   an   die   Freunde   vom   20.   Juli   in   1994,  which   consisted   of   seven  
detailed  portrayals  of  noble  conspirators.91    
To   a   certain   degree,   this   behaviour   can   surely   be   explained   by   Dönhoff’s  
social   background   and   her   friendships   with   the   noble   conspirators.  
However,   in   these   articles,   Dönhoff   portrayed   the   Prussian   nobility   as  
uniquely   predestined   to   resist.   She   transformed   these   noblemen   into  
preordained  exponents  of  the  Prussian  virtues,  the  last  pillars  of  chivalry  in  
Germany’s  darkest  hour.92    “We  were  all  about  the  same  age”,  she  recounts  
in   her   book,   published   1994,   “[…]   all   came   from   a   rural   milieu   in   which  
continuity,   responsibility   for   the   community,   honour,   duty   and   a   certain  
austerity   formed   the   pillars   of   our   lifestyle.”93  It   was   this   deeply   inherent  
“chivalrous  attitude”  of  the  noble  conspirators,  which,  in  her  eyes,  served  as  
the  historical  prerequisite  of  20  July  1944.    
From  Marwitz  to  Stauffenberg:  How  President  Heuss  Established  a  Link  
between  Resistance  and  Nobility    
The   entire   process   of   aligning   the   nobility  with   the  military   resistance   and  
thereby   establishing   a   positive   narrative   of   the   nobility’s   role   in   the   Third  
Reich  was   also  made   possible   by   the   deliberate   efforts   of   the   government,  
especially   in   the   1950s,   to   incorporate   the   military   resistance   into   the  
founding  myth  of   the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany.   It  was   recognised   that  
                                                                                                 
91  Marion  Gräfin  Dönhoff,  Um  der  Ehre  Willen  –  Erinnerungen  an  die  Freunde  vom  20.  Juli  in  
1994  (Berlin,  1994).  
92  Conze,  Aufstand  des  preußischen  Adels,  in:  Vierteljahreshefte  für  Zeitgeschichte,  p.  497.  
93  Dönhoff,  Um  der  Ehre  Willen,  p.  186.  
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the   resistance   of   the   elites,   among   which   the   nobility   played   a   prominent  
role,  represented  a  “better  Germany”.94  The  foundation  of  the  FRG  four  years  
after   the   conclusion   of   the   war   in   some   ways   ensured   a   vitally   needed  
dissociation  from  the  regime  and  therefore  allowed  for  a   ‘clean’  start  of   the  
new  republic.95  The  perception  of  a  morally  intact  Germany,  embodied  by  the  
victims   of   the   failed   plot,   helped   to   build   a   bridge   over   the   horrors   and  
crimes   of   the   Third   Reich   and   link   the   young   republic   to   the   democratic  
traditions  of  Weimar.96    
Furthermore,   the   government   actively   promoted   the   gradual   political   and  
social   re-­‐‑integration   of   the   nobility   into   the   newly   established   democracy.  
The  FRG’s   clear   commitment   to   freedom  of  property,   in   times  when  noble  
families   were   strategically   expelled   and   expropriated   in   the   German  
Democratic   Republic,   significantly   increased   the   nobility’s   commitment   to  
integration.97  The   introduction   of   financial   compensation   for   expropriated  
property  in  the  East  in  1951  –  known  as  the  Equalisation  of  Burdens  Law  –  not  
only  facilitated  the  nobility’s  identification  with  the  economic  foundations  of  
the  newly  founded  state,  but  also  often  saved  noble  families  from  complete  
poverty. 98   Additionally,   the   openly   propagated   anti-­‐‑communism   of   the  
                                                                                                 
94  See  especially  chapter  I  of  this  thesis.  
95  Conze,  Von  Deutschem  Adel,  pp.  167–170.  
96  Conze,  Aufstand  des  preußischen  Adels,  in:  Vierteljahreshefte  für  Zeitgeschichte,  p.  497.  
97  Conze,  Von  Deutschem  Adel,  pp.  166–169.  
98  See:  Michael  L.  Hughes,  Shouldering  the  burdens  of  defeat.  West  Germany  and  the  
Reconstruction  of  Social  Justice  (Chapel  Hill,  1999);  Lothar  F.  Neumann  und  Klaus  Schaper,  Die  
Sozialordnung  der  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  2008),  see  especially  chapter  
10.3,  Lastenausgleich  und  Eingleiderung,  pp.  281–285;  Michael  Schwartz,  Lastenausgleich:  
Ein  Problem  der  Vertriebenen  im  doppelten  Deutschland,  in:  Marita  Krauss  (ed.),  
Integrationen  –  Vertriebene  in  den  deutschen  Ländern  nach  1945  (Göttingen,  2008),  pp.  167–193.  
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government  had  a  considerably  reassuring  effect  on  this  highly  insecure  and  
anxious   caste.   For   decades,   the   nobility’s   abhorrence   of   communism   had  
predominately  been  shaped  by  the  lurid  tales  of  the  Russian  revolution  and  
the   atrocities   which   had   been   inflicted   on   their   Baltic   peers.   Flight   and  
expulsion,  which   the  majority  had  experienced   first-­‐‑hand,   raised   this  noble  
anti-­‐‑communism  to  new  heights.99  
Most  important  among  these  efforts,  however,  was  the  government’s  explicit  
official  recognition  of  the  nobility’s  outstanding  share  in  the  conspiracy.  This  
acknowledgement   was   prominently   expressed   by   Theodor   Heuss,   the  
president  of  the  FRG,  at  the  ten-­‐‑year  anniversary  of  the  failed  coup,  in  1954.  
In  his  commemorative  speech,  Heuss  framed  the  resistance  movement  as  an  
amalgamation   of   the   “Christian   nobility   of   the   German   nation   with   the  
leaders  of  the  socialists  [and]  the  unionists”.100  Perhaps  equally  important:  he  
established  a   link  to  a   longstanding  tradition  of  righteous  resistance  among  
the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility  by  relating  the  behaviour  of  the  men  of  20  July  1944  
to   the  disobedience  of   Johann  Friedrich  von  der  Marwitz  during   the  Seven  
Years’   War.   Against   the   explicit   order   of   Frederick   the   Great,   von   der  
Marwitz   had   refused   to   plunder   the   estate   of   the   Saxon  minister   of   state,  
remarking   that   such   behaviour   would   be   unbefitting   to   an   officer   of   his  
majesty.101  Such   prominent   appreciation   from   the   highest   representative   of  
the   government   was   ground   breaking   for   the   public   perception   of   the  
                                                                                                 
99  Eckart  Conze,  Edelmann  als  Bürger?,  in:  Hettling  und  Ulrich  (eds),  Bürgertum  nach  1945,  p.  
360.  
100  Heuss,  Der  20.  Juli  1944,  Ansprache  des  Bundespräsidenten  am  19  Juli  1954.  
101  Marwitz  is  quoted  with  the  following  words:  “In  such  cases  one  might  use  a  mercenary  
officer,  but  not  the  commander  of  His  Majesty’s  Gendarmes”:  See:  Theodor  Fontane,  Das  
Oderland,  Wanderungen  durch  die  Mark  Brandenburg  II  (Berlin,  2014),  p.  174.  
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nobility’s  role  in  the  Third  Reich,  and  whether  he  intended  to  or  not,  Heuss  
practically   re-­‐‑ennobled   the   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility   under   the   auspices   of   the  
Republic.102    
Unfortunately,  one  can  only  speculate  as  to  Heuss’  motivations  for  coming  to  
the  rescue  of  the  nobility  in  this  way.  Unlike  other  leading  politicians,  Heuss  
generally   drafted   his   speeches   himself   and  did   not   rely   on   any   substantial  
external   input.103  One   possible   reason   for   his   attitude  might   have   been   the  
influence  of  his  wife,  Elly  Heuss-­‐‑Knapp,  whose  mother  descended   from  an  
old  Georgian  noble  family.104  More  likely,  however,  Heuss  was  driven  by  the  
desire   to   commemorate   his   various   friends   among   the   conspirators,  which  
included  men  like  Hans  Bernd  and  Werner  von  Haeften,  as  well  as  Albrecht  
Graf  von  Bernstorff.105  His  close  friendship  with  Bernstorff,  a  former  member  
of  the  Foreign  Office  and  resolute  opponent  of  the  Nazis,  seems  to  have  been  
                                                                                                 
102  Conze,  Aufstand  des  preußischen  Adels,  in:  Vierteljahreshefte  für  Zeitgeschichte,  p.  498.  
103  See  the  comments  of  Hans  Herwarth  von  Bittenfeld,  one  of  the  leading  staff  of  the  Federal  
President’s  Office  at  the  time:  “For  us,  the  staff  of  the  Federal  President’s  Office,  Heuss  was  
(…)  a  very  pleasant  boss,  since  he  personally  drafted  his  speeches.  (…)  We  went  to  look  for  
punch  lines  and  ideas,  but  that  was  all  we  contributed  to  his  speeches.”  Hans  Herwarth  von  
Bittenfeld,  Von  Adenauer  zu  Brandt  (Berlin,  1990),  pp.  102,  103.  
104  See:  Theodor  Heuss’  letter  to  Dr.  Klaus  Mehnert  on  23  September  1958,  in:  Theodor  
Heuss,  Der  Bundespräsident:  Briefe  1954–1959,  Ernst  Wolfgang  Becker,  Martin  Vogt,  Wolfram  
Werner  (eds),  (Berlin,  2012),  p.  478.  
105  See  the  comments  of  Heuss’  personal  assistant,  Hans  Bott,  who  referred  to  these  
friendships  as  motivation  to  commemorate  the  military  resistance  in  a  letter  to  Georg  
Schwarz,  in:  Theodor  Heuss,  Der  Bundespräsident:  Briefe  1949–1954,  Ernst  Wolfgang  Becker,  
Martin  Vogt,  Wolfram  Werner  (eds.)  (Berlin,  2012),  p.  558.  
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formative  in  this  context,  particularly  as  he  also  wrote  a  lengthy  preface  to  a  
memorial  booklet  in  honour  of  Albrecht  von  Bernstorff  in  1962.106    
Conclusion  
Forging  a  close  alignment  with  the  military  resistance  proved  to  be  a  crucial  
step   in   the   nobility’s   post-­‐‑war   history   management.   This   was   the   pivotal  
stepping-­‐‑stone   towards   the   reconstruction  of   the  nobility’s   shattered   image  
after   the   war.   It   distanced   the   nobility   from   the  machinations   of   the   Nazi  
regime  and  established  a  positive  and  lasting  narrative  of  its  role  during  the  
Third  Reich.   It   also  helped   the  nobility   to   establish   a  viable  public   identity  
within   the   new   democratic   Germany   by   allowing   it   to   become   part   of   the  
‘other’,  morally  intact  Germany.  It  was  a  counterweight  of  great  value  to  the  
accusation   that   the   nobility   had   been   the   gravedigger   of   the   Weimar  
Republic,  and   it  helped  to  allay   the   lasting  hostility   towards   the  old   Junker  
elite.107    
Overall,   this   entire   process   was   carefully   steered   by   a   select   group   of  
noblemen   and   -­‐‑women  who,   at   an   early   stage,   had   realised   the   enormous  
benefits   a   strategic   alignment   with   the   military   resistance   might   yield.  
Significantly   aided   by   leading   representatives   of   the   government,   the  
perception   that   20   July   1944   had,   in   fact,   been   a   revolt   of   the   nobility,  
gradually  found  its  way  into  collective  memory.  By  1969,  this  perception  had  
                                                                                                 
106  Kurt  von  Stutterheim,  Die  Majestät  des  Gewissens.  In  Memoriam  Albrecht  Bernstorff  
(Hamburg,  1962);  For  Heuss‘s  friendship  with  Bernstorff  see:  Theodor  Heuss,  In  der  Defensive  
–  Briefe  1933–1945,  Elke  Seefried  (ed.)  (Munich,  2009),  p.  238.  
107  Conze,  Aufstand  des  preußischen  Adels,  in:  Vierteljahreshefte  für  Zeitgeschichte,  p.  497.  
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found   so   much   acceptance   that   at   the   official   memorial   service   of   the  
government  at  the  Bendlerblock  –  the  main  site  of  the  failed  plot  in  Berlin  –  
when   the   renowned   writer   Carl   Zuckmayer   proclaimed   that   “almost   all  
names   of   the   German   nobility   were   to   be   found   among   the   resistance”  
against  Hitler,  no  objections  were   raised.108  The   fact   that  almost   every  East-­‐‑
Elbian  noble  family  had  been  prominently  represented  within  the  NSDAP  or  
other  party  organs,  and  that  most  of  the  noble  conspirators  had  been  isolated  
figures  within  their  caste  and  families,  had  apparently  been  forgotten.109    
                                                                                                 
108  Carl  Zuckmayer,  Die  Opposition  in  Deutschland,  Rede  im  Ehrenhof  des  Bendlerblocks  
am  20.07.1969  in  Berlin,  online  at:  www.20-­‐‑juli-­‐‑44.de/reden/.  
109  See:  Beide  Geschichten  erzählen:  Der  Historiker  Stephan  Malinowski  über  die  
Begeisterung  im  deutschen  Adel  für  den  Nationalsozialismus  und  die  Rolle  von  Grafen  und  
Baronen  beim  Attentat  auf  Hitler,  SPIEGEL,  12.07.2004.  
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Strategies  of  Rehabilitation:  Autobiography  as  Transfiguration  
Introduction  
Who   has   defined   our   image   of   East-­‐‑Prussia?   Before   the  war,   as   well   as   up   to   the   1980s,   this   was  
almost  exclusively  the  domain  of  noble  authors  –  Marion  Countess  Dönhoff,  Hans  Count  Lehndorff,  
Alexander  Prince  Dohna-­‐‑Schlobitten,  Esther  Countess  Schwerin.  We  are  thus  under  the   impression  
that  noblemen  ride  through  the  East-­‐‑Prussian  countryside,  chatting  in  a  caring,  paternalistic  sort  of  
way  with  their  subjects  and  that  squires  maintain  order.  Many  people  during  the  formative  years  of  
the  Federal  Republic  did  not  want  to  deal  with  the  problematic  heritage  of  the  Third  Reich,  but  instead  
preferred  such  images,  which  allowed  for  a  romantic  and  nostalgic  transfiguration  of  a  lost  world  in  
the  East.1    
Dr  Andreas  Kossert.  SPIEGEL,  25.01.2011  
  
The  alignment  of  the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility  with  the  anti-­‐‑Hitler  resistance  was,  
as   we   have   seen,   one   strand   of   the   process   by   which   nobles   sought   to  
decontaminate   and   rebuild   the   reputation   of   their   social   caste   after   1945.    
Another   strategy   was   the   transfiguration   of   East   Elbia   and   its   traditional  
social   relations   into   a   site   of   nostalgia   and   desire.   For   decades   after   the  
Second  World  War,  millions  of  German  refugees  still  viewed  the  regions  east  
of   the   river   Elbe   as   their   Heimat   and   longed   to   return   there.   Noble  
autobiographies   catered   to   this   market   and   exploited   these   emotions   by  
                                                                                                 
1  Randlage  mit  Bollwerksfunktion  –  Der  Osteuropahistoriker  Andreas  Kossert  über  den  
Mythos  Ostpreußen,  die  chauvinistische  Vergangenheit  und  die  Wiederentdeckung  des  
kulturellen  Reichtums,  SPIEGEL,  25.01.2011.  
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projecting   the   image   of   an   egalitarian,   economically   prosperous   society,  
bound  together  by  a  strong  sense  of  mutual  obligation,  and  set  in  a  landscape  
of   incomparable   scenic   beauty.   The   once   dominant   image   of   the   dashing,  
militaristic   Junker   officer2  gave   way   to   the   simulacrum   of   the   caring   and  
indulgent   squire  whose  only   concern  was   the  wellbeing  of  his  people.  The  
nobility  managed   to   create   a   space   outside   history.   Noble   life   in   the   East,  
closely   centred   on   the   patrimonial   estate   system,   was   wrested   from   the  
contamination  of  the  Third  Reich  and  integrated  into  a  carefully  constructed  
world  of  romanticism  and  nostalgia.    
Autobiographies   can  be  mined   for   various  purposes.      They   can  be  used   to  
illuminate  how  societal  changes  make  themselves  felt  in  individual  lives,  or  
to   show   how   the   experience   of   change   within   an   individual   life   is  
“emplotted,  bounded  or  framed”.3    They  can  offer  a  micro-­‐‑historical  lens  into  
practices   that   are   unlikely   to   be   recorded   elsewhere,   such   as   the   collecting  
and   telling   of   fairy   tales   in   nineteenth-­‐‑century   France.4    Alternatively,   they  
can   be   used   to   break   down   large   ideological   phenomena   into   individual  
packages   of   sentiment   and   intention. 5      These   modes   of   engagement  
                                                                                                 
2  See:  Heinz  Reif,  Die  Junker,  in:  Etienne  Francois  und  Hagen  Schulze  (eds),  Deutsche  
Erinnerungsorte  (Munich,  2001),  pp.  520–536;  Ferdinand  Seibt,  Das  alte  böse  Lied.  Rückblicke  auf  
die  deutsche  Geschichte  1900–1945  (Munich,  2000),  p.  57.  
3  Carolyn  A.  Barros,  Figura,  Persona,  Dynamis:  Autobiography  and  Change,  in:  Biography,  
15:1  (1992),  pp.  1–28.  
4  David  M.  Hopkin,  Storytelling,  Fairytales  and  Autobiography:  Some  Observations  on  
Eighteenth-­‐‑  and  Nineteenth-­‐‑Century  French  Soldiers'ʹ  and  Sailors'ʹ  Memoirs,  in:  Social  History,  
29:2  (2004),  pp.  186–198.  
5  Thomas  Hippler,  Les  Soldats  allemands  dans  l’armée  Napoléonienne  d’après  leurs  
autobiographies:  Micro-­‐‑républicanisme  et  décivilisation,  in:  Annales  historiques  de  la  
Révolution  française,  348,  Guerre(s),  Société(s),  Mémoire  (April/June  2007),  pp.  117–130.  
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presuppose  that  the  autobiography  grants  the  researcher  privileged  access  to  
a  world  of  private  experience  that  would  otherwise  remain  undiscovered.      
As   we   shall   see,   this   approach   would   not   be   entirely   appropriate   for   an  
investigation   intent  on  discovering  how  members  of   the  nobility  attempted  
to   reposition   themselves   in   the   world   after   1945.      For   one   thing,   the  
noblemen   and   -­‐‑women  who   published   autobiographies   after   1945   did   not  
acknowledge   the   rehabilitation  of   their   caste   as   a   legitimate   subject  matter.  
Their  writings  were   evidence   of   the  phenomenon  of   self-­‐‑rehabilitation,   not  
descriptions  of  it.    Moreover,  as  members  of  a  social  group  deeply  concerned  
with   their   collective   and   public   destiny   and   preoccupied   by   questions   of  
decorum,   noble   autobiography   writers   tended   to   avoid   the   ‘significant  
selfhood’   –   particularly   in   relation   to   personal   relationships   –   which   is  
considered   a   structuring   feature   of   the   traditional   autobiography.      In   that  
respect,   they   resembled   those   working-­‐‑class   Victorian   autobiographies   of  
which  it  has  been  said  lack  ‘flair’  and  ‘personality’.    Their  writing,  as  Virginia  
Woolf   remarked   of   the   papers   of   the  Women’s   Co-­‐‑operative   Guild,   “lacks  
detachment  and  imaginative  breadth”.6    Yet  when  we  read  them  en  masse,  as  
the  highly   imitative  articulations  of  a   collective  habitus,   they   reveal  a  great  
deal   about   how   the   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility   came   to   terms   with   the   need   to  
define   their   standing   in  a  post-­‐‑war,  bourgeois   society   still  deeply  unsettled  
by  the  memory  of  Nazism.      
                                                                                                 
6  Regenia  Gagnier,  Social  Atoms:  Working-­‐‑Class  Autobiography,  Subjectivity,  and  Gender,  
in:  Victorian  Studies,  30:3  (1987),  pp.  335–363.  
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Both  major   crises   in   twentieth   century  German  history   produced  waves   of  
memoirs.  Autobiographies  had  been  used  before,  but  only   in   the   twentieth  
century   did   they   become   a   crucial   tool   of   exculpation.   In   the   nineteenth  
century,  few  nobles  had  published  autobiographies,  and  those  that  did  were  
exceptional  individuals  who  had  held  high  office  and  had  ‘something  to  say’  
about   national   politics.   In   these   accounts,   the   author   carefully   constructed  
their   own   important   role   in   the   vicissitudes   of   politics,   but   generally  
refrained   from  giving  detailed   insight   into   their  private   life.7  Only  after   the  
caesura  of  the  First  World  War  did  the  autobiography  become  a  strategic  tool  
for  the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility  to  re-­‐‑establish  their  individual  reputation,  as  well  
as   its   collective   standing.  Yet,   it   is   impossible   to   capture   the   specificities  of  
what  occurred  in  the  latter  part  of  the  twentieth  century  without  establishing  
the  contrast  between  autobiographical  production  after  World  War  Two  and  
its  antecedents  in  the  interwar  period.  Only  by  making  this  comparison  can  
we   see   how   fundamentally   the   nobility’s   strategy   shifted   between   the   two  
conflicts.      
After   the   First   World   War,   the   nobility   developed   a   radically   anti-­‐‑
democratic,  elitist,  and  racist  rhetoric,  aligning  itself  in  many  cases  with  the  
extreme   right.   After   the   Second  World  War,   the   nobility   chose   a   different  
course:   it   redefined   itself   by   degrees   as   a   depoliticised   elite.   The   political  
activism  and  corporate  agenda  of   the   interwar  period  gave  way   to  a  much  
                                                                                                 
7  Funck  and  Malinowski,  Masters  of  Memory,  in:  Confino  and  Fritzsche  (eds),  The  Work  Of  
Memory,  p.  92;  See:  Otto  von  Bismarck,  Gedanken  und  Erinnerungen  (Berlin,  1922);  Friedrich  
August  Ludwig  von  der  Marwitz,  Lebensbeschreibung  (Berlin,  1852);  Karl  August  Fürst  von  
Hardenberg,  Denkwürdigkeiten  des  Staatskanzlers  Fürsten  von  Hardenberg  (Leipzig,  1877);  
Gebhard  von  Blücher,  Vorwärts!  Ein  Husarentagebuch  und  Feldzugsbriefe  (Munich,  1914);  
Sophie  Marie  Gräfin  von  Voss,  69  Jahre  am  Preußischen  Hofe  (Leipzig,  1894).  
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more  apolitical  and  individualised  history  management.  The  nobility  began  
to   embrace   the   new   political   order,   and   turned   itself   into   a   symbolic   elite.  
The   foundation   for   this   symbolic   elitism   is   formed   by   the   strategic  
transfiguration  of  the  idyllic  pre-­‐‑war  patrimonial  world.    
Post  World  War  I  
From  Collapse  to  Resurgence  
The   collapse  of  Germany   in   1918  marked  a  profound   caesura   in  noble   life.  
Between   4,500   and   4,800   noble   officers,   and   almost   a   quarter   of   the   adult  
male  population,  had   fallen  victim   to   the  war.8  The  Hero-­‐‑Memorial-­‐‑Booklet   of  
the  German  Nobility,  published   in  1921,   listed  675  only  sons,  100  fathers  and  
sons   and   497   brothers   who   fell   in   the   “hottest   heat   of   the   battle   or   went  
missing   on   audacious  patrols   […]   in   churning  waters,   in   the   thicket   of   the  
jungle   or   in   the   horrors   of   the   dessert’s   solitude”.9  Furthermore,   with   the  
proclamation   of   the   republic,   and   the   Kaiser’s   flight   to   Holland,   the   East-­‐‑
Elbian  nobility   lost   its   connection   to   the  monarch   as   the   head   of   the   noble  
                                                                                                 
8  Iris  Freifrau  von  Hoyningen-­‐‑Huene,  Adel  in  der  Weimarer  Republik.  Die  rechtlich-­‐‑soziale  
Situation  des  reichsdeutschen  Adels  1918–1933  (Limburg  an  der  Lahn,  1992),  pp.  22–23;  see  also:  
Görlitz,  Die  Junker,  pp.  319–320.  
9  Alexis  von  Schoenermarck,  Helden-­‐‑Gedenkmappe  des  Deutschen  Adels  (Stuttgart,  1921),  cited  
in:  Malinowski,  Vom  König  zum  Führer,  p.  200.  The  high  number  of  casualties  obviously  
correlates  with  the  fact  that,  especially  in  East  Elbia,  many  noble  families  were  old  military  
clans,  which  for  centuries  had  sent  their  later-­‐‑born  sons  into  the  Prussian  army.  In  1914,  the  
Puttkamers  listed  49  active  officers,  the  Kleists  44,  the  Zitzewitz  34  and  the  Bonins  30.  
During  the  war  33  Bülow,  26  Arnim,  24  Wedel,  22  Oertzen,  21  Puttkamer,  19  Schwerin,  16  




hierarchy,  as  supreme  commander,  and  emperor  of  the  Reich.  The  previous  
congruence  of  loyalty  to  the  monarch  and  loyalty  to  the  state  ceased  to  exist  
in  the  republic.10    
The   Weimar   constitution   of   1919   furthermore   abolished   the   nobility   as   a  
privileged  social  class  and  deprived  it  of  its  titles.  Article  155  also  proclaimed  
the  dissolution  of  the  Fideikommiss,  the  legal  rampart  protecting  the  integrity  
of   the   large  estates.11  Although   large-­‐‑scale  expropriation  of   the  nobility  was  
discussed,   it   did   not   find   a  majority   in   parliament.   In   1927,   however,   after  
years  of  debate,  the  Prussian  government  ultimately  attempted  to  tackle  the  
nobility’s   supremacy   on   the   land   by   abolishing   the   Gutsbezirke.   These  
remnants   of   feudal   lordship   formed   the   local   fundament   of   the   political  
power   of   the   nobility.   Within   these   administrative   districts,   the   squire’s  
power  was   supreme;   besides   him,   there  was   no   other   communal   organ   to  
represent  the  will  of  the  people.12  At  last,  the  implementation  of  the  Treaty  of  
Versailles   in   1920   led   to   the   reduction   of   the   army   to   a  mere   100,000  men.  
This   step   not   only   significantly   curtailed   the   nobility’s   influence   on   state  
affairs,  but  also  deprived  it  of  its  main  source  of  income  for  later  born  sons.  
Within  the  span  of  a  few  years,  the  parameters  of  the  nobility’s  existence  had  
therefore  changed  dramatically.  
                                                                                                 
10  Wencke  Meteling,  Der  deutsche  Zusammenbruch  1918  in  den  Selbstzeugnissen  adliger  
preußischer  Offiziere,  in:  Wienfort  und  Conze  (eds),  Adel  und  Moderne,  p.  289.  
11  See:  Jens  Beckert,  Unverdientes  Vermögen,  Soziologie  des  Erbrechts  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  2004),  pp.  
184–186.  1167  Fideikommisse  existed  in  Prussia  in  1919,  covering  1.8  Million  hectares  of  
land.  See  Görlitz,  Die  Junker,  p.  344.  
12  Conze,  Von  deutschem  Adel,  p.  91;  In  1927,  there  were  still  approximately  12,000  
Gutsbezirke,  which  covered  29  per  cent  of  Prussia  and  comprised  about  1.5  million  people.  
See:  Horst  Möller,  Parlamentarismus  in  Preussen  1919–1932  (Düsseldorf,  1985)  p.  474.  
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The  nobility,  however,  was  not  willing  to  accept  this  erosion  of  its  power.  As  
soon  as  the  first  shock  had  faded,  it  went  to  work  in  an  attempt  to  recapture  
its   dominant   role   in   society.      As   Eckart   Conze   illustrated   in   his   study  
concerning   the   Bernstorff   family,   many   noblemen   succeeded   in   either  
preventing   the   establishment   of   local   revolutionary   peasant   councils   or  
managed  to  influence  them  in  line  with  their  own  interests.13  They  also  set  up  
local   militias   and   pressure   groups   to   protect   their   assets   and   encouraged  
other  noblemen  to  do  the  same.14  This  was  especially  the  case  in  the  foremost  
eastern   province   of   the   Reich,   East   Prussia,   which   witnessed   the  
establishment   of   numerous   such   private   militias.   Elard   von   Oldenburg  
Januschau   prominently   formed   a   three-­‐‑dozen   strong   “assault   detachment”  
against   “revolutionary   sailors”; 15   Wilhelm   von   Oppen-­‐‑Tornow   hid  
reactionary   rebels   in   his   manor   house;   and   Alexander   Prince   Dohna-­‐‑
Schlobitten  secreted  weapons  and  ammunitions  in  his  private  chapel.16  Other  
noblemen,  such  as  Count  Brünneck-­‐‑Belschwitz,  Count  Dohna-­‐‑Tolksdorf  and  
Count   Eulenburg-­‐‑Wicken,   formed   the   Heimatbund   Ostpreußen   to   counter  
“domestic   revolutionary   elements”   as   well   as   the   threat   posed   by   Soviet  
                                                                                                 
13  Conze,  Von  deutschem  Adel,  pp.  29–50,  especially  37;  See  also:  Axel  Schildt,  Der  Putsch  der  
Prätorianer,  Junker  und  Alldeutschen.  Adel  und  Bürgertum  in  den  Anfangswirren  der  
Weimarer  Republik,  in:  Reif  (ed.),  Adel  und  Bürgertum  in  Deutschland  II,  p.  109;  Jens  
Flemming,  Landwirtschaftliche  Interessen  und  Demokratie,  Ländliche  Gesellschaft,  Agrarverbände  
und  Staat  1890–1925  (Bonn,  1978),  p.  161.  
14  See  the  appeal  of  the  Prussian  association  of  forest  owners  on  3  June  1919.  Conze,  Von  
deutschem  Adel,  p.  415.  
15  Elard  von  Oldenburg-­‐‑Januschau,  Erinnerungen  (Leipzig,  1936),  p.  209.  




Russia   and   Poland. 17   Additionally,   noblemen   played   key   roles   in   the  
founding  of  paramilitary  organisations  such  as  the  Stahlhelm.18    
Additionally,   the   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility   supported   en   masse   the   numerous  
Freikorps  set  up  throughout  the  Reich  to  shoot  down  the  revolution.  Besides  
providing  significant  financial  assistance,  a  disproportionately  high  number  
of  noblemen  joined  these  paramilitary  organisations  to  fight  the  revolution.19  
As   one   of   the   most   notorious   Freikorps   leaders,   Walther   von   Lüttwitz,  
proclaimed  “the  desire  of   the  old  officers   to   render   service   to   the  Reich  by  
defending   it   against   Bolshevism   was   immense”.20  Although   there   are   no  
precise  numbers  of  the  nobility’s  overall  share  in  the  Freikorps,  the  fact  that  
42   out   of   the   132   Freikorps   bore   noble   names,   and   that   certain   Freikorps  
predominantly   consisted  of   former  officers   of   the   Imperial  Army,   indicates  
large-­‐‑scale   noble   participation.21  A   closer   look   at   the   noble   share   of   the  
officers   involved   in   the   Kapp-­‐‑Lüttwitz   Putsch   in   March   1920   further  
substantiates  this  claim.  When  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  was  implemented  and  
the   reduction  of   the  army  was   finalised   in   early  1920,   the  government  was  
forced  to  dissolve  the  Freikorps.  Many  members,  however,  were  unwilling  to  
accept  this  ruling,  and  General  von  Lüttwitz  marched  his  troops  to  Berlin  in  
                                                                                                 
17  Görlitz,  Die  Junker,  p.  354.  
18  Volker  Berghahn,  Der  Stahlhelm  –  Bund  der  Frontsoldaten  1918–1935  (Düsseldorf,  1966),  pp.  
56,  133.  
19  For  financing  of  the  Freikorps  see:  Günter  Paulus,  Die  soziale  Struktur  der  Freikorps,  in:  
Zeitschrift  für  Geschichtswissenschaft,  5:3  (1955),  pp.  685–704.  
20  Walther  von  Lüttwitz,  Im  Kampf  gegen  die  Novemberrevolution  (Berlin,  1934),  p.  49.  
21  Nigel  H.  Jones,  Hitler’s  Herolds.  The  Story  of  the  Freikorps  1918–1923  (London  1987),  pp.  249–
265;  Paulus,  Die  soziale  Struktur  der  Freikorps,  in:  Zeitschrift  für  Geschichtswissenschaft,  pp.  




an   attempt   to   overthrow   the   government   and   install   a   reactionary  
dictatorship.   Out   of   the   540   officers   charged   after   the   coup,   116   members  
belonged  to   the  nobility,   forming  almost  a  quarter  of   its  contingent.22  These  
numerous  direct  interventions  in  politics  and  counter  revolutionary  activities  
show  that  despite  an  initial  state  of  shock  following  Germany’s  military  and  
political  collapse,  the  nobility  quickly  went  to  work  to  salvage  the  remnants  
of  its  power.    
A  Stab  in  the  Back:  Drafting  the  Image  of  Infallible  Noble  Leadership  
Simultaneously,   this   undertaking   was   powerfully   flanked   by   a   literary  
campaign   to   regain   interpretative   sovereignty   over   the   reasons   for   and  
meaning   behind   Germany’s   catastrophe.   The   predominant   tool   in   this  
operation   was   the   autobiography.   It   served   as   an   instrument   of   self-­‐‑
assurance   and   infra-­‐‑corporate   communication.   It   allowed   noble   authors   to  
process   their   individual   experiences   of   the   war,   and   the   downfall   of   the  
monarchy,   while   simultaneously   contributing   to   a   joint   effort   to   exculpate  
the   nobility   as   a   whole.   More   importantly,   however,   it   “proved   to   be   an  
exquisite  tool  to  defame  the  political  enemy”.23  Countless  noblemen  took  up  
the  pen  to  foster  the  notorious  “stab  in  the  back”  theory,  blaming  the  military  
collapse   on   the   ‘weakness’   and   ‘betrayal’   of   the   home   front.   This   myth,  
                                                                                                 
22  See  the  list  of  officers  in  Emil  Julius  Gumbel,  Verschwörer.  Zur  Geschichte  und  Soziologie  der  
deutschen  nationalistischen  Geheimbünde  1918–1924  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1984),  pp.  62–71;  see  also:  
Schildt,  Der  Putsch  der  Prätorianer,  in:  Reif  (ed.),  Adel  und  Bürgertum  in  Deutschland  II,  pp.  
103–125.  
23  Meteling,  Der  deutsche  Zusammenbruch  1918  in  den  Selbstzeugnissen  adliger  preußischer  
Offiziere,  in:  Wienfort  und  Conze  (eds.),  Adel  und  Moderne,  p.  292.  
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originally   developed   by   the   army’s   former   General   Chief   of   Staff,   Erich  
Ludendorff,   in  1919,   resurfaces   in  almost  every  noble  autobiography  of   the  
Weimar  Republic.24  Field  Marshall  Paul  von  Hindenburg,  former  head  of  the  
Supreme   Army   Command   and   subsequent   President   of   the   Weimar  
Republic,  prominently   claimed,   “our  government   conceded   in   the  hope   for  
clemency   and   justice”.25  As   a   result,   “our   exhausted   front   collapsed   like  
Siegfried   under   the   deceitful   javelin   throw   of   the   ferocious   Hagen”. 26  
According   to   Friedrich   Wilhelm   von   Oertzen,   the   social   democrats   even  
“systematically  carried  revolutionary  subversion  from  the  homeland  […]  to  
the  frontline”.27  For  Elard  von  Oldenburg-­‐‑Januschau,  “the  young  glory  of  the  
German   Reich   had   been   tainted   by   the   betrayal   of   its   own   people”.28  The  
general  consensus  was  that  “neither  Versailles  and  its  consequences,  nor  the  
Polenschmach  in  the  East,  nor  the  French  incursion  into  the  Ruhr  area  would  
have  occurred”  without   the  betrayal  of   the  home   front.29  The  noble  authors  
painted  the  image  of  an  army  that  had  returned  “undefeated  by  the  enemy,  
covered  in  glory  and  wounds”;30  an  army,  which  according  to  Rüdiger  Graf  
von  der  Goltz,  had  “won  the  greatest  ‘breakthrough  battles’  and  had  proven  
to  be  the  paramount  victor  on  the  battlefield”  only  to  be  abandoned  “in  the  
                                                                                                 
24  William  L.  Shirer,  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich  (New  York,  1960),  p.31;  also  see:  
Manfred  Nebelin,  Ludendorff:  Diktator  im  Ersten  Weltkrieg  (Munich,  2011).  
25  Paul  von  Hindenburg,  Aus  meinem  Leben  (Leipzig,  1934),  p.  395.  
26  Hindenburg,  Aus  meinem  Leben,  p.  403.  
27  Friedrich  Wilhelm  von  Oertzen,  Die  deutschen  Freikorps  1918–1923  (Munich,  1938),  p.  245.  
28  Oldenburg,  Erinnerungen,  p.  208.  
29  Hugo  von  Freytag  Loringhoven,  Menschen  und  Dinge  wie  ich  sie  in  meinem  Leben  sah  (Berlin,  
1920),  p.  330.  
30  Oldenburg,  Erinnerungen,  p.  213.  
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most   dreadful   fashion”. 31   In   return   for   their   heroics,   “the   ungrateful  
fatherland  and  the  dishonourable  people  tore  the  decorations  off  their  chests  
and   the   epaulettes   off   their   shoulders”.32  As   much   as   all   these   literary  
assaults  were  attempts   to  exculpate   the   former   imperial  officer   corps  –  one  
should   not   forget   that   by   the   beginning   of   the  war,   the   noble   share   of   the  
corps  accounted  for  almost  forty  per  cent33  –  they  were  designed  to  directly  
intervene  in  day-­‐‑to-­‐‑day  politics  and  help  to  attack  and  delegitimise  the  new  
order.    
At  the  same  time,  the  exceedingly  self-­‐‑righteous  and  brazenly  self-­‐‑defensive  
tone   of   these   memoirs   suggests   that   the   noble   authors   were   entirely  
unwilling  to  accept  any  sort  of  responsibility  for  the  collapse  of  the  German  
Empire.   The   common  narrative  was   that   the   government   of   the  Reich   had  
already   been   interspersed  with   subversive   “republican   elements”   and   had  
lacked  the  resolute  leadership  required  to  destroy  the  “undignified  vermin”  
of   Bolshevism.34  Ostensibly,   if   only   the   nobility   had   been   allowed   to,   they  
would  have  shot  down   the   revolution.  Hugo  Graf  von  Westarp,  one  of   the  
founding  members  of   the  DNVP,  assigned  responsibility   for   the  collapse  of  
Germany   to   South-­‐‑German   republicans   who   “in   reality   had   caused   the  
                                                                                                 
31  Rüdiger  Graf  von  der  Goltz,  Meine  Sendung  in  Finnland  und  im  Baltikum  (Leipzig,  1920),  p.  
30.  
32  Oldenburg,  Erinnerungen,  p.  213.  
33  Detlef  Bald,  Der  deutsche  Offizier.  Sozial  und  Bildungsgeschichte  des  deutschen  Offizierskorps  im  
20.  Jahrhundert  (Munich,  1982),  pp.  21,  39.  
34  Michael  Epkenhans:  “Wir  als  deutsches  Volk  sind  doch  nicht  klein  zu  kriegen  ...”.  Aus  den  
Tagebüchern  des  Fregattenkapitäns  Bogislav  von  Selchow.  1918/19,  in:  Militärgeschichtliche  
Mitteilungen,  55  (1996),  p.  201.  
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abolition  of   the  monarchy  by  means  of  a   forged  abdication  of   the  Kaiser”.35  
Elard   von   Oldenburg-­‐‑Januschau   was   “deeply   disappointed”   that   the  
government   had   not   issued   a   “firing   order”.   If   only   he   had   been   atop   the  
government,  he  would  have  been  the  man  “who  fired  himself”.  Ernst  Graf  zu  
Reventlow  was   convinced   that   “under   decisive   and   vigorous   leadership,   a  
small   detachment   of   troops   could   have   quickly   restored   order   in   Berlin”.  
Rüdiger   Graf   von   der   Goltz   wanted   the   navy   to   bomb   Stockholm   in   case  
Sweden  intended  to  give  up  neutrality  and  defect  to  the  Allies.  “This  manly  
argumentation   would   have   had   a   far   greater   effect   than   the   pathetic  
advances   of   German   diplomats.”   Friedrich   Graf   von   der   Schulenburg,   the  
former  chief  of  staff  of  the  army  group  Kronprinz,  intended  to  put  the  Kaiser  
at  the  head  of  his  troops  and  shoot  down  the  revolts  in  the  Reich.36    
While   accusing   the   government   of   sacrificing   the   Reich   on   the   “altars   of  
liberalism  and  social-­‐‑democracy”,  the  noble  authors  were  quick  to  point  out  
that   their   unrivalled   leadership   skills   had   remained   unaffected   throughout  
the  crisis.  Rüdiger  Graf  von  der  Goltz  claimed  his  troops  “maintained  [their]  
firm  and  proud  discipline  and  remained  loyal  to  the  monarch  until  the  very  
end”.  The  wavering  few  were  won  over  by  a  passionate  speech,  at  the  end  of  
which,  everybody  cheered   the  abdicated  Kaiser.37  Colonel  General  Karl  von  
Einem  similarly  celebrated  his  troops,  “[who]  had  proved  as  valuable  in  the  
war  of  attrition  on  the  western  front  as  they  had  on  horseback  in  the  east  and  
                                                                                                 
35  Kuno  Graf  von  Westarp,  Das  Ende  der  Monarchie  am  9.  November  1918.  Abschließender  Bericht  
nach  den  Aussagen  der  Beteiligten,  Werner  Conze  (ed.)  (Berlin,  1952),  p.  140.  
36  For  a  detailed  account  of  Count  Schulenburg’s  plans  see:  Friedrich  Graf  von  der  
Schulenburg,  Denkschrift  zum  9  November,  LHAM-­‐‑AW,  Rep.  H  Karow,  Nr.  219,  Fol.  48–57,  
all  cited  in:  Malinowski,  Vom  König  zum  Führer,  p.  231.  
37  Goltz,  Meine  Sendung  in  Finnland  und  im  Baltikum,  p.  30.  
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had  marched  back   into   the  Heimat   in   firm  discipline”.38  By   reaffirming   the  
loyalty   of   their   troops,   the   authors   reassure   themselves   of   their  
accomplishment   as   commanding   officer.   The   troops’   reliability   during  war  
thereby   becomes   the   officers’   legitimisation   as   leaders.   The   fact   that   von  
Einem  had  frequently  referred  to  the  exhaustion  and  the  hopelessness  of  his  
troops   and   the   concomitantly   increasing   rate   of   desertion   in   his   diary   in  
autumn  1918  had  long  been  forgotten  by  the  time  of  his  memoir’s  publication  
a  decade  later.39    
As  much  as  these  affirmations  of  leadership  skills  were  attempts  to  exculpate  
the   author   of   any   responsibility   for   Germany’s   collapse,   they   were   at   the  
same   time   designed   to   align   the   nobility   with   the   newly   evolving   Führer  
concepts  of   the   far   right.40  Authors  such  as   Joseph  Arthur  Count  Gobineau,  
Houston  Stewart  Chamberlain,  and  even  Walther  Rathenau,  grounded  their  
ideas  of  a  new  elite  on  racial/Germanic  categories  rather  than  birth.  In  their  
visions,   biological,   as  well   as   intellectual-­‐‑psychological   criteria,   formed   the  
basis   for   a   “new”   aristocracy,   a   small   elite   of   ruthless   leaders  who  would  
guide   the   confused   and   disoriented  masses;41  such   ideas   partly   formed   the  
basis  for  the  later  writings  of  authors  such  as  Arthur  Moeller  van  den  Bruck  
                                                                                                 
38  Karl  von  Einem,  Erinnerungen  eines  Soldaten  (Leipzig,  1933),  p.  45.  
39  Meteling,  Der  deutsche  Zusammenbruch  1918  in  den  Selbstzeugnissen  adliger  preußischer  
Offiziere,  in:  Wienfort  und  Conze  (eds.),  Adel  und  Moderne,  p.  297.  
40  See  especially  Stephan  Malinowski’s  chapters:  Führertum  und  Neuer  Adel  as  well  as  
Führertum  und  Adelserneuerung,  in:  Malinowski,  Vom  König  zum  Führer,  pp.  299–321;  See  
also:  Edgar  Julius  Jung,  Adel  oder  Elite?,  in:  Europäische  Revue,  9  (1933),  pp.  533–535;  Edgar  
Julius  Jung,  Die  Herrschaft  der  Minderwertigen  (Berlin,  1927).  
41  See:  Houston  Stewart  Chamberlain,  Die  Grundlagen  des  neunzehnten  Jahrhunderts  (Munich,  
1899);  Joseph  Arthur  Count  Gobineau,  Versuch  über  die  Ungleichheit  der  Menschenrassen  
(Stuttgart,  1902);  Alexandra  Gerstner,  Neuer  Adel  –  Aristokratische  Elitekonzeptionen  zwischen  
Jahrhundertwende  und  Nationalsozialismus  (Darmstadt,  2008),  pp.  115–130.  
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and  Walther  Darré.42  Even   though  for   the   large  majority  of   the  nobility,   the  
monarchy  remained  the  desired  system  of  government,  the  idea  of  a  strong  
Führertum,   centred   on   ‘people’   and   ‘fatherland’,   became   more   and   more  
popular. 43   Deprived   of   the   traditional   monarch,   such   a   newly   founded  
Volksgemeinschaft   was   to   be   headed   by   a   dictator   and   a   so-­‐‑called   “Führer-­‐‑
Adel”.  Thus  when  Elard  von  Oldenburg-­‐‑Januschau  proudly   restored  order  
on   his   estate   solely   by   threatening   to   “beat   the   hell”   out   of   an   insurgent  
peasant,  it  was  always  an  act  of  self-­‐‑assurance,  but  also  an  attempt  to  portray  
the   inherent   steadfastness   and   resoluteness   of   the   nobility   and   its  
predisposition   to   rule.44  It   is   a   similar   case   when   the   former   crown   prince  
recites   an   anecdote   in   his   memoirs,   published   in   1922,   in   which   he   “gave  
such  a  shout  to  a  riotous  bloke  that  he,  shivering  and  green  with  fear,  saluted  
without   cease”. 45   Manfred   von   Killinger,   a   member   of   the   Freikorps  
Marinebrigade  Ehrhardt,  even  ordered  brutal  force  to  be  used  against  every  
insurgent,   male   as   well   as   female,   only   to   justify   it   by   claiming   that  
“everything  else  the  riffraff  would  have  interpreted  as  ‘weakness’”.46  Lita  zu  
Putlitz,   who   was   allegedly   supposed   to   be   hanged   by   a   revolutionary  
council,   repulsed   her   executioners   by   firmly   declaring   her   loyalty   to   the  
                                                                                                 
42  See:  Arthur  Moeller  van  den  Bruck,  Das  Dritte  Reich  (Berlin,  1923);  Walther  Darré,  Neuadel  
aus  Blut  und  Boden  (Munich,  1923).  
43  Martin  Kohlrausch,  Die  Flucht  des  Kaisers  -­‐‑  Doppeltes  Scheitern  adlig-­‐‑bürgerlicher  
Monarchiekonzepte,  in:  Reif,  Adel  und  Bürgertum  in  Deutschland  II,  pp.  65–101;  Malinowski,  
Vom  König  zum  Führer,  p.  209.  
44  Oldenburg,  Erinnerungen,  pp.  207–209.  
45  Wilhelm,  Deutscher  Kronprinz  und  von  Preußen,  Erinnerungen  (Wieringen,  1922),  p.  330.  
46  Manfred  von  Killinger,  Ernstes  und  Heiteres  aus  dem  Putschleben  (Munich,  1927),  p.  52.  
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Kaiser.   “The   revolutionaries   stole   away   in   shame.”47  All   these   anecdotes  
contained   a   central  message:   even   during   the   upheavals   of   revolution   and  
republic,   the   nobility   stood   firm,   and   due   to   its   ancient   and   infallible  
experience  in  leadership,  it  was  predestined  to  rule  in  the  future.    
Self-­‐‑Critical  Views  
In   addition,   the   interwar   autobiographies   impress   by   the   intensity   of   their  
corporatism,   and   thereby   stand   in   sharp   contrast   to   the   much   more  
individualistic  approach  adopted  after  the  Second  World  War.  The  memoirs  
of   the  Weimar  Republic   are   almost   exclusively  dominated   by   the  desire   to  
attack   the   political   enemy,   delegitimise   the   new   order,   and   re-­‐‑establish   a  
paramount  noble  dominance  of  politics  and  society.  The  complete  denial  of  
the   nobility’s   culpability   in   the   collapse   of   the   empire   is   coupled  with   the  
defamation  of  the  republic  and  its  dignitaries,  and  an  absurd  glorification  of  
the  nobility’s  alleged  predisposition  to  lead.  The  level  of  corporatism  among  
the  authors  of  the  autobiographies  is  further  exemplified  by  what  happened  
to  members  of   the  nobility  who  dared   to  break  out  of   this  carefully  crafted  
narrative.  Paul  von  Schoenaich,  a   former  general  of   the   imperial  army,  had  
ventured   publicly   to   condemn   the  mendacity   of   official  war   reporting   and  
excoriate  the  Kaiser’s  flight  to  Holland.  These  events  had  convinced  him  that  
“after  the  armistice,  the  old  powers  and  system  of  government  had  to  vanish  
                                                                                                 
47  Görlitz,  Die  Junker,  p.  329;  For  more  examples  see:  Wolfgang  Gans  Edler  Herr  zu  Putlitz,  
Unterwegs  nach  Deutschland  (Berlin,  1956),  pp.  13,  14;  Fritz  Günther  von  Tschirschky,  
Erinnerungen  eines  Hochverräters  (Stuttgart,  1972),  pp.  32,  36,  37.  
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irrevocably”. 48   In   1918,   he   joined   the   German   Democratic   Party   and  
published  articles  against  the  “stab  in  the  back  theory”.  In  1922,  he  became  a  
member  of  the  German  Peace  Society.  This  radical  break  with  the  traditions  
and   convictions   of   his   peers   led   to   his   discharge   from   the   army   and  
expulsion   from   various   officer-­‐‑   and   regiment-­‐‑associations. 49   While   the  
overwhelming   majority   of   authors   tried   to   transfigure   the   collapse   into   a  
heroic  struggle  of  the  old  “undefeated”  army,  shift  the  blame  onto  the  home  
front   and   glorify   their   own   leadership   skills   in   an   attempt   to   qualify  
themselves   for   a   dominant   role   in   an   authoritarian   future,   Schoenaich’s  
critical  position  resulted  in  social  ostracism.    
A   similar   fate   awaited   Robert   Graf   von   Zedlitz   und   Trützschler,   former  
imperial   court  marshal   and   son  of   the   former  Prussian  minister   of   cultural  
affairs,  who  had  labelled  the  Kaiser’s  rule  as  “despotism”  and  bemoaned  the  
“dangers”  of  a  hereditary  monarchy  in  which  millions  of  people  are  forced  to  
entrust   their   destiny   to   the   hands   of   a   man   only   empowered   by   the  
coincidence  of  birth.50  Not  only  was  he  expelled  from  the  Association  of  the  
German  Nobility  (Deutsche  Adelsgenossenschaft  (DAG)),  but  the  majority  of  
his   family  also  boycotted  him.  He  was  disinvited   from  hunting  parties  and  
called   a   ‘traitor’   by   his   neighbours.   This   situation   amounted   to   a   virtual  
social  execution.51  In  some  cases,  however,  the  defensive  mechanisms  of  the  
                                                                                                 
48  Paul  von  Schoenaich,  Mein  Damaskus  (Berlin,  1925),  p.  205.  
49  Meteling,  Der  deutsche  Zusammenbruch  1918  in  den  Selbstzeugnissen  adliger  preußischer  
Offiziere,  in:  Wienfort  und  Conze  (eds),  Adel  und  Moderne,  p.  318.  
50  Robert  Graf  von  Zedlitz  und  Trützschler,  Zwölf  Jahre  am  deutschen  Kaiserhof  (Stuttgart,  
1923),  pp.  248,  249.  
51  Alexander  Stahlberg,  Als  Preußen  noch  Preußen  war.  Erinnerungen  (Berlin,  1992),  pp.  131–
132;  For  Zedlitz’  exclusion  from  the  DAG  see:  Erwein  Freiherr  von  Aretin,  Adel,  Nation  und  
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old  elites  resulted  in  even  more  grotesque  reactions.  When  in  1919,  Paul  Graf  
von  Hoensbroech  ridiculed  Wilhelm  II  in  a  brochure  as  a  pompous  coward,  
Friedrich   Graf   von   der   Schulenburg   demanded   that   two   of   his   officers  
challenge  Hoensbroech  to  a  duel.52  
The   striking   level   of   corporatism   is   also   reflected   in   the   correspondence   of  
the  aforementioned  Graf  von  der  Schulenburg  and  Dietlof  Graf  von  Arnim,  
which   reveals   Schulenburg’s   deep   concern  with   the   publications   of   critical  
noble   autobiographies.   “After  Waldersee   and  Zedlitz   the   ‘wretchedness’   of  
Bülow   has   a   disastrous   effect.   […]   I   see   in   Bülow   the   gravedigger   of   the  
German  empire.”53  The  former  Reich  Chancellor,  Bernhard  Fürst  von  Bülow,  
had  used  his  posthumously  published  memoirs  in  1930  to  settle  scores  with  
the  Kaiser.  At  length,  he  lamented  the  Kaiser’s  imprudence  and  political  faux  
pas,   and   remarked   that   the   “careless,   hasty,   foolish   and   even   childish  
governance  of  the  head  of  the  Reich  inevitably  had  to  end  in  catastrophe”.54  
This  sharp  criticism  led  to  heated  debates  in  wide  circles  of  the  nobility.  The  
General  Imperial  Administration  in  Doorn,  supported  by  the  head  of  DAG,  
even  called  for  the  family  association  of  the  Bülows  to  publicly  denounce  the  
statements  of  the  former  Reich  Chancellor.55      
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Krone,  in:  In  Treue  fest  (21.7.1924),  cited  in:  Malinowski,  Vom  König  zum  Führer,  p.  465;  A  
detailed  description  of  the  boycott  of  his  peers  can  be  found  in:  Gerhard  von  Jordan,  Unser  
Dorf  in  Schlesien  (Berlin,  1987),  p.  181.  
52  Malinowski,  Vom  König  zum  Führer,  p.  249.  
53  Rainer  Pomp,  Dietlof  Graf  von  Arnim-­‐‑Boitzenburg,  Wandlungen  eines  preußischen  
Konservativen  bis  1933,  cited  in:  Malinowski,  Vom  König  zum  Führer,  p.  251.  
54  Heinrich  August  Winkler,  Der  lange  Weg  nach  Westen,  Deutsche  Geschichte  vom  Ende  des  alten  
Reiches  bis  zum  Untergang  der  Weimarer  Republik  (Munich,  2002),  p.  300.  
55  Malinowski,  Vom  König  zum  Führer,  p.  250.  
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Overall,   the  noble  autobiographies  of  the  Weimar  era  show  a  striking  unity  
of   thought.   The   writings   are   strategically   used   to   defend   the   common  
narrative   of   a   strong   and   infallible   noble   leadership,   defame   the   political  
enemy,  and  build  a  bridge   to   the  newly  evolving  authoritarian   ideology  of  
the   far   right.   At   the   same   time,   the   corporate   activism   revealed   in   the  
treatment  of  critical  peers  exposes  the  nobility’s  gradual  transformation  from  
a   traditional   political   elite   into   somewhat   of   an   “imagined   community”,  
eager  to  cement  its  external  boundaries.56    
Post  World  War  II  
The  Apologia  of  the  1945-­‐‑Generation  
The   unconditional   surrender   of   the   Axis   powers   in   1945   resulted   in   the  
second  and  final  defeat  of   the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility.  Already  abolished  as  an  
independent  social  and  political  force  in  1918,  the  expropriation  of  the  large  
ancestral  estates  in  the  East  irrevocably  robbed  the  nobility  of  its  traditional  
economic  and  cultural  basis  of  power.57  As  after  Germany’s  collapse  in  1918,  
a  crisis  of   such  magnitude   triggered  a  glut  of  noble  memoirs.  However,  on  
this   occasion,   two   major   waves   of   autobiographical   production   must   be  
differentiated.  The  first  wave  spans   from  the   late  1940s  until   the   late  1960s.  
Former  career  officers,  dignitaries  of  the  Third  Reich,  and  surviving  members  
                                                                                                 
56  Marcus  Funck  und  Stephan  Malinowski,  Geschichte  von  Oben,  Autobiographien  als  
Quellen  einer  Sozial-­‐‑  und  Kulturgeschichte  des  deutschen  Adels  in  Kaiserreich  und  
Weimarer  Republik,  in:  Historische  Anthropologie,  7  (1999),  p.  244.  
57  For  detailed  depictions  of  the  severity  of  losses  see  Görlitz,  Die  Junker,  pp.  425–428.  
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of   the  military   resistance  dominate   the   authorship  of   this  period.  They  use  
these  autobiographies  to  clarify  –  or  rather  transfigure  –  their  role  in  society,  
while  at  the  same  time  trying  to  exculpate  and  distance  themselves  from  the  
criminality  of  the  Nazi  regime.    
The  second  wave  was  shaped  primarily  by  people  who  had  still  grown  up  in  
the   manor   houses   of   East   Elbia,   but   who   had   not   played   any   social   or  
political  role  in  the  Third  Reich.  Following  the  Ostpolitik  of  the  1960s,  as  well  
as   the   growing   realisation   that   East   Elbia   had   become   –   in   an   irrevocable  
sense   –   the   “world   we   have   lost”,   a   new   type   of   remembrance   literature  
developed.   The   apologetic   and   partly   aggressive   character   of   the   early  
autobiographies  gave  way  to  a  more  personal  and  nostalgic  farewell  tone.58  
The  early  post-­‐‑war  works  were  still  aligned  with  the  noble  autobiographical  
output  of  the  Weimar  Republic,  remaining  a  medium  of  strategic  exculpation  
and  apologia.  Yet  the  point  of  departure  was  completely  shifted.  In  1918,  the  
nobility  had  fought  a  largely  honourable  –  and  for  a  long  period,  popular  –  
war.  Despite  defeat  and  revolution,  the  old  monarchical  system  still  enjoyed  
considerable  support  among  large  parts  of  society.  This  residual  affirmation  
allowed   the   nobility   not   only   to   glorify   and   defend   the   old   political   and  
social  order,  but  also  to  attack  and  actively  fight  the  political  enemy  from  a  
position  of  relative  strength.  After  1945,  conversely,  political  activism  of  this  
kind   disappeared.   The   complete   destruction   of   Germany,   the   loss   of   East  
Elbia,  and  the  expropriation  of  the  estates  had  unsettled  and  bewildered  the  
nobility   to   such   a   degree   that   it   was   obliterated   as   an   influential   political  
                                                                                                 
58  Reif,  Die  Junker,  in:  Francois  und  Schulze  (eds),  Deutsche  Erinnerungsorte,  p.  535.  
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force.   Furthermore,   the   Third   Reich   had   been   so   heavily   discredited   that  
nobody   wanted   to   be   associated   with   it.   There   was,   therefore,   nothing   to  
glorify   or   defend   anymore.   The   focus   of   the   nobility   instead   shifted   to   an  
effort  to  distance  themselves  from  the  criminality  of  the  regime.    
Former  career  officers  generally  justified  their  continued  loyalty  to  the  Third  
Reich  with  their  personal  oath  to  Adolf  Hitler.59  Simultaneously,  they  shifted  
the   responsibility   for   the   collapse   of   the   Wehrmacht   exclusively   onto   the  
military   incompetence   of   the   Führer,   due   to   whom   the   German   generals  
could  only  achieve  “lost  victories”.60  The  autobiographies  of  this  time  are  rife  
with   condescending   remarks   about   Hitler’s   ineptitude   and   inability   to  
understand   the   fundamentals   of   military   strategy.   Field   Marshal   von  
Manstein  repeatedly  denied  Hitler’s  grasp  of  “the  fundamental  basics  of  real  
military  prowess”.  According  to  him,  Hitler  believed  solely  in  the  “power  of  
his   will”,   but   was   lacking   any   understanding   of   the   art   of   war.61  Field  
Marshal  von  Rundstedt  mockingly   labelled  Hitler’s  supposedly  omnipotent  
West   Wall   as   a   mere   “mouse-­‐‑trap”,   and   although   he   “would   never   have  
broken  his  oath”,  frequently  described  how  difficult  it  had  been  to  remain  in  
command  due   to   the  “personal  and  military  differences”  and  the  “growing  
                                                                                                 
59  Exemplary  in  this  context  is  Fieldmarschall  von  Manstein’s  comment  after  the  war:  “We  
had  not  learnt  to  gamble  with  the  definition  of  the  oath.”  Erich  von  Manstein,  Aus  einem  
Soldatenleben  (Bonn,  1958),  p.  270;  Also  see:  Ernst  Auer,  Zwischen  Eid  und  Gewissen  (Vienna,  
1983),  p.  65;  Also  see:  Johannes  Hürter,  Hitlers  Heerführer,  Die  deutschen  Oberbefehlshaber  im  
Krieg  gegen  die  Sowjetunion,  1941/42  (Munich,  2007),  p.  134.  
60  “Lost  Victories”  was  the  title  of  Erich  von  Manstein’s  memoirs:  Erich  von  Manstein,  Lost  
Victories:  The  War  Memoirs  of  Hitler’s  Most  Brilliant  General  (London,  1958).  
61  Erich  von  Manstein,  Verlorene  Siege  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1955),  p.  618.  
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political  distrust”  between  himself  and  the  Führer.62  Enno  von  Rintelen,   the  
former  German  military  attaché  in  Rome,  adopted  the  same  line  of  argument  
when  complaining  about  Hitler’s  blindness  “to  accept  neither   the  warnings  
of  the  diplomat63  nor  the  soldier64  about  the  overestimation  of  Italian  military  
strength”.65  For  Walther   von   Seydlitz-­‐‑Kurzbach,   who   famously   defected   to  
the  Soviets  after  the  battle  of  Stalingrad,  Hitler  was  “without  doubt  the  main  
culprit”.66    
While   former   officers   tried   to   foist   responsibility   onto   Hitler,   other   noble  
dignitaries   of   the   Third   Reich   tried   to   convey   the   image   of   a   prescient  
political  elite,  which  had  anticipated  the  evil  character  of  the  regime  from  the  
very   beginning.   Their   collaboration   is   skilfully   framed   and   presented   as   a  
strategic   attempt   to   control,   direct   and   undermine   National   Socialism   to  
prevent   Germany’s   slide   into   catastrophe.   The   former   Reich   Chancellor  
Franz   von   Papen,   who   served   as   Vice-­‐‑Chancellor   in   Hitler’s   first   cabinet,  
claimed  in  his  memoirs  in  1952  that  he  had  “realized  it  would  not  be  easy  to  
bring   Hitler   and   his   party   to   a   sense   of   statesmanlike   responsibility”   and  
thus   “made   what   suggestions   [he]   could   for   keeping   the   Nazis   within  
bounds”.67  Ernst  von  Weizsäcker,  under-­‐‑secretary  in  the  Foreign  Office,  very  
quickly  “came  under  the  impression  that  the  now  ruling  party  did  not  solely  
                                                                                                 
62  Guenther  Blumentritt  and  Gerd  von  Rundstedt,  The  Soldier  and  the  Man  (London,  1952),  p.  
278.  
63  Ulrich  von  Hassel,  the  German  Ambassador  in  Rome  at  the  time.  
64  The  author  himself,  the  German  military  attaché  in  Italy  at  the  time.  
65  Enno  von  Rintelen,  Mussolini  als  Bundesgenosse,  Erinnerungen  des  deutschen  Militärattachés  in  
Rom  1936–1943  (Tübingen,  1951),  p.  256.  
66  Walther  von  Seydlitz-­‐‑Kurzbach,  Stalingrad  –  Konflikt  und  Konsequenz  –  Erinnerungen  
(Oldenburg,  1977),  p.  232.  
67  Franz  von  Papen,  Der  Wahrheit  eine  Gasse  (Munich,  1952),  p.  239.  
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consist   of   noisy   troublemakers   and   demagogues,   but   of   dangerous  
revolutionaries,  of  people  who  were  capable  of  carrying  out  their  threats”.68  
As   consequence,   he   advised   his   fellow   colleagues,   such   as   under-­‐‑secretary  
Bernhard   Wilhelm   von   Bülow,   to   “remain   in   office   until   the   rider   had  
crossed   lake  Constance”,   since  he  “could  not  believe   in   the  perpetuation  of  
the   Third   Reich”.69  Lutz   Graf   Schwerin   von   Krosigk,   Minister   of   Finance  
under  Papen,  Schleicher  and  Hitler,  apparently  recognised  the  evil  character  
of   the  Nazis   as   early   as   1932   and  “would  have   loved   to   spare   the  German  
people  a  National  Socialist   rule”.  Yet,  he   feared  a  violent   struggle  with   the  
Nazis,  and  therefore  opted  for  Hitler’s  nomination  to  be  able  to  control  him  
from  within.70    
This  oft-­‐‑recurring  ‘taming  concept’  (Zähmungskonzept),  however,  was  driven  
less   by   fear   of   Nazi   violence   than   of   the   fascination   of   an   emphatically  
national  mass  movement.  The  deluded  hope   that  one  might   solve   a  highly  
precarious  domestic  political   situation  while   simultaneously  profiting   from  
the  potential  of  National  Socialist  mass  appeal  essentially  contributed  to  the  
fatal   underestimation   of   Hitler. 71   In   this   context,   we   also   see   Tilo   von  
Wilmowsky,  a  German  industrialist  and  brother  in  law  to  Gustav  Krupp  von  
Bohlen  und  Halbach,   retrospectively   justifying  his  party  membership  as  an  
attempt  to  “turn  the  tide  and  avoid  a  further  drift  into  radical  waters”.72  With  
                                                                                                 
68  Ernst  von  Weizsäcker,  Erinnerungen  (Munich,  1950),  pp.  104,  105.  
69  Ibid,  p.  106.  
70  Lutz  Graf  Schwerin  von  Krosigk,  Memoiren  (Stuttgart,  1977),  p.  152.  
71  Andreas  Wirsching,  Die  Weimarer  Republik,  Politik  und  Gesellschaft  (Munich,  2000),  p.  42.  
72  Tilo  von  Wilmowsky,  Rückblickend  möchte  ich  sagen...  An  der  Schwelle  des  150  jährigen  Krupp  
Jubiläums  (Oldenburg,  1961),  p.  223.  
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fellow  colleagues,  he  wanted  to  “erect  a  dyke  against  the  rising  flood”.73  Otto  
von  Hentig  also  tried  to  excuse  his  liaison  position  between  the  NSDAP  and  
the  Auswärtige  Amt,  assigned  to  him  by  Rudolf  Heß,  as  an  effort  to  ensure  
the   “highest   possible   unity”   of   the   Auswärtige   Amt.   He   regarded   it   as   a  
“necessary   and   important   achievement”   to   procure   peaceful   working  
relations  between  the  Amt  and  the  Nazi  party.  Only  thereby,  he  claimed,  was  
it  possible  to  keep  the  “machinations  of  the  party”  under  control.74    
Yet,   although   after   1945,   the   main   focus   had   shifted   from   defending   and  
glorifying  the  old  system  to  distancing  oneself  from  the  previous  regime,  the  
narrative   of   noble   superiority   remained   completely   unabated.   Once   again,  
the   nobility   appears   as   a   “rocher   de   bronze,   an   embodiment   of   a   superior  
culture  and  way  of  life,  which  had  not  been  able  to  halt  the  National  Socialist  
masses,  but  which  had  maintained  an  insurmountable  distance  from  them”.75  
The   wild   revolutionary  masses   of   the   post   1918   accounts   gave   way   to   ill-­‐‑
mannered   “upstarts”   in   “badly   fitted   uniforms”   who   performed   “pseudo-­‐‑
military  parades”.76  Adolf  Hitler  was  frequently  referred  to  as  a  “dodger”,  a  
“minion”   or   simply   the   “bohemian   lance   corporal”. 77   Leo   Gayr   von  
Schweppenburg,   a   high-­‐‑ranking   Panzer-­‐‑General,   condescendingly  
contrasted   him   with   Anthony   Eden,   “adjutant   of   the   Rifle   Brigade,  
outwardly  extremely  smart,  on  top  of  that  collector  of  French  miniatures  and  
                                                                                                 
73  Ibid,  p.  222.  
74  Otto  von  Hentig,  Mein  Leben  –  Eine  Dienstreise  (Göttingen,  1962),  p.  293.  
75  Funck  and  Malinowski,  Masters  of  Memory,  in:  Confino  and  Fritzsche  (eds),  The  Work  Of  
Memory,  p.  96.  
76  Alexander  von  Falkenhausen,  Was  ich  dachte  und  was  ich  tat.  Aufzeichnungen  des  
ehemaligen  Militärbefehlshabers  von  Belgien  in  der  Haft,  Auszüge  aus  seinen  Memoiren  in  
Die  Zeit,  27.04.1950;  Seydlitz-­‐‑Kurzbach,  Erinnerungen,  pp.  84,  75.  
77  Gans  Edler  zu  Putlitz,  Unterwegs  nach  Deutschland,  pp.  106–107.  
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Persian  love  poems,  overall   the  noble  product  of  Oxford  and  Eaton.  On  the  
other   hand   Adolf   Hitler”.78   Friedrich   von   Prittwitz,   the   former   German  
ambassador   to   the  United   States,  was   “deeply   impressed”   by   the   Führer’s  
“insecurity”,  79  while  Otto  von  Hentig,   a  high   ranking  diplomat,   referred   to  
Mein  Kampf  as  an  opus  “brewed  up  by  a  vain  autodidact”.  He  remembered  
Joachim  von  Ribbentrop,  the  Foreign  Minister  of  the  Third  Reich,  as  a  “little  
lieutenant”   he   had   met   in   Constantinople   during   the   First   World   War,   a  
notion,   which   “did   not   change”   over   the   years. 80   For   Fabian   von  
Schlabrendorff,   the   Nazis   “showed   a   complete   lack   of   good   manners,   a  
deliberate   rejection   of   decorum   and   the   proprieties,   and   a   brutal,   coarse  
vitality”.81  Field  Marshall  Erich  von  Manstein   labelled   the  “vociferous”  and  
“violent”  methods  of  the  party  as  particularly  “un-­‐‑Prussian”,  and  Ernst  von  
Weizsäcker  disdained   the  Nazis   to  a  degree   that  he  was   simply  unable  “to  
take  them  seriously”.82      
By  contrast  with  the  earlier  autobiographical  wave,  the  post-­‐‑1945  works  did  
not  advance  the  alleged  superiority  of   the  nobility  as  a  claim  to  continuous  
political  and  social  leadership,  but  rather  as  a  subtle  means  of  depoliticising  
the   nobility’s   relationship   to   power   by   reframing   it   as   a   question   of   social  
caste,  refinement  and  taste.  Thus  when  we  see  noblemen  stating,  “they  [the  
Nazis]   went   against   everything   my   own   upbringing   represented,   and   the  
                                                                                                 
78  Leo  Geyr  von  Schweppenburg,  Erinnerungen  eines  Militärattachés  –  London  1933–1937  
(Stuttgart,  1949),  p.  31.  
79  Friedrich  von  Prittwitz  und  Gaffron,  Zwischen  Petersburg  und  Washington  –  Ein  
Diplomatenleben  (Munich,  1952),  p.  228.  
80  Hentig,  Mein  Leben,  pp.  275,  322.  
81  Schlabrendorff,  Offiziere  gegen  Hitler,  p.  37.  
82  Manstein,  Soldatenleben,  p.  168;  Weizsäcker,  Erinnerungen,  p.  103.  
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traditions,   principles,   and   history   of   families   such   as   mine”, 83   we   may  
understand  that  they  are  defining  their  relationship  to  the  Nazis  in  terms  of  
social   distance   and   thereby   implying   a   traditional   and   insurmountable  
division   which   inevitably   kept   the   nobility   aloof   from   the   criminal  
machinations   of   the   regime.   The   authors   thereby   construct   an   image   of   a  
morally  and  socially  highly  superior  caste,  which  was  beyond   the  ordinary  
brutality  of  National  Socialism.  This  approach,  in  turn,  tends  to  re-­‐‑legitimise  
the  hierarchical  order  of  the  old  imperial  regime,  which  is  now  reimagined  as  
a   bulwark   against   the   levelling   tendencies   that   supposedly   made   Nazism  
possible.    
Noble  Participation  in  the  Historical  Division  of  the  US  Army  
Several   of   the   noble   authors 84   considered   above   had   already   gained  
experience   in   historical   writing   during   the   immediate   aftermath   of   the  
Second  World  War  within   the   framework   of   the   newly   founded  Historical  
Division   of   the   US-­‐‑Army.   Under   the   aegis   of   US   officers   and   military  
historians,   large   parts   of   the   former   German   officer   corps   had   been  
encouraged   to   put   down   in   writing   their   military   experiences   of   the   war.  
This   large-­‐‑scale   strategic   effort   to   receive   and  gather  German   strategic   and  
operational   ideas   was   set   up   to   fill   the   gaps   in   Allied   understanding   of  
German  strategic  warfare,  as  well  as  to  compile  an  official  military  account  of  
the   Second  World  War.   Initially,   these   documents   were   largely   limited   to  
                                                                                                 
83  Schlabrendorff,  Offiziere  gegen  Hitler,  p.  37.  
84  Most  prominently:  Kurt  Rued  von  Collenberg,  Enno  von  Rintelen,  Leo  Geyr  von  
Schweppenburg,  Rudolf  von  Gersdorff  and  Alexander  von  Falkenhausen.  
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describing  the  western  theatres  of  war  in  which  the  Wehrmacht  had  been  in  
contact  with  Allied  armies.  In  light  of  a  rapidly  escalating  East-­‐‑West  conflict,  
however,   the  US-­‐‑Army  became   increasingly   interested   in   the  Wehrmacht’s  
experiences   in   the  major   battles   of   the   Barbarossa  Campaign.   Especially   in  
the   context   of   the   emerging   Korean   conflict,   German   experiences   with  
Guerrilla  warfare  in  rough  terrain  seemed  to  be  of  the  highest  importance.85    
These   exposés  were   solely   intended   to   close  American  gaps   in   knowledge.  
However,   the   deepening   involvement   of   former   German   officers   also  
encouraged  them  to  view  the  work  of  the  Historical  Division  both  as  a  means  
of   “continuing   the   struggle   against   bolshevism” 86   and   of   shaping   the  
historical  reputation  of  the  Wehrmacht  in  general,  and  the  officer  corps  and  
general   staff,   in   particular.   The   head   of   a   subdivision   in  Garmisch,   former  
Field  Marshall   Georg   von   Küchler,   repeatedly   reminded   his   subordinates:  
“we   do   not  want   to  write   American,   but   German  military   history”.   In   his  
eyes,   these   exposés   were   designed   to   portray   “German   exploits”   and  
“thereby  memorialise  our  troops”.87    
                                                                                                 
85  Charles  B.  Burdick,  Vom  Schwert  zur  Feder.  Deutsche  Kriegsgefangene  im  Dienst  der  
Vorbereitung  der  amerikanischen  Kriegsgeschichtsschreibung  über  den  zweiten  Weltkrieg.  
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86  Comment  of  Colonel  General  Franz  Halder,  former  head  of  the  General  Chief  of  Staff,  See:  
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87  Fieldmarshall  von  Küchler,  Weisung  vom  7.3.1947,  BA-­‐‑MA,  ZA  1/70,  cited  in:  Bernd  
Wegner,  Erschriebene  Siege,  Franz  Halder,  die  Historical  Division  und  die  Rekonstruktion  
des  zweiten  Weltkrieges  im  Geiste  des  deutschen  Generalstabes,  in:  Ernst  Willi  Hansen,  
Gerhard  Schreiber  und  Bernd  Wegner  (eds),  Politischer  Wandel,  organisierte  Gewalt  und  
nationale  Sicherheit  (Munich,  1995),  p.  294.  
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This   framework   also   marked   the   birth   of   the   strategy   to   whitewash   the  
Wehrmacht  and  its  operational  heads.  On  the  one  hand,  the  German  officers  
involved   in   the   programme   deliberately   attempted   to   distance   the  
Wehrmacht   from   the   criminal   machinations   of   the   SS   and   the  
Einsatzgruppen   and  portray   the  Wehrmacht   as   the   honourable   remnant   of  
German  military  tradition.  On  the  other  hand,  they  attributed  the  operational  
and   strategic   mistakes   made   to   the   unpredictability   of   climate   and  
geography,   and   most   importantly,   to   the   dilettantism   and   obtuseness   of  
Adolf   Hitler.88  The   absence   of   the   large   majority   of   the   official   files   and  
documents  –  most  of   it  had  been  brought  overseas  by   the  Allies   –   allowed  
this  perception  to  survive  for  years,  if  not  decades,  after  the  war.    
One   may   therefore   regard   the   participation   of   various   noblemen   in   the  
Historical  Division  as  a  first  tentative  step  towards  an  active  engagement,  not  
only  in  historiography  itself,  but  also  in  influence  of  the  public  perception  of  
certain  social  groups.  It  seems  that  these  authors  gained  their  experience  by  
exculpating  and  vindicating   the  deeds  and  machinations  of   the  Wehrmacht  
and  the  officer  corps,  before  moving  on  to  use  these  skills  and  techniques  for  
their  own   individual  benefits.  What   is  also  striking   is   the  significantly  high  
share   of   noble   authors   within   the   Historical   Division.   At   the   time   of   the  
dissolution   of   the   Historical   Division   in   1961,   more   than   five   hundred  
authors  had  been  enlisted,  of  which,  more  than  one  hundred  were  of  noble  
                                                                                                 
88  See:  Georg  von  Sodenstern,  Der  Feldherr  Adolf  Hitler  und  das  Ende  einer  Feldherrnrolle;  Kurt  
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descent.89  Although   one   should   not   forget   that   the  German   officer   corps   at  
the   end   of   the   war   still   included   a   significant   share   of   noblemen,   the  
importance   of   the   nobility   within   the   army   had   significantly   declined  
throughout   the   Third  Reich.90  Especially   considering   that   during   the   build-­‐‑
up  of  the  Wehrmacht  in  the  mid-­‐‑1930s,   the  promotion  of  non-­‐‑noble  officers  
had  been  encouraged,  and  the  massive  expansion  of  the  officer  corps  during  
the   war   had   ultimately   led   to   a   continuous   reduction   of   noble   influence.  
These  numbers,  therefore,  do  appear  to  be  disproportionally  high.  
The  Struggle  for  the  Commemoration  of  East  Elbia    
The  second  wave  of  post-­‐‑war  noble  autobiographic  production  began  in  the  
late  1960s.  The  apologetic  tone  and  the  self-­‐‑glorification  of  the  early  accounts  
slowly   gave  way   to   a   nostalgic   farewell.   These  works  were  not   centred   on  
heroic   battles,   political   intrigues   or   individual   exculpation.      They   offered  
instead   a  melancholy  description   of   the   nobility’s   shattered  Lebenswelten   in  
the  East.  Only  now  did  the  authors,  who  had  grown  up  on  the  eastern  estates  
but  had  not,  for  the  most  part,  played  prominent  political  or  military  roles  in  
the   Third   Reich,   evoke   the   remote   life   of   East-­‐‑Elbian   pre-­‐‑war   society.   The  
autobiographies  of  the  second  phase  show  how  closely  Prussia’s  ruling  class  
                                                                                                 
89  Colonel  William  S.  Nye,  Chief  Historian,  USAREUR.  Guide  to  Foreign  Military  Studies  
1945–1954:  Catalog  and  Index,  Headquarters  United  States  Army,  Military  Institute  
(Karlsruhe,  1954).  
90  In  1932,  the  nobility  accounted  for  23.8  per  cent  of  the  officer  corps  of  the  Reichswehr.  By  
1943,  that  share  had  fallen  to  a  mere  7.1  per  cent  of  the  Wehrmacht.  The  traditionally  high  
noble  share  among  the  generals  had  experienced  a  similar  drop.  Whereas  in  1939,  still  34  per  
cent  of  the  generals  had  been  noblemen,  that  share  was  down  to  19.8  per  cent  by  1943.  See:  
Hürter,  Hitlers  Heerführer,  p.  29.  
140  
  
had  been  attached  to  land  and  nature,  and  to  what  degree  conventions  and  
traditional   rules   had   survived   in   the   isolated   estate   societies   of   the   most  
eastern  provinces  of  the  Reich.    
Most   importantly,   however,   the   memoirs   communicated   an   increasing  
acceptance  of  the  loss  of  East  Elbia.  For  the  first  time  since  the  war,  the  focus  
was  not  on  traumatic  memories  of  war,  destruction  and  expulsion,  but  rather  
on  the  remembrance  of  a  peaceful  and  harmonious  pre-­‐‑war  society,  idealised  
within  parameters  that  were  common  to  the  genre  as  a  whole.  The  new  wave  
of   autobiographies   detached   the   commemoration   of   the  German   east   from  
the  horrors  of  the  war.  It  also  simultaneously  established  a  counter  discourse  
to   the   claim   that   the   regions   east   of   the   Oder-­‐‑Neiße   must   ultimately   be  
returned  to  Germany.  Instead,  the  authors  sought  to  create  a  lasting  place  for  
East  Elbia  within  the  collective  memory  of  the  nation.    
The  Failure  of  the  Expellee  Associations  
Throughout  the  first  two  decades  following  the  war,  the  claim  that  East  Elbia  
must  be  restored  to  Germany  had  been  articulated  by  the  numerous  expellee  
organisations.  In  1950,  German  expellees  from  Eastern  Europe  accounted  for  
16.5  per  cent  of  West  Germany’s  population.  This  figure  rose  to  more  than  20  
per  cent   in  1961,  due  to  the  mass  exodus  from  the  GDR.  Hence,  one  in  five  
citizens   of   the   Federal   Republic   of   Germany   was   a   refugee   or   expellee.91  
Large   and   superregional   associations   such   as   the   Landsmannschaft  
                                                                                                 
91  Helga  Hirsch,  Flucht  und  Vertreibung  –  Kollektive  Erinnerung  im  Wandel,  in:  Aus  Politik  
und  Zeitgeschichte  (B  40–41/2003),  pp.  18,  19.  
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Ostpreußen,   the   Vereinigte   Ostdeutsche   Landsmannschaften,   and   the  
Zentralverband   der   vertriebenen   Deutschen   were   set   up   throughout  
Germany. 92   By   1952,   almost   3,500,000   refugees   had   joined   an   expellee  
association.   Considering   that   by   that   time,   West   Germany   had   taken   in  
8,258,000  expellees,   the  percentage  of   expellees   involved   in  an  organisation  
thus  amounted  to  a  staggering  42  per  cent.93  
From  their  origins,  the  main  agenda  of  these  large  expellee  associations  was  
the   return   of   the   former   German   provinces   east   of   the   newly   established  
Oder-­‐‑Neiße   line.   For   example,   the   initial   charter   of   the   Landsmannschaft  
Ostpreußen  demanded  in  Article  4  to  “take  any  appropriate  action  to  achieve  
a  reunification  of  East  Prussia  as  a  German  province  with  a  unified  Reich”.94  
In   1950,   various   associations   solemnly   united   to   adopt   the   “Charta   der  
deutschen  Heimatvertriebenen”.   Although   therein   they   explicitly   refrained  
from   “revenge   and   retribution”   the   document   unmistakably   demanded   a  
“right   to   Heimat”,   which   ultimately   meant   nothing   else   but   a   “right   to  
return”.95    
                                                                                                 
92  See:  Andreas  Kossert,  Kalte  Heimat  –  Die  Geschichte  der  deutschen  Vertriebenen  nach  1945  
(Munich,  2008),  pp.  139–144.  
93  Mathias  Stickler,  Ostdeutsch  heisst  Gesamtdeutsch  –  Organisation,  Selbstverständnis  und  
Heimatpolitische  Zielsetzungen  der  Deutschen  Vertriebenenverbände  1949–1972  (Düsseldorf,  
2004),  pp.  141–147.  
94  Dr.  Jos  Schnurer,  Plädoyer  für  eine  Wiederentdeckung  –  Rezension:  “Ostpreußen.  




95Kossert,  Kalte  Heimat,  pp.  151–153.  
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Once   they   had   channelled   their   power   by   setting   up   a   united   umbrella  
organisation   called   the   Bund   der   Vertriebenen   (BdV)   in   1957,   the   expellee  
associations  became  a  very  powerful  and  influential  pressure  group  in  post-­‐‑
war  Germany  laying  claim  to  a  kind  of  custodianship  over  the  remembrance  
of   war   and   expulsion.   When   the   first   signs   of   actively   accounting   for  
Germany’s  guilt  over   its  Nazi  past  occurred   in  post-­‐‑war  German  society   in  
the   late  1950s,   the  BdV  protested  sharply:  “It   is  with  deep  concern   that   the  
board   of   the   Bund   der   Vertriebenen   feels   obliged   to   declare   that,   due   to  
unilateral   German   guilt   confessions   and   advance   offers,   the   Federal  
Republic’s   foreign   policy   stance   towards   certain   Eastern   bloc   countries   is  
being   irresponsibly   undermined”.96  The   BdV   frantically   tried   to   hold   on   to  
the  common  conviction   that   the  Soviets  had  been  solely  responsible   for   the  
horrors  of  flight  and  expulsion,  and  that  German  refugees  had  been  “victims  
of   exorbitant   retaliation”.97  Any   sort   of   critical   historiography   was   sharply  
rebuffed:   “it   cannot   be   allowed   that   a   tendentious   historiography   prevails,  
which  omits  the  entanglement  of  European  nations  and  thereby  the  objective  
causes  of  the  wars  and  revolutions  of  present  times  and  constructs  a  German  
‘Alleinschuld’”.98  The   post-­‐‑war   expulsion   was   declared   “a   crime   against  
humanity  and  a  violation  of  the  basic  ethical  principles  of  our  civilisation”.99  
Walter   Rinke,   a   leading   expellee   politician,   even   called   it   “the   greatest  
                                                                                                 
96  Werner  Blumenthal  und  Bardo  Faßbender  (eds),  Erklärungen  zur  Deutschlandpolitik.  Eine  
Dokumentation  von  Stellungnahmen,  Reden  und  Entschließungen  des  Bundes  der  Vertriebenen  –  
Vereinigte  Landsmannschaften  und  Landesverbände.  Part  1:  1949–1972  (Bonn,  1984),  p.  76.  
97  Ibid,  p.  123.  
98  Ibid,  p.  109.  
99  Die  Tschechoslowakische  Frage,  pamphlet  Sept.  1952  by  the  Sudetendeutschen  
Landsmannschaft,  cited  in:  Pertti  Ahonen,  After  the  Expulsion  –  West  Germany  and  Eastern  
Europe  1945–1990  (Oxford,  2003),  p.  46.  
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collective   crime   in  history”   thereby   implicitly  placing   the  expellees’   fate  on  
level  with  that  of  the  Jewish  survivors  of  the  Holocaust.100    
Thus   by   the   mid-­‐‑1950s,   a   situation   had   arisen   in   which   the   expellee  
associations   attempted   to   direct   and   control   the   remembrance   of   German  
suffering   during   and   after   the  war.   Largely   supported   by   the   government  
and   generally   backed   by   public   opinion,   their   general   stance  was   strongly  
revanchist,   their   tone   highly   aggressive,   and   their   rhetoric   staunchly   anti-­‐‑
communist.    
The   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility   did   not   play   a   prominent   role   in   these  
developments.  Although  the  Adelsverband  (Association  of  German  Nobles)  
had   been   re-­‐‑established   in   1956,   it   did   not   actively   intervene   in   public  
debates.   In   this   regard,   it   had   very   little   in   common   with   its   pre-­‐‑war  
predecessor,   the   highly   reactionary   and   staunchly   anti-­‐‑Semitic   Deutsche  
Adelsgenossenschaft   (DAG).101  Whereas   the  DAG   had   deliberately   fostered  
the   political   radicalisation   of   the   nobility   in   the   aftermath   of   defeat   and  
revolution   in   1918,   the   post-­‐‑war   Adelsverband   was   more   apolitical   and  
generally   refrained   from   commenting   on   political   issues.102  This   became  
especially   apparent   in   the   social   and   political   pieces   published   in   the  
Adelsblatt.   In   the   first   decade   of   its   existence,   a  mere   two   articles   appeared  
                                                                                                 
100  Walter  Rinke  at  the  Heimattreffen  of  the  Landsmannschaft  Schlesien,  Frankfurt  a.  M.,  18  
July  1954,  cited  in:  Ahonen,  After  the  Expulsion,  p.  46.  
101  For  the  role  of  the  DAG  in  the  Third  Reich  see  especially:  Malinowski,  Vom  König  zum  
Führer,  pp.  144–197  and  pp.  321–357.  




which  primarily  dealt  with  the  role  of  the  expellees.103  Tellingly,  one  of  these  
related  to  the  question  of  whether  expelled  noblemen  and  -­‐‑women  were  still  
allowed  to  bear  their  titles.    
In   the  early  post-­‐‑war  era,   the  nobility  was  more  concerned  with  rebuilding  
and   strengthening   its   infra-­‐‑corporate   identity   than   intervening   in   political  
debates.  They   tended   to   focus   attention  on   family   associations,  noble  balls,  
festivities   and   conventions. 104   The   focus   was   on   personal   progress,  
overcoming   financial   and   physical   hardship   and   reconstructing   a   secure  
existence.105  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  there  were  no  nobles  actively  involved  
in   expellee   associations,   nor   that   the   stance   of   these   organisations   did   not  
often   align   with   widely   held   opinions   among   the   nobility.   In   fact,   people  
such  as  Walter  von  Keudell,  Erik  von  Witzleben  and  Herbert  von  Bismarck,  
and  later  on  in  the  1970s,  Philipp  von  Bismarck  and  Joachim  von  Braun,  held  
prominent  posts  within   these  organisations.106  Yet,   their   commitment   to   the  
                                                                                                 
103  Dr.  Wolff  Freiherr  von  Wrangel,  Die  Bedeutung  der  Heimatvertriebenen  für  die  Politik  
der  Bundesrepublik,  Deutsches  Adelsblatt,  Juli  1960,  pp.  130,  131;  Otto  von  Bary,  
Heimatvertriebene  erhalten  die  Möglichkeit,  wieder  ihren  adeligen  Namen  zu  führen,  
Deutsches  Adelsblatt,  Oktober  1961,  pp.  188,  189.  
104  For  the  importance  of  the  Familienverbände  see  chapter  IV  of  this  thesis.  
105  Conze,  Der  Edelmann  als  Bürger?,  in:  Hettling  und  Ulrich  (eds),  Bürgertum  nach  1945,  pp.  
369,  370.  
106  Walter  von  Keudell  headed  the  Landsmannschaft  Berlin-­‐‑Mark-­‐‑Brandenburg,  Erik  von  
Witzleben  the  Landsmannschaft  Westpreußen  and  Joachim  von  Braun  presided  over  the  
Landsmannschaft  Ostpreussen  between  1972  and  1974.  Philipp  von  Bismarck  headed  the  
Landsmannschaft  Pommern  between  1970  and  1990.  He  was  the  brother  of  Klaus  von  
Bismarck,  a  staunch  opponent  of  the  expellee  associations  and  their  adherence  to  East  Elbia.  
Although  Philipp  von  Bismarck  opposed  the  cession  of  Germany’s  eastern  territories  he  
never  fully  supported  the  radical  position  of  the  BdV.  Instead,  he  lastingly  worked  for  
Polish-­‐‑German  reconciliation  and  according  to  Herbert  Czaja,  the  long-­‐‑term  president  of  the  
BdV,  Bismarck  “hardly  represented  the  positions  of  the  BdV”.  See:  Herbert  Czaja,  Unterwegs  
zum  kleinsten  Deutschland?  Mangel  and  Solidarität  mit  den  Vertriebenen  –  Marginalien  zu  50  
Jahren  Ostpolitik  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1996),    p.  570.  
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expellee   issue  remained   individual.  There   is  no   indication  that  any  of   them  
tried   to  portray   their  personal   engagement  within   the   expellee   associations  
as  being  representative  of  the  nobility  as  a  whole.    
The  1960s,   saw  a  growing  alienation  between   the  expellee  associations  and  
the  majority  of  the  general  public.  Thanks  in  large  part  to  the  government’s  
successful   integration   policy   by  means   of   the   Equalisation   of   Burdens   Act  
and  to  a  thriving  economy,  most  of  the  expellees  were  able  to  establish  a  new  
life   in   West   Germany.   The   thought   of   a   permanent   return   to   East   Elbia  
gradually  lost  its  appeal.  The  younger  generation  scarcely  maintained  a  close  
connection  with   the   former  German   territories   in   the  East.   Instead  German  
society   gradually   began   to   re-­‐‑appraise   the   country’s   recent   past.   The  
conviction   of   Adolf   Eichmann   in   Jerusalem   in   1961,   and   the   subsequent  
Auschwitz  trials  in  Frankfurt,  began  to  sensitise  the  population  to  the  crimes  
committed  by  Germans  during  the  Third  Reich.  
As   a   result   of   this   growing   revaluation   of   Germany’s   past,   the   thought   of  
accepting  history’s  verdict  and  recognising  the  loss  of  the  eastern  territories  
became  more   and  more   socially   acceptable.   Even   leading  politicians   of   the  
SPD,  the  same  party  that   in  the  1950s  had  assured  the  expellee  associations  
that   renouncing   East   Elbia  was   treachery,   now   called   for   “change   through  
rapprochement”. 107   At   the   end   of   the   1960s,   this   concept   resulted   in  
Germany’s  new  Ostpolitik,  which  meant   that  Germany  officially   recognised  
                                                                                                 
107  Egon  Bahr  used  this  term  to  propose  a  policy  of  stronger  cooperation  between  West  
Germany  and  the  Communist  states  of  Eastern  Europe  in  a  speech  he  gave  at  the  Evangelical  
Academy  in  Tutzing  on  15.07.1963;  the  speech  is  printed  in:  Boris  Meißner  (ed.),  Die  deutsche  
Ostpolitik  1961–1970  (Cologne,  1970),  pp.  45–48.  
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the   Republic   of   Poland   and   acknowledged   the   current   European   borders,  
thereby  de   facto   giving  up  German   claims   for   East   Elbia.  One   of   the  main  
supporters  of  this  political  strategy  had  been  the  German  Protestant  Church.  
As  early  as  1954,  Klaus  von  Bismarck,  former  land  owner  and  member  of  the  
committee  of   the  German  Protestant  Church  Congress,  publicly  proclaimed  
at   the   Church   Convention   in   Leipzig:   “It   is   my   personal   opinion   –   which  
some  of  you  might  not  be  able  to  agree  with  –  that  before  god,  we  have  no  
right   to   regain   what   he   took   from   us,   even   if   international   and   civil   law  
might   provide   us   with   a   claim”.108  In   1961-­‐‑62,   leading   members   of   the  
Protestant   Church   addressed   a  memorandum   to   parliament   calling   for   the  
official  recognition  of  the  Oder-­‐‑Neiße  border.109  This  position  was  powerfully  
reaffirmed  in  the  so-­‐‑called  Ostdenkschrift  in  1965.    
Thus  in  the  1960s,  Germany’s  attitude  towards  its  former  eastern  territories,  
as  well  as   its  recent  past,   fundamentally  changed.  The  younger  generations  
revolted  against  the  veil  of  silence  that  had  carefully  been  placed  over  their  
parents’  entanglement  with  the  Third  Reich.  They  were  no  longer  willing  to  
accept   the   reactionary   revanchism   of   the   1950s   and   instead   called   for   an  
active   accountability   for   the   past,   to  which   end   the   loss   of   East   Elbia  was  
perceived  most  frequently  as  an  inevitable  punishment  for  German  atrocities  
committed  during  the  war.  The  realities  had  changed  to  such  a  degree   that  
many   regarded   the   mere   commemoration   of   the   expulsion   as   an   act   of  
revanchism   which   might   prove   detrimental   to   the   desired   process   of  
                                                                                                 
108  Harald  Schroeter,  Kirchentag  als  vorläufige  Kirche  (Stuttgart,  1993),  p.  161.  
109  See:  Martin  Greschat,  Mehr  Wahrheit  in  der  Politik!  Das  Tübinger  Memorandum  von  
1961,  in:  Vierteljahreshefte  für  Zeitgeschichte,  48:3  (2000),  pp.  491–513.  
147  
  
reconciliation. 110   The   unceasing,   aggressive   rhetoric   of   the   expellee  
associations  added  to  this  perception,  and  as  a  result,  not  only  did  the  name  
of  East   Elbia   hold  very  negative   connotations,   but   its   commemoration  was  
gradually  erased  from  society’s  collective  memory.    
Land  of  Desire:  the  Literary  Resurrection  of  East  Elbia  in  Noble  Memoirs  
At  the  same  time,  a  younger  generation  of  nobles  who  had  grown  up  on  the  
estates   in  East  Elbia,   but  had  predominantly  not  held   any  higher  positions  
under  Hitler,  began  to  reinterpret  the  nobility’s  role  in  pre-­‐‑war  Germany.  For  
years   after   the  war,   large  parts  of   the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility   –   like   the   rest  of  
German   society   –   remained   impervious   to   the   realisation   that   their  
traditional  way  of  life  on  the  eastern  estates  had  been  irreversibly  lost.  Only  
the  cultural  instability  of  the  late  1960s  generated  a  change  in  perception.    
Nourishing  the  idealised  memory  of  a  bygone  era  became  the  central  strand  
of   noble   history   management.   The   autobiographies   morphed   from   being  
tools   of   political   activism   and   individual   exculpation   into   instruments   for  
preserving  the  remembrance  of  noble  habitus  and  ways  of  life.  The  memoirs  
became   a   platform   to   pass   on   the   virtues,   convictions   and   beliefs   of   a  
dispossessed  and  uprooted  caste,  to  reinvent  its  public  image  in  the  present,  
but  also   to  provide  a   reservoir  of  memory   for   future  generations.  Christian  
Graf   von   Krockow   called   this   the   “treasure   box   of   memory”, 111   which  
allowed   the   nobility,   to   re-­‐‑immerse   itself   in   the   past   and   consolidate   their  
                                                                                                 
110  Hirsch,  Flucht  und  Vertreibung,  in:  Aus  Politik  und  Zeitgeschichte,  p.  25.  
111  Christian  Graf  von  Krockow,  Erinnerungen  –  Zu  Gast  in  drei  Welten  (Munich,  2002),  p.  295.  
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own  noble  identity.     Monika  von  Zitzewitz  explained:  “we  need  the  past  to  
walk  into  the  future.  […]  If  we  do  not  tell  our  children  where  we  come  from,  
we  deprive   them  of   their   roots.   […]  The   last  survivors  who  still  have  vivid  
memories  of   the   lands  east  of   the  Oder  have   to  pass   them  on”.112  Similarly,  
Hasso   von   Knebel-­‐‑Doeberitz   urged   his   family   to   write   down   as   much   as  
possible.   “We  have  been   robbed  of   almost   everything.  Memory   is   the  only  
asset   which   cannot   be   taken   away   from   us.” 113   The   same   motivation  
encouraged  Georg  Graf  von  Schwerin  to  publish  his  memoirs.  Worried  that  
the  expulsion  from  East  Elbia  would  ultimately  lead  to  the  disappearance  of  
the   traditional   rural   noble   way   of   life,   he   specifically   wrote   his  
autobiography  to  preserve  the  memory  of  the  ordinary  life  of  a  Mecklenburg  
Junker   in  order   to   “prevent   it   from   falling   into  oblivion  within  a   couple  of  
generations”.114  
When   the   first   nostalgic   noble   autobiographies   appeared   in   the   late   1960s,  
the   commemoration   of   East   Elbia  was   highly   controversial.   The   revanchist  
stance   of   the   expellee   associations   had   created   a   situation   in   which   the  
majority   of   German   society   now   looked   back   on   the   formerly   German  
territories  east  of  the  Oder  and  Neiße  “as  a  Frenchman  would  look  back  on  
the  loss  of  Indochina”.115  In  other  words,  the  remembrance  of  East  Elbia  was  
receding   from  view  and  beginning   to   fade   into   obscurity.  The   approach  of  
                                                                                                 
112  Monika  von  Zitzewitz,  Preface  in:  Aninka  Gräfin  Bellavitis,  Wir  haben  das  Korn  geschnitten  
–  Erinnerungen  aus  Ostpreußen  (Munich,  2002),  pp.  7,  8.  
113  Hasso  von  Knebel-­‐‑Doeberitz,  Originale,  Pommersche  Jagdgeschichten  und  anderes  
(Dietersdorf,  1964),  p.  9.  
114  Georg  Graf  von  Schwerin,  Zettemin:  Erinnerungen  eines  mecklenburgischen  Gutsherrn  
(Munich,  1995),  p.  10.  
115  Alfred  Heuß,  Versagen  und  Verhängnis.  Vom  Ruin  deutscher  Geschichte  und  ihres  
Verständnisses  (Berlin,  1984),  p.  143.  
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commemoration  adopted  by  the  new  wave  of  noble  publications  was  sharply  
at  odds  with  the  one  we  have  witnessed  among  the  expellee  associations.  In  
contrast   to   the   aggressive   and   defiant   rhetoric   of   expellee   representatives,  
noble  authors  now  generally  accepted  the  loss  of  their  Heimat.  They  realised  
that  the  political  realities  had  irrevocably  changed  and  the  only  way  to  come  
to  terms  with  their  loss  was  to  acknowledge  it.    
Dankwart  von  Arnim  claimed  that  right  after   the  war,  he  was  aware  of   the  
definite  loss  of  Sperrenwalde.  “The  estate  was  gone  –  I  had  grasped  that.”116  
To   Gerhard   von   Jordan,   this   realisation   had   come   during   the   final   days  
before  his  expulsion  from  Silesia  in  January  1945.  “You  are  seeing  this  all  for  
the   very   last   time.   You   will   not   return   –   over,   lost…”117  Alexander   Prince  
Dohna  described  a  similar  experience  when  he  wrote,  “already  at  the  end  of  
the  war  I  was  fully  aware  that  East  Elbia  was  lost”.118  Yet,  factual  realisation  
was   one   thing   and   actually   acceptance   another.   Dohna   refers   to   the  
Ostdenkschrift   of   the   Protestant   Church   in   1966   as   the   turning   point   in   his  
process   of   coming   to   terms   with   the   loss   of   East   Elbia.   “The   Protestant  
Church  proclaimed   that   no  more   claims   should   be  made   for   the   territories  
east  of  the  Oder  and  Neiße.  Accepting  this  proved  to  be  immensely  difficult  
for  me,   but   it  was   the   price   the  German   people   had   to   pay   for  Hitler   and  
National   Socialism.”119  It   also   took   Marion   Gräfin   Dönhoff   more   than   two  
decades  to  accept  that  her  Heimat  was  irrevocably  lost.  Although  from  early  
on,   she   renounced  any   claim   to   regain   the  German   territories  by   force,   she  
                                                                                                 
116  Dankwart  von  Arnim,  Als  Brandenburg  noch  die  Mark  hieß  (Berlin,  1991),  p.  291.  
117  Jordan,  Unser  Dorf  in  Schlesien,  p.  212.  
118  Dohna,  Erinnerungen,  p.  322.  
119  Ibid,  p.  322.  
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was  unwilling  to  renounce  German  claims  in  general.  It  was  only  the  onset  of  
Ostpolitik  and  ultimately  the  Warsaw  Genuflection  of  Chancellor  Brandt  that  
made  her  realise   that   it  was  time  to   let  go.120  “Nowadays,  nobody  can  hope  
any  more  that  the  lost  territories  will  ever  be  German  again.  Those  who  think  
differently  would  have  to  dream  of  reconquering  them  by  force.”121  
Acknowledging  the  cession  of  East  Elbia  turned  out  to  be  the  crucial  turning  
point  in  the  nobility’s  approach  to  coming  to  terms  with  their  loss.  The  long  
process  of  letting  the  past  go  ultimately  enabled  them  to  resurrect  it  in  their  
imagination  and  pave  the  way  for  its  entry  into  collective  memory.  Only  then  
could   the   noble   authors   tap   into   the   endless   reservoir   of   memory   and  
illustrate  the  fascinating  details  of  the  nobility’s  rich  culture  and  way  of  life,  
which  were  so  deeply  rooted  in  nature  and  the  archaic  traditions  of  a  bygone  
era.122    
The   key   to   the   nobility’s   literary   resurrection   of   East   Elbia   was   the  
transfiguration  of   these   lost  provinces   into  a   romanticised  world  of   a   long-­‐‑
gone   age.   Pre-­‐‑existing  mythical   and   literary   template   shaped   this   process,  
particularly  in  the  case  of  East  Prussia,  where  many  of  the  themes  of  the  new  
wave   transfigurations   can   already   be   found   in   the   interwar   period.      East  
Prussia   was   the   only   German   province   during   the   First   World   War   to  
experience   wartime   occupation   by   foreign   troops.   Although   the   Russians  
                                                                                                 
120  See  her  interview  in  the  documentary:  Marion  Dönhoff  –  Die  Gräfin  und  die  Zeit,  Zeit  
Dokumentation  –  Deutschland:  Lenker  und  Gestalter  –  Große  Persönlichkeiten  der  
Bundesrepublik  im  Portrait,  DVD  Edition,  2008.  
121  Ein  Kreuz  auf  Preußens  Grab,  Die  Zeit,  20.11.1970.  
122  Funck  and  Malinowski,  Masters  of  Memory,  in:  Confino  and  Fritzsche  (eds),  The  Work  Of  
Memory,  p.  96.  
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were  defeated   at   Tannenberg   and  ultimately   expelled   from  East   Prussia   in  
February   1915,   the   devastations   were   considerable.   Thirty-­‐‑nine   cities   and  
almost   1,900   villages   were   destroyed. 123   In   1915,   an   emergency   appeal  
(Ostpreußenhilfe)   was   issued   throughout   the   Reich   to   collect   donations   for  
reconstruction.   Dozens   of   private   initiatives   donated   money,   clothes   and  
furniture.   The   Münchner   Ostpreußenhilfe   alone   collected   almost   half   a  
million  Reichsmark.124    
In  1919,   the  Allies   created   the  Polish  Corridor.  Poland  gained  access   to   the  
Baltic   Sea,   but   East   Prussia   was   cut   off   from   the   Reich.   When   the   news  
emerged  that  a  plebiscite  should  decide  on  the  future  of  the  ethnically  mixed  
regions   of   southern   East   Prussia,   the   wartime   solidarity   with   Germany’s  
most   eastern   province   reached   new   heights.   The   propaganda   surrounding  
the   plebiscite   for   self-­‐‑determination   of   the   regions   Allenstein   and  
Marienwerder  in  1920,  transformed  the  referendum  into  a  “border  skirmish  
and   a   racial   struggle”.125  The  government   erected   a  monstrous  memorial   at  
the   site   of   the   Tannenberg   battle   and   the   victorious   commander,   Field  
Marshall   von   Hindenburg,   was   glorified   as   the   saviour   of   East   Prussia.  
Pilgrimages   to  Tannenberg  became  a  “national  obligation”   for  every  young  
                                                                                                 
123  “Zum  Besten  der  Ostpreußenhilfe”  –  Spenden  für  den  Wiederaufbau  ab  1915,  Ausstellung  
im  Ostpreußischen  Landesmuseum  Lüneburg,  23.09.2006  –  28.01.2007,  online  at:  
www.ostpreussisches-­‐‑landesmuseum.de/en/museum/ausstellungsarchiv/2007-­‐‑2006/zum-­‐‑
besten-­‐‑der-­‐‑ostpreussenhilfe-­‐‑spenden-­‐‑fuer-­‐‑den-­‐‑wiederaufbau-­‐‑ab-­‐‑1915.html.  
124  Sven  Felix  Kellerhoff,  Heimatfront:  Der  Untergang  der  heilen  Welt  –  Deutschland  im  ersten  
Weltkrieg  (Cologne,  2014),  p.  135.  
125  Andreas  Kossert,  Ostpreußen  –  Geschichte  und  Mythos  (Munich,  2007),  p.  221.  
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German.126  The   German   historian,   Heinrich   von   Treitschke,   had   already   in  
1862   described   East   Prussia   as   “a   breakwater   thrusting   from   the   German  
shore   boldly   into   the   wave-­‐‑tossed   sea   of   the   eastern   peoples”.127  Now,   the  
nationalist  press  took  this  description  further  by  declaring  East  Prussia  to  be  
the  bulwark  against  the  advancing  Slavdom.128  In  this  process,  as  the  Polish  
historian,   Rafael   Zytyniec,   has   explained,   East   Prussia   was   systematically  
transformed   into   a   “specifically   German   landscape”.129  In   the   elections   of  
March   1933,   the  NSDAP   gained   almost   sixty   per   cent   of   the   votes,   and   in  
some   districts,   even   up   to   eighty   per   cent   –   the   highest   percentage   in   the  
entire  Reich.130    
The   mystification   of   East   Prussia’s   landscape   thus   began   long   before   the  
expulsions  that  accompanied  the  collapse  of  the  Third  Reich.  Novels  such  as  
Das  Haus   am  Haff   by   Hugo  Marti,   Fritz   Kudnig’s   book   of   poetry   Land   der  
tausend   Seen,   Jakob   Schaffner’s   booklets  Offenbarung   in   deutscher   Landschaft,  
Eine   Sommerfahrt   and  Ostpreußen,   Stille   und  Kraft   and   the   various   poems   of  
Agnes  Miegel,  transformed  the  landscape  between  Vistula  and  Memel  into  a  
                                                                                                 
126  For  the  glorification  of  Tannenberg  see:  Mathieu  Olivier,  Schlacht  bei  Tannenberg  –  Erfolg  
und  Scheitern  von  Siegesmythen,  in:  Hans  Henning  Hahn  und  Robert  Traba  (eds),  Deutsch-­‐‑
Polnische  Erinnerungsorte,  Volume  I  (Paderborn,  2015),  pp.  283–300.  
127  Heinrich  von  Treitschke,  Origins  of  Prussianism  (The  Teutonic  Knights)  (London,  1942),  p.  
39.  
128  Martin  Sander,  Buchkritik,  Bollwerk  Ostpreußen,  Deutschlandradio  Kultur,  24.06.2010.  
129  Rafael  Zytyniec,  Ostpreußen,  Ermland  und  Masuren  –  Vom  Bollwerk  zur  Borussia,  in:  
Hahn  und  Traba  (eds),  Deutsch-­‐‑Polnische  Erinnerungsorte,  p.  102.  
130  See  footnote  No.  283  in:  Dieter  Hertz-­‐‑Eichenrode,  Politik  und  Landwirtschaft  in  Ostpreußen  




mystic  land  of  desire.131  Iconic  places  like  the  Marienburg,  Trakehnen,  Steinort  
and  Königsberg,  as  well  as  the  unique  characteristics  of  nature,  such  as  in  the  
Kurische  Nehrung,   the   Frische  Haff,   the   forests   and   lakes,   became   formative  
terms   in   the   myth   surrounding   East   Prussia.   The   survival   of   the   elk,   the  
iconic   heraldic   animal   of   the   province,   and   the   amber   harvested   from   the  
East  Prussian  coast,  conveyed  an  image  of  archaic  nature,  a  kind  of  Prussian  
Siberia.132  The   widely   popular   song  Oratorium   an   die   Heimat,   composed   by  
Herbert  Brust  in  the  early  1930s,  further  consolidated  an  image  that  idealised  
East  Prussia  as  “the  land  of  dark  forests  and  clear  lakes”.  This  song  became  
so   popular   that   it   was   renamed   the   Ostpreußenlied   and   replaced   the  
traditional   state-­‐‑anthem.133  Ironically,   East   Prussia   had   the   smallest   acreage  
of  forest  of  all  German  provinces  and  hardly  any  major  lakes  except  for  the  
Masurian  Lake  District  in  the  southern  borderlands.134    
Even   a   cursory   examination   of   the   new-­‐‑wave   autobiographies   reveals   that  
the   authors   deliberately   built   on   this   pre-­‐‑existing   mystification   of   East  
Prussia.  The  transfiguration  of  this  province  and  its  landscape  is  omnipresent  
and  already  evident  from  the  titles  and  the  book  covers:  East  Prussian  Diary,  
Country-­‐‑Life  in  East  Prussia,  Childhood  in  East  Prussia,  Recollections  of  an  old  East  
Prussian,  Only  the  Storks  Remained  and  People,  Horses,  Wide  Country.135  Most  of  
                                                                                                 
131  See:  Hubert  Orlowski,  Das  Bild  Ostpreußens  in  der  deutschen  Literatur  des  20.  
Jahrhunderts,  in:  Matthias  Weber  (ed.),  Preußen  in  Ostmitteleuropa  –  Geschehensgeschichte  und  
Verstehensgeschichte  (Munich,  2003),  p.  272  and  especially  footnote  No.  34.  
132  Orlowski,  Das  Bild  Ostpreußens  in  der  deutschen  Literatur  des  20.  Jahrhunderts,  pp.  272,  273.  
133  See:  Gerhart  Seiffert,  Land  der  dunklen  Wälder  und  kristall’nen  Seen:  Das  Ostpreußenlied,  seine  
Entstehung  und  sein  Komponist  Herbert  Brust  (Bremerhaven,  1970).  
134  Wolf  Lepenies,  So  wurde  Ostpreußen  zum  heiligen  deutschen  Osten,  WELT,  30.07.2010.  
135  Hans  Graf  von  Lehndorff,  East  Prussian  Diary,  1945–1947  (London,  1963);  Hedwig  von  
Lölhöffel,  Landleben  in  Ostpreußen  (Hamburg,  1973);  Marion  Gräfin  Dönhoff,  Kindheit  in  
154  
  
the   book   covers   feature   romantic   photographs   of   the   East   Prussian  
landscape.   The  most   popular   scenes   are   deserted   lakes,   blossoming   fields,  
idyllic  manor  houses  or  mighty  tree-­‐‑lined  alleys.136    
The   first  writer   to   set   the   tone   of   the   nobility’s   nostalgic   transfiguration   of  
East  Elbia  was  Hans  Graf  von  Lehndorff  in  1961.  Although  his  East  Prussian  
diary   only   covered   the   years   1944   to   1947   –   he   published   his   full  
autobiography   in   1980   –   it   can   be   regarded   as   the   formative   work   that  
sparked   the   second   wave   of   post-­‐‑war   noble   autobiographies.   The   first  
paragraph  of  this  book  exemplifies  how  the  noble  authors  were  to  pick  up  on  
the  myth  surrounding  East  Prussia.  “Once  again,  before  the  bulldozer  of  the  
war  drove   over   it,  my  East   Prussian   homeland  unfolded   all   its  mysterious  
splendour.  Whoever   lived   through   those   last  months  with   receptive   senses  
must   have   felt   that   never   before   had   the   light   been   so   intense,   the   sky   so  
lofty,   the  distance   so  vast.  And  all   that   impalpable   essence  distilled  by   the  
landscape,  lending  wings  to  the  spirit,  took  shape  with  an  intensity  that  only  
the  hour  of  farewell  could  have  given  it.”137    
Marion   Gräfin   Dönhoff,   who   was   the   second   pioneer   of   this   nostalgic  
farewell  literature  –  she  published  her  first  work,  Namen  die  keiner  mehr  nennt,  
in   1962   –   approached   the   rediscovery  of   her  Heimat   in   similar   fashion.   She  
uses  the  enigmatic  beauty  of  East  Prussia  to  establish  a  land  of  desire,  which  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Ostpreußen  (Berlin,  1988);  Dohna,  Erinnerungen;  Ottfried  Graf  von  Finckenstein,  Nur  die  
Störche  sind  geblieben  (Munich,  1994);  Hans  Graf  von  Lehndorff,  Menschen,  Pferde,  weites  Land  
(Munich,  1980).  
136  The  covers  frequently  changed  over  the  years.  Most  of  these  books  saw  numerous  
editions.  Yet  almost  all  of  the  above  mentioned  appeared  with  variations  of  East  Prussian  
landscape  scenes.  
137  Lehndorff,  East  Prussian  Diary,  p.1.  
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is   worth   being   remembered.   “Naturally,   everyone   who   felt   at   home   there  
reminisces  about   the  beautiful   landscape  –   the  endless  meadows  and   fields  
beneath  the  grand  eastern  sky;  the  secluded  forests  and  clear  lakes.  […]  No  
one   who   ever   galloped   astride   a   noble   steed   across   the   fields   of   stubble,  
tracing  a  slalom  among  the  hay  stack,  will  ever  call  any  other  place  but  East  
Prussia  their  Heimat.”138    
Out  of  such  prose  the  place-­‐‑myth  of  East  Prussia  was  woven.    The  concept  of  
the  ‘place-­‐‑myth’  as  a  way  of  characterising  “the  skein  of  expectations,  hopes,  
stereotypes   and   associations   attached   to   a   place”   is   useful   here,   because   it  
alludes   to   a   collective   process   by   which   a   particular   landscape   or   locality  
acquires   a   stable   set   of   attributes   so   dominant   that   they   displace   to   some  
extent   the   reality   of   the   place   in   question   and   perpetuate   themselves   in   a  
manner   that  may  be  quite   autonomous   from   the   experience  of   individuals.    
Rather   than   capturing   impressions   from   the   past,   a   place-­‐‑myth  may   retro-­‐‑
project   itself   onto   the   remembered   space.139     It   was   almost   as   if   the   noble  
authors   had   collectively   agreed   in   advance   to   resurrect   the   mythical   East  
Prussia  in  West  German  collective  memory  by  deploying  a  shared  repertoire  
of   tropes.      Alexander   Prince   Dohna   fondly   recalled   the   wintery   hunting  
season.  “In  complete  silence  we  glided   through   the  softly  glistening,  snow-­‐‑
capped  East  Prussian  countryside.”140  He  reports  on  the  sighting  of  a  bear  in  
                                                                                                 
138  Marion  Gräfin  Dönhoff,  Preface  –  Bemerkungen  zur  Geschichte  Ostpreußens,  in:  Adelaide  
von  Eulenburg  und  Hans  Engels,  Ostpreußische  Gutshäuser  in  Polen.  Gegenwart  und  
Erinnerung  (Munich,  1987),  p.  11.  
139  On  place-­‐‑myth  as  a  key  to  understanding  collective  responses  to  a  symbolically  charged  
locality,  see  Nina  Lübbren,  Rural  Artists’  Colonies  in  Europe,  1870–1914  (Manchester,  2001),  p.  
115–7.  
140  Dohna,  Erinnerungen,  pp.  49.  
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the   East   Prussian   wilderness   and   depicts   the   remoteness   of   the   Masurian  
Lake   District   as   an   Eldorado   for   waterfowl. 141   For   Aninka   Gräfin   von  
Bellavitis,  it  was  the  East  Prussian  sky  which  stood  out,  since  “it  appeared  to  
be  much  closer,  the  stars  sparkled  like  gold,  and  one  was  almost  certain  they  
were   in   reach”.142  Hans   Graf   von   Lehndorff   portrayed   his   Heimat   as   a  
‘borderland’:  “the  wind  from  there  moved  the  heart,  the  spirit  tempted  one’s  
readiness  to  make  sacrifices.  It  was  not  a  neutral  life  one  lived  there.  One  was  
needed”.143     Ottfried   Graf   von   Finckenstein   affectionately   remembered   the  
“rattling  of   the  storks”  and  was  overwhelmed  by  “the   light  summer  sky  of  
the   east,   which   was   always   bright,   from   horizon   to   horizon”.144  Marion  
Dönhoff   accentuated  East  Prussia’s  wilderness   even   further  by   setting   it   in  
contrast  with   the   industrial   pollution   of   the   1960s.   “In   such   a  world   birds,  
otters,  martens  and  polecats  still  had  their  place,  which  today’s  assiduously  
economising  society  deprives  them  of.  The  sea  eagle,  crane  and  large  curlew  
found  remote  breeding  areas,  and  alongside   fields  and  paths  grew  poppies  
and  cornflowers,  not  having  to  elude  death  by  myriad  chemicals.”145    
Other  noble  authors  picked  up  these  themes  and  extended  the  technique  to  
East   Elbia   as   a   whole.   Although   the   depictions   of   the   natural   beauty   of  
Pomerania  and  Silesia  were  not  as   exuberant  as   those  of  East  Prussia,   they  
still   conveyed   an   image   of   a   melancholic   and   pristine   lost   world.   Thus  
Dankwart   Graf   von   Arnim   indulged   in   the   memory   of   Lake   Zervelien,  
                                                                                                 
141  Ibid,  pp.  157,  158,  152.  
142  Bellavitis,  Wir  haben  das  Korn  geschnitten,  p.  92.  
143  Lehndorff,  Menschen,  Pferde,  weites  Land,  p.  48.  
144  Finckenstein,  Nur  die  Störche  sind  geblieben,  pp.  7,  9.  
145  Marion  Gräfin  Dönhoff,  Namen  die  keiner  mehr  nennt  (Munich,  2000),  p.  7.  
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“which  was  situated  in  the  middle  of  the  dark  forest  and  still  possessed  the  
aura   of   deep   and   uninhabited   seclusion”.146     For   Franz   von   Unruh   “the  
summer   [in   the  East]  gleamed   in  an   infinite  blue   […]  and  upon   the   leaves’  
subtle   change   in   colour,  when   the  wine  was   suffused  with   crimson,  when  
storms  broke  and  covered  paths  with  leaves  drenched  in  rainwater,  then  the  
inimitable  scent  of  autumn  began  to  suffuse   the  air”.147  Klaus  von  Bismarck  
reminisced  about  “snow-­‐‑drifted  farm  roads,  covered  by  willow  trees,  which  
at   nightfall  melancholically   stood   out   from   the   crusted   snow   cover”.148  For  
Rudolf-­‐‑Christoph   von   Gersdorff   the   “wild   and   therefore   particularly  
beautiful  landscape  of  the  Riesengebirge”  formed  the  basis  for  his  “immutable  
love  for  his  Silesian  Heimat”.149      
Redrafting  the  Popular  Image  of  the  East-­‐‑Elbian  Nobility  
Onto   this   nostalgic   land   of   desire   the   noble   authors   plotted   the   redrafted  
image  of   the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility.  For  decades,   the   Junkers  had  been  at   the  
centre   of   a   widespread   Adelskritik,   notoriously   propagated   in   satirical  
magazines   such   as   Simplicissimus.150  Here   the   Junkers   were   portrayed   as  
ruthless  agrarian  capitalists,  “who  ruled  their  workers  with  the  authority  and  
                                                                                                 
146  Arnim,  Als  Brandenburg  noch  die  Mark  hieß,  p.  19.  
147  Friedrich  Franz  von  Unruh,  Ehe  die  Stunde  schlägt  –  Kindheitserinnerungen  (Bodensee,  1967),  
p.  10.  
148  Klaus  von  Bismarck,  Aufbruch  aus  Pommern:  Erinnerungen  und  Perspektiven  (Munich,  1992),  
p.  14.  
149  Rudolf-­‐‑Christoph  Freiherr  von  Gersdorff,  Soldat  im  Untergang  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1977),  p.  
23.  




the   style   of   Prussian   officers”.151  Yet,   in   the   second   half   of   the   twentieth  
century,   this  widely   popular   pre-­‐‑war   characterisation   of   the   dashing   East-­‐‑
Elbian   Junker,   meticulously   subjugating   the   people   on   his   estates,   had  
gradually   faded   into   obscurity.   The   expulsion   of   the   nobility   had   simply  
made   it   superfluous.   What   we   see   instead   is   a   predominant   focus   on   the  
nobility’s  role  in  Weimar  and  Nazi  politics.    
As  we   recounted   in   the   introduction   to   this   thesis,  historians   such  as  Hans  
Rosenberg,   Heinrich-­‐‑August   Winkler   and   Hans-­‐‑Ulrich   Wehler   staunchly  
attacked   the   Junkers   for   being   heavily   responsible   for   leading   Germany  
down   its   fateful   path   in   the   twentieth   century. 152   The   Bielefeld   School  
constructed   their  Sonderweg-­‐‑theory   around   the   failure   to   destroy   the   social  
and   political   power   of   Germany’s   ‘traditional   elites’.   As   Germany’s   most  
powerful   elite,   the   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility   was   at   the   heart   of   these   debates.  
They   were   regarded   as   the   driving   force   behind   building   up   an   anti-­‐‑
republican   Reichswehr,   which  was   eager   to   forcefully   revise   the   Treaty   of  
Versailles.   They   were   also   impugned   with   having   significantly   assisted  
Hitler’s  rise  to  power  by  having  sought  a  formal  coalition  with  the  National  
Socialist  movement  as  early  as  in  the  winter  of  1932-­‐‑33.153      
It  was   a   distinguishing   feature   of   the   new  wave   of   noble   publications   that  
they  did  not  respond  directly  to  this  criticism,  but  sought  instead  to  shift  the  
focus   from   the   political   role   of   the   nobility   towards   its   cultural   and   social  
responsibility   in   pre-­‐‑war  Germany.   Rather   than   addressing   the   role   of   the  
                                                                                                 
151  Bismarck,  Aufbruch  aus  Pommern,  p.  30.  
152  See  the  section  State  of  Research  in  the  Introduction  of  this  thesis.  
153  Wehler,  Deutsche  Gesellschaftsgeschichte,  Volume  4,  pp.  326–332.  
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nobility   in   the   political   transformations   of   East   Prussia   in   the   late  Weimar  
and   Nazi   years,   they   created   a   space   outside   history,   a   space   filled   with  
endless  charming  anecdotes  of  a  peaceful  and  harmonious  hierarchical  social  
system  built  upon  Prussian  virtues  and  moral  integrity  and  kept  together  by  
the  special  bond  between  the  squire  and  his  people.  In  other  words,  the  noble  
publicists   drew   the   portrait   of   an   indulgent   Junker   archetype,   firmly  
anchored  in  an  archaic  social  system  so  stable  that  it   ‘protected’  East-­‐‑Elbian  
society  from  the  enticements  of  National  Socialism.      
These  memoirs  led  the  reader  on  an  extensive  tour  through  the  Lebenswelten  
of   the   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility.   The   writers   symbolically   opened   their   manor  
houses  to  the  public.  Once  inside,  the  reader  encountered  a  carefully  curated  
exhibition   intended   to   portray   the   immaculate   image   of   a   lenient,   tolerant  
and  humble  local  elite,  sheltered  from  the  vicissitudes  of  politics.  The  setting  
is  generally  a  picturesque  manor  house,  surrounded  by  a  spacious  park  lined  
with   ancient   trees   and   an   idyllic   pond.   The   estates   are   predominantly  
autarchic   often   including   sawmills,   dairies   and   fish   farms.154   The   noble  
children   are   playing   with   the   village   youth,   the   servants   tend   to   be   the  
nobles’   best   friends   and   class   distinctions   seem   to   be   non-­‐‑existent.155  “The  
lordship’s  children  were  barefoot  like  those  of  the  workers,  sat  on  the  same  
horse  carts  at  times  of  harvest  and  drew  them  in  for  play  in  the  manor’s  park.  
                                                                                                 
154  Maria  Gräfin  von  Maltzan,  Schlage  die  Trommel  und  fürchte  dich  nicht  –  Erinnerungen  
(Berlin,  2009),  p.  12;  Also  see  Marion  Gräfin  Dönhoff’s  chapter,  “Self-­‐‑Sufficiency”,  in:  Before  
the  Storm:  Memories  of  my  Youth  in  Old  Prussia  (New  York,  1990),  pp.  65–70.  
155  See:  Lehndorff,  Menschen,  p.  15;  Lölhöffel,  Ostpreußen,  p.  35;  Gersdorff,  Soldat  im  
Untergang,  p.  19;  Esther  Gräfin  von  Schwerin,  Kormorane,  Brombeerranken,  Erinnerungen  an  
Ostpreußen  (Munich,  2009),  p.  28.  
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Nobody  envied  the  life  in  the  stately  homes.”156  Omnipresent  throughout  the  
autobiographies   is  also  the  nobility’s   fervour  for  horses  and  hunting.  Every  
young  nobleman-­‐‑  and  woman  learns  from  early  on  how  to  ride  a  horse  and  
handle  a  rifle.  Extended  anecdotes  of  multi-­‐‑generational  hunting  adventures,  
stalking  techniques  passed  down  by  generations  and  carefully  nurtured  and  
cultivated  game  preserves  show  the  reader  how  closely  the  nobility’s  lifestyle  
was   connected   to   land   and   nature   and   by   implication   how   far   it   was  
removed  from  urban  modernity.157  
Despite   the   privileged   setting,   the   upbringing   of   the   children   is   invariably  
depicted   as   “specifically   simple,   almost   Spartan”. 158   We   see   Count  
Finckenstein,  the  owner  of  vast  estates  in  East  Prussia,  denying  his  son  even  
the   minimum   allowance   suggested   by   the   boarding   school,   to   make   him  
accustomed  with,   as   he   put   it,   being   part   of   the   less  well   off.159  Klaus   von  
Bismarck   remembered   that   only   on   special   occasions,   if   ever,   a   lamb   was  
especially  killed  for  the  squire’s  family.  The  rest  of  the  year  the  family  lived  
off  the  leftovers  from  the  farm,  just  like  any  other  family.160  Marion  Dönhoff  
recalled  that  in  her  childhood  she  was  “never  allowed  to  put  both  butter  and  
jam  on  her  bread”  because  it  was  considered  too  lavish.  She  and  her  siblings  
“never  travelled  second  class  on  the  railroad  (first  class  was  not  to  be  thought  
                                                                                                 
156  Lölhöffel,  Ostpreußen,  p.  27.  
157  See:  Lehndorff,  Menschen,  p.  25;  Dohna,  Erinnerungen,  pp.  152-­‐‑158;  Arnim,  Als  Brandenburg  
noch  die  Mark  hieß,  pp.  99-­‐‑106;  Dönhoff,  Before  the  Storm,  pp.  54-­‐‑56.  
158  Gersdorff,  Soldat  im  Untergang,  p.  17.  
159  Finckenstein,  Nur  die  Störche  sind  geblieben,  pp.  66–69.  
160  Bismarck,  Aufbruch  aus  Pommern,  p.  74;  also  see:  Schwerin,  Kormorane,  p.  26;  Finckenstein,  
Nur  die  Störche  sind  geblieben,  p.  39.  
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of),  but  sat  on  the  hard  wooden  benches  of  third  class,  even  for  trips  as  long  
as  from  Königsberg  to  Berlin”.161  
Yet,   austerity   was   not   the   only   virtue   the   nobility   claimed   as   a   family  
heirloom.   They   invoked   the   entire   catalogue   of   the   so-­‐‑called   “Prussian  
virtues”:   honesty,   punctuality,   loyalty,   self-­‐‑reliance,   responsibility,   bravery,  
courage,   modesty   and   discipline.      These   were   the   pole   star   that   guided  
generations  of  young  nobles  through  the  turbulent  waters  of  political  change.  
Thus  Klaus   von  Bismarck   spoke   for   his   entire   class  when  he   claimed,   “the  
virtues   that   the   Prussian   kings   demanded   from   their   subjects   have   always  
taken   priority”. 162   Throughout   his   childhood,   Alexander   zu   Dohna   was  
urged  by  his  grandfather  to  take  responsibility.  “From  an  early  age  on,  every  
young   man   from   a   decent   family   shall   strive   to   distinguish   himself   as   a  
leader  among  his  peers,  through  his  diligence,  skill  and  competence.”163  Self-­‐‑
discipline,  the  necessity  never  to  “lose  control”,164  was  another  key  theme  in  
these   autobiographies.   As   Rudolf-­‐‑Christoph   von   Gersdorff   declared  
“modesty  and  posture  were  the  key  values  our  parents  tried  to  instil  in  us”.165  
Their  whole  upbringing  “was  guided  by  the  principle  of  what  one  should  do  
and,  more  important,  what  one  should  not  do”.166    Again  and  again,  we  see  
the  young  noble   children  on  horseback  with   their  parents,  grandparents  or  
aunts  and  uncles  eventually  falling  off  the  horse  and  being  left  behind.  Even  
a  broken  arm  could  not  stop  them  from  re-­‐‑saddling  and  accepting  this  with  
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163  Dohna,  Erinnerungen,  p.  30.  
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grace  and  utmost  restraint,  and  acquiescing   it  as  an   important   life   lesson.167  
As  Marion  Dönhoff  called  it,  “tolerating  pain  without  complaining  was  part  
of  our  honour  code”.168    
This   image   of   impeccable   moral   integrity   is   further   fostered   by   the  
omnipresent  transfiguration  of  the  squire’s  care  for  the  local  community.  The  
authors  explicitly  countered  the  widely  caricatured  image  of  the  pre-­‐‑war  era  
of   the   dashing   Junker   who   meticulously   subjugated   his   people.   At   the  
bottom   of   these   vignettes   once   again   lies   a   strategic   transfiguration   of  
another   Prussian   virtue   the   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility   customarily   claimed  
heirloom   to,   the   concept   of   loyalty.   Traditionally,   this   virtue   found   its  
expression   in   the   close   relationship   between   the   nobility   and   the   Prussian  
kings.   However,   in   the   absence   of   a   Hohenzollern   monarch,   this  
unconditional   loyalty   is   now   skilfully   transferred   onto   the   relationship  
between  squire  and  peasant.  “The  so-­‐‑called  patriarchal  relationship  between  
peasants  and  servants,   squires  and   farm   labourers,  often  revealed   in  use  of  
traditional  conventions  and  titles,  has  been  frequently  misinterpreted.  There  
was   no   ‘suppression’   and   ‘servility’”   Hedwig   von   Lölhöffel   argued. 169  
According  to  Georg  Graf  von  Schwerin  the  squires  “considered  their  people  
particularly   entrusted   to   their   care   by   fate   and   god”.      In   return,   the  
landowners   were   assured   of   the   “love   and   endless   trust   of   the   people”.170    
Throughout  the  extracts,  these  nobles  defended  their  people  if  they  came  into  
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conflict   with   the   law;   they   cared   for   the   Russian   prisoners   of   war;   and  
invariably  proved  to  be  generous  in  times  of  despair.171  Even  the  renovation  
of   farmer   cottages   took  priority   over   the   redecoration   of   the  manor   house,  
and  it  goes  without  saying  that  the  hyperinflation  of  the  early  1920s  was  not  
abused   to   extend   the  west  wing   or   undertake   journeys   to   exotic   countries,  
but  rather,   to   improve  the   living  conditions  of   local  workers.172  Even  highly  
controversial  personalities,   such  as  Elard  von  Oldenburg-­‐‑Januschau,  one  of  
the  most   notorious   advocates   of   the   conservative   elites   in  East   Elbia   and   a  
prominent  member  of  the  Hindenburg  Camarilla,  are  portrayed  as  loving  old  
grandfathers  whose   life  was  mainly   taken  up   by   “advising   his   people   and  
helping  them  back  on  their  feet,  […]  often  by  means  of  paying  their  debts”.173  
The  fact  that  the  very  same  Oldenburg  had  some  decades  earlier  boasted  of  
restoring   order   on   his   estate   by   threatening   “to   beat   the   hell”  174  out   of   an  
insurgent  peasant  was  now  studiously  forgotten.    
Yet,  as  much  as  these  autobiographies  were  intended  to  rebuild  and  reshape  
the   image   of   the   nobility   and   ensure   its   survival   in   Germany’s   collective  
memory,  they  were  also  subtle  attempts  to  reassure  this  bewildered  class  of  
its  unbroken  connection  with  a  unique  past.  What  we  see  in  these  accounts  is  
an   unresolved   tension   between   the   image   of   an   austere,   indulgent   and  
tolerant  elite,  closely  attached  to  land  and  people,  and  the  continual  claim  of  
social   superiority.   Between   the   lines,   these   accounts   are   interspersed   with  
                                                                                                 
171  See:  Bismarck,  Aufbruch  aus  Pommern,  pp.  61–64;  Schwerin,  Zettemin,  p.  16;  Finckenstein,  
Nur  die  Störche  sind  geblieben,  pp.  14–18;  Lehndorff,  Menschen  pp.  147–149;  Schwerin,  
Kormorane,  pp.  14–16;  Lölhöffel,  Ostpreußen,  pp.  28,  29.  
172  Schwerin,  Zettemin,  p.  24.  
173  Lehndorff,  Menschen,  p.  152.  
174  Oldenburg,  Erinnerungen,  pp.  207–209.  
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anecdotes   of   lavish   dinner   parties,175  liveried   servants,176  richly   furnished  
manor   houses,177  and   subtle   hints   at   insurmountable   social   hierarchies,   all  
designed  to  provide  an  endless  reservoir  of  symbolic  social  capital  to  cherish  
and  maintain  the  nobility’s  habitus  in  the  present.    
The  often-­‐‑quoted  anecdotes  of  noble  children  playing  with  the  village  youth  
are  exemplary  in  this  context.178  Although  at  first  glance,  such  informal  social  
intercourse  is  displayed  as  an  expression  of  social  proximity  within  the  estate  
society,   in   reality,   it   is   rather   an   indication   of   social   distance   designed   to  
prepare  the  young  noble  children  for  their  future  role  as  leaders  of  their  local  
communities. 179   An   old   family   picture   of   the   Dönhoff   children,   albeit  
involuntarily,   exemplifies   this.   Two   Dönhoff   sons   on   ponies,   formally  
dressed   in   Hussars   uniforms   and   equipped   with   small   sabres,   are   shown  
commanding   a   unit   of   informally   dressed   village   boys   armed  with   simple  
wooden  swords.180      
The   same   ambivalence   is   expressed   in  Hans   von   Lehndorff’s   account   of   a  
Christmas  party  during  his  youth.  All  the  village  children  were  invited  to  the  
manor   house   to   celebrate   together.   They   all   received   small   gifts,   even   in  
                                                                                                 
175  Schwerin,  Kormorane,  p.  27;  Finckenstein,  Nur  die  Störche  sind  geblieben,  p.  40;  Maltzahn,  
Schlage  die  Trommel,  p.  13.  
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179  Malinowski,  Vom  König  zum  Führer,  p.  111.  
180  Dönhoff,  Before  the  Storm,  p.  54.  
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times  of  despair.  At   the  end  of   the  ceremony,   the  children  were  allowed  to  
pick  cookies  and  pastries  from  the  Christmas  tree,  and  the  squire’s  children,  
from  an  elevated  position,  threw  the  leftovers  into  the  bulk  of  the  children.181    
Dankwart  von  Arnim’s  memoirs  also  fondly  depict  his  childhood  friendships  
with   the  village  boys,  a  world  allegedly   free  of  class  distinctions  and  social  
hierarchies.  Yet,  the  incidental  remark  about  the  golden-­‐‑edged  plate  and  the  
distinct   mug   he   was   presented   with   when   having   lunch   at   some   of   his  
friends’  house  again  quietly  draws  attention  to  the  elevated  character  of  the  
author’s  social  milieu.182          
A   final   crucial   step   in   the  process   of   remodelling   the   image   of   the   Junkers  
was   the   effort   to   distance   the   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility   from   the   Nazi   regime.  
Throughout   the   autobiographies,   it   is   suggested   that   the   noble   families  
remained   aloof   from   the   machinations   of   the   regime.   The   Nazis   were  
commonly   referred   to   as   “hooligans” 183   or   upstarts   of   “disgusting  
behaviour” 184   and   Hitler   was   described   as   an   “obnoxious   and   bloated  
plebeian”185  who  should  be  admitted   to  a  mental   institution.  The  rowdiness  
and  coarseness  of   the  Nazi  movement  supposedly  discouraged   the  nobility  
from   finding   an   arrangement   with   Hitler.   In   this   respect,   these  
autobiographies  differed  little  from  their  predecessors  in  the  immediate  post-­‐‑
war  era.  What  is  noticeable,  however,   is  that  most  of  the  new  generation  of  
authors   simply  denied   flat   out   any   sort   of   involvement   in   the  Third  Reich.  
                                                                                                 
181  Lehndorff,  Menschen,  p.43.  
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The  references  to  National  Socialism  were  no  longer  apologetic  or  repentant  
but  rather  declaratory.  There  was  no  deeper  accounting  for  the  issue.  Instead,  
a  widespread  anti-­‐‑Nazi  attitude  is  simply  presupposed  as  a  matter  of  course  
among  the  entirety  of  the  local  nobility.  Exemplary  in  this  context  is  Gerhard  
von  Jordan,  who  declared:  “We,  our  friends  and  neighbours,  were  not  Nazis.  
There   were   exceptions,   an   informer,   a   party   functionary   and   a   few  
committed  disciples,  but  those  were  scarce.  The  majority  of  squires  and  their  
families  were  sceptical:  instead  of  speaking  of  the  Führer,  one  spoke  of  Hitler  
and  no  offices  were  held  in  the  party  or  its  subdivisions”.186  Similarly,  Wend  
Graf  von  Eulenburg-­‐‑Hertefeld  remarked,  “everybody  had  already  –  directly  
or   indirectly   –   raised   criticism,   uttered   defeatist   comments,   doubted   final  
victory   or   condemned   the   treatment   of   the   Jews”. 187   Georg   Graf   von  
Schwerin  conveyed  the  same  image  in  several  short  anecdotes.  He  claims  to  
have  been  annoyed  by  the  Nazis’  attempts  to  infiltrate  the  rural  societies,  and  
adds:  “it  goes  without  saying  that  I,  like  my  neighbours,  declined  to  acquire  
a   Reich  Hunting   Uniform:   the   oldest   hat   shot   best,   and  white   tie   was   the  
most   befitting   dress   for   any   hunting   dinner”. 188   Schwerin   and   his  
neighbouring   squires   supposedly   never   attended   the   ostentatious   harvest  
festivals  of  the  Nazis:  “it  sufficed  to  command  one  of  the  workers  to  go  and  
cover  his   cost  of   travel.  Nobody  went  voluntarily”.189  Dankwart  von  Arnim  
expressed  the  same  aloofness  in  a  more  subtle  way  by  referring  to  a  picture  
of   Hindenburg   with   the   devoutly   bowing   Hitler   in   front   of   him,   which  
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occupied  a  prominent  place  in  “our  and  many  other  noble  houses”.  “On  the  
one  hand  it  was  compulsory  to  have  a  picture  of  Hitler,  on  the  other  hand,  it  
was  believed  that  Hitler’s  bow  reflected  the  actual  realities.”190    
  It  may  well  be  that  these  vignettes  authentically  illustrate  the  attitudes  and  
convictions   of   the   time.   But   the  memoirs   are   so   heavily   interspersed  with  
oppositional   anecdotes   that   the   reader   almost   gets   the   impression   that   the  
entirety  of  the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility  had  been  staunchly  opposed  to  National  
Socialism.   This   effect   is   reinforced   by   the   fact   that   most   authors   simply  
withheld  most  compromising   information  about   their   relatives  and   friends,  
which   thereby  gradually  made   their  way   into  oblivion.  Consequently,  even  
though  many  of  these  anecdotes  might  be  authentic,  they  often  only  tell  half  
of   the   story,   as   the   examples   of  Ottfried  Graf   von   Finkenstein   and  Marion  
Gräfin  Dönhoff  show.    
In   one   of   the   chapters   of   his   autobiography,   Finckenstein   depicts   his  
encounter   with   one   of   his   brother’s   gardeners   at   the   ancient   family   seat  
Schönberg.      The   gardener   had   been   an   early   supporter   of   the   regime.   “He  
showed  me  his  brown  shirt,  which  he  had  strategically  hid   in   the  bee  hive,  
where   no   one   else   dared   to   come.   It   was   evident   that   he   felt   caught   on  
forbidden   grounds,   as   a  member   of   an   organisation,   of  which   his   lordship  
was   not   allowed   to   know.” 191   Although   not   explicitly   expressed,   this  
anecdote   is   intended   to   convey   the   idea   that   the   Finckensteins   were  
inherently  anti-­‐‑Nazi  and  thereby  would  not   tolerate   the  gardener’s  support  
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for  the  new  regime.  What  the  autobiography,  however,  does  not  tell  us  is,  the  
fact   that   Finckenstein’s   brother   and   sister   in   law   were   early   and   ardent  
supporters  of  Hitler  and  the  party.  Even  before  the  Nazis’  seizure  of  power  
in   1933,  Hitler   and  Göring  had  both  been  personally   invited   to   Schönberg.  
East  Prussia’s  notorious  Gauleiter  Erich  Koch  was  also  a   frequent  visitor   in  
the  years  to  come.192    
Marion   Dönhoff’s   denial   of   the   actual   realities   are,   at   times,   even   more  
grotesque  when   she  declared   in   her  memoirs:   “it   goes  without   saying   that  
none  of   the  new  brown  men  –  neither   important,  nor  minor  –  ever  set   foot  
into  Friedrichstein  palace  or,  all  the  more  certain,  ever  felt  at  home  there”.193  
She  may  be  true  that  no  “important”  Nazi  of  the  likes  of  Hitler,  Himmler  or  
Goering   set   foot   in   her   ancestral   home,   but   it   is   undeniable   that   several  
‘minor’  Nazis  not  only  crossed  the  doorstep  of  Friedrichstein  palace,  but  also  
felt   at   home   there.   The   most   prominent   examples   were   her   two   brothers,  
Dieter  and  Christoph  Dönhoff.  The  former   joined  the  NSDAP  in  May  1933,  
although  his  descendants  claim  even  today  that  he  only  joined  to  “keep  harm  
from  the  Dönhoffs  and  their  estate”.194  Christoph  joined  the  party  in  1935  and  
was  also  a  member  of  the  Gestapo.  In  1942,  he  became  head  of  the  Rechtsamt  
in  Paris,  which  was  responsible  for  the  repatriation  of  Germans  living  abroad  
(Reichsdeutsche).  In  this  capacity,  he  also  oversaw  the  deportation  of  German  
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Jews   who   had   fled   to   France.   In   June   of   1944,   he   joined   the  Waffen-­‐‑SS.195  
Another   frequent  visitor  was  Heinrich  Graf  von  Lehndorff  who  was  one  of  
Marion  Dönhoff’s   closest   friends  and  who  gained  posthumous  prominence  
for  his  participation  in  Stauffenberg’s  attempted  coup  at  the  Wolfsschanze  in  
July   1944.   Both  Marion  Dönhoff   and  his   cousin,  Hans  Graf   von  Lehndorff,  
wrote  extensive  appraisals  of  this  man,  portraying  him  as  a  shining  example  
of   noble   integrity   who   had   masterfully   rebuilt   the   family   estate   in   East  
Prussia   and   personally   taken   action   against   Hitler   in   1944.196  What   both  
authors,  however,  studiously  ignore,  is  the  fact  that  this  man  had  joined  the  
NSDAP   as   early   as   1932   and   built   up   a   local   party   chapter   (Ortsgruppe)   in  
East  Prussia,  over  which  he  also  presided.197    
Yet,   the   noble   authors   not   only   attempted   to   presuppose   a   firm   anti-­‐‑Nazi  
attitude   among   the   nobility,   but   systematically   extended   this   conjecture   to  
the  whole  of   rural  East  Elbia.  Thereby   the  writers  of   these  autobiographies  
once  again  illustrate  that  their  works  were  not  solely  designed  to  redraft  the  
image   of   the   nobility,   but   attempt   to   resurrect   East   Elbia   in   the   collective  
memory   of   German   society.   At   the   heart   of   this   concept   is   once   again   the  
allegedly  special  bond  between  the  Junker  and  his  people.  Since  the  Junkers  
were   customarily   anti-­‐‑Nazis,   or   so   the   story   goes,   their   people   were  
inevitably   anti-­‐‑Nazis   as   well,   since   they   trusted   their   lord   more   than   the  
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enticements   of   the  Nazis.   The   estate   societies   of   the   East  were   refashioned  
into   apolitical   islands   far   removed   from   the   vicissitudes   of   politics.   In   the  
countryside,   the   dark   clouds   of   Nazism   were   barely   recognisable.   “In  
Sperrenwalde   of   the   1930s,   one   could  merely   catch   a   glimpse   of   it.   It   was  
more   of   an   anxiety,   an   undefined   fear,   which   arose   in   conversations   with  
friends  from  Berlin,  who  spoke  of  the  Confessing  Church  or  the  night  of  the  
long  knives.  The  countryside  remained  secluded  islands  where  nothing  had  
changed   for   the   past   one   hundred   years   […]   and   everything   proceeded  
amidst  the  old,  unquestionable  structures.”198    
Nazism  was  portrayed  as  a  phenomenon  of  urban  circles.  In  the  countryside,  
Nazism  only  appealed  to  some  “idealists”  and  “eternally  malcontents”.  Only  
non-­‐‑locals  or  workers  who  had  just  recently  joined  the  estate  participated  in  
the   local   SA-­‐‑chapter.199  In   some   cases,   this   aversion   went   so   far   that   the  
squire   had   to   force   one   of   his   workers   to   attend   a   compulsory   party  
gathering   in   the   nearby   district   town,   since   nobody   wanted   to   follow   the  
instructions   of   the   party.   Hans   Lehndorff   described   the   East   Prussian  
countryside  in  the  1930s  as  “peaceful  as  a  graveyard”.  “Here,  the  new  spirit  
hardly  found  any  fertile  ground.”200    
How  fabricated  this  narrative  of  the  apolitical  countryside  in  East  Elbia  was  
is  clear  not  only  from  the  enormous  electoral  success  of  the  NSDAP  in  East  
Prussia,  but  also  from  the  refreshingly  balanced  account  of  Alexander  Fürst  
zu   Dohna-­‐‑Schlobitten.   Unlike   the   majority   of   his   peers,   he   refrained   from  
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systematically   transfiguring  the  political  and  social  realities  of  pre-­‐‑war  East  
Elbia  and  instead  not  only  openly  disclosed  his  early  membership  in  the  SS,  
but  also  critically  accounted  for  the  wrong  path  Germany  took  as  a  whole  in  
the   1930s.201  Dohna-­‐‑Schlobitten   recalled   the   overwhelming   excitement   and  
enthusiasm  that  encompassed  the  whole  of  German  society.  “In  the  summer  
of  1933,  Christian  Prince  Lippe  and  his  beautiful  wife  Echen,  née  von  Trotha,  
came  to  visit  us  at  Schlobitten.  As  so  many  of  our  friends  in  those  days,  both  
were  ardent  supporters  of  Hitler.  We  often  took  the  car   to  show  our  guests  
the  East  Prussian  countryside;  again  and  again  Christian  raised  his  arm  for  
the  Hitler   salute   and   everywhere,   on   fields   and   in   villages,   people   eagerly  
returned  the  gesture.  Everybody  seemed  relieved  from  a  heavy  burden.  This  
enthusiasm   also   infected   my   wife   and   me   and   both   of   us   happily   joined  
in.”202  Yet,  such   insight   into   the  actual  social   realities  remained  the  absolute  
exception   among   East-­‐‑Elbian   autobiographies.   The   majority   confined  
themselves   to   conveying   a   narrow   image   of   a   nostalgic   land   of   desire   in  
order  to  create  a  narrative  that  was  worth  being  remembered.    
Conclusion  
The  second  post-­‐‑war  wave  of  noble  autobiographies  profoundly  changed  the  
public  perception  of  the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility  and  transformed  East  Elbia  into  
a  nostalgic   land  of  desire.  By  the  end  of   this  metamorphosis,   the   imperious  
Herrenmensch  who  exploited  and  subjugated  his  workers  had  made  way  for  
                                                                                                 
201  See  his  chapter  in  his  autobiography  Politische  Erfahrungen  (1919-­‐‑1939),  in:  Dohna,  
Erinnerungen,  pp.  163–188.  
202  Dohna,  Erinnerungen,  p.  172.  
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the   indulgent   and   altruistic   squire   organically   connected   to   the   life   of   the  
land  and  its  people.      
This   chapter,   like  most   of   this   dissertation,   has   focused   on  what  we  might  
describe   as   the   ‘supply-­‐‑side’   of   public   memory.   It   has   discussed   and  
analysed   the   autobiographical   texts  written   by  members   of   the   East-­‐‑Elbian  
nobility,  with  a  view  to  better  understanding  the  strategies  they  developed  in  
order   to   purge   the   nobility   of   the   negative   ballast   inherited   from   the  Nazi  
past.    The  very  existence  of  these  texts,  is,  of  course,  to  some  extent  evidence  
of  their  public  salience,  in  the  sense  that  their  appearance  under  well-­‐‑known  
imprints   reflected   assumptions   shared   by   authors,   editors   and   marketing  
experts   about   the   broader   resonance   and   likely   public   reception   of   these  
works.    I  return  below  to  the  role  of  the  publishers.      
But  it  has  to  be  concluded  that  there  remains  a  problem  with  reception.  This  
chapter   has   not   succeeded   in   quantifying   the   impact   and   success   of   noble  
efforts  to  improve  the  public  image  of  their  social  group.    We  have  seen  how  
varied,  how  intensive  and  how  consistent  the  activities  of  the  noblemen  and  -­‐‑
women   were.   But   we   have   had   to   infer,   rather   than   demonstrating,   their  
impact   on   the   broader   society.   The   reason   lies   above   all   in   the   paucity   of  
pertinent  sources.      This  may  seem  an  odd  complaint  in  a  work  of  twentieth  
century  history,  an  era  supposedly  characterised  by  a  superfluity  of  sources.    
But   the   fact   remains   that   while   tracing   the   background,   inception   and  
content   of   books   and   television  programmes   is   relatively   easy,   quantifying  
their  impact  is  not.  
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My  efforts   to   track  down  readers’   letters   to  publishing  houses   in  respect  of  
the  more  important  relevant  titles  from  the  1960s  to  1990s  were  in  vain,  since  
the  publishers  in  question  do  not  retain  accessible  collections  of  such  letters.    
The  depositories  that  did  exist  have  been  outsourced  and  broken  up  and  are  
now  very  difficult  to  trace.203    One  can  of  course,  consult  the  readers’   letters  
logged  online  by  internet  booksellers  such  as  Amazon.  And  this,  admittedly  
rather   exiguous   body   of   texts   does,   it   it   true,   suggest   that   readers   were  
prepared  to  buy  into  positively-­‐‑framed  narratives  of  noble  life  in  the  East.  L.  
Moeller   praised   “the   solidarity   of   lordship,   land   and   people;   the  
responsibility   and   welfare   of   the   squire   in   the   old   rural   society   are   being  
vividly   portrayed.”204  The   special   bond   between   squire   and   people   also  
impressed  Heidemarie  Krause.  She  stated  that  especially  the  nobility’s  “sense  
of   responsibility,   which   the   youth   has   been   instilled   with   from   the   very  
beginning,   is   depicted   particularly   well”. 205   Admiration   for   noble  
responsibility   was   also   at   the   heart   of   Philipp   Wildenbruch’s   review   of  
Alexander  Prince  Dohna’s  autobiography.  “Count  Alexander  is  a  role  model  
unlike   few   other.  He   lived   up   to   his   responsibility   until   the   very   end   and  
sacrificed  himself  for  his  peasants,  who  had  been  the  prerequisite  for  his  and  
                                                                                                 
203  Personal  correspondence  with  the  Diederichs,  Rowohlt  and  Rautenberg  publishing  house.    










his   forefathers’   fortune.”206  B.   Preuschoff   suggested   that   everybody   should  
read  Marion  Countess  Dönhof’s  books  “in  order  to  understand  that  Prussia  
does   not   represent   the   cliché   of   dull   militaristic   stubbornness   but   a   very  
special  Heimat,   especially   cherished   by   those  who   had   lived   there.”207  And  
another   anonymous   reader   -­‐‑   somewhat   surprised   –   stated,   “there   were  
indeed  noble   families  who   for  centuries   served   the  public  well.   In   terms  of  
duty  and  decency  todays  politicians  could  certainly  learn  a  lot  from  them.”208      
What  is  noticeable  about  these  readers’  letters  is  the  fact  that  most,  whether  
or   not   they   refer   to   the   issues   raised   in   this   thesis,   are   enthusiastically  
positive.   Only   very   rarely   is   there   a   sceptical   comment   questioning   the  
“seemingly   idyllic   world” 209   of   East-­‐‑Elbia   and   identifying   the   authors’  
attempts  to  “transfigure  the  role  of  the  East-­‐‑Prussian  nobility  and  the  feudal  
society  which  had  been  very  much  intact  until  1945”.210    
                                                                                                 
206  Philipp  Wildenbruch,  Rezension,  11.06.2012,  online  at:  
http://www.buecher.de/shop/buecher/erinnerungen-­‐‑eines-­‐‑alten-­‐‑ostpreussen/dohna-­‐‑
schlobitten-­‐‑alexander-­‐‑fuerst-­‐‑zu/products_products/detail/prod_id/20779426/  








209  Unknown,  War  es  wirklich  so?,  14.02.2006,  online  at:  https://www.amazon.de/product-­‐‑
reviews/3442722659/ref=cm_cr_dp_see_all_summary?ie=UTF8&reviewerType=all_reviews&
showViewpoints=1&sortBy=helpful  
210  Hans  Peter  Roentgen,  Erinnerungen  an  ein  verlorenes  Land,  eine  verlorene  Zeit,  





But  these  letters  only  start,  for  obvious  reasons,  in  the  late  1990s.  Reviews  of  
the   noble   autobiographies   in   the   print   media   are   strikingly   rare   and  
generally  only  appear  in  relation  to  books  about  the  best-­‐‑known  families.  But  
these,   too,  offer   thin  pickings.     They  tend  to  deal  with  specific   issues  of   the  
autobiography,   filleting   the   book   under   review   for  memorable   scenes   and  
vignettes,  but  they  do  not  generally  comment  on  the  changing  image  of  the  
nobility   or   broadcast   the  writer’s   personal   view   of   the   nobility   as   a   social  
caste. 211      The   conclusions   we   draw   on   the   basis   of   such   sources   must  
therefore  remain  tentative.  
Television  is  a  less  helpful  venue  than  one  might  have  hoped.    There  was  a  
flood  of  television  documentaries  in  the  early  2000s,  triggered  by  the  return  
of  some  families  to  their  ancestral  estates  after  the  fall  of  the  wall  –  I  discuss  
these  in  chapter  five.    But  television  treatments  of  the  twentieth-­‐‑century  East-­‐‑
Elbian  nobility  are  very  thin  before  1989.    On  the  other  hand,  the  enormous  
popularity  of   the   film  Die  Flucht  does  vividly  demonstrate   the  resonance  of  
the  pro-­‐‑nobility  narrative  with  the  broader  German  public.  With  more  than  
eleven  million  viewers  in  2007,  it  proved  to  be  the  most  successful  film  in  the  
ARD   in  more   than   a  decade.212  It   tells   the   story  of  Countess  Mahlenberg,   a  
courageous  and  indulgent  noblewoman  who  returns  to  East  Prussia  during  
the   final   stages   of   the   war   to   take   over   the   management   of   her   paternal  
estate.  She  rides  through  dark  forests  and  lush  fields,  attends  opulent  dinner  
                                                                                                 
211  See  here:  Freudig  mit  dem  Hitler-­‐‑Gruß:  Aufrichtige  Erinnerung  eines  alten  Ostpreußen,  
ZEIT,  19.01.1990.;  Immer  im  Aufbruch:  Ein  reiches  Leben  –  Die  Erinnerungen  des  
pommerschen  Dickschädels,  ZEIT,  06.03.1992;  Maria  Gräfin  von  Maltzahn,  ZEIT,  01.04.1994.  
212  See:  Überwältigender  Erfolg  für  das  ARD  Geschichtsdrama,  Presseportal,  05.03.2007;  "ʺDie  
Flucht“,  Erfolgreichster  ARD  Film  seit  10  Jahren,  WELT,  05.03.2007.  
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parties  and  devotedly  cares  for  her  workers.  In  the  face  of  the  advancing  Red  
Army,   she   once   more   rises   to   the   occasion.   She   meticulously   plans   and  
organises  the  evacuation  of  her  entire  estate,  rejects  the  call  to  hang  on  from  
die-­‐‑hard  Nazi  officials,  and  dutifully  leads  the  trek  to  Bavaria.213    
The  parallels  with  the  widely-­‐‑known  autobiography  of  Marion  Dönhoff  are  
unmistakeable.  With  a  perhaps  unsurprising  lack  of  historical  sophistication,  
the   film  broadcasts   the   image  of   an  apolitical   elite   instinctively  opposed   to  
National  Socialism.  Yet,  the  scriptwriters  –  one  of  them  coincidentally  being  
Dönhoff’s  niece  Tatjana  Dönhoff  –  did  not  leave  it  at  that.  They  expanded  the  
already   highly   embellished   narrative   of   the   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility   by   having  
Countess  Mahlenberg,  the  fictitious  equivalent  of  Countess  Dönhoff,  lead  the  
trek   and   guide   her   people   through   the   perils   of   collapsing   Germany.   In  
reality,  Dönhoff  had  abandoned  ‘her  people’  and  escaped  on  horseback  from  
the  approaching  armies  of  the  Soviet  Union.214  As  a  consequence,  the  claim  –  
entirely   false  –   that  nobles  had  predominantly  directed   the  great  westward  
treks  was  added  to  the  burnished  image  of  the  nobility’s  role  in  the  first  half  
of   the   twentieth   century.215  In   this   way,   Tatjana   Dönhoff   followed   in   the  
footsteps  of  her  aunt  who  had  proclaimed  decades  earlier:   “in   the  end   it   is  
not   the   facts   that   are   determinative   but   the   perception   people   derive   from  
                                                                                                 
213  See:  Die  Flucht,  ARD,  04.03.2007.  
214  See:  Marion  Dönhoff,  Nach  Osten  fuhr  keiner  mehr,  in:  Dönhoff,  Namen  die  keiner  mehr  nennt,  
pp.  7–34.  
215  Hans-­‐‑Ulrich  Wehler,  Deutsche  auf  der  Flucht,  Interview  for  Titel,  Thesen,  Temperamente,  
ARD,  25.02.2007.  For  examples  where  noblemen  actually  directed  entire  treks  see  for  
example:  Dohna,  Erinnerungen,  pp.  260–291  or  the  typewritten  account  of  Franz-­‐‑Adalbert  
Freiherr  von  Rosenberg,  Bericht  über  den  Treck  1945,  provided  to  the  author  of  this  thesis  by  
Adalbert  Freiherr  von  Rosenberg.    
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these  facts”.216  The  audience  of  more  than  eleven  million  viewers  are  a  strong  
indication   that  Marion  Dönhoff  was  right,   though  the  sources  do  not  allow  
us  to  enquire  further  into  how  exactly  viewers  responded  to  what  they  saw.    
The  historians  were  sceptical  of  course:   in  an  interview  for  Deutschlandfunk,  
Heinrich  Schwendemann  called   the   film’s  depiction  of   the  nobility   “utterly  
exaggerated   and   misrepresented”   and   a   commentary   by   the   online   critic  
Peter  Röntgen  lamented  the  crass  discrepancies  between  the  events  depicted  
in  the  film  and  the  actual  facts  of  Dönhoff’s  flight  from  the  east,  noting  that  
the  few  Nazis  featured  in  the  film  appeared  as  detached  from  the  lives  of  the  
East   Elbian   elites   as   invading   aliens   from   outer   space.217     But   there   is   no  
reason  to  believe  that  these  views  –  published  after  the  film  had  already  gone  
to  air  –  had  any  bearing  on  the  public  enthusiasm  for  the  topic  evidenced  by  
the  extraordinary  viewing  figures.      
Yet,   the  most  powerful   indicator  of   the  public’s  willingness   to  acquiesce   in  
the   nobility’s   depiction   of   East-­‐‑Elbia   are   the   sales   numbers   of   the   noble  
autobiographies.  Over   the   years,   books   like  Namen   die   keiner  mehr   nennt   or  
Before  the  Storm:  Memories  of  My  Youth  in  Old  Prussia  by  Marion  Dönhoff  have  
been   reprinted   dozens   of   times.   Hans   von   Lehndorff’s   East   Prussian  Diary  
achieved   thirty-­‐‑three   editions   in   the   Deutscher   Taschenbuch   Verlag   (DTV)  
alone.   Numerous   additional   editions   were   printed   by   other   publishing  
houses.   The   reprints   of   Esther   von   Schwerin’s   and   Alexander   zu   Dohna’s  
                                                                                                 
216  Dönhoff,  Um  der  Ehre  Willen,  pp.  19,  20. 
217  See:  the  interview  with  the  historian  Heinrich  Schwendemann  who  called  the  film’s  
depiction  of  the  nobility  “utterly  exaggerated  and  misrepresented”,  in:  “Das  stimmt  hinten  
und  vorne  nicht”  –  Historiker  kritisiert  “Die  Flucht”,  Deutschlandfunk,  05.03.2007;  Also  see  the  
review  of  Hans  Peter  Röntgen,  online  at:  www.literatur-­‐‑fast-­‐‑pur.de/HP/3flucht.html.  
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memoirs  also  reached  double  figures  over  the  years.218  The  exact  numbers  are  
unfortunately  difficult   to  obtain,   since   the  publishers   are   reluctant   to  make  
these  figures  public.  Matters  are  complicated  further  by  the  fact  that  several  
books   have   been   reprinted   in   various   different   publishing   houses,   and  
therefore  obtaining  a  definitive  number  of  sales  is  almost  impossible.  Yet,  the  
sheer   number   of   reprints   not   only   suggests   a   lasting   public   interest   in   the  
topic,   but   also   a   distinct   willingness   among   German   society   to   accept   the  
nobility’s   own   interpretation   of   the   vicissitudes   of   its   history.   It   is   striking  
that   even   a   relatively   sceptical   journal   like   Der   Spiegel   offered   a   warm  
reception   to   Marion   Countess   Dönhoff’s   Kindheit   in   Ostpreussen.   “Most  
impressive”  the  review  stated  “were  the  descriptions  of  the  relatively  austere  
lifestyle  the  family  practised  as  well  as  how  deeply  this  nobility  felt  obliged  
to  care  for  its  people.”219          
Schoolbooks   would   appear   to   be   one   source   that   offer   the   prospect   of  
measuring   the   impact   of   these   narratives   on   the   wider   reception   (and  
teaching)   of   German   history.      But   here,   too,   the   yield   is   disappointing,  
perhaps   because   the   post-­‐‑Marxist-­‐‑Weberian   paradigm   informing   the  
compilation  of  such   texts  militated  against  accentuating   the  experience  of  a  
                                                                                                 
218  By  1997  “Namen  die  keiner  mehr  nennt”  had  already  reached  31  editions  in  the  dtv.  Five  
editions  had  been  printed  in  the  Rowohlt  publishing  house  by  2009.  Further  editions  
appeared  at  Hugendubel,  Siedler,  K.  G.  Saur,  Rautenberg  and  Diederichs.  Among  other  
publications,  Ester  von  Schwerin’s  memoirs  “Kormorane,  Brombeerranken,  Erinnerungen  an  
Ostpreußen”  achieved  eight  reprints  at  Langen  Müller  until  2009.  Dohna’s  “Erinnerungen  
eines  alten  Ostpreußen”  saw  numerous  editions  in  various  different  publishing  houses  such  
as  Rautenberg,  Orbis,  btb  and  Siedler.  Lehndorff’s  “East  Prussian  Diary”  reached  33  editions  
in  the  dtv.  Additional  issues  appeared  at  Biederstein,  C.  H.  Beck  and  Madsack.  




particular  elite  social  group.    In  this  field,  to  a  much  greater  extent  than  in  the  
world  of   television  or   of  publishing,   the  negative  historiographical   valence  
attached  to  the  ‘traditional  elites’  by  the  Gesellschaftsgeschichte  of  the  ‘critical  
school’  shaped  the  narrative  of  Germany’s  road  out  of  the  moral  catastrophe  
of  Nazism.220    
  
Part  of   the  problem,  of   course,   is   that   the   story   the  nobles  wish   to   tell  was  
always  one  strand  in  a  much  larger  narrative.    The  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility  were  
all  expelled,  to  be  sure,  but  the  story  of  the  expulsion  was  much  bigger  than  
the   story  of   the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility.  The  nobility   is   interwoven  with   it   -­‐‑   as  
Andreas   Kossert   has   powerfully   demonstrated   in   his   book   Damals   in  
Ostpreußen:  der  Untergang  einer  deutschen  Provinz  -­‐‑  and  the  expulsion  is  part  of  
their   public   identity,   but   it   is   not   a   story   about   the   nobility.   Thus   when  
schoolbooks  touch  upon  the  expulsion  of  the  German  people  from  East-­‐‑Elbia  
                                                                                                 
220  See  here:  Daniela  Bender,  Ludwig  Bernlochner,  Michael  Epkenhans,  et  al.,  (eds),  
Geschichte  und  Geschehen  5/6,  (Stuttgart,  2010);  Hans-­‐‑Jürgen  Lendzian  und  Christoph  
Andreas  Marx,  (eds),  Geschichte  und  Gegenwart,  (Paderborn,  2001);  Prof.  Dr.  Hilke  Günther-­‐‑
Arndt,  Dr.  Dirk  Hoffmann,  Prof.  Norbert  Zwölfer,  (eds),  Geschichtsbuch  Oberstufe,  Vol.  2,  
(Berlin,  1996);  Prof.  Dr.  Gerhard  Brunn,  Andreas  Dilger,  et.  Al.,  (eds),  Kursbuch  Geschichte  –  
Berlin/Brandenburg,  (Berlin,  2001);  Imanuel  Geiss,  Rolf  Ballof,  Renate  Fricke-­‐‑Finkelnburg,  
(eds),  Epochen  und  Strukturen  –  Grundzüge  einer  Universalgeschichte  für  die  Oberstufe,  
(Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1996);  Frank  Bahr,  (ed.),  Horizonte  II  –  Geschichte  für  die  Oberstufe,  
(Brunswick,  2007);  Wolfgang  W.  Mickel,  (ed.),  Geschichte  Politik  und  Gesellschaft,  Vol.  1,  
(Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1988);  Berthold  Wiegand,  (ed.),  Geschichte  Politik  und  Gesellschaft,  Vol.  2,  
(Berlin,  1993);  Dieter  Brückner,  (ed.),  Das  waren  Zeiten,  Vol.  4,  (Bamberg,  2005);  Herbert  




-­‐‑  a  topic  that  generally  is  not  rewarded  more  than  a  few  pages  –  the  attention  
is  not  on  the  nobility  but  rather  on  society  as  a  whole.  Drawing  conclusions  
from  schoolbooks  about  the  changing  perception  of   the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility  
therefore  remains  impossible.    
We   are   thus   left  with   the  print   runs,   viewer   statistics   for   a   film   and   a   few  
reader’s   letters.   In   the   absence   of   opinion   polls,   a   wider   public   debate   or  
detailed   reviews   of   the   noble   autobiographies   allowing   us   to   draw  
conclusions  about  perception,  we  are  in  the  rather  unsatisfactory  situation  of  
having   to   accept   the   output   itself   as   key   evidence   of   success.      So   we   can  
never  know  with  any  precision  the  extent  to  which  the  positive  mood  music  
of   noble   propaganda   facilitated   the   nobility’s   re-­‐‑admittance   into   German  
boardrooms,   legal   practices   or   industrial   companies,   or   helped   them   to   re-­‐‑
ascend  the  peaks  of  West-­‐‑German  society  and  revive  the  charm  and  charisma  
of  names  like  Hardenberg  and  Bülow.    On  the  other  hand,  we  can  imagine  a  
counterfactual   scenario  where   none   of   this  worked   and  where   the   nobility  
remained  a  despised  and  impoverished  network,  a  group  obsessed  with  their  
own  past  but  rejected  by  everybody  else  -­‐‑  the  greatest  failures  and  losers  of  
German  history.    Under  such  circumstances,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  the  process  
of  public  history  management  could  have  continued,  why  it  would  not  have  
been  abandoned.    No  reputable  and  successful  publishing  house  would  have  
wanted  to  publish  such  books  and  the  nobility  would  have  ended  up  being  
the   only   audience   impressed   and   convinced   by   its   own   propaganda.   That  
history   did   not   take   this   path   at   least   suggests   that   the   nobles   knew  what  
they   were   doing   when   they   invested   such   energy   and   inventiveness   in  
polishing  up  their  collective  past.  
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The  Cultivation  of  Memory  
Introduction  
In   the   spring   of   2013,   the   author   of   this   thesis  was   invited   to   the   house   of  
Carl-­‐‑Friedrich  Freiherr  von  B.  He  lives   in  a  modest  farmhouse  half  an  hour  
outside   of  Münster,   embedded   in   the   rolling   landscape   of  Westphalia.  His  
family   was   expelled   from   its   ancestral   estate,   Groß   Mahnsfeld   in   East  
Prussia,  during  the  final  months  of  the  Second  World  War.    
The   few   large   family  portraits  which   could   be   saved   in   1945  dominate   the  
simple   entrance  hall.  One  of   them   shows  von  B.’s   grandfather   in   the  dress  
uniform  of   the  1st  Foot  Guard  Regiment.  At   the  end  of   the  hall,  a   low  door  
leads   into  a   large  and  spacious   living  room,  which  is   filled  with  all  sorts  of  
memorabilia.  Here,  Freiherr  von  B.  has  created  something  of  a  shrine  to  the  
history   of   the   von   B.   family.   Tea   is   served   in   a   silver   pot   which   his  
“grandmother   rescued  when   the   Russians  were   already   in   the   house”.  On  
the   various   side   tables   sit   elegant   ammunition   pouches   from   the   Franco-­‐‑
Prussian  war,  numerous  black  and  white  photographs  of  the  pre-­‐‑war  estate,  
precious  tobacco  tins  from  the  time  of  Frederick  the  Great,  statues,  vases  and  
exquisite   Chinese   ashtrays   that   a   distant   relative   brought   home   from   his  
grand  tour  in  the  eighteenth  century.  The  entire  room  feels  like  an  attempt  to  
recreate  Groß  Mahnsfeld  and  preserve  the  memory  of  a   lost  world.  Next  to  
the   window   sits   a   bust   of   Carl-­‐‑Friedrich’s   grandfather,   made   by   the  
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renowned   artist  Wilhelm   Schlüter.   “My   grandfather   was   a  member   of   the  
DNVP.  He  could  not  stand  Hitler.  He  always  thought  of  him  as  a  lousy  and  
ill-­‐‑mannered  Austrian  upstart  who  caused  the  downfall  of  Germany  and  the  
loss  of  the  eastern  provinces.”    
Freiherr   von   B.   directs   my   attention   to   a   large,   beautifully   bound   book,  
prominently  placed  in  the  middle  of  the  room,  entitled  700  Jahre  Familie  von  
B.   “The   newest   edition   of   the   family   chronicle   has   just   been   completed.   It  
was   edited   by   my   nephew,   a   history   student   from   Göttingen,   who   spent  
years   in   the   family   archive   to   compile   this   volume   for   the   seven  hundreth  
anniversary   of   the   family   last   year.”   The   chronicle   is   filled   with   endless  
family   trees,  vignettes  of  distinguished  family  members,  displays  of   landed  
wealth   and   accounts   of   expulsion   and   expropriation   in   the   wake   of   the  
Second  World  War.    
After   tea,   we   take   a   walk   through   the   adjacent   fields   along   the   forest,   a  
landscape   that   poignantly   reminds   von  B.   of   his  Heimat   in   the   East.  Again  
and   again,   he   drifts   off   into   long   monologues   about   the   beauty   of   East  
Prussia   and   the   cruelties   his   family   had   to   experience   and   endure   during  
their  flight  to  the  West.  At  the  end  of  my  visit,  von  B.  hands  me  his  personal  
memoirs.  “This  might  be  of  interest  for  you.  I  wrote  this  so  my  children  and  
grandchildren  get  a  better  understanding  of  where  we  come  from  and  where  
we   belong.   I   hope   it   might   spark   their   historical   awareness   and   the  
importance  of  close  inter-­‐‑family  cooperation.”    
This  vignette  represents  an  isolated  moment  in  a  much  larger  enterprise  that  
we   might   call   the   “cultivation   of   memory”.   It   is   astonishing   how   much  
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energy   these   noble   families   devote   to   privately   archived   cultural  memory.  
All   families   do   this   to   a   degree.   These   are   the   poignant   reminders   of   how  
time  passes   through   the   generations:   old   family  pictures,   lines   on  doors   to  
show   how   children   grow   up,   or   family   jewellery.   But   noble   families   are  
special  in  this  regard,  in  the  way  that  they  preserve  the  family  as  a  collective  
agent.    
The   expropriation   and   expulsion   in   1945   put   an   end   to   the   traditional  
manorial  complexes  in  East  Elbia  and  forced  the  large  majority  of  the  nobility  
to  find  makeshift  accommodation  in  the  west.  Only  a  fortunate  few  were  able  
to   rely  on   residual   assets   in   the  west  or   family   connections,  which  enabled  
them  to  sustain   the   lifestyle   they  had  been  accustomed  to.1  New  and  rather  
modest   residences   became  depositories   of   family  memorabilia.  Apartments  
and   detached   houses   were   converted   into   shrines   to   family   history,   often  
almost  resembling  miniature  museums.  Every  object  that  somehow  survived  
the   expulsion   from   East   Elbia   seemed   to   enter   into   a   large   collection   of  
memorabilia,   forming   the   basis   of   the   commemoration   of   the   old  manorial  
world  in  the  East.    
These   collections   of   memorabilia   created   a   symbolic   proximity   for   noble  
descendants   to   their   forefathers.   Family   trees,   royal   certificates,   family  
                                                                                                 
1  See  the  Henckel  von  Donnersmarck  family,  who  owned  a  large  property  in  Rottach-­‐‑Egern,  
Bavaria,  see  the  short  description  of  Guidotto  Karl  Lazarus  I  Graf  Henckel  von  
Donnersmarck,  in:  Wolfgang  Huber,  Kurt  Huber  vor  dem  Volksgerichtshof:  zum  zweiten  Prozess  
gegen  die  weiße  Rose  (Berlin,  2009),  p.  130;  also  see  the  Dönhoff  family  who  found  refuge  at  
the  vast  estate  of  the  Hatzfelds  at  Crottorf  in  the  Rhineland-­‐‑Palatinate,  in:  Christian  Graf  von  
Krockow,  Portraits  berühmter  deutscher  Frauen  –  Von  Königin  Luise  bis  zur  Gegenwart  (Munich,  
2004),  p.  392;  Kilian  Heck  and  Christian  Thielemann  (eds),  Friedrichstein  –  Das  Schloss  der  
Grafen  von  Dönhoff  in  Ostpreussen  (Berlin,  2006),  pp.  93,  191.  
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portraits,   richly   decorated   crests,   historic   sabres   and   family   silver   all  
belonged  to  a  sophisticated  noble  remembrance  system.  Shotguns,  once  a  gift  
of  Tsar  Nicholas  II,  portraits  given  to  Count  Dönhoff  by  Frederick  the  Great,  
family   portraits   and   diaries,   and   a   highly   precious   sabre   bestowed   by   the  
Prince  of  Orange  are  all  insignia  of  timeless  noble  grandeur.    They  rest  upon  
the   connection   of   past,   present   and   future,   and   refer   to   a   century   old,  
complex  system  of  noble  remembrance  techniques.2    
The  evocation  of  historical  depth  is  a  crucial  strand  of  noble  memory  culture.  
The   nobility   is   able   to   trace   back   their   ancestors   for   centuries.   Individual  
nobles  regard  themselves  as  a  small  “serving  part  in  a  chain  of  generations,  
one   among   many   who   has   to   pass   on   the   legacy”,   thereby   forming   a  
“community  of  the  dead,  living  and  unborn  generations”.3  Within  the  noble  
self-­‐‑perception,   this   connectedness   seems   to   be   aloof   from   any   historic  
change.4  The  name  of  the  family  was  constantly  kept  alive  through  the  name  
of   villages,   estates,   regiments,   coats   of   arms   and   extensive   family   trees.5  
Noble   memory   therefore   does   not   confine   itself   to   a   few   generations;   it  
extends  across  centuries.    
                                                                                                 
2  Dohna,  Erinnerungen,  p.  287;  Dönhoff,  Kindheit  in  Ostpreußen,  p.  16;  Dohna,  Erinnerungen,  p.  
323;  Deutsches  Adelsarchiv  (DAA),  Familiengeschichte  (FG)  Bül,  von  Bülow’scher  
Familienverband  (ed.),  Bülowsches  Familienbuch,  III.  Band,  1994,  p.  371;  also  see:  
Malinowski,  Vom  König  zum  Führer,  pp.  51,  52.  
3  Lölhöffel,  Ostpreußen,  p.  37.  
4  See  especially:  Daniel  Menning,  Adelige  Familien  und  Konservativismus  im  19ten  
Jahrhundert,  in:  Eckart  Conze,  Wencke  Meteling,  Jörg  Schuster,  Jochen  Strobel  (eds),  
Aristokratismus  und  Moderne  –  Adel  als  kulturelles  und  politisches  Konzept  (Cologne,  2013),  p.  
174;  Also  see:  Johannes  Rogalla  von  Bieberstein,  Adelsherrschaft  und  Adelskultur  in  
Deutschland  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1991),  pp.  121–124.  
5  Funck  and  Malinowski,  Masters  of  Memory,  in:  Confino  and  Fritzsche  (eds),  The  Work  Of  
Memory,  pp.  86–98,  here  p.  86.  
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The   memory   cultivated   in   such   contexts   is   not   comprehensive.      Not   all  
'ʹremembered'ʹ   events   are   accorded   the   same   weight.   The   memory   of   past  
generations   is   always   carefully   pruned   and   selected.   Most   retrospective  
depictions  reflect  the  presumption  that  the  judgement  of  a  family  should  be  
based  on  its  most  able  rather  than  on  its  merely  average  members.  Families  
such   as   the   Bismarcks,   Hardenbergs   and   Moltkes   have   perfected   this  
technique   over   the   centuries.   The   production   of   memorial   booklets,  
sponsored  biographical  accounts,  the  naming  of  regiments  and  streets,  grand  
festivities   to   commemorate   the   anniversaries  of   their   achievements,   as  well  
as  the  erection  of  memorials  are  all  examples  of  this  technique.  This  ability  to  
establish  a  perception  of  solely  outstanding  and  exceptional  personalities  not  
only  allowed  the  rest  of   the   family   to  hide   in   the  shadows  of  distinguished  
forebears,  but  also  contributed  to  the  willingness  of  the  people  to  accept  the  
families  as  a  hereditary  elite.6  
The  Evolution  of  the  Family  Chronicle  
Among  these  commemorative   techniques,  an  especially  elevated  position   is  
often   assigned   to   the   family   chronicle,   since   it   ideally   combines   the   three  
categories  of  noble  memory  culture.  Prominently  placed   in   the   living  room  
or   the  entrance  hall,   the   chronicle   is  not  only  an   important  object   to   subtly  
point  out  the  splendour  and  antiquity  of  the  family,  but  simultaneously  one  
                                                                                                 
6  Monika  Kubrova,  Vom  guten  Leben,  Adelige  Frauen  im  19ten  Jahrhundert  (Berlin,  2011),  p.  104;  
Funck  and  Malinowski,  Masters  of  Memory,  in:  Confino  and  Fritzsche  (eds),  The  Work  Of  
Memory,  p.  86;  Georg  Simmel,  Exkurs  über  den  Adel  (1908),  in:  Georg  Simmel  (ed.),  




of  the  most  important  ways  in  which  a  family  controls  how  it  is  remembered  
and  what  it  is  remembered  for.    
Undertaking  a  rigorous  analysis  of  this  kind  of  source  is  difficult.  There  is  no  
central  collection  point.  Many  of  these  chronicles  are  published  in  very  small  
print  runs,  generally  not  exceeding  one  hundred  copies.  Only  the  chronicles  
of   the   large   family   associations   such   as   the   Bülows,   Goltz   or   Arnims  
occasionally  reach  a  few  hundred  copies.7  They  are  mainly  circulated  among  
family  members.  Archives  and  libraries  occasionally  purchase  a  few  editions.  
Distinctly  strong  family  bonds  and  a   largely  closed  connubiality  ensure   the  
spread   of   these   chronicles,   not   only   within   the   core,   but   also,   within   the  
extended  noble  family.8  Copies  are  given  to  cousins,  second  cousins  or  even  
distantly  related  families  in  the  region.  Women  who  marry  into  other  noble  
families  add  their  family  history  to  the  already  existing  collections.    
Compiling   an   exhaustive   statistical   analysis   is   not   a   practical   undertaking.  
One   would   need   to   travel   to   the   chief   residences   of   virtually   every   East-­‐‑
Elbian  family  in  order  to  track  down  these  chronicles.  This  would  exceed  the  
time  and  resources  available  for  this  dissertation.  However,  with  the  help  of  
Count   Finckenstein   and   Dr   Franke   at   the   Adelsarchiv   in   Marburg,   it   was  
possible  to  study  a  selection  of  noble  family  chronicles.  I  have  focused  on  a  
sample  of  thirty-­‐‑five  family  histories  published  after  1945.    
                                                                                                 
7  Personal  interview  with  Manfred  Dreiss,  owner  of  the  publishing  house  Degener  &  Co.,  
17.06.2015;  Personal  correspondence  with  Hans  Albrecht  Graf  von  der  Goltz.  There  are  255  
printed  copies  of  the  von  der  Goltz  Family  Chronicle.  
8  For  noble  marital  behaviour  see:  Conze,  Von  Deutschem  Adel,  pp.  329–340.  
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What   is   striking   about   these   publications   is   that   they   are   all   extensions   of  
previous  editions;  they  all  build  on  volumes  that  were  first  published  during  
the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century.  The  post-­‐‑1945  era  was  not  the  first  
in  which  the  nobility  had  had  to  rally  after  a  challenge  to   its  pre-­‐‑eminence.    
The   increasing   socio-­‐‑political   change   of   the   nineteenth   century   saw   many  
noble  families  fear  for  their  leading  position  in  society.  The  upheavals  of  1848  
had   alarmed   the   nobility.   These   upheavals   had   been   implicitly  more   anti-­‐‑
aristocratic   than  anti-­‐‑monarchical.   In  fact,   the  convention  at   the  Paulskirche  
had  debated  whether  or  not   to  abolish   the  nobility,  not   the  monarchy.9  The  
industrial  revolution  and  its  insatiable  need  for  cheap  labour  led  to  a  steady  
rural   exodus   and   increased   demands   for   political   participation   among   the  
workforce.10  As   the  population  grew  dramatically,  so  did   the  need  for   loyal  
civil  servants.11  In  response  to  this  need,  the  German  sovereigns  increasingly  
began  to  hand  out  noble  titles  and  created  a  so-­‐‑called  ‘meritocratic  nobility’  
                                                                                                 
9  Fritz  Stern,  Prussia,  in:  David  Spring  (ed.),  European  landed  elites  in  the  nineteenth  century  
(Baltimore,  1977),  p.  55;  Josef  Matzerath,  Adelsprobe  an  der  Moderne  –  Sächsischer  Adel  1763–
1866  –  Entkonkretisierung  einer  traditionalen  Sozialformation  (Stuttgart,  2006),  p.  101;  Ulrike  
Ruttman,  Wunschbild,  Schreckbild,  Trugbild  –  Rezeption  und  Instrumentalisierung  Frankreichs  in  
der  deutschen  Revolution  von  1848/9  (Stuttgart,  2001),  p.  195.  
10  See:  Michel  Hubert,  Deutschland  im  Wandel,  Geschichte  der  deutschen  Bevölkerung  seit  1815  
(Stuttgart,  1998),  pp.  155,  156;  Thomas  Nipperdey,  Deutsche  Geschichte  1866–1918:  Arbeitswelt  
und  Bürgergeist  (Munich,  1994),  pp.  192–225;  Florian  Tennstedt,  Sozialgeschichte  der  
Sozialpolitik  in  Deutschland  (Göttingen,  1981),  p.  135.  
11  The  population  of  the  Deutsche  Bund  grew  by  54  percent  from  1816  to  1864  (29.86  million  
to  45.92  million).  In  the  same  period,  Prussia’s  population  even  grew  by  86  percent  (10.4  
million  to  19.3  million).  See:  Reinhard  Rürup,  Deutschland  im  19.  Jahrhundert  1815–1871  
(Göttingen,  1992),  p.  22.  
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(Verdienstadel).   The   old   nobility   not   only   feared   an   erosion   of   its   political  
power,  but  also  an  infiltration  of  its  meticulously  shielded  caste.12      
The   family   chronicles  must  be   read  against   the  background  of   this  gradual  
erosion   of   status   and   social   exclusivity.      The   landed   elites   reacted   to   the  
threat   of   déclassement   with   a   twofold   strategy.   On   the   one   hand,   they  
significantly  intensified  their  infra-­‐‑corporate  cooperation.  On  the  other  hand,  
they   began   to   meticulously   document   their   family   histories. 13   The   later  
nineteenth   century   witnessed   a   growing   trend   among   the   larger   families  
such  as  the  Bülows,  Arnims,  Bredows,  Puttkamers  and  Dewitzes  to  set  up  so  
called   ‘family   associations’.   Membership   was   strictly   limited   to   legitimate  
bearers  of  the  family  name,  limited  to  descendants  of  the  male  line  and  their  
wives,   as   well   as   their   children   born   in  wedlock.14  The   family   associations  
were  funded  by  membership  fees  and  managed  by  a  committee,  which  was  
generally   chaired   by   the   head   of   the   main   family   line.15  The   main   task   of  
these  committees  was  to  foster  the  family’s  unity  and  reputation,  preserve  its  
monuments  and  heritage,  support  its  financially  weaker  members  and,  most  
importantly,  promote  the  family  history.16  To  achieve  the  latter  objective,  the  
                                                                                                 
12  See  the  treatise  about  the  origins  of  the  Massow  Family  Association,  in:  DAA,  FG  Mas,  
Kurt  von  Massow  (ed.),  Die  Massows:  100  Jahre  Familienverband  1875–1975  (1975),  p.  29.  
13  Conze,  Von  deutschem  Adel,  p.  345.  
14  See  for  example  the  statute  of  the  Oppen  family  association,  online  at:  
http://www.vonoppen.org/.  
15  The  von  Bülow  family,  for  example,  charged  a  minimum  of  five  Thaler.  See:  Die  
Geschichte  unseres  Familienverbandes  und  der  Wiederaufbau  vor  50  Jahren,  Vortrag  
Henning  von  Bülow,  Familientagssitzung  1998,  online  at:  http://familie.von-­‐‑
buelow.de/index.php5?Familie:Geschichte:Wiederaufbau.  
16  See  for  example  the  statutes  of  the  von  Bülow  family  association,  online  at:  
http://familie.von-­‐‑buelow.de/index.php5?Familienverband:Willkommen;  Similarly  for  the  
von  Arnim  family,  online  at:  http://www.vonarnim.com/start.html;  also  see  §  9  of  the  
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families   either   commissioned   a   favourable   historian   or   appointed   a  
knowledgeable   family   member   to   compose   a   benevolent   treatise   of   the  
centuries  old  family  history.17  
These  chronicles  use  genealogy  and  idealised  vignettes  of  exceptional  family  
members   to  enhance  and  reinforce   the   family’s  self-­‐‑identity.  By  embedding  
these   isolated  moments  of   family  history   in   the   larger  narrative  of  popular  
history,   a   long,   uninterrupted   list   of   family   achievements   emerges.   This  
creates   an   enormous   pool   of   past   splendour   and   inspiring   anecdotes   from  
which  current  and  future  generations  can  derive  invaluable  symbolic  capital.  
Yet,   additionally,   these   chronicles   presented   an   ideal   tool   to   wield   the  
prerogative   of   interpretation   and   counter   anti-­‐‑nobility   attacks   launched   in  
the  context  of  public  debates.  The  resource  of   the  family  chronicle  acquired  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
statutes  of  the  von  der  Marwitz  family,  in:  DAA,  FG  Mar,  Helga  Helene  von  der  Marwitz  
(ed.),  800  Jahre  von  der  Marwitz  –  Ein  märkisches  Familiengeschlecht  (2014),  p.  644.  
17  At  a  family  convention  in  1908,  Lieutenant-­‐‑General  Adolf  von  Bülow  was  assigned  to  
compose  a  family  chronicle.  The  first  volume  was  published  in  1911,  the  second  in  1914,  
DAA,  FG  Bül,  von  Bülow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Bülowsches  Familienbuch,  I.  Band,  
1911;  DAA,  FG  Bül,  von  Bülow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Bülowsches  Familienbuch,  II.  
Band,  1914;  Commissioned  by  the  Arnim  family,  Dr.  Ernst  Devrient  composed  Das  
Geschlecht  von  Arnim  in  1923,  DAA,  FG  Arn,  von  Arnim’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Das  
Geschlecht  von  Arnim,  II  Band,  1923;  Henning  von  Koss,  in  cooperation  with  Juliane  von  
Bredow,  composed  the  von  Bredow  chronicle,  DAA,  FG  Bre,  von  Bredow’scher  
Familienverband  (ed.),  Das  Geschlecht  von  Bredow  –  Herkunft  und  Entwicklung  –  1251–
1984,  1984;  The  Hardenberg  family  commissioned  Karl  Heinrich  Lang  in  1793.  They  paid  
him  400  Thaler  over  two  years,  in:  DAA,  FG  Har,  von  Hardenberg’scher  Familienverband  
(ed.),  Die  Geschichte  des  Geschlechtes  von  Hardenberg,  1793.  pp.  2–10;  The  Kleist  family  
chronicle  was  published  in  1887  and  cost  a  staggering  5326  Mark.  See:  Von  Kleist’scher  
Familienverband  (ed.),  Kurze  Nachrichten  aus  den  letzten  50  Jahren  der  v.  Kleist’schen  
Familiengeschichte  1858–1908  (Bergisch-­‐‑Gladbach,  2007),  p.  2.  
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heightened  significance  in  the  face  of  intensified  popular  Adelskritik  and  the  
emergence  of  Neuadelskonzepte  at  the  turn  of  the  century.18    
It  is  hardly  surprising  that  in  1945,  the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility,  once  again  faced  
with   a   challenge   to   its   social   and   political   pre-­‐‑eminence,   reverted   to   pre-­‐‑
existing   and   well-­‐‑established   techniques   to   re-­‐‑strengthen   their   shattered  
identity  and  regain  control  over  their  public  image.  The  expulsion  from  East  
Elbia,  a  rupture  of  unique  magnitude,  once  again  gave  rise  to  a  reversion  to  
the   family,   the   core   of   noble   identity.   The  widely   dispersed   families  made  
use   of   their   tight   organisation   and   within   a   few   years,   the   first   family  
conventions  were   organized.19  As   early   as   1948,   the  Bülows’   family   council  
met  at  the  Bossee  estate  to  initiate  the  reunion  of  the  family  in  the  west.  The  
same   was   true   for   the   Klitzings,   who   reconvened   at   Alvesse   near  
Braunschweig.  The  Wedels  re-­‐‑established  their  family  association  in  the  early  
1950s  and  introduced  annual  conventions  thereafter.  The  von  der  Marwitzes  
once  again  came  together  in  1952  in  Hamburg,  as  well  as  the  Bredows,  who  
met  in  Mueden  near  Celle.20    
                                                                                                 
18  See  especially  Max  Weber,  Der  Nationalstaat  und  die  Volkswirtschaftspolitik.  Akademische  
Antrittsrede  (Leipzig,  1895);  Max  Weber,  Die  Verhältnisse  der  Landarbeiter  im  ostelbischen  
Deutschland  (Leipzig,  1892);  For  Neuadelskonzepte  see  especially  pp.  124-­‐‑125  of  this  thesis  as  
well  as:  Houston  Stewart  Chamberlain,  Die  Grundlagen  des  neunzehnten  Jahrhunderts  (Munich,  
1899);  Joseph  Arthur  Graf  Gobineau,  Versuch  über  die  Ungleichheit  der  Menschenrassen  
(Stuttgart,  1902);  Alexandra  Gerstner,  Neuer  Adel  –  Aristokratische  Elitekonzeptionen  zwischen  
Jahrhundertwende  und  Nationalsozialismus  (Darmstadt,  2008),  pp.  115–130.  
19  As  early  as  October  1945,  Jürgen  von  Flotow  and  Hans  Friedrich  von  Ehrenkrook  set  up  
the  Adelsblatt  as  an  attempt  to  channel  the  noble  refugee  lists  and  coordinate  the  re-­‐‑
conflation  of  noble  families  that  had  been  dispersed  by  the  war.  
20  “Die  Geschichte  unseres  Familienverbandes  und  der  Wiederaufbau  vor  50  Jahren“,  
Vortrag  des  Vetters  Henning  v.  Bülow,  Aumühle,  im  Anschluß  an  die  Familientagssitzung,  
online  at:  http://familie.von-­‐‑buelow.de/index.php5?Familie:Geschichte:Wiederaufbau;  
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The   continuation   of   the   family   history   was   a   central   theme   of   the   family  
conventions  after  the  war.  The  Third  Reich  had  produced  a  caesura  in  noble  
family  documentation.  The  war  years  had  put  a  halt  on  such  endeavours  and  
the  invasion  and  occupation  of  East  Elbia  by  Russian  Forces  during  the  final  
phase  of  the  war  had  not  only  led  to  the  nobility’s  complete  expulsion  from  
its  ancestral  homes,  but  also  resulted  in  the  loss  of  vast  archival  collections,  
which   often   went   up   in   flames.21  Thus,   the   first   conventions   after   the   war  
were  used  to  promote  the  meticulous  gathering  of  information  to  ensure  an  
uninterrupted  continuation  of  the  family  history.  Every  family  member  was  
encouraged   to   examine,   collect   and   report   all   documents   that  were   still   in  
their   possession   and   send   copies   to   the   family   committee.   Older   relatives  
were  urged  to  write  down  anything  family  related  from  memory  and  submit  
pictures  from  the  lost  estates  in  the  East.22    
Various  families  went  to  work  quickly.  One  of  the  earliest  publications  was  
the  chronicle  of  the  Eulenburg  family  in  1948.  The  Klitzings  published  their  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Familienverband  der  Herren  und  Grafen  von  Wedel,  Aus  Wedel  über  Pommern  nach  
Europa,  Neugründung  des  Familienverbandes,  online  at:  
http://www.vonwedel.com/index.php/geschichtliches;  The  information  concerning  the  
Klitzings,  Marwitz’  and  Bredows  derive  from  personal  correspondence  between  the  author  
and  the  respective  families.  
21  Eulenburg-­‐‑Hertefeld,  Ein  Schloß  in  der  Mark  Brandenburg,  pp.  193,  194;  Dohna,  
Erinnerungen,  pp.  301–305;  Personal  correspondence  with  Hans  Albrecht  Graf  v.  d.  Goltz,  
Dönhoff,  Namen  die  keiner  mehr  nennt,  p.  197;  DAA,  FG  Ber,  Werner  Graf  von  Bernstorff  (ed.),  
Die  Herren  und  Grafen  von  Bernstorff  –  Eine  Familiengeschichte,  1999,  pp.  252/53.  
22  Auszug  aus  dem  Protokoll  des  Familientages  1948,  Personal  correspondence  with  Jasper  
von  Arnim;  See  also:  1.  Nachrichtenblatt  des  v.  Winterfeld(t)schen  Familienverbandes  nach  
dem  2  Weltkrieg,  in:  DAA,  FG  Win,  von  Winterfeld(t)scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  
Geschichte  des  Geschlechts  v.  Winterfeld(t),  2009,  p.  364;  DAA,  FG  Mar,  Helga  Helene  von  
der  Marwitz  (ed.),  800  Jahre  von  der  Marwitz  –  Ein  märkisches  Familiengeschlecht,  2014  p.  
646;  DAA,  FG  Bon,  von  Bonin’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Pommersche  Familie  von  Bonin,  
2008,  p.  162.  
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first  post-­‐‑war  genealogical  tables  in  1950,  followed  by  a  treatise  in  1952.  The  
Wedels  followed  suit  in  1951.  The  Stülpnagels  issued  the  first  sequel  to  their  
extensive  family  chronicle  in  1957.  The  1950s  saw  further  similar  publications  
of  the  Arnims,  the  Kleists,  the  Zitzewitzes,  the  Massows,  and  the  Goltzes.23  
Unfortunately,   there   is   very   little   information   available   about   the  decision-­‐‑
making  process  behind  these  post-­‐‑war  chronicles.  It  would  be  of  great  value  
to  glean  more  about  this  process;  how  the  committees  debated  the  structure  
of   the   chronicles,   how   they   reached   a   consensus   about   the   narrative,   and  
how  expensive  it  was  to  compile.  This  information  is  regrettably  impossible  
to  reconstruct  because  the  noble  families  are  very  protective  of  the  committee  
protocols   and   their   balance   books.   Various   families   refused   to   give  
information   about   such   enquiries.   Others   simply   did   not   have   detailed  
minutes  of  these  conventions.  The  few  accounts  the  author  was  able  to  obtain  
are   very   sparse   and   generally   only   identify   the   family   members   in  
attendance  or  the  various  items  on  the  agenda.    
                                                                                                 
23  DAA,  FG  Eul,  von  Eulenburg’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Eulenburgs,  1948;  DAA,  
FG  Kli,  von  Klitzing’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Stammtafeln,  1950;  DAA,  FG  Kli,  von  
Klitzing’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Familie  von  Klitzing,  ihre  Schwiegertöchter  und  
deren  Ahnen,  1952;  DAA  FG  Wed,  von  Wedel’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Wedel  in  8  
Jahrhunderten,  1951;  DAA,  FG  Stü,  von  Stülpnagel’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Fortsetzung  
des  Geschlechts  von  Stülpnagel,  1957;  DAA,  FG  Arn,  von  Arnim’scher  Familienverband  
(ed.),  Beiträge  zur  Geschichte  des  Geschlechts  von  Arnim,  1957;  DAA,  FG  Kle,  von  
Kleist’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Familie  von  Kleist,  1957;  DAA,  FG  Zit,  von  
Zitzewitz’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Chronik  des  Geschlechtes  von  Zitzewitz  –  Geschichte  
der  ersten  und  zweiten  Linie  des  Geschlechts  von  Zitzewitz  1340–1958,  1958;  DAA,  FG  Mas,  
von  Massow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Massows:  Kleine  Genealogie,  1957;  DAA,  FG  
Gol,  von  der  Goltz’sche  Familienverband  (ed.),  Stammreihe  der  Grafen  und  Freiherren  von  
der  Goltz,  1956.  
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What   does   become   apparent,   however,   is   that   the   immediate   post-­‐‑war   era  
hardly   saw  any   commissioned   chronicles.  Mainly   for   financial   reasons,   the  
great  majority  of  families  assigned  a  historically  experienced  family  member  
to  serve  as  editor  and  oversee  the  production  of  the  chronicle.24  At  the  same  
time,  the  entire  family  was  encouraged  to  write  vignettes  about  their  closest  
family   members,   as   well   as   their   experiences   during   and   after   the   war,  
thereby   turning   these   chronicles  more   into   a   composite  work   of   numerous  
authors.  The  family  association  would  initially  cover  the  printing  costs,  and  
after   the   chronicle’s   completion,   the   various  members  were   encouraged   to  
acquire  the  chronicle  at  a  discounted  price.    
National  Socialism:  a  Footnote  of  Noble  History  
The  majority   of   these   chronicles   built   on   the   previous   editions   of   the   late  
nineteenth   and   early   twentieth   century.   The   basic   structure   was   generally  
carried  over,  as  well  as  the  majority  of  the  older  vignettes.  But  a  survey  of  the  
post-­‐‑1945  addenda  reveals  a  preoccupation  with  the  immense  material  losses  
in   the  East   and   a   striking  unwillingness   to  do   justice   to   the   entanglements  
between   individual   families   and   the  Hitler   regime.   Such   few   references   to  
National   Socialism   as   occur   betray   a   determination   to   downplay   the  
                                                                                                 
24  See:  DAA,  FG  Arn,  von  Arnim’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Das  Geschlecht  von  Arnim,  
Chronik  der  Familie  im  neunzehnten  und  zwanzigsten  Jahrhundert,  IV  Band,  2002,  
compiled  by  Jochen  v.  Arnim;  DAA,  FG  Blü,  Lebrecht  von  Blücher  (ed.),  Geschichte  der  
Familie  von  Blücher  von  1914–2003,  2003;  DAA,  FG  War,  Diedrich-­‐‑Werner  Graf  von  
Hardenberg  (ed.),  Das  Geschlecht  von  Wartensleben  1270–2000,  2000;  DAA,  FG  Mar,  Helga  
Helene  von  der  Marwitz  (ed.),  800  Jahre  von  der  Marwitz  –  Ein  märkisches  
Familiengeschlecht,  2014;  DAA,  FG  Boe,  von  Boetticher’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  




nobility’s   complicity   in   the   criminality   of   the   regime.   In   no   case   are   the  
authors  are  willing  to  face  the  implications  of  National  Socialism,  nor  rethink  
their   families’   situation   in   the   light   of   the   difficult   conditions   of   the   Third  
Reich.   They   instead   decide   to   simply   add   a   few   descriptive   and   highly  
apolitical  chapters  to  cover  the  lives  of  the  family  members  who  experienced  
the  Third  Reich.  At  the  same,  time  countless  reports  about  expropriation  and  
expulsion  emphasise  the  suffering  of  the  families  and  substantiate  their  self-­‐‑
perception  as  victims  rather  than  perpetrators.    
The   focus   is  mainly  on  male  members  of   the   family.  Women  are  portrayed  
throughout   the   chronicles,   but   predominantly   in   their   role   as   wives.25  The  
vignettes   differ   in   length   and   detail.   A   few   notable   family   members,  
generally   the   owners   of   the   large   estates,   are   honoured   with   lengthy  
vignettes.   These   detailed   descriptions   give   a   close   insight   into   the   typical  
living   conditions   of   an   East-­‐‑Elbian   squire.   We   read   about   a   traditional  
upbringing   in   the   Wilhelmine   era,   lavish   dinner   parties   with   120   guests,  
extravagant  shooting  days,  and  all  sorts  of  activities  the  protagonists  prevail  
                                                                                                 
25  See  the  lengthy  vignette  of  Dietloff  von  Arnim  and  his  wife  Alexandra,  in:  DAA,  FG  Arn,  
von  Arnim’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Das  Geschlecht  von  Arnim,  Chronik  der  Familie  im  
neunzehnten  und  zwanzigsten  Jahrhundert,  IV  Band,  2002,  pp.  429–430;  Vignette  of  Antonie  
von  Bülow,  in:  DAA,  FG  Bül,  von  Bülow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Bülowsches  
Familienbuch,  III.  Band,  1994,  p.  372;  Vignette  of  Else  Gräfin  von  Bernstorff,  in:  DAA,  FG  
Ber,  Werner  Graf  von  Bernstorff  (ed.),  Die  Herren  und  Grafen  von  Bernstorff  –  Eine  
Familiengeschichte,  1999,  p.  268;  Vignette  of  Hedwig  von  Jagow,  in:  DAA,  FG  Jag,  von  
Jagow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Geschichte  des  Geschlechtes  von  Jagow  1243–1993,  1993,  
p.  71;  Vignette  of  Margarethe  von  der  Marwitz,  in:  DAA,  FG  Mar,  Helga  Helene  von  der  
Marwitz  (ed.),  800  Jahre  von  der  Marwitz  –  Ein  märkisches  Familiengeschlecht,  2014,  p.  412;  
Vignette  of  Margarethe  von  Massow,  in:  DAA,  FG  Mas,  Kurt  von  Massow  (ed.),  Die  
Massows:  100  Jahre  Familienverband  1875–1975,  1975,  pp.  176,  177.  
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in.26  There  are  plenty  of  references  to  the  participation  in  the  Great  War,  the  
economic   difficulties   of   the   1920s,   and   the   deeply   inherent   piety   of   these  
noblemen. 27   All   of   the   protagonists   of   these   chronicles   held   numerous  
honorary  posts,  passionately  cared  for  their  workers  and  actively  promoted  
the  respective  communities.  They  built  hospitals  and  retirement  homes,  and  
renovated   local   churches.28  The   enormous   socio-­‐‑political   upheavals   of   the  
Third  Reich,  however,  are  studiously  avoided.  It   is  striking  how  sparse  and  
skeletal  references  to  National  Socialism  or  Hitler  are.  If  we  come  across  any  
such   references,   they   are   exclusively   embedded   into   resistant   anecdotes  
designed   to  portray  an   inherently  distant,   if  not  even  oppositional,  attitude  
of   the  protagonist.   In   these   cases,  we   read  of   Joachim  Carl   von  Maltzahn’s  
“tense  relationship  to  the  Gauleitung”,  Dietloff  von  Arnim’s  membership  in  
                                                                                                 
26  For  a  typical  noble  upbringing  in  boarding  schools,  cadett  schools  and  Corps  Saxonia  in  
Göttingen  see:  Traugott  von  Jagow  (1865-­‐‑1941),  in:  DAA,  FG  Jag,  von  Jagow’scher  
Familienverband  (ed.),  Geschichte  des  Geschlechtes  von  Jagow  1243–1993,  1993,  p.  155;  For  a  
depiction  of  a  grand  party  see  the  account  of  the  50  year  wedding  anniversary  of  Georg  and  
Marie  von  Klitzing,  in:  DAA,  FG  Kli,  von  Klitzing’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Menschen  
und  Schicksale  –  von  Klitzing’sche  Häuser  im  19.  und  20.  Jahrhundert,  5.  Teil,  1993,  pp.  179–
185;  For  a  description  of  a  shooting  day  see  the  vignette  of  Hermann  von  Bernstorff  (1867-­‐‑
1946),  in:  DAA,  FG  Ber,  Werner  Graf  von  Bernstorff  (ed.),  Die  Herren  und  Grafen  von  
Bernstorff  –  Eine  Familiengeschichte,  1999,  p.  265.  
27  For  achievements  during  the  Great  War  see  especially  the  vignettes  of  Fritz  and  Otto  von  
Below,  in:  DAA,  FG  Bel,  Oskar  Pusch  (ed.),  von  Below:  Ein  deutsches  Geschlecht  aus  dem  
Ostseeraum,  1974,  pp.  577–578;  For  a  typical  foreclosure  in  the  1920s  see  the  description  of  
the  estate  Karwe,  in:  DAA,  FG  Win,  von  Winterfeld(t)scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  
Geschichte  des  Geschlechts  von  Winterfeld(t),  6.  Teil,  7.  Band,  2009,  pp.  32–33.  
28  See  especially  the  vignette  of  Joachim  Dietlof  Graf  von  Arnim,  in:  DAA,  FG  Arn,  von  
Arnim’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Das  Geschlecht  von  Arnim,  Chronik  der  Familie  im  
neunzehnten  und  zwanzigsten  Jahrhundert,  IV  Band,  2002,  pp.  433–440;  Walter  von  Below,  
in:  DAA,  FG  Bel,  Oskar  Pusch  (ed.),  von  Below:  Ein  deutsches  Geschlecht  aus  dem  
Ostseeraum,  1974,  p.  441;  DAA,  FG  Mal,  von  Maltza(h)n’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  
Maltza(h)n  1194–1945  –  Der  Lebensweg  einer  ostdeutschen  Adelsfamilie,  1979,  p.  295:  For  
the  construction  of  numerous  workers  homes  see:  DAA,  FG  Mas,  Kurt  von  Massow  (ed.),  
Die  Massows:  100  Jahre  Familienverband  1875–1975,  1975,  p.  111.  
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the   Deutschnationale   Volkspartei   and   his   “invariable   distance   to   Adolf  
Hitler”,   Joachim   von   Arnim’s   resignation   from   the   SA,   or   Werner   von  
Bernstorff’s  dismissal  from  the  civil  service  due  to  “political  unreliability”.29    
This  supposedly  oppositional  mind-­‐‑set  is  further  underlined  by  the  recurring  
theme   that   the   individual   in   question   “fled”   into   the   army   to   avoid   an  
impending   obligation   to   join   the   NSDAP   or   one   of   its   sub-­‐‑organisations.  
Throughout   the   Third   Reich,   the  Wehrmacht   remained,   at   least   on   paper,  
apolitical,   and   thus   being   a   soldier/officer   precluded   membership   in   any  
political   party,   including   the   NSDAP.   Various   family   chronicles   make  
strategic  use  of  this  apologetic  argument.  There  is,  for  example,  Hans-­‐‑Klaus  
von  Goldbeck,  who,   after   years   in   the   private   sector,   decided   to   take   up   a  
position   in   the   civil   service   to   escape   the   economic   difficulties   of   the   early  
1930s.  “Based  on  his  qualifications  and  experience  –  he  had  been  a  lieutenant  
during   the   First   World   War   –   the   Wehrmacht   seemed   to   be   the   natural  
choice.   Furthermore,   he   thereby   avoided   having   eventually   to   join   the  
NSDAP   of   which   he   disapproved.”30  Analogously,   Viggo   von   Blücher   is  
portrayed  as  being  repulsed  by   the  Roehm  coup   in  1934,  and  subsequently  
joining  the  Wehrmacht  to  escape  the  clutches  of  the  NS-­‐‑regime.31  The  same  is  
                                                                                                 
29  DAA,  FG  Mal,  von  Maltza(h)n’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Maltza(h)n  1194–1945  –  
Der  Lebensweg  einer  ostdeutschen  Adelsfamilie,  1979,  p.  323;  DAA,  FG  Arn,  von  
Arnim’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Das  Geschlecht  von  Arnim,  Chronik  der  Familie  im  
neunzehnten  und  zwanzigsten  Jahrhundert,  IV  Band,  2002,  pp.  431,  437;  DAA,  FG  Ber,  
Werner  Graf  von  Bernstorff  (ed.),  Die  Herren  und  Grafen  von  Bernstorff  –  Eine  
Familiengeschichte,  1999,  p.  272.  
30  DAA,  FG  Gol,  Hans-­‐‑Georg  von  Goldbeck  (ed.),  Geschichte  der  Familie  von  Goldbeck,  
2002,  p.  78.  
31  DAA,  FG  Blü,  Lebrecht  von  Blücher  (ed.),  Geschichte  der  Familie  von  Blücher  von  1914–
2003,  2003,  p.  129.  
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true  for  Jaspar  von  Maltzahn,  who  allegedly  avoided  membership  in  the  SA  
by   joining   the  Wehrmacht   as   a   reserve   officer,   recalling   the  Wehrmacht   as  
somewhat  of  “a  natural  reserve,  providing  shelter  from  the  encroachments  of  
the  party”.32  
The  plausibility  of  this  argument  is  questionable.  It  goes  without  saying  that  
in  certain  professions  and  situations  it  certainly  proved  beneficial  to  join  the  
NSDAP.  Membership,  however,  was  only  very  rarely  compulsory.  Quite  the  
contrary,  following  the  Nazis’  ascension  to  power  in  early  1933,  the  NSDAP  
effectively   put   a   halt   on   new   memberships   in   April   of   that   year,   since  
numbers   had   skyrocketed   from   roughly   850,000   in   January   to   around   2.5  
million   in  April.33  The  gradual  abolition  of   this   restriction   in  1937  and  1939  
once  again  did   lead   to  an   increase   to  5.3  million   in  1939  and  8.5  million   in  
1945.   This   meant   that   even   in   1945,   at   the   absolute   peak,   only   every   fifth  
adult  was  a  member  of  the  NSDAP.34  Thus  speaking  of  a  compulsion  to  join  
the   NSDAP   is   highly   debatable.   Such   coercion   might   have   been   true   for  
certain   sections  of   the   civil   service,   especially  during   the   later   stages  of   the  
Third   Reich,   but  most   certainly   not   during   the   formative   years.   It   is  more  
likely   that   the   widespread   argument   of   having   “fled”   into   the   army   is   a  
retrospective   attempt   to   imply   an   alleged   early   reluctance   towards   the  
regime   by   using   one’s   involvement   in   the   Wehrmacht   as   a   pretence   to  
suggest  an  anti-­‐‑NS  attitude.  
                                                                                                 
32  DAA,  FG  Mal,  von  Maltza(h)n’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Maltza(h)n  1194–1945  –  
Der  Lebensweg  einer  ostdeutschen  Adelsfamilie,  1979,  p.  317.  
33  Nolzen,  Die  NSDAP  vor  und  nach  1933,  in:  Aus  Politik  und  Zeitgeschichte,  47  (2008),  p.  23.  




Reading   these  vignettes,   one  almost  gets   the   impression   that   the   era  of   the  
Third   Reich   was   dominated   by   social   tranquillity,   political   stability   and  
significant  tedium.  We  hardly  find  any  reference  –  let  alone  any  self-­‐‑critical  
reference   –   to   crucial   events   such   as   Hitler’s   seizure   of   power,   the  
Nuremberg  Laws,  the  anti-­‐‑Jewish  pogroms,  the  Anschluss  of  Austria  or  the  
crimes  committed  in  the  East.  Unlike  the  highly  detailed  vignettes  of  the  pre-­‐‑
war  period,  these  treatises  are  also  not  linked  to  the  larger  picture  of  popular  
history.   In   other  words,   the   isolated  moments   of   individual   family   history  
are   not   embedded   into   corollary   history   of   the   Third   Reich,   thereby  
preventing   the   reader   from   being   able   to   understand   the   historical  
framework  of  the  time.    As  consequence,  these  vignettes  mostly  remain  aloof  
from   the   criminality   of   the   regime.   To   an   outsider,   it   thus   seems   as   if   the  
East-­‐‑Elbian  estates  and  its  squires   lived  in  an  apolitical  bubble  during  most  
of  the  Third  Reich.    
The   large   majority   of   the   post-­‐‑war   vignettes,   however,   are   rather   brief,  
sometimes   almost   bullet   point-­‐‑like   abstracts.   One   is   first   struck   by   how  
skeletal  the  information  provided  is.  These  treatises  generally  resemble  short  
curricula   vitae   and   therefore   often   remain   highly   descriptive.   Mostly,   the  
material  confines  itself  to  key  biographical  data,  such  as  date  of  birth,  year  of  
graduation,   initial  occupation  and  a   few   lines  about   interests  and  character  
traits   of   the   protagonists.   Predominantly,   we   encounter   men   who   were  
educated   at   knight   academies   (Ritterakademien)   or   cadet   schools.   Many   of  
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them  became   civil   servants,   officers   or   agrarians,   and   shared   a   passion   for  
horses  and  hunting.35    
Yet,   once   again,   these   vignettes   do   not   contain   any   direct   references   to   a  
possible   involvement   in   the  machinations  of   the  Nazi   regime.  There  are  no  
indications   of   SA,   SS   or   NSDAP   memberships.36  Any   information   about  
political  attitudes,  allegiances  or   ideology  is  kept  under  tight  wraps.  This   is  
even  more   remarkable  given   the   fact   that  Stephan  Malinowski  has   recently  
proven   that   noble   families,   especially   the   large   East-­‐‑Elbian   noble   families,  
provided   dozens   of   party   members.   There   were   34   Alvenslebens   in   the  
NSDAP,  53  Arnims,  34  Bismarcks,  40  Bülows,  33  Klitzings,  36  Maltzahns,  70  
Ostens,  41  Schulenburgs  and  78  Wedels.37  
What  is  interesting,  however,  is  that  almost  every  vignette  to  a  certain  degree  
accounts   for   the   protagonist’s   military   involvement   in   the   Second   World  
War.   This   procedure   powerfully   reveals   the   nobility’s   crucial   dilemma   in  
                                                                                                 
35  See  exemplary  the  vignette  of  Helmuth  Wilhelm  von  Hardenberg  (1842-­‐‑1915).  Hardenberg  
went  to  boarding  school.  Thereafter,  aged  17,  he  joined  the  Prussian  Dragonerregiment  No.  
2.  Finished  his  career  as  Major-­‐‑General,  DAA,  FG  Har,  Diedrich-­‐‑Werner  Graf  von  
Hardenberg  (ed.),  Die  Hardenbergs  –  Lebensläufe,  Stammtafeln  und  Urkunden  1139–2005,  
2005p.  49;  For  a  typical  career  in  the  civil  service  see  the  vignette  of  Andreas  von  Bernstorff  
(1844-­‐‑1907),  who,  after  his  law  exams,  joined  the  Foreign  Office,  in:  DAA,  FG  Ber,  Werner  
Graf  von  Bernstorff  (ed.),  Die  Herren  und  Grafen  von  Bernstorff  –  Eine  Familiengeschichte,  
1999,  pp.  339–344;  For  another  military  career  see  Friedrich  Heinrich  August  Freiherr  von  
Bülow,  who  died  as  an  active  officer  in  WWI,  in:  DAA,  FG  Bül,  von  Bülow’scher  
Familienverband  (ed.),  Bülowsches  Familienbuch,  III.  Band,  1994,  p.  350;  For  the  career  of  an  
agrarian  see:  Hans  Detlev  von  Arnim,  in:  DAA,  FG  Arn,  von  Arnim’scher  Familienverband  
(ed.),  Das  Geschlecht  von  Arnim,  Chronik  der  Familie  im  neunzehnten  und  zwanzigsten  
Jahrhundert,  IV  Band,  2002,  pp.  616/617.  
36  The  only  exception  is  the  von  Wietersheim  Chronicle,  which  at  least  provides  limited  
information  about  NSDAP  membership.  See:  DAA,  FG  Wie,  von  Wietersheim’scher  
Familienverband  (ed.),  Geschichte  der  Familie  von  Wietersheim,  2.  Band,  2006.  
37  Malinowski,  Vom  König  zum  Führer,  footnote  422,  p.  574.  
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dealing   with   its   role   during   the   Third   Reich.   On   the   one   hand,   the   noble  
families   are   keen   to   emphasise   their   undying   loyalty   to   the   Reich.   On   the  
other   hand,   the   authors   of   the   chronicles   are   determined   to   downplay   the  
nobility’s   complicity   in   the   criminality   of   the  Nazi   regime.  As   a   result,   the  
large   majority   of   these   vignettes   feature   numerous,   yet   highly   skeletal,  
references  to  military  careers.    
The  chronicles  meticulously  and  prominently  list  all  casualties  of  the  Second  
World  War.  These  sections  feature  endless  pictures,  which  even  today  show  
the  protagonists  in  Wehrmacht  uniforms  –  as  if  the  family  did  not  have  any  
other   kind   –   and   thereby   remind   the   reader   of   the   family’s   cumulative  
sacrifice.38  Short   descriptions   tell   us   of   extraordinary   fighter   pilots,   highly  
decorated   commanders   and   fearless   attacks   deep   into   enemy   territory.  We  
come   across   paratroopers   who   decisively   fend   off   Soviet   breakthrough  
attempts,   young   flying   aces   who   prevail   in   dozens   of   aerial   battles,   and  
commanders  who  die  in  the  lead  of  their  battalion.  We  see  hearts,  filled  with  
ardent   love   for   the   fatherland,   stop   beating,   and   outstanding   young   pilots  
fail   to   return   from   the   front   over   England.39  Almost   every   family   can   list  
                                                                                                 
38  See  exemplary:  DAA,  FG  Stü,  von  Stülpnagel’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Geschichte  des  
Geschlechts  von  Stülpnagel,  2009,  pp.  65–68;  DAA,  FG  Wie,  von  Wietersheim’scher  
Familienverband  (ed.),  Geschichte  der  Familie  von  Wietersheim,  2.  Band,  2006,  pp.  34,  53,  56,  
69,  80,  86,  91,  103;  DAA,  FG  Bül,  von  Bülow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Bülowsches  
Familienbuch,  III.  Band,  1994,  pp.  238,  276,  286,  314,  332,  426.  
39  DAA,  FG  Sch,  Dietrich  Werner  Graf  von  der  Schulenburg  (ed.),  von  der  Schulenburg  –  
Geschichte  von  1237–1983,  1984,  p.  366;  DAA,  FG  Mal,  von  Maltza(h)n’scher  
Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Maltza(h)n  1194–1945  –  Der  Lebensweg  einer  ostdeutschen  
Adelsfamilie,  1979,  pp.  317–320;  DAA,  FG  Bül,  von  Bülow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  
Bülowsches  Familienbuch,  III.  Band,  1994,  pp.  373,  363–365.  
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numerous   casualties   from   the   defence   of   the   fatherland.40  These   portrayals  
clearly   display   how   the   nobility   intended   to   preserve   an   untainted   self-­‐‑
perception.  Ever  since  the  foundation  of  the  Kingdom  of  Prussia  in  1701,  the  
East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility   had   regarded   itself   as   the   hereditary   defender   of   king  
and   country.   For   centuries,   it   had   sent   its   younger   sons   to   the   army   and  
accepted   enormous   casualties   in   Prussia’s   frequent   wars.   Despite   the  
abolition  of  the  monarchy  in  1918  and  the  introduction  of  a  republican  army,  
this   self-­‐‑perception   had   not   changed.   The   Second   World   War   once   again  
demanded  a  “horrible  death  toll”;  8,284  noblemen  died  in  battle  or  remained  
missing.41  (Considering  the  fact  that  the  nobility  accounts  for  roughly  0.1  per  
cent  of  the  population,  this  is  an  exceptionally  high  share.)    
Although  the  individual  vignettes  tend  to  be  less  heroic,  they  also  tell  us  very  
little   about   what   actually   happened   during   the   war.   Predominantly,   these  
records   are   kept   very   brief   and   only   give   basic   information   about   rank,  
branch   of   service   and   sometimes   theatre   of   operations.  All  we   learn   about  
                                                                                                 
40  These  numbers  include  military  as  well  as  civilian  casualties:  11  Belows,  in:  DAA,  FG  Bel,  
Oskar  Pusch  (ed.),  von  Below:  Ein  deutsches  Geschlecht  aus  dem  Ostseeraum,  1974,  pp.  578–
583;  11  Bernuths,  in:  DAA,  FG  Ber,  von  Bernuth’scher  Familienverband  (ed.)  Das  Bernuth  
Buch,  1986,  pp.  439–442;  33  Maltza(h)ns,  in:  DAA,  FG  Mal,  von  Maltza(h)n’scher  
Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Maltza(h)n  1194–1945  –  Der  Lebensweg  einer  ostdeutschen  
Adelsfamilie,  1979,  pp.  317–320,  pp.  320–322;  13  Lüttwitz,  in:  DAA,  FG  Lüt,  von  
Lüttwitz’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Geschichte  des  schlesischen  Geschlechtes  von  
Lüttwitz  1185–2000,  2001,  pp.  13–14;  15  Massows,  in:  DAA,  FG  Mas,  Kurt  von  Massow  (ed.),  
Die  Massows:  100  Jahre  Familienverband  1875–1975,  1975,  p.  16;  20  Schulenburgs,  in:  DAA,  
FG  Sch,  Dietrich  Werner  Graf  von  der  Schulenburg  (ed.),  von  der  Schulenburg  –  Geschichte  
von  1237–1983,  1984,  pp.  19–26;  9  Goltz,  DAA,  FG  Gol,  von  der  Goltz’sche  Familienverband  
(ed.),  Die  Grafen  und  Freiherren  von  der  Goltz  1885–1960,  1960,  pp.  30–35;  20  Groeben,  
DAA,  FG  Gro,  Friedhelm  Dölling  und  Wolfgang  von  der  Groeben  (eds),  Die  Geschichte  der  
Familie  von  der  Groeben  –  Eine  Wort-­‐‑  und  Bilddokumentation.  Von  der  Mark  Brandenburg  
bis  nach  Ostpreußen,  2009,  pp.  349–357.  




Ernst  Georg  von  Bernuth,   for   instance,   is   that  he  was  drafted  when  he  was  
still  at   school  and  died  at   the  age  of   twenty  as   lieutenant   in  1945.42  Ludwig  
von   Bernstorff   served   as  major   in   the   Luftwaffe;43  Ernst   von   Bülow   fought  
throughout   the   entire   war   and   ended   up   in   American   captivity;44  Heinz  
Fedor  von  Wietersheim  became  a  pilot   in   the  Luftwaffe,  whereas  his   father  
commanded  a  Flakregiment  and  was  posted   to  France  and  Russia  before  a  
sniper  shot  him  during  the  suppression  of  the  Warsaw  uprising.45  Bernhard  
von  Bernuth’s  vignette  is  equally  less  revealing,  and  only  tells  us  that  he  re-­‐‑
joined   the   army   in   1934   and   ended   the   war   as   Lieutenant   Colonel.46  The  
actual  information  we  are  able  to  derive  from  these  abstracts  is  always  a  bare  
minimum.   None   of   these   cases   feature   any   kind   of   specifics   about   what  
actually  happened  at  the  front  and  what  these  men  experienced.  There  are  no  
references   to   the   cruelties   of   the   war   or   the   inhuman   policies   of   the  
Wehrmacht.  There  is  no  effort  to  reflect  on  the  crimes  committed  in  the  East  
or   the  brutality  of  German  warfare.  Above  all,   there   is  none  of   the  kind  of  
context  that  would  allow  these  experiences  to  be  put  into  perspective.    
By  implication,  this  lack  of  information  makes  it  very  hard  to  assess  to  which  
degree   these   men   have   actually   been   entangled   in   the   criminality   of   the  
                                                                                                 
42  DAA,  FG  Ber,  von  Bernuth’scher  Familienverband  (ed.)  Das  Bernuth  Buch,  1986,  pp.  21,  
441.  
43  DAA,  FG  Ber,  Werner  Graf  von  Bernstorff  (ed.),  Die  Herren  und  Grafen  von  Bernstorff  –  
Eine  Familiengeschichte,  1999,  p.  296.  
44  DAA,  FG  Bül,  von  Bülow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Bülowsches  Familienbuch,  III.  
Band,  1994,  p.  366.  
45  DAA,  FG  Wie,  von  Wietersheim’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Geschichte  der  Familie  von  
Wietersheim,  2.  Band,  2006,  pp.  69,  70  and  pp.  25–27.  




regime.      Investigating  all   these  cases  would  go  far  beyond  the  scope  of  this  
thesis.   There   are,   however,   a   number   examples   that   suggest   that   the  
complicity   of  many   of   these  men   in   the   crimes   committed   in   the   East  was  
much  deeper  than  these  chronicles  generally  allow  for.    
At   the  end  of   the  1930s,  Hermann  von  Bülow  was  promoted  to  provisional  
officer   responsible   (Reichsbeauftragter)   at   the   Reichs   Office   for   Petroleum.  
Between  1940  and  1945,  he  served  as  senior  department  head  of  petroleum  in  
the  Wirtschaftsstab  Ost  and  the  Four  Year  Plan  Office.47  At   first  glance,   this  
information   does   not   seem   especially   problematic.   What   the   chronicle  
studiously   overlooks,   however,   is   the   fact   that   the  Wirtschaftsstab  Ost   had  
solely  been  designed  for  the  “radical  exploitation  of  the  occupied  territories”  
in   the   Soviet   Union.48  In   due   course,   the   Wirtschaftsstab   Ost   was   also   in  
charge  of  the  recruitment  and  transportation  of  forced  labour,  and  therefore  
indirectly  responsible  for  the  deaths  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Soviet  slave  
labourers.49    
A   wartime   career   of   Fritz-­‐‑Otto   von   Bernuth’s   is   bowdlerised   in   a   similar  
manner.  “During  the  Second  World  War,  Fritz-­‐‑Otto  served  for  several  years  
as   commander   of   the   large   prisoner   camp   in   Hammerstein.   Due   to   great  
personal  aptitude  and  commitment  he  saved  innumerable  Soviet  prisoners  of  
                                                                                                 
47  DAA,  FG  Bül,  von  Bülow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Bülowsches  Familienbuch,  III.  
Band,  1994,  p.  357.  
48  Bundesarchiv  Freiburg,  RW  31  (Wirtschaftsstab  Ost,  mit  Geschäftsbereich  1940–1945)  /  
Einleitung.  
49  Bundesarchiv  Freiburg,  RW  31  (Wirtschaftsstab  Ost,  mit  Geschäftsbereich  1940–1945)  /  
Einleitung;  also  see:  Rolf-­‐‑Dieter  Müller,  Raub,  Vernichtung,  Kolonisierung.  Die  deutsche  
Wirtschaftspolitik  in  den  besetzten  sowjetischen  Gebieten  1941–1944,  in:  Hans  Schafranek  




war   from   starvation.”50  The   fact,   however,   that   the   Soviet   inmates   had   to  
sleep   in   burrows   dug   in   the   ground   because   the   barracks   had   no   heating,  
floors   or   windows,   finds   as   little   mention   as   the   typhus   epidemic,   which  
alone   killed   between   forty   and   fifty   thousand   Soviet   POWs.51  An   official  
report   of   the   US   Military   Intelligence   Service   in   1945   regarding   the  
conditions   at   Hammerstein   stated,   “treatment   was   worse   at   Stalag   II-­‐‑B  
(Hammerstein)   than   at   any   other   camp   in  Germany.   […]  Harshness   at   the  
base  Stalag  degenerated  into  brutality  and  outright  murder”.52  Although  the  
report  did  not  raise  any  specific  allegations  against  the  camp’s  commandant,  
Lieutenant-­‐‑Colonel  von  Bernuth,  himself   it  did  note,  “it   is  unlikely   that   the  
extreme  severity  of  his  underlings  could  have  existed  without  his  knowledge  
and  consent”.53    
The  vignette  of  Alfred  von  Wietersheim  also  prompts  several  questions.  He  
apparently   served   in   the   headquarters   of   the   6th   Army   as   accompanying  
officer   to  Field  Marshal  von  Reichenau,   the  very  man  who  shortly  after   the  
start   of   operation   Barbarossa   had   issued   the   notorious   severity   order.  
Therein  he  stated  that  “the  most  important  objective  of  this  campaign  against  
the   Jewish-­‐‑Bolshevik   system   is   the   complete   destruction   of   its   sources   of  
power   and   the   extermination   of   the   Asiatic   influence   in   European  
                                                                                                 
50  DAA,  FG  Ber,  von  Bernuth’scher  Familienverband  (ed.)  Das  Bernuth  Buch,  1986,  p.  343.  
51  Christian  Streit,  Die  Behandlung  der  sowjetischen  Kriegsgefangenen  und  völkerrechtliche  
Probleme  des  Krieges  gegen  die  Sowjetunion,  in:  Gerd  R.  Ueberschär  und  Wolfram  Wette  
(eds),  Unternehmen  Barbarossa.  Der  deutsche  Überfall  auf  die  Sowjetunion  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1991),  
p.  169.  
52  Richard  Lucas,  Axis  Sally:  The  American  Voice  of  Nazi  Germany  (Havertown,  2010),  p.  92.    
53  “American  Prisoners  of  War  in  Germany”,  Prepared  by  Military  Intelligence  Service,  War  
Department,  1  November  1945,  National  Archives  at  College  Park,  Series:  Subject  Files,  1942-­‐‑
1946,  Record  Group  389:  Records  of  the  Office  of  the  Provost  Marshal  General,  1920-­‐‑1975.    
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civilisation.   In   this  eastern   theatre,   the  soldier   is  not  only  a  man  fighting   in  
accordance  with   the   rules   of   the   art   of  war,   but   also   the   ruthless   standard  
bearer  of  a  national  conception”.54  Even  though  there   is  no  file   in  the  Berlin  
Document   Centre   which   gives   specific   evidence   of   von   Wietersheim’s  
complicity  in  any  war  crimes  committed  in  the  East,  the  fact  that  he  was  the  
closest   aide   of   one   of   Hitler’s   most   notorious   paladins   suggests   a   much  
deeper   involvement   in   the   criminality   of   the   regime   than   the  Wietersheim  
chronicle  implies.    
Further   samples   also   reveal   the   nobility’s   reluctance   to   disclose   their  
involvement   in   the   agencies   of   the   Third   Reich.   Carl-­‐‑Eduard   Brandt   von  
Lindau  was  the  heir  to  a  large  estate  in  Schmerwitz.  He  travelled  extensively,  
owned  a   large   racing  stable,  was  a  passionate  hunter  and  skilled  bobsleigh  
rider  in  St.  Moritz.  His  daughter  described  him  as  “a  kind,  generous  and  all-­‐‑
understanding”   squire   who   had   no   enemies.55  The   fact   that   he   joined   the  
NSDAP   around   1930   and   soon   after   became   Ortsgruppenführer   in  
Wiesenburg,  where  he  also  promoted  the  SA  and  built  up  a  Reitersturm,   is  
deliberately  ignored.56  The  chronicle  gives  us  no  hint  at  all  at  his  complicity  
in  the  Nazi  regime.    
We   come   across   a   similar   case   in   the   Bülow   chronicle.   Hans   von   Bülow  
mentions  his  cousin,  Ulrich  von  Gienanth,  who  had  joined  him  at  one  of  the  
remaining  family  estates  in  Holstein  after  the  expulsion  from  the  East.  After  
                                                                                                 
54  William  Craig,  Enemy  at  the  Gates:  The  Battle  for  Stalingrad  (Old  Saybrook,  1973),  pp.  10,  11.  
55  DAA,  FG  Bra,  Friedrich  Graf  von  Pfeil  und  Klein-­‐‑Ellguth  (ed.),  Die  Nachkommen  der  
Herren  Brandt  von  Lindau  aus  der  Schmerwitzer  Linie,  2014,  p.  200.  
56  John  Shreve,  Reetz.  Ein  Dorf  in  der  Brandtsheide  1861–1961  (Reetz,  1998),  pp.  112–116.  
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his   return   from  Sweden,   von  Gienanth  had   apparently   spent   some   time   in  
British   captivity.   Thereafter   he   found   work   on   a   neighbouring   estate.57  
Nothing   in   this  description   remotely   indicates   that  we   are   actually  dealing  
with  a   former  SS-­‐‑Hauptsturmführer.   In   fact,   since  1937,  Ulrich  von  Gienanth  
had   been   the   propaganda   attaché   at   the   German   embassy   in  Washington,  
simultaneously   serving   as   the   head   of   the   Gestapo   in   the   United   States.  
During   the   war,   he   transferred   to   the   Swedish   embassy   from   where   he  
returned  to  Germany  in  1945.58    
Hans-­‐‑Joachim   von   Wietersheim’s   description   does   not   imply   any   sort   of  
involvement  in  the  organisations  of  the  Third  Reich.  The  chronicle  only  tells  
us   about   his   professional   career,   which   saw   him   working   for   a   German-­‐‑
Russian   oil   company   before   he   joined   the   finance   department   of   the   IG-­‐‑
Farben  in  1939.59  The  fact  that  he  had  served  as  the  personal  assistant  to  Karl  
Ernst,   the  notorious  head  of  the  SA  in  Berlin,  between  1932  and  1935  as  SA  
Sturmbannführer  finds  no  mention.60    
Overall,   information  about   the  nobility’s   involvement   in   the  Third  Reich   is  
strikingly  sketchy  and  skeletal.  One  almost  gets  the  impression  that  National  
Socialism  had  merely  been  a  footnote  of  German  history.  This  impression  is  
                                                                                                 
57  DAA,  FG  Bül,  von  Bülow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Bülowsches  Familienbuch,  III.  
Band,  1994,  p.  466.  
58  Personalakte  Ulrich  von  Gienanth  in:  Pol.  Archiv  AA,  G  Stockholm  409,  cited  in:  
Daniel  B.  Roth,  Hitlers  Brückenkopf  in  Schweden  –  Die  deutsche  Gesandtschaft  in  Schweden  
(Berlin,  2009),  p.  214.  
59  DAA,  FG  Wie,  von  Wietersheim’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Geschichte  der  Familie  von  
Wietersheim,  2.  Band,  2006,  p.  40.  
60  Nationalrat  der  Nationalen  Front  des  Demokratischen  Deutschland  
Dokumentationszentrum  der  Staatlichen  Archivverwaltung  der  DDR  (eds.),  Braunbuch:  
Kriegs-­‐‑  und  Naziverbrecher  in  der  Bundesrepublik  und  in  Westberlin  (Berlin,  1968),  p.  408.  
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especially  formed  by  the  countless  vacuous  references  to  military  careers,  as  
well   as   the   evident   omission   of   NS-­‐‑careers,   revealing   an   enormous  
determination   to   trivialise   the  nobility’s  complicity   in   the  criminality  of   the  
regime.   The   sporadic   references   to   National   Socialism   that   do   surface  
indirectly   reinforce   this   impression.  As  Harald  Welzer  has  suggested   in  his  
study   regarding   trans-­‐‑generational   remembrance,   NS-­‐‑related   accounts  
generally  centre  on  sacrifice,  justification  and  distancing  from  the  regime.    
Thus,   when   the   Brackel   chronicle   bemoans   the   bitter   fate   of   Harald   von  
Brackel  –  whom  was  prohibited  from  continuing  his  stamp  business  after  the  
war   due   to   an   early   NSDAP   membership   that   his   brother   in   law   had  
apparently  talked  him  into  –  this  cannot  be  considered  an  example  of  dealing  
with   the  NS-­‐‑past,   but   rather   an   attempt   to   victimise   the   protagonist.61  The  
same   is   true   for   the   vignette   of   Hans   von   Wietersheim,   who   had   been  
dismissed   from   the   civil   service   due   to   his  NSDAP  membership,   and  was  
therefore   forced   to   work   as   a   tour   guide   of   a   travelling   theatre,   factory  
worker  and  ‘small’  employee  of  the  British  Military  government,  by  turns.62  
“Such   a   depiction   ultimately   generates   compassion   and   empathy.   Who  
himself  had  been  a  victim  of  the  system,  so  appears  to  be  the  subtext  of  such  
victim-­‐‑constructions,   is   defended   against   the   suspicion   of   having   been   an  
offender  or  even  a  profiteer.”63  The  Maltzahn  chronicle  goes  even  further  by  
extending   this   approach   to   the   entire   family.   “If   members   of   the   younger  
                                                                                                 
61  DAA,  FG  Bra,  Peter  von  Brackel  (ed.),  Das  Geschlecht  von  Brackel,  2004,  p.  687.  
62  DAA,  FG  Wie,  von  Wietersheim’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Geschichte  der  Familie  von  
Wietersheim,  2.  Band,  2006,  p.  71.  
63  Harald  Welzer,  Opa  war  kein  Nazi.  Nationalsozialismus  und  Holocaust  im  Familiengedächtnis  
(Frankfurt  a.  M.  2003),  p.  82.  
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generations  joined  the  NSDAP  it  often  was  not  a  sign  of  allegiance  to  Hitler  
but   rather   an   attempt   to   avoid   trouble.”64  Ultimately,   all   these   hints   of  
information  join  the  ranks  of  a  carefully  constructed  concept  of  strategic  and  
apologetic   remembrance   to   downplay   the   nobility’s   entanglement   in   the  
Third  Reich  and  shift  the  focus  from  complicity  to  victimhood.    
Selective  Remembrance  
In   sharp   contrast   to   the   sparse   and   skeletal   references   to   the   Third   Reich,  
which   suggest   a   strategic   suppression   of   the  Nazi   era,  we   come   across   an  
enormous   depth   of   detail   when   it   comes   to   noble   suffering   during   the  
expulsion  from  East  Elbia  in  1945.  Whereas  the  nobility  went  to  great  length  
to  curtain  and  conceal  their  complicity  in  the  crimes  committed  in  Germany’s  
name,  they  eagerly  attempted  to  highlight  and  document  their  role  as  victims  
of  the  Red  Army  and  the  post-­‐‑war  settlement.        
The  chronicles  are  interspersed  with  lengthy  and  particularised  descriptions  
of  all  sorts  of  unimaginable  horrors.  The  deeply  rooted  fear  of  the  Red  Army  
drove   dozens   of   noblemen   and   -­‐‑women   to   commit   suicide.   “War,  
desperation   and   fear   about   the   uncertain   future   had   demoralized   our  
relatives   to  a  degree   that  on  18  April  1945  our  beloved  grandmother  Helen  
von   der   Marwitz,   her   daughter   Anna   Ilse,   her   son   in   law   Wilhelm   von  
                                                                                                 
64  DAA,  FG  Mal,  von  Maltza(h)n’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Maltza(h)n  1194–1945  –  
Der  Lebensweg  einer  ostdeutschen  Adelsfamilie,  1979,  p.  318.  
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Lyncker   and   their   children   took   their   own   lives.”65   Alexandra   von   der  
Marwitz  described  a   similar   scenario  at  Nossin.  “Shortly  after   the  Russians  
had  arrived,  the  manor  house  was  set  aflame.  Everything  burned  down  and  
the  fire  smouldered  for  days.  The  hardship  of  the  villagers  was  indescribable;  
some  families  collectively  committed  suicide.”66  
Wherever   the   Soviets   arrived,   they   left   a   trail   of   devastation.   “Upholstery  
and   family   paintings   were   slashed,   furniture   burnt   and   destroyed,   the  
silverware  stolen  and  the  manor  house  looted.”67  The  alley  leading  up  to  one  
of   the  Maltzahn   estates  was   entirely   chopped   down,   the   driveway   ruined,  
the  stables  and  barns  demolished  and  the  surrounding  farms  collectivised.68  
When  the  squire  had  not  left  in  time,  the  Soviets  generally  showed  no  mercy.  
“On   2   May   1945   a   Russian   commando   arrived   at   the   manor   house   and  
grabbed  Gerhard  von  Maltzahn.  His  wife   saw  how  he  was  dragged   into   a  
car.  Ever  since,  Gerhard  has  been  missing.”69  Friedrich  von  Arnim  suffered  a  
similar   fate.  When   the   Russians   arrived   at   his   castle,   Arnim   and   his  male  
relatives  were  driven  into  one  of  the  barns.  “Shots  were  fired,  the  commissar  
came  out.  […]  My  father  was  dead,  head  shot!”70    
The   majority   tried   to   escape   the   advancing   Red   Army.   The   German  
population  was   so  deeply   suffused  with   fear   of   Soviet   revenge   that   “all   of  
                                                                                                 
65  DAA,  FG  Mar,  Helga  Helene  von  der  Marwitz  (ed.),  800  Jahre  von  der  Marwitz  –  Ein  
märkisches  Familiengeschlecht,  2014,  p.  509.  
66  Ibid,  p.  526.  
67  Ibid,  p.  509.  
68  DAA,  FG  Mal,  von  Maltza(h)n’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Maltza(h)n  1194–1945  –  
Der  Lebensweg  einer  ostdeutschen  Adelsfamilie,  1979,  p.  359.  
69  Ibid,  p.  360.  
70  DAA,  FG  Kli,  von  Klitzing’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Menschen  und  Schicksale  –  von  
Klitzing’sche  Häuser  im  19.  und  20.  Jahrhundert,  5.  Teil,  1993,  p.  529.  
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Prussia  was  on   the  move;   in  horse-­‐‑drawn  carts,  on  bicycle  or  on   foot.”71  “It  
was  twenty-­‐‑five  degrees  below  zero  in  an  icy  easterly  wind.  With  lightning  
speed  we  packed  everything  and  vacated  the  estate.  Hell  had  broken  lose  at  
the  train  station.”72  Yet,  the  families  who  had  managed  to  leave  in  time  often  
were  not  spared  either.  “Babies  froze  to  death  on  the  open  horse-­‐‑drawn  carts  
and   had   to   be   abandoned   by   their   mothers   in   the   snow.”73  Gisela   von  
Massow   left   her   ancestral   estate   in   February   1945,   only   for   her   “trek   to   be  
overrun  and  pillaged  by  the  pursuing  Russians”.74  Elisabeth  von  Jagow  “fell  
victim  to  Soviet  fighter  planes,  which  mercilessly  attacked  the  treks.”75  Such  
attacks   happened   everywhere   along   the   trek   routes.   “Just   short   of  
Swinemünde,   an   air   raid   dispersed   the   treks   and   caused   thousands   of  
victims.”76  “The   Russians   caught   up   with   the   trek   from   Exin   and   caused  
havoc   among   the   refugees.   The  men  were  mostly   shot   in   roadside  ditches.  
Women   and   children  were   also   executed.   The  wife   and   children   of   Pastor  
Dinkelmann  from  Zinsdorf  fell  victim  to  randomly  fired  machine  guns.”77  
                                                                                                 
71  DAA,  FG  Eul,  Christoph  L’Estocq  (ed.),  Fünf  Eulenburgs  aus  dem  Hause  Wicken  im  alten  
Ostpreußen,  2.  Fortsetzung,  1988,  p.  170.  
72  DAA,  FG  Kli,  von  Klitzing’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Menschen  und  Schicksale  –  von  
Klitzing’sche  Häuser  im  19.  und  20.  Jahrhundert,  5.  Teil,  1993,  p.  527.  
73  DAA,  FG  Mar,  Helga  Helene  von  der  Marwitz  (ed.),  800  Jahre  von  der  Marwitz  –  Ein  
märkisches  Familiengeschlecht,  2014,  p.  509.  
74  DAA,  FG  Mas,  Kurt  von  Massow  (ed.),  Die  Massows:  100  Jahre  Familienverband  1875–
1975,  1975,  p.  195.  
75  DAA,  FG  Jag,  von  Jagow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Geschichte  des  Geschlechtes  von  
Jagow  1243–1993,  1993,  p.  109.  
76  DAA,  FG  Mar,  Helga  Helene  von  der  Marwitz  (ed.),  800  Jahre  von  der  Marwitz  –  Ein  
märkisches  Familiengeschlecht,  2014,  p.  528.  
77  Und  die  Räder  sangen  auf  dem  Schnee...  (22/23  Januar  1945)  Treckbericht,  in:  DAA,  FG  
Bül,  von  Bülow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Bülowsches  Familienbuch,  III.  Band,  1994,  p.  
466,  p.  446.  
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The  situation  was  especially  painful  for  women.  Without  their  husbands  and  
fathers,   who   were   mostly   dead   or   on   the   front,   they   were   defencelessly  
exposed   to   Russian   vengeance.   Cautious   estimates   assume   that   at   least  
860,000   German   women   were   raped   by   Allied   soldiers   and   occupation  
forces.78  The  majority  of  these  cases  occurred  during  the  Soviet  advance  into  
East   Elbia.   Overall,   the   topic  was   collectively   suppressed   in   German   post-­‐‑
war  society  due  to  the  moral  stigma  attached  to  the  crime.  Yet  several  noble  
chronicles   addressed   the   issue   between   the   lines.   Members   of   the   Arnim  
family  were  incarcerated  in  the  basement  of  the  manor  house  and  “the  girls,  
aged  between   twenty-­‐‑two  and   twenty-­‐‑five  were  exposed   to   ‘special   terror’.  
When  their  aunt  wanted  to  protect  them  she  was  almost  beaten  to  death  with  
a  revolver”.79  
Three   daughters   of   the   von   Bernuth   family   “had   to   experience   how   their  
father  was  deported  and  their  mother  was  wounded  so  badly  by  a  head  shot  
that   she   died   a   few  days   later.  Over   the   following  weeks   and  months,   the  
three   sisters,   aged   between   twenty-­‐‑one   and   twenty-­‐‑five,   experienced  
inconceivable  misery  and  degradation.  All  Germans,  especially  women,  were  
regarded  as  fair  game”.80  The  Klitzing  Chronicle  tells  us  that  although  one  of  
their  estates  had  already  been  thoroughly  looted  by  various  detachments  of  
the  Red  Army,  Russian   soldiers  kept   returning  again  and  again   to   look   for  
German   women,   “sometimes   up   to   nine   times   a   day.   All   doors   remained  
                                                                                                 
78  Miriam  Gebhardt,  Als  die  Soldaten  kamen.  Die  Vergewaltigung  deutscher  Frauen  am  Ende  des  
Zweiten  Weltkriegs  (Munich,  2015),  p.  8.  
79  DAA,  FG  Kli,  von  Klitzing’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Menschen  und  Schicksale  –  von  
Klitzing’sche  Häuser  im  19.  und  20.  Jahrhundert,  5.  Teil,  1993,  p.  529.  
80  DAA,  FG  Ber,  von  Bernuth’scher  Familienverband  (ed.)  Das  Bernuth  Buch,  1986,  p.  74.  
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unlocked.  We  listened  in  awe  to  the  screaming  and  shouting  of  the  girls  on  
the   lower   floor.  They  were  searching   for   ‘Paninkas’  –  girls  –   for  everything  
they  could  pick  up”.81    
Overall,  the  exceptional  depth  of  detail  displayed  in  these  accounts  of  noble  
suffering  reveals  how  selectively  noble  chronicles   shaped   the   remembrance  
of  the  recent  past.  Wherever  noble  families  could  be  portrayed  as  victims  of  
the  avenging  Allied  armies,  the  bestiality  of  the  Nazi  regime  or  the  injustices  
of  foreign  occupation,  noble  memory  appears  to  be  sharp,  vivid  and  verbose.  
Yet,   as   soon  as   the   focus   is   laid  on   their   role   as  perpetrators,   the  nobility’s  
distinct  passion  for  meticulously  documenting  their   family  history  becomes  
rather  monosyllabic.      
This   approach,   however,   was   nothing   particularly   unusual.   West   German  
society  as  a  whole  passed  through  a  long  and  complex  process  after  1945  that  
has   sometimes   been   called   ‘coming   to   terms   with   the   past’.82  Soon   fed   up  
with  denazification,  German  society  largely  turned  against  a  reprocessing  of  
their  Nazi-­‐‑past  and  vigorously  demanded  to  draw  a  line  under  the  ambitious  
re-­‐‑education   efforts   of   the   Allies.83  “The   large   mass   of   the   population   […]  
                                                                                                 
81  DAA,  FG  Kli,  von  Klitzing’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Menschen  und  Schicksale  –  von  
Klitzing’sche  Häuser  im  19.  und  20.  Jahrhundert,  5.  Teil,  1993,  p.  574.  
82  See:  Peter  Reichel,  Vergangenheitsbewältigung  in  Deutschland.  Die  Auseinandersetzung  mit  der  
NS-­‐‑Diktatur  von  1945  bis  heute  (Munich,  2001);  Richard  Matthias  Müller,  Norma-­‐‑Null  und  die  
Zukunft  der  deutschen  Vergangenheitsbewältigung  (Schernfeld,  1994);  Klaus  Sühl  (ed.),  
Vergangenheitsbewältigung  1945  und  1989.  Ein  unmoeglicher  Vergleich?  (Berlin,  1994);  Armin  
Mohler,  Vergangenheitsbewältigung  (Krefeld,  1980);  Eckhard  Jesse  und  Konrad  Löw  (eds),  
Vergangenheitsbewältigung  (Berlin,  1997);  Meinhard  Adler,  Vergangenheitsbewältigung  in  
Deutschland  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1990);  Gary  Schaal  und  Andreas  Wöll  (eds.),  
Vergangenheitsbewältigung.  Modelle  der  politischen  und  sozialen  Integration  in  der  bundesdeutschen  
Nachkriegsgeschichte  (Berlin,  1997).  
83  Frei,  Vergangenheitspolitik,  p.  14.  
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could  understand  neither  its  intent  nor  its  purpose.”84  Thus,  public  sentiment  
was  firmly  supportive  of  a  ‘forgive  and  forgot’  policy.85  The  mass  amnesties  
granted   by   the   German   parliament   between   1949   and   1954   famously  
accounted  for  this  public  desire.86    
The   government   also   actively   promoted   the   widely   held   view   that   the  
German  population  had  been  the  victim  of  Hitler  as  much  as  of  the  Soviets.  
The   meticulously   researched   and   state   sponsored   Dokumentation   der  
Vertreibung   der  Deutschen   aus  Ost-­‐‑   und  Mitteleuropa   painstakingly   portrayed  
German   suffering   during   and   after   the   war.87  Thousands   of   eyewitness  
reports,  personal  letters  and  official  documents  were  gathered  to  support  the  
victimisation  of   the  German  population.   In   the  documentation,  virtually  all  
Germans  were   portrayed   as   innocent.88  They  were   used   to   divert   the   focus  
from  German   culpability   and   relativise   German   atrocities   during   the  Nazi  
era.  
                                                                                                 
84  OMGWB  Monthly  Historical  Report  For  October  1945  vom  15.11.1945;  NA,  RG  260,  3/410-­‐‑
2/7;  OMGSK  Stuttgart,  Monthly  Narrative  Historical  Report  vom  15.12.1945;  NA,  RG  260,  
5/10-­‐‑1/12,  cited  in:  Michael  Fichter,  Betriebsräte,  in:  Martin  Broszat,  Klaus-­‐‑Dietmar  Henke  
und  Hans  Woller  (eds),  Von  Stalingrad  zur  Währungsreform  –  Zur  Sozialgeschichte  des  Umbruchs  
in  Deutschland  (Munich,  1988),  p.  509,  510.  
85  Public  attitudes  toward  denazification,  ICD  Report,  No.  55  vom  15.4.1947,  in:  Barbara  Fait,  
Die  Kreisleiter  der  NSDAP  –  nach  1945,  in:  Broszat,  Henke  und  Woller  (eds),  Von  Stalingrad  
zur  Währungsreform,  p.  233;  the  report  also  stated  that  “a  solid  majority  (62%)  were  opposed  
both  to  noting  former  NSDAP  membership  in  Pg’s  identification  cards  and  keeping  them  
from  going  back  to  their  former  jobs”.  
86  Frei,  Vergangenheitspolitik,  p.  18.  
87  Schieder  und  das  Bundesministerium  für  Vertriebene  (eds.),  Dokumentation  der  Vertreibung  
der  Deutschen  aus  Ost-­‐‑  und  Mitteleuropa.  
88  Robert  G.  Moeller,  War  Stories  –  The  Search  for  a  Usable  Past  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  
Germany  (Los  Angeles,  2003),  p.  74.  
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The   story   of   German   forgetting   –   whether   pathological,   therapeutic   or  
politically  expedient  –  has  had  an  extraordinary  longevity.89  As  late  as  1987,  
Hermann  Luebbe  labelled  this  process  “the  ‘socio-­‐‑psychologically  necessary  
medium’   of   a   successful   transformation   of   former   NS-­‐‑Volksgenossen   into  
citizens   of   the   Federal   Republic”.90  Yet,   only   recently   has   a   closer,   more  
critical  look  at  the  early  history  of  the  FRG  revealed  that  “in  the  1950s,  West  
Germans   were   neither   disabled   by   their   inability   to   mourn   […]   nor  
intentionally  silent  about  National  Socialism  in  order  to  get  on  with  post  war  
reconstruction  and  democratic  re-­‐‑education”.91  Numerous  accounts  of  recent  
‘desirable’  German  history  were  published   in   the   1950s.92  Even   several  war  
films  were  shown  in  cinemas  which  highly  praised  the  Wehrmacht’s  unique  
camaraderie.93  The   nobility’s   one-­‐‑sided   remembrance   policy   thus   coincided  
with   a   larger   trend   among   German   society;   a   trend,   which   showed   that  
dealing  with  Germany’s   recent  past  was  not   so  much  about   forgetting,  but  
rather  about  remembering  selectively.  
                                                                                                 
89  Ibid,  p.  16.  
90  Hermann  Luebbe,  Der  Nationalsozialismus  im  politischen  Bewusstsein  der  Gegenwart,  in:  
Martin  Broszat,  Ulrich  Dübber,  Walther  Hofer  (eds.),  Deutschlands  Weg  in  die  Diktatur  (Bonn,  
1983)  p.  334.  
91  Moeller,  War  Stories,  p.  16.  
92  See:  Bundesministerium  für  Vertriebene,  Flüchtlinge  und  Kriegsgeschädigte  (eds),  
Dokumentation  der  Vertreibung  der  Deutschen  aus  Ost-­‐‑  und  Mitteleuropa  (Bonn,  1953–1961;  
Walther  Hubatsch,  Die  deutsche  Besetzung  von  Dänemark  und  Norwegen  (Göttingen,  1952);  
Eberhard  Orthbandt,  Deutsche  Geschichte:  Lebenslauf  des  deutschen  Volkes,  Werdegang  des  
Deutschen  Reiches  (Laupheim,  1954);  Hubertus  Prinz  zu  Löwenstein,  Deutsche  Geschichte:  Der  
Weg  des  Reiches  in  zwei  Jahrtausenden  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1951);  Peter  Rassow  (ed.),  Deutsche  
Geschichte  im  Überblick  (Stuttgart,  1953).  
93  Axel  Schildt,  Kultur  im  Wiederaufbau,  Tendenzen  des  westdeutschen  Kulturbetriebs,  in:  
Informationen  zur  politischen  Bildung,  256  (Reprint  2012),  p.  48.  
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Delegitimising  the  Post-­‐‑War  Settlement  in  the  East  
In  addition  to  the  highly  detailed  accounts  of  flight  and  expulsion,  the  noble  
chronicles   also   reveal   a   salient   preoccupation   with   property.   The   treatises  
meticulously   document   the   families’   landed   interest   and  highly   glorify   the  
pre-­‐‑war   estate   culture.   At   the   same   time,   they   give   ample   space   to  
demonstrate   the   rapid  deterioration  of   culture  after   the  war.  Consequently,  
this   preoccupation   is   not   only   an   expression   of   the   nobility’s   deep  
connectedness   to   its   ancestral   land,   but   also   a   strategic   attempt   to  
delegitimise  the  political  post-­‐‑war  settlement  in  the  East.    
The   immediate   aftermath   of   the   Second   World   War   saw   the   complete  
expropriation  of  the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility.  The  former  German  provinces  east  
of   the  Oder-­‐‑Neiße  shared   this   fate  with   the   rest  of   the  German  population.  
The  redrawing  of  Poland  at  the  Potsdam  Conference  in  the  summer  of  1945  
had  led  to  a  mass  displacement  of  the  remaining  German  populations  in  the  
East.94  In  the  Soviet  Occupation  Zone,  however,  which  covered  the  remaining  
parts  of   traditional  East  Elbia,   the  nobility   faced  a  unique   situation.  Unlike  
any  other  social  group,  it  was  collectively  held  responsible  for  the  crimes  of  
the  Hitler   regime   and   the   suppression  of   the   rural   population.  The   Soviets  
made  no  distinction  between  ‘good’  and  ‘bad’  members  of  the  nobility.  Even  
those  who  remained  politically  uncontaminated  or  uncompromised  faced  the  
loss  of  their  estates.  
                                                                                                 
94  See:  G.  C.  Paikert,  The  German  Exodus.  A  selective  study  on  the  post-­‐‑World  War  II  expulsion  of  
German  populations  and  its  effects  (The  Hague,  1962),  pp.  6–20;  See  also:  A.  de  Zayas,  Nemesis  
at  Potsdam.  The  Expulsion  of  the  Germans  from  the  East  (Lincoln,  1989);  Kossert,  Kalte  Heimat.  
216  
  
On   11   June   1945,   the   Central   Committee   of   the   Communist   Party   (KPD)  
issued   a   proclamation   which   demanded   “the   liquidation   of   the   large  
landownership,   the   large   estates   of   the   Junkers,   counts   and   princes   and  
transfer  of  all  their  land  as  well  as  their  livestock  and  equipment  to  the  […]  
peasants”.95     The   intention   was   the   complete   “destruction   of   the   economic  
basis   of   Prussian   Junkerdom”,   hence   a   kind   of   cataclysmic   assault   on   the  
traditional  power  structure  of  the  nobility.96  In  the  autumn  of  1945,  all  but  a  
handful   of   noble   estates   had   been   expropriated,   and   the   vast   majority   of  
families   had   been   deported   to  Western  Germany.97  By   the   end   of   the   year,  
noble  life  in  East  Elbia  had  ceased  to  exist.      
Complete   expropriation   was   not   only   a   material,   but   also   a   traumatic  
psychological,  shock  for  the  nobility.  The  basic  prerequisite  for  the  nobility’s  
self-­‐‑assertion   in   the  modern  world  had  been   the  preservation  of   its   landed  
wealth,  the  safeguarding  of  its  connection  to  the  land,  and  thereby  its  ancient  
supremacy   among   rural   society. 98   Ewald   von   Kleist-­‐‑Schmenzin   was  
convinced   that   “the   roots   of   the   nobility’s   power   were   anchored   and   will  
                                                                                                 
95  “Manifest  der  Kommunistischen  Partei  Deutschlands”,  Deutsche  Volkszeitung,  11  June  
1945,  cited  in:  Paffrath,  Macht  und  Eigentum,  p.  54.  
96  Peter  Erler,  Horst  Laude  und  Manfred  Wilke  (eds),  Nach  Hitler  kommen  wir  –  Dokumente  zur  
Programmatik  der  Moskauer  KPD-­‐‑Führung  1944/45  für  Nachkriegsdeutschland  (Berlin,  1994),  p.  
311.  
97  Every  estate  exceeding  100  hectares  was  expropriated  in  autumn  1945.  The  vast  majority  of  
noble  estates  fell  into  this  category.  Some  families  tried  to  circumvent  this  policy  by  splitting  
up  their  estates.  Those,  however,  fell  victim  to  the  subsequent  expropriation  waves  of  the  
late  1940s  and  early  1950s.  See:  DAA,  FG  Stü,  von  Stülpnagel’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  
Geschichte  des  Geschlechts  von  Stülpnagel,  2009,  pp.  55–65;  Jonathan  Osmond,  
Geschlechterspezifische  Folgen  der  Bodenreform  in  der  Sowjetischen  Besatzungszone:  
Gutsbesitzerinnen,  Bäuerinnen  und  Landarbeiterinnen  nach  1945,  in:  Arnd  Bauerkämper  
(ed.),  Junkerland  in  Bauernhand?  (Stuttgart,  1996),  p.  151.  
98  Heinz  Reif,  Adel  im  19.  und  20.  Jahrhundert  (Munich,  1999),  p.  9.  
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always  be  anchored   in   large   landed  estates”  and  Franz  von  Papen   labelled  
the  estates  “the  bedrock  of  our  status,  our  claim  for  leadership”.99  The  large  
estates  provided  financial   independence  to  hold  high  office  and  offered  the  
local   context   for   a   befitting   lifestyle.   It  was   here   that   central   aspects   of   the  
noble   cultural   model   –   hunting   and   equestrianism   –   were   exclusively  
pursued.100    
Most   importantly,   however,   the   estates   invariably   served   as   a   refuge  point  
for   the   entire   family.   The   larger   houses   traditionally   provided   shelter   for  
unmarried  aunts,  far-­‐‑travelled  uncles,  orphaned  cousins,  or  family  friends.101  
They  truly  proved  to  be  the  connecting  piece  between  generations,  ensuring  
continuity;  a  concept  which  was  of  unique  importance  to  the  identity  of  the  
nobility.  The  nobility’s  understanding  of  its  own  uniqueness  is  largely  based  
on  “a  special  historic  dimension;  from  the  earliest  known  generations  to  the  
currently  living  ones,  up  to  the  ones  born  in  the  future,  one  feels  connected  
within   the   nobility.   Within   the   noble   self-­‐‑perception   this   connectedness  
appears  to  be  immune  to  all  historic  change.”102    
This   trans-­‐‑generational   consciousness   largely   finds   its   expression   in   the  
nobleman’s   relationship   with   the   ancestral   estate.   The   hall   decked   family  
portraits,  “where  the  living  individual  recognizes  himself  as  a  working  link  
                                                                                                 
99  Friedrich  Keinemann,  Vom  Krummstab  zur  Republik  –  Westfälischer  Adel  unter  preußischer  
Herrschaft  1802–1945  (Bochum,  1997),  p.  391;  Ewald  von  Kleist-­‐‑Schmenzin,  Adel  und  
Preußentum,  in:  Süddeutsche  Monatshefte,  23,  (1925/26),  p.  379.  
100  For  the  importance  of  hunting  and  horses  see:  Theilemann,  Adel  im  grünen  Rock,  pp.  53–
202;  also  see:  Malinowski,  Vom  König  zum  Führer,  pp.  64–68.  
101  Conze,  Von  deutschem  Adel,  pp.  148–164.  
102  Menning,  Adelige  Familien  und  Konservativismus  im  19ten  Jahrhundert,  in:  Conze,  
Meteling,  Schuster,  Strobel,  Aristokratismus  und  Moderne,  p.  174.  
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in  a   long  chain  of  generations,  as  one  among  many  who  has  to  pass  on  the  
heritage”,  creates  a  link  between  the  past  and  the  present.103  The  same  image  
is  conveyed  when  Ottfried  Finckenstein  feels  the  “breath  of  history”  wafting  
around  the  six  hundred  year  old  walls  of  his  ancestral  castle  in  East-­‐‑Prussia;  
when  the  Maltzahn  family  chronicle  mourns  the  loss  of  Vanselow,  an  estate  
which   had   been   in   the   family   for   almost   six   hundred   years;   when   family  
pilgrimages  return  to  the  East  to  lay  down  wreaths  on  the  ruined  graves  of  
their   ancestors,   or   donate   generously   for   the   restoration   of   ancient   tomb  
stones.104  The  alleys  planted  by  the  great-­‐‑grand  father,  the  location  where  one  
shot  their  first  dear,  or  the  family  tomb  underneath  the  oak  trees  at  the  end  of  
the   park   –   all   signify   the   interconnectedness   between   land   and   trans-­‐‑
generational  continuity.105      
Thus,   it   is   not   surprising   that   the   chronicles   assign   ample   space   to   the  
portrayal   of   the   estates.   Most   of   the   editions   feature   lengthy   sections  
detailing  all  the  estates  that  at  some  point  in  time  were  in  family  possession.  
The  Bismarck  chronicle  lists  –  over  112  pages  –  almost  two  hundred  estates.  
The   Belows   record   221   estates,   divided   between   the   two   branches   of   the  
family,  dating  back  as  far  as  1300.  The  extensive  table  of  the  Hake  chronicle  
mentions  173  estates,  of  which  only  two  appear  to  have  remained  in  family  
possession  by   the   first  half  of   the   twentieth   century.  The  Stechows   list   104,  
the   Goltz’   274,   and   the   Eickstedts   239.   The   Schulenburgs   even   establish  
                                                                                                 
103  Lölhöffel,  Ostpreussen,  p.  37.  
104  Finckenstein,  Nur  die  Störche  sind  geblieben,  p.  10;  DAA,  FG  Mal,  von  Maltza(h)n’scher  
Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Maltza(h)n  1194–1945  –  Der  Lebensweg  einer  ostdeutschen  
Adelsfamilie,  1979,  p.  334;  DAA,  FG  Wed,  von  Wedel’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  
Wedel  –  Eine  kleine  Familiengeschichte,  2003,  p.  150;  Dohna,  Erinnerungen,  p.  325.  
105  Malinowski,  Vom  König  zum  Führer,  p.  63.  
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various  subcategories,   including   their  exact   losses   through  expropriation   in  
1945,  amounting  in  total  to  more  than  41,000  hectares.106  
On   the   one   hand,   such   detailed   documentation   was   certainly   intended   to  
maintain  claims  over   this   land   in  case   there  might  be  a   reversal  of  political  
fortune.  One  might  compare  this   to  the  extensive  record  of   family  trees.  As  
much   as   they   were   utilised   to   display   the   antiquity   and   splendour   of   the  
family,   they   were   also   always   a   tool   to   assert   claims   over   inheritances   or  
territories.107  On   the   other   hand,   such   thorough   documentation   shows   the  
significance   of   these   estates   to   the   nobility’s   self-­‐‑identity.   Such   endless  
catalogues  create  an  uninterrupted  list  of  landed  wealth,  relating  the  estates  
to  the  “extreme  longue  durée,  sheltered  from  all  accidents,  crises  and  sudden  
breaks”.108    
Additionally,  every  chronicle  offers   lengthy  descriptions  of   the   large  family  
estates.  We   learn   about   their   historic   origin.   Many   of   them,   such   as   Neu-­‐‑
Hardenberg  or  Groß  Kreisau,  were  royal  donations.  The  Finckenstein  estate  
at  Schönberg  dated  back   to   the  Teutonic  knights.  Others  were  bought  with  
                                                                                                 
106  DAA,  FG  Bis,  von  Bismarck’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  700  Jahre  altmärkisch  –  
uradeliges  Geschlecht  von  Bismarck,  1971,  pp.  287–389;  DAA,  FG  Bel,  Oskar  Pusch  (ed.),  von  
Below:  Ein  deutsches  Geschlecht  aus  dem  Ostseeraum,  1974,  pp.  576–584;  DAA,  FG  Hak,  
Dietloff  von  Hake  (ed.),  Geschichte  der  brandenburgischen  Familie  von  Hake,  1928,  pp.  521–
523;  DAA,  FG  Ste,  von  Stechow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Herren  von  Stechow,  1979,  
pp.  35–38;  DAA,  FG  Gol,  von  der  Goltz’sche  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Grafen  und  
Freiherren  von  der  Goltz  1885–1960,  1960,  pp.  11–27;  DAA,  FG  Eic,  von  Eickstedt’scher  
Familienverband  (ed.),  Familienbuch  der  von  Eickstedt,  3.  Band,  1993,  pp.  26–60;  DAA,  FG  
Sch,  Dietrich  Werner  Graf  von  der  Schulenburg  (ed.),  von  der  Schulenburg  –  Geschichte  von  
1237–1983,  1984,  p.  305.  
107  Monika  Wienfort,  in:  Adel  verpflichtet:  Ist  der  Adel  noch  elitär?,  ARD,  27.10.2012.  
108  Fernand  Braudel,  On  History  (Chicago,  1980),  p.  45.  
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earnings   from  public  office  or  acquired   through  strategic  marriage.109  There  
are   plenty   of   anecdotes   about   the   dangers   they   faced   during   Russia’s  
incursion   during   the   Seven   Years   War,   the   Napoleonic   occupation   in   the  
early  nineteenth  century  or  the  Russian  advance  into  East  Prussia  in  1914.110  
There   is   ample   material   about   agricultural   development,   architectural  
change,   and   the   nobility’s   fervour   for   hunting   or   a   royal   visit.111  All   in   all,  
these   accounts   provide   a   detailed   insight   into   traditional   noble   life   in   the  
countryside.    
Most   importantly,   however,   these   accounts   betray   an   extraordinary  
unwillingness   to   accept   the   post-­‐‑war   political   settlement   in   the   East.  
                                                                                                 
109  DAA,  FG  Win,  von  Winterfeld(t)scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Geschichte  des  Geschlechts  
v.  Winterfeld(t),  2009,  p.  340;  DAA,  FG  Bül,  von  Bülow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  
Bülowsches  Familienbuch,  III.  Band,  1994,  p.  43;  DAA,  FG  Mar,  Helga  Helene  von  der  
Marwitz  (ed.),  800  Jahre  von  der  Marwitz  –  Ein  märkisches  Familiengeschlecht,  2014,  p.  374;  
DAA,  FG  Jag,  von  Jagow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Geschichte  des  Geschlechtes  von  
Jagow  1243–1993,  1993,  p.  210;  DAA,  FG  War,  Diedrich-­‐‑Werner  Graf  von  Hardenberg  (ed.),  
Das  Geschlecht  von  Wartensleben  1270–2000,  2000,  p.  50.  
110  DAA,  FG  Kli,  von  Klitzing’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Menschen  und  Schicksale  –  von  
Klitzing’sche  Häuser  im  19.  und  20.  Jahrhundert,  5.  Teil,  1993,  p.  39;  DAA,  FG  Ber,  Werner  
Graf  von  Bernstorff  (ed.),  Die  Herren  und  Grafen  von  Bernstorff  –  Eine  Familiengeschichte,  
1999,  p.  215;  DAA,  FG  Bel,  Oskar  Pusch  (ed.),  von  Below:  Ein  deutsches  Geschlecht  aus  dem  
Ostseeraum,  1974,  p.  199;  DAA,  FG  Mar,  Helga  Helene  von  der  Marwitz  (ed.),  800  Jahre  von  
der  Marwitz  –  Ein  märkisches  Familiengeschlecht,  2014,  p.  259;  DAA,  FG  Win,  von  
Winterfeld(t)scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Geschichte  des  Geschlechts  v.  Winterfeld(t),  2009,  
p.  66.  
111  DAA,  FG  War,  Diedrich-­‐‑Werner  Graf  von  Hardenberg  (ed.),  Das  Geschlecht  von  
Wartensleben  1270–2000,  2000,  p.  50;  DAA,  FG  Ber,  Werner  Graf  von  Bernstorff  (ed.),  Die  
Herren  und  Grafen  von  Bernstorff  –  Eine  Familiengeschichte,  1999,  p.  257;  DAA,  FG  Mal,  
von  Maltza(h)n’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Maltza(h)n  1194–1945  –  Der  Lebensweg  
einer  ostdeutschen  Adelsfamilie,  1979,  p.  267;  DAA,  FG  Arn,  von  Arnim’scher  
Familienverband  (ed.),  Das  Geschlecht  von  Arnim,  Chronik  der  Familie  im  neunzehnten  
und  zwanzigsten  Jahrhundert,  IV  Band,  2002,  p.  427;  DAA,  FG  Jag,  von  Jagow’scher  
Familienverband  (ed.),  Geschichte  des  Geschlechtes  von  Jagow  1243–1993,  1993,  p.  211;  
DAA,  FG  Bül,  von  Bülow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Bülowsches  Familienbuch,  III.  Band,  
1994,  p.  274.  
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Throughout  the  vignettes,  the  authors  are  anxious  to  enhance  and  glorify  the  
pre-­‐‑war  noble  patrimonial  system  and  present  it  as  the  humane  alternative  to  
post-­‐‑war  Soviet   collectivism.  The  pre-­‐‑war  estates  are   turned   into  havens  of  
social  welfare   and   justice,   political   tranquillity   and   economic   productivity,  
whereas   the  post-­‐‑war  descriptions   are   cluttered  with   accounts  of   economic  
decline,  structural  decay  and  political  despotism.      
Accordingly,   we   see   Friedrich   von   Maltzahn   riding   45   kilometres   on  
horseback  to  inspect  his  fields,  listen  to  the  concerns  of  his  workers  and  visit  
the   sick.112  In   celebration   of   his   75th   birthday,   Walter   von   Below   granted  
considerable   donations   to   especially   loyal   workers   and   threw   them   a  
banquet.113  Antonie  von  Bülow  fulfils  the  idealistic  role  of  a  patron’s  wife  by  
loyally  nursing   the   sick  workers   of   the   estate.   “Even   in   the  worst  weather,  
day  or  night,  she  never  shrank  from  visiting  the  sick  since  doctors  and  nurses  
lived  far  away.”114  His  lordship’s  children  play  with  the  son  of  the  coachman,  
and  on  Christmas,  the  gardener  receives  a  box  of  cigars.115  Friedrich  Wilhelm  
von  der  Goltz  gives  his   attention   to   the   construction  of  workers’  dwellings  
and   sponsors   a   modern   local   hospital.116  Dietlof   von   Arnim   and   his   wife  
Alexandra  are   further  examples  of   indulgent  and  solicitous  patriarchs.  Like  
                                                                                                 
112  DAA,  FG  Mal,  von  Maltza(h)n’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Maltza(h)n  1194–1945  –  
Der  Lebensweg  einer  ostdeutschen  Adelsfamilie,  1979,  p.  275.  
113  DAA,  FG  Bel,  Oskar  Pusch  (ed.),  von  Below:  Ein  deutsches  Geschlecht  aus  dem  
Ostseeraum,  1974,  p.  442.  
114  DAA,  FG  Bül,  von  Bülow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Bülowsches  Familienbuch,  III.  
Band,  1994,  p.  372.  
115  DAA,  FG  Bra,  Friedrich  Graf  von  Pfeil  und  Klein-­‐‑Ellguth  (ed.),  Die  Nachkommen  der  
Herren  Brandt  von  Lindau  aus  der  Schmerwitzer  Linie,  2014,  p.  115.  
116  DAA,  FG  Gol,  von  der  Goltz’sche  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Grafen  und  Freiherren  von  
der  Goltz  1885–1960,  1960,  p.  164,  p.  172.  
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their   forefathers,   they   felt  obliged   to  provide   for   their  people  and   therefore  
renewed  and  rebuilt  their  houses,  cared  for  the  sick,  built  kindergartens  and  
provided  for  the  elderly.117  
These  accounts  draw   the   image  of  an   idealistic  manorial   complex   in  which  
everybody  worked  towards  the  greater  good  of  the  community.  This  concept  
closely   followed  Heinrich  Wilhelm  Riehl’s   theory  of   the  Ganze  Haus,  which  
described   the   ideal   family   as   a   combination  of   “an   economic,   consumption  
and   living   community”.   The  Ganze   Haus   presupposes   the   subservience   of  
everybody   to   the   lord   of   the   manor   (pater   familias)   in   return   for   material  
provision  and  physical  protection.118  Various  generations  are  depicted  living  
together   and   helping   one   another.   The   workers   may   have   been   bound   to  
their   lord  but,   in  return,   they  were  cared  for  when  they  were  sick  or  old.119  
Noble   chronicles   had   nurtured   this   ideal-­‐‑type   of   a   traditional   family   ever  
since  the  turn  of  the  century.  So  effective  was  the  propagation  of  this  model  
in  noble  publications,  that  by  1900,  the  concept  of  the  'ʹtraditional  family'ʹ  was  
strongly   associated  with   the   nobility   –   a   state   of   affairs   that   endowed   the  
family   chronicles  with  even  greater  propagandistic   importance.120  The  post-­‐‑
war   chronicles   heavily  draw   from   this  decade  old   strategy   and  powerfully  
                                                                                                 
117  DAA,  FG  Arn,  von  Arnim’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Das  Geschlecht  von  Arnim,  
Chronik  der  Familie  im  neunzehnten  und  zwanzigsten  Jahrhundert,  IV  Band,  2002,  pp.  429–
430.  
118  Wolf-­‐‑Dieter  Scholz,  Familie  auf  neuen  Wegen?  Familiensoziologische  Veränderungen  und  ihre  
Auswirkungen  auf  die  Erziehung.  Vom  'ʹganzen  Haus'ʹ  zur  bürgerlichen  Klein-­‐‑  bzw.  Kernfamilie:  
Wandlungen  in  den  Familienformen  (Münster,  2005),  p.  1.  
119  See:  Otto  Brunner,  Das  “ganze  Haus”  und  die  alteuropäische  “Ökonomik“,  in:  F.  Oetter  
(ed.),  Familie  und  Gesellschaft  (Mohr,  1966),  pp.  23–56.  
120  Menning,  Adelige  Familien  und  Konservativismus  im  19ten  Jahrhundert,  in:  Conze,  
Meteling,  Schuster,  Strobel  (eds),  Aristokratismus  und  Moderne,  pp.  177–180.  
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utilised  it  to  expose  the  contrast  between  pre-­‐‑war  social  harmony  and  post-­‐‑
war  discord  and  horror.    
At   the   same   time,   these   countless   anecdotes   of  welfare   and   solidarity   turn  
these  estates   into  escape   capsules   from  history.  The   idea  of   the  Ganze  Haus  
offers   a   refuge   from   the  vicissitudes   of  politics,   implying   continuity   that   is  
ultimately   apolitical   or   at   least   politically   neutral.   Just   like   the   individual  
vignettes   of   family  members,   the  descriptions  of   the   estates   entirely   ignore  
National   Socialism.   Instead   the   estates   are   construed   as   an   idyllic   refuge  
where   the  nobility   can  weather  out   the   crises  of  war,   the  Weimar  Republic  
and  the  Third  Reich.  Thereby  the  estates  are  wrested  from  the  contamination  
of  the  Third  Reich  and  stand  the  test  of  time  in  noble  commemoration  of  East  
Elbia.  
What   these   family   histories   tend   to   omit,   however,   is   the   fact   that   these  
estates   or   manorial   districts,   as   Otto   Braun,   the   social   democratic   Prime  
Minister   of   Prussia   during   the   Weimar   Republic,   remarked,   formed   “the  
attribute  of  the  supremacy  of  a  privileged  caste  typical  for  the  old  Prussia”.121  
Albert  Grzesinski,  the  interior  minister  at  the  time,  similarly  saw  the  estates  
as  the  most  concise  expression  of  power  distribution  from  which  the  nobility,  
after  1918,  continued  to  derive  their  strength,  since  these  districts  continued  
to  remain  “small,  absolute  lordships”.122  And  by  contrast  with  their  depiction  
in  the  chronicles,  the  estates  indeed  served  as  centres  of  political  activism  in  
the  rural  areas  of  East  Elbia.  Famously,  they  served  as  the  breeding  ground  
                                                                                                 
121  Otto  Braun,  Von  Weimar  zu  Hitler  (Zürich,  1940),  p.  239.  
122  Grzesinski,  Im  Kampf  um  die  deutsche  Republik,  p.  198.  
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for   the   reactionary   counter   revolutionary   movement   during   the   formative  
years   of   the   Weimar   Republic,   when   the   large   estates   eagerly   served   as  
training  grounds  for  paramilitary  formations  and  hideouts  for  weapons  and  
ammunition.123  Leading   landowners,  such  as  Count  von  Eulenburg-­‐‑Prassen,  
Count   von   Eulenburg-­‐‑Wicken   and   Count   von   Dohna-­‐‑Tolksdorf,   helped   to  
organize   the   Heimatbund   Ostpreussen   to   protect   the   province   against  
internal   insurrection,   as   well   as   against   possible   external   threats   posed   by  
Poland  and  Soviet  Russia.124  Furthermore,   they   served  as   connecting  points  
between  the  old  and  new  elites  during  the  rise  of  National  Socialism,  when  
squires   like   Konrad   Count   Finckenstein   or   Hermann   Count   Dohna  
welcomed  prominent  Nazis,  such  as  Erich  Koch,  Hermann  Goering  and  even  
Adolf  Hitler,  into  their  country  homes.125  
In   addition   to   depicting   the   estates   as   apolitical   islands,   the   authors   of   the  
family  histories  celebrated  the  management  and  cultivation  of  their  forebears  
who  appear  as  model-­‐‑agrarians  who,  over  many  centuries,  had  established  
“flourishing  landscapes”  in  the  East.  Implicit  in  this  mode  of  representation  
was  an  attempt  to  delegitimise  the  post-­‐‑war  settlement  by  drawing  attention  
to  rural  stagnation  and  neglect  in  post-­‐‑1945  East  Elbia.  
The   chronicles   convey   the   impression   that   the   majority   of   East-­‐‑Elbian  
landowners   were   highly   successful   agrarians,   conscientiously   managing  
their   land   and   people.      Noble   properties   are   elevated   almost   without  
                                                                                                 
123  Dohna,  Erinnerungen,  p.  165;  Schildt,  Der  Putsch  der  Prätorianer,  in:  Reif  (ed.),  Adel  und  
Bürgertum  in  Deutschland  II,  pp.  103  -­‐‑125.  
124  Görlitz,  Die  Junker,  p.  351.  
125  Ibid,  p.  374.  
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exception   to   “model   estates   [in]   excellent   economic   and   structural  
condition”.   We   make   the   acquaintance   of   “outstanding   agrarian[s]   and  
stockbreeders”  who  despite  “immensely  difficult  conditions  and  heavy  soil”,  
significantly   reduce   the   debts   of   their   forefathers,   set   up   horse   breeding  
programmes,   revive   their   forestry   and   renovate   their   partially   superb  
edifices.126    The  various  agricultural  crises  of  the  last  decades,  which  led  to  a  
massive  reduction  of   the  nobility’s   landed  wealth,  are  frequently  addressed  
between   the   lines.   These   crises   appear   as   dim   signals   from   distant   times,  
often  serving  as  the  stepping-­‐‑stone  for  later  generations  of  model  agrarians,  
who  took  over  and  saved  the  indebted  and  low-­‐‑yielding  estates  to  turn  them  
into  modern  and  flourishing  agricultural  businesses.127      
The   fact   that   around   one   third   of   the   landed  wealth   had   to   be   sold   off   or  
foreclosed   during   the   protracted   crisis   of   the   late   1920s   and   early   1930s,  
however,   is  often  overlooked.128  Striking  also   is   the  disregard  of   the  Eastern  
Aid  program.  This  government  policy  was  introduced  in  1929-­‐‑30  to  provide  
financial   relief   for   bankrupt   estates   in   East   Elbia.   Large   scale   debt  
                                                                                                 
126  DAA,  FG  Gol,  von  der  Goltz’sche  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Grafen  und  Freiherren  von  
der  Goltz  1885–1960,  1960,  pp.  144–146  and  164;  DAA,  FG  Sch,  Dietrich  Werner  Graf  von  der  
Schulenburg  (ed.),  von  der  Schulenburg  –  Geschichte  von  1237–1983,  1984,  p.  392;  DAA,  FG  
Bül,  von  Bülow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Bülowsches  Familienbuch,  III.  Band,  1994,  pp.  
380–382.  
127  See,  for  example,  the  detailed  description  of  Joachim  Dietlof  Graf  von  Arnim’s  
achievements  at  Boitzenburg  in  the  1930s,  DAA,  FG  Arn,  von  Arnim’scher  Familienverband  
(ed.),  Das  Geschlecht  von  Arnim,  Chronik  der  Familie  im  neunzehnten  und  zwanzigsten  
Jahrhundert,  IV  Band,  2002,  pp.  432–439;  see  also:  DAA,  FG  Gol,  von  der  Goltz’sche  
Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Grafen  und  Freiherren  von  der  Goltz  1885–1960,  1960,  pp.  144–
146  and  164;  DAA,  FG  Bül,  von  Bülow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Bülowsches  
Familienbuch,  III.  Band,  1994,  p.  382;  DAA,  FG  Mas,  Kurt  von  Massow  (ed.),  Die  Massows:  
100  Jahre  Familienverband  1875–1975,  1975,  p.  45;  DAA,  FG  Ber,  von  Bernuth’scher  
Familienverband  (ed.)  Das  Bernuth  Buch,  1986,  pp.  39–41.  
128  Reif,  Adel  im  19.  und  20.  Jahrhundert,  p.  98.  
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restructuring   and   reduction   of   interest   payments   significantly   eased   the  
financial  pressure  on  the   large  East-­‐‑Elbian  estates.  Until  31  March  1933,   the  
Eastern   Aid   authorised   16,358   debt   relief   loans   accounting   for   196,327,350  
Reichsmark.   Of   these,   1,039   loans   with   a   volume   of   staggering   99,773,210  
Reichsmark  were  granted  to  estates  measuring  more  than  100  ha.129  Based  on  
the   relation  between  deleveraged   agricultural   enterprises   and   the   allocated  
funds,  a  strong  preference  for  the  large  estates  is  hard  to  deny.  A  significant  
majority   of   these   large   estates   were   still   in   noble   hands,   wherefore   the  
Eastern   Aid   program   became   in   actuality   a   clandestine   government  
subsidiary   policy   for   the   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility. 130   In   December   1932   and  
January   1933,   the   suspicion   was   raised   that   the   Eastern   Aid   program   had  
been  massively  abused  to  fill  the  pockets  of  large  landowners.131  The  ensuing  
scandal,   which   threatened   to   implicate   hundreds   of   the   oldest   Junker  
families   who   had   waxed   fat   on   unredeemed   government   loans,   was  
eventually   silenced  by   the  new  Nazi  government   in   the   summer  of   1933.132  
Yet  none  of  these  events  find  expression  in  the  family  chronicles.  Instead,  the  
chronicles  paint  the  picture  of  exemplary  and  conscientious  model  agrarians,  
who  weather  the  economic  and  social  storms,  repair  the  damage  of  previous  
generations   and   guide   the   estates   and   their   people   into   a   calm   and   steady  
                                                                                                 
129  Daniela  Münkel,  Nationalsozialistische  Agrarpolitik  und  Bauernalltag  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1996),  
pp.  281–282.  
130  Alfred  Kantorowicz,  Ost  und  West:  Beiträge  zu  kulturellen  und  politischen  Fragen  der  Zeit  
1947–1949  (Königstein,  1979),  p.  24.  
131  See  especially  the  remarks  of  Joseph  Ersing,  secretary  of  the  Christian  unions,  in  the  
Reichstag:  “If  the  state  subsidies  are  not  being  used  for  the  repayment  of  debts  but  for  the  
acquisition  of  luxury  cars,  race  horses  and  journeys  to  the  Riviera,  the  state  has  to  ask  for  this  
capital  to  be  returned.”  Printed  in:  Winkler,  Der  lange  Weg  nach  Westen,  p.  542.  
132  Shirer,  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Third  Reich,  p.  180.  
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future.  Large-­‐‑scale  government  interventions  to  help  the  nobility  back  on  its  
feet  did  not  fit  into  this  carefully  constructed  image  of  economic  excellence.    
One  has   to  read   these   idealising  and  glorifying  accounts  as  appeals  against  
economic  mismanagement   and   social   injustice   in   the   Communist   East.   All  
these   subtle   suggestions   of   past   success,   splendour   and   achievements   are  
designed   to   present   a   positive   alternative   to   the   post-­‐‑war   settlement.   The  
chronicles   elevate   the   pre-­‐‑war   noble   estate   culture   to   a   socially   just   and  
economically   unrivalled   system.   Therein,   the   rural   population   is   provided  
for,   the   agricultural   economy   is   thriving   and   the   nobility   maintains   and  
protects  the  achievements  of  German  culture  in  Eastern  Europe.    
This   alternative   is   vividly   supported   in   the   family   histories   by   extensive  
photographic  evidence  documenting  the  immaculate  structural  condition  of  
the  estates  and  the  flourishing  landscapes  of  the  pre-­‐‑war  era.  The  chronicles  
are   littered   with   images   of   magnificent   manor   houses,   servants   in  
immaculate   liveries,  hardworking  peasants  on   fertile   fields,  and  beautifully  
kept   parks.133  To   increase   the   contrast   to   the   communist   era,   these   idyllic  
depictions  are  generally  set  against  dark  and  grim  post-­‐‑war  pictures  of  decay  
and  deterioration.  Overgrown  parks,  vandalised  graveyards  and  dilapidated  
manor  houses  dominate   these   illustrations.  To  emphasise   the  overt  decline,  
                                                                                                 
133  See  exemplary  the  chronicles  of:  DAA,  FG  Bon,  von  Bonin’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  
Pommersche  Familie  von  Bonin,  2008,  pp.  167–169;  DAA,  FG  Mar,  Helga  Helene  von  der  
Marwitz  (ed.),  800  Jahre  von  der  Marwitz  –  Ein  märkisches  Familiengeschlecht,  2014,  pp.  
437–438,  494,  501,  505;  DAA,  FG  Mal,  von  Maltza(h)n’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  
Maltza(h)n  1194–1945  –  Der  Lebensweg  einer  ostdeutschen  Adelsfamilie,  1979,  pp.  331,  358,  
362,  370,  379;  DAA,  FG  Sch,  Dietrich  Werner  Graf  von  der  Schulenburg  (ed.),  von  der  
Schulenburg  –  Geschichte  von  1237–1983,  1984,  pp.  337,  361,  371,  390,  391,  404,  443,  449;  
DAA,  FG  Jag,  von  Jagow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Geschichte  des  Geschlechtes  von  
Jagow  1243–1993,  1993,  pp.  144,  177,  199,  206,  212,  218.  
228  
  
many   of   the   pre-­‐‑war   photographs   have   been   exactly   recreated.134  Thus   we  
see,  for  example,  the  Dewitz  family  celebrating  a  family  day  after  the  fall  of  
the  Wall   in   a   terribly  decayed  drawing   room  of  one  of   their   former  manor  
houses.  Adjacent   to  this   image,  we  find  original  pictures  of   the  resplendent  
drawing   room   from   the   end   of   the   nineteenth   century,   powerfully  
representing   the   magnitude   of   deterioration. 135   Often   these   comparative  
images  are  annotated   to   further  accentuate   the  depletion  of   the  estates  and  
inculpate   the  post-­‐‑war   system.  The  Groeben  chronicle  bemoans   that  one  of  
their   “beautiful   manor   house   had   been   turned   into   a   rundown   block   of  
flats”.136  The  magnificent  views  from  the  Below  estate  at  Seehof  are  “entirely  
overgrown”   and   “the   heads   of   the   family   crest   guarding   the  main   portico  
have  been  knocked  out”.  At  Pustamin,  “the  roof  is  wrecked  and  the  ceilings  
and  walls   are   tumbling   down.   The   entire   house   is   left   to   ruin”.  When   the  
Belows  still  owned  these  houses,  the  chronicle  boasts,  “those  domains  were  
                                                                                                 
134  See  exemplary:  DAA,  FG  Dew,  von  Dewitz’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Neugier  auf  
Vergangenheit  –  Die  Geschichte  der  Familie  von  Dewitz  in  Bildern,  2013,  pp.  62–64,  113–115,  
127;  DAA,  FG  Win,  von  Winterfeld(t)scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Geschichte  des  
Geschlechts  v.  Winterfeld(t),  2009,  pp.  344  and  347;  DAA,  FG  Mar,  Helga  Helene  von  der  
Marwitz  (ed.),  800  Jahre  von  der  Marwitz  –  Ein  märkisches  Familiengeschlecht,  2014,  p.  370;  
DAA,  FG  War,  Diedrich-­‐‑Werner  Graf  von  Hardenberg  (ed.),  Das  Geschlecht  von  
Wartensleben  1270–2000,  2000,  pp.  56,  57;  DAA,  FG  Har,  Hardenberg,  Diedrich-­‐‑Werner  Graf  
von  (ed.),  Die  Hardenbergs  –  Lebensläufe,  Stammtafeln  und  Urkunden  1139–2005,  2005,  pp.  
146,  147;  DAA,  FG  Gro,  Friedhelm  Dölling  und  Wolfgang  von  der  Groeben  (eds),  Die  
Geschichte  der  Familie  von  der  Groeben  –  Eine  Wort-­‐‑  und  Bilddokumentation.  Von  der  
Mark  Brandenburg  bis  nach  Ostpreußen,  2009,  pp.  97,  188,  189.  
135  DAA,  FG  Dew,  von  Dewitz’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Neugier  auf  Vergangenheit  –  
Die  Geschichte  der  Familie  von  Dewitz  in  Bildern,  2013,  p.  66.    
136  DAA,  FG  Gro,  Friedhelm  Dölling  und  Wolfgang  von  der  Groeben  (eds.),  Die  Geschichte  
der  Familie  von  der  Groeben  –  Eine  Wort-­‐‑  und  Bilddokumentation.  Von  der  Mark  
Brandenburg  bis  nach  Ostpreußen,  2009,  p.  302.  
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model  estates”.137  At  Brauchitschdorf,  a   former  estate  of   the  Klitzing  family,  
“the   roof  has  come  down  and  horror   sprouts  out  of   the  windows.   […]  The  
fine  old   rooms  with   its  magnificent   stucco  have  been   repainted  with  green  
and  dark  yellow  oil  paint.  It  is  a  horrible  scene”.138    
Thus  these  chronicles  paint  a  colossal  glorification  of  a  perished  world.  The  
nobility   attempts   to   monopolise   certain   values   and   images   to   construct   a  
highly   transfigured   past.  Most   of   these   images   revolve   around   the   former  
estates   and   the   nobility’s   connection   to   its   ancestral   lands.   The   chronicles  
strategically   adopt   the   concept  of   the  Ganze  Haus   to  portray   the  nobility   as  
the  benevolent  guardians  of  the  rural  population.  They  forge  the  impression  
of   apolitical   squires   whose   vast   landed   interest   not   only   guaranteed  
continuity  for  the  family,  but  for  society  as  a  whole.  They  paint  the  image  of  
moral   integrity,   social  welfare   and   economic   excellence.  All   this   is   sharply  
juxtaposed   with   post-­‐‑war   decay   and   deterioration.   Thereby   the   chronicles  
create  a  fictional  elite  of  successful  and  altruistic  squires,  without  whom  East  
Elbia  is  doomed  and  left  to  ruins.  The  underlying  conclusion  to  be  drawn  is  
that   East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility,   even  decades   after   the  war,   had  not   accepted   the  
expropriation   of   their   estates   in   the   East.   In   their   eyes,   they   “had   lost  
everything  through  no  fault  of  their  own”.139  They  had  fallen  victim  not  only  
to   Hitler   and   National   Socialism,   but   also   to   the   horrors   of   war   and   the  
ensuing  barbaric  implications  of  Soviet  collectivism.    
                                                                                                 
137  DAA,  FG  Bel,  Oskar  Pusch  (ed.),  von  Below:  Ein  deutsches  Geschlecht  aus  dem  
Ostseeraum,  1974,  pp.  582–584.  
138  DAA,  FG  Kli,  von  Klitzing’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Menschen  und  Schicksale  –  von  
Klitzing’sche  Häuser  im  19.  und  20.  Jahrhundert,  5.  Teil,  1993,  pp.  441–443.  
139  DAA,  FG  Mas,  Kurt  von  Massow  (ed.),  Die  Massows:  100  Jahre  Familienverband  1875–




The  expulsion  in  1945  transformed  East  Elbia’s  ancient  landed  nobility  into  a  
displaced   community.   The   loss   of   its   material   and   social   pre-­‐‑eminence  
triggered   a   return   to   infra-­‐‑corporate   cooperation   and   assistance.   Strategic  
efforts   to   reunite   family   members   and   revive   traditional   noble   networks  
promptly   after   the   war   were   the   first   attempts   in   a   long   process   of  
replenishing  noble  habitus,   re-­‐‑strengthening  self-­‐‑identity  and  reshaping   the  
image   of   this   bewildered   caste. 140   The   most   important   aspect   of   this  
reconstruction  process  was   to   re-­‐‑obtain   the  prerogative   of   interpretation  of  
collective   memory.   To   do   so,   the   nobility   could   draw   on   centuries   of  
experience   of   controlling,   shaping   and   utilising   their   own   history.   As  
“masters   of   memory”,141  they   put   traditional   techniques   of   remembrance  
back   into   service   in   order   to   process   the   traumata   of   expulsion   and  
decontaminate  the  past,  and  as  consequence,  establish  a  desirable  perception  
in  the  present.    
A  few  intertwining  conceptual  images  form  the  basis  of  this  noble  post-­‐‑war  
memorial   strategy.   The   chronicles   consistently   try   to   convey   an   image   of  
continuity.   The   families   are   presented   as   one   long,   uninterrupted   chain   of  
notable   family   members,   bound   together   by   service   to   their   people   and  
                                                                                                 
140  As  early  as  October  1945,  Jürgen  von  Flotow  and  Hans  Friedrich  von  Ehrenkrook  had  
published  the  so  called  “Refugee  List  I”.  Its  main  purpose  was  the  reuniting  of  dispersed  
families  from  East  Elbia.  Online  at:  http://www.sachsenadel.de/6-­‐‑0-­‐‑publikationen.html;  
Shortly  after  the  war,  Wolf  von  Wrangel  also  put  together  a  list  of  all  dispersed  East  Prussian  
noble  families,  including  new  addresses  in  the  West.  See:  DAA,  FG  Eul,  von  Eulenburg’scher  
Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Eulenburgs,  1948,  p.  322.  
141  The  term  derives  from  an  article  published  by  Stephan  Malinowski  and  Markus  Funck,  
Masters  of  Memory,  in:  Confino  and  Fritzsche  (eds),  The  Work  Of  Memory,  pp.  86–98.  
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fatherland.  The  excessive  display  of  enormous  landed  wealth  buttressed  with  
endless  anecdotes  of  patrimonial  welfare  and  diligence  paint  the  image  of  an  
autochthonous  elite,   solely  driven  by   the  desire   to  maintain   the  heritage  of  
the  family.  The  constantly  resurfacing  attempt  to  transfigure  the  estates  into  
alleged   islands   of   apolitical   continuity   are   designed   to   detract   the   highly  
glorified  manorial  life  from  the  vicissitudes  of  politics,  and  henceforth,  allow  
the   accounts   from   this   period   to   enter   untarnished   into   a   carefully  
constructed   remembrance   system.   The   simultaneous   presentation   of   the  
alleged   economic   soundness   of   the   estate   economy   further   supports   the  
image  of  a  highly  successful,  but  also  benevolent,   elite.  Combined,   such  an  
image   was   designed   to   subtly   attack,   and   thus   delegitimise,   the   German  
post-­‐‑war   settlement   of   expropriation   and   redistribution   of   land.   This  
narrative  was  used  to  reassure  the  nobility  of  its  self-­‐‑perceived  pre-­‐‑eminence,  
as   well   as   the   injustice   which   had   been   brought   upon   them,   and   thereby,  
became  a  potent  infra-­‐‑corporate  connecting  point.    
  Similarly,   such  extensive   commemorational  work  proved   to  be  a  powerful  
tool   in   the   strategic   attempt   to   decontaminate   the   recent   past   and  distance  
the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility  from  the  crimes  of  the  National  Socialist  regime.  The  
multitudinous   anecdotes   of   bravery,  moral   integrity   and  heroism  paint   the  
picture  of  a  loyal  military  caste,  willing  to  sacrifice  themselves  for  the  greater  
good   of   the   nation.   The   constant   subtle   references   to   alleged   widespread  
resistive   tendencies   among   the   nobility   reveal   the   authors’   attempts   to  
cement   a   position   for   their   families   on   the   right   side   of   history.   The  
enhancement   and   emphasis   of   the   nobility’s   participation   in   the   military  
resistance   is   subliminally   employed   to   depict   the   nobility   as   a   caste   who  
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exclusively  realised  the  Nazis’  criminal  nature  and  acted  accordingly.  Lastly,  
the   infinite   accounts   of   noble   suffering   during   and   after   the   war   help   to  
transform   an   image   of   complicity   into   one   of   victimhood   and   as   a  
consequence,  divert  the  narrative  focus  from  guilt  to  suffering.    
Yet,  one  should  not  forget  that  many  of  these  addressed  anecdotes  might  by  
and  large  be  true,  and  represent  the  actual  convictions  of  the  many  people  in  
question.   What   is   so   interesting   and   revealing   about   these   accounts,  
however,   is   the   context   in   which   they   are   presented.   The   complete  
suppression  of  any  self-­‐‑critical  stories,  and  the  widespread  denial  of  National  
Socialism   in   general,   render   these   anecdotes   seemingly   universal   for   the  
social  class  as  a  whole.  As  Maurice  Halbwachs  has  suggested,  such  anecdotes  
are   responsible   for   setting   the   framework   of   family   remembrance.   The  
constant   repetition   of   certain   values   and   behaviour   patterns   ultimately  
creates  family  specific  characteristics  which  have  to  be  kept  intact.142  Hereby,  
the  chronicles  strategically  allow  for  the  transformation  of  individual  stories  
of  the  past  into  a  “common  attitude  of  a  group”  from  which,  in  this  case,  the  
entire  family,  and  subsequently  the  nobility  as  a  whole,  can  benefit.143    
For  roughly  three  decades  after  the  war,  the  family  chronicles  proved  to  be  a  
decisive  tool  in  the  nobility’s  struggle  to  decontaminate  the  past  and  regain  
the  prerogative  of  interpretation.  Increasingly  thawing  relations  with  Poland,  
and   the   subsequent   widespread   acceptance   of   the   definitive   loss   of  
traditional   East   Elbia,   however,   led   to   gradual   textual   and   stylistic   change  
                                                                                                 
142  Maurice  Halbwachs,  Das  Gedächtnis  und  seine  sozialen  Bedingungen  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1985),  
p.  209.  
143  Halbwachs,  Das  Gedächtnis,  p.  209.  
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within   the   chronicles.   As   can   also   be   witnessed   in   the   autobiographies  
written   in   this   period,   a   younger   generation,   generally   not   having   held  
higher   offices   during   the   war,   began   to   shift   the   focus   from   glorification,  
justification   and   apologetics   towards   a  more   neutral   and   less   embellishing  
form  of  commemoration.  Firstly,  this  generation  had  been  much  less  actively  
involved   in   the  Third  Reich   than   their  predecessors,   and   therefore,  did  not  
feel  the  same  desire  to  explain,  justify  or  exculpate  their  behaviour.  Secondly,  
by   the   1970s,   the  worst   of   the   post-­‐‑war   crisis   had   been   overcome   and   the  
nobility  had  succeeded  in  re-­‐‑establishing  itself  in  West  German  society.  As  in  
the  past,  periods  of  crisis,  such  as   in  the   late  19th  century  or  especially  after  
the  First  World  War,  which  saw  a   sharp   increase   in  written   family  history,  
were  followed  by  periods  of   less   literary  activity,  simply  because  there  was  
less  of  an  imperative  for  self-­‐‑defence.    
The  more  recent  editions  of   the  chronicles   thus  confine   themselves   to  short  
and  simplistic  additions  to  the  previous  volumes.  Ubiquitous  glorification  of  
the  protagonists  hardly  occurs.  The  newer  vignettes  tend  to  be  rather  neutral  
in   tone   and   style   and   thereby   significantly  differ   from   their   early  post-­‐‑war  
counterparts.  The  early  accounts  are  dispersed  with  declamatory  vocabulary  
and   Nazi-­‐‑terminology,   while   terms   such   as   “red   hordes”,   who   “flood   the  
boarders   of   the   Reich”   to   destroy   600   years   of   German   pioneering   work,  
“Anglo-­‐‑American  terror  air-­‐‑raids”  or  “landmarks  of  German  proficiency  and  
vigour”  do  not  feature  in  the  newer  editions.144    
                                                                                                 
144  DAA,  FG  Bel,  Oskar  Pusch  (ed.),  von  Below:  Ein  deutsches  Geschlecht  aus  dem  
Ostseeraum,  1974,  p.  579;  DAA,  FG  Eic,  von  Eickstedt’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  
Familienbuch  der  von  Eickstedt,  3.  Band,  1993,  p.  274;  DAA,  FG  Gol,  von  der  Goltz’sche  
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What  is  even  more  striking  about  the  more  recent  volumes,  however,  is  that  
they   remain   reprints   of   the   previous   editions,   featuring   additions   only   of  
present   generations.   They   are   ‘continued’   by   means   of   updating  
supplements,   in   the   manner   of   the   sixteenth-­‐‑   and   seventeenth-­‐‑century  
chronicles   of   European   royal   houses.   145   Hardly   any   critical   revision   of  
previous   accounts   occurs.   Cultivating   rather   than   scrutinising   memory  
remains  the  first  priority  today,  as  in  the  decades  after  1945.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Grafen  und  Freiherren  von  der  Goltz  1885–1960,  1960,  p.  14;  
DAA,  FG  Ste,  von  Stechow’scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Die  Herren  von  Stechow,  1979,  p.  
175.  
145  Philippe  Ariès,  Le  Temps  de  l’histoire  (Paris,  1986),  pp.  135–138.  
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Return  to  East  Elbia  
Introduction  
On   9   November   1989   at   7:02   p.m.,   a   wire   report   from   Reuters   emerged,  
stating  that  Günter  Schabowski,  a  member  of  the  Politburo  of  the  GDR,  had  
just  declared   in  a  press  conference  that  “leaving  via  all  GDR  checkpoints   is  
immediately  possible”.  A  more  detailed  statement  followed  soon  after.  “East  
German   citizens  wishing   to   leave   can,   starting   immediately,   use   all   border  
crossings   […]   those  who  want   to   leave  no   longer  need   to   take  a  detour  via  
Czechoslovakia.   The   responsible   police   offices   are   instructed   to   issue   visas  
for  emigration  immediately.”1    
Despite   perestroika   and   glasnost,   intensifying   economic   problems,   and   the  
mass  demonstrations  of   the  East  German  people   throughout   the  preceding  
months,  hardly  anybody  had  deemed  the  GDR  at  risk,  let  alone  predicted  the  
sudden   and   total   collapse   of   the   workers’   and   peasants’   state.   As   late   as  
September  1989,  the  BND2  concluded  that  the  population  of  the  GDR  lacked  
a  “broad  popular  consensus  to  protest”  against   the  ruling  elite,  and  neither  
the   state,   nor   the   social   system   were   in   immediate   danger   of   being  
overthrown.3  The  mass   exodus   of   GDR   citizens   to   Czechoslovakia   in   early  
                                                                                                 
1  Mary  Elise  Sarotte,  The  Collapse  –  The  Accidental  Opening  of  the  Berlin  Wall  (New  York,  2014),  
p.  127;  See  also:  Hans-­‐‑Hermann  Hertle  and  Gerd-­‐‑Rüdiger  Stephan  (eds),  Das  Ende  der  SED:  
Die  letzten  Tage  des  Zentralkomitees  (Berlin,  1997),  pp.  54–57.  
2  Bundesnachrichtendienst,  West  German  Secret  Service.  
3  Bodo  Hechelhammer  (ed.),  25  Jahre  Mauerfall.  Dokumente  aus  den  Akten  des  BND-­‐‑Archivs,  
Mitteilungen  der  Forschungs-­‐‑  und  Arbeitsgruppe  “Geschichte  des  BND”  (Berlin,  2014),  p.  51.  
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autumn   of   1989   instilled   in   many   a   feeling   of   hope   for   a   less   repressive  
future,   but   nobody   dared   to   imagine   the   complete   collapse   of   Eastern  
Germany.  The  fall  of   the  Berlin  Wall  and  the  ensuing  collapse  of   the  Soviet  
Union   ushered   in   a   political   and   social   transformation   of   historical  
dimensions,   ultimately   resulting   in   the   reunification   of   Germany   on   3  
October  1990.    
The   momentous   events   of   1989-­‐‑90   drastically   changed   the   situation   for   a  
large   segment  of   the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility.  For   the  majority  of  Pomeranians,  
East-­‐‑Prussians  and  Silesians,  whose  estates  had  laid  beyond  the  Oder-­‐‑Neisse  
line,   the   fall   of   the   Wall   had   no   material   consequences,   as   their   lands  
remained   part   of   Poland,   and   to   a   small   degree,   Russia.   However,   the  
situation  shifted  dramatically  for  families  originating  from  the  areas  between  
the   rivers   Elbe   and  Oder.   Their   ancestral   lands,  which   had   been   forcefully  
expropriated  some  forty-­‐‑five  years  before,  were  once  again  within  reach.  The  
new  circumstances  placed  this  group  in  a  very  peculiar  position.  Over  forty  
years   after   their   expulsion   from   the   family   estates,   their   relationship   to   the  
land  was  about  to  be  transformed  again.  Suddenly,  their  ancestral  lands  were  
part  of  the  country  they  were  citizens  of.    
This   chapter   assesses   the   profound   impact   of   the   events   of   1989-­‐‑90   on   the  
history  management  of  the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility.  The  protracted  political  and  
legal   controversy   over   expropriation   and   restitution,   the   initially   difficult  
reintegration   of   the   expellees,   and   the   eventual   return   of   a   few   hundred  
families   to   the   region   between   Elbe   and   Oder   created   new   points   of  




departure.  The  process  of  reestablishment  depended  not  only  on  the  efforts  
of   the   returnee   families   to   integrate   themselves   into   their   new   (‘old’)  
communities,   but   also   on   how   they  managed   to   present   themselves   in   the  
eyes   of   the   public.   Numerous   exhibitions   and   individual   communal  
encounters,   as   well   as   the   strategic   use   of   the   mass   media,   significantly  
helped   the   nobility   to   partly   regain   its   position   among   an   often   still-­‐‑
deprecating  East  German  society.      
The  Problem  of  Restitution  
The  overwhelming  majority  of   the  nobility  had  been  expelled  at   the  end  of  
the   Second  World  War.   Only   months   later,   in   September   1945,   the   Soviet  
Military   Administration   pushed   for   comprehensive   land   reform   in   its  
occupational   zone,   and   subsequently,   more   than   ten   thousand   estates  
spanning  over  more  than  three  million  hectares  were  forcefully  expropriated,  
partitioned   and   redistributed   among   landless   peasants. 4   Overnight,  
thousands  of  property  owners,  many  of  them  belonging  to  the  nobility,  were  
forced  to  vacate  their  estates  and  leave  their  ancestral  land  between  Elbe  and  
Oder.    
Once  the  Wall  came  down  in  November  1989,  and  reunification  of  Germany  
became   an   increasingly   tangible   option   throughout   the   course   of   1990,   the  
prospects   for   the  nobility  of   regaining   this   land   improved  dramatically.  As  
                                                                                                 
4  Felbick,  Schlagwörter  der  Nachkriegszeit,  p.  128;  see  also:  Verordnung  über  die  Bodenreform  
im  Lande  Mecklenburg-­‐‑Vorpommern  (Verordnung  Nr.  19)  vom  5.9.1945,  cited  in:  
Gesamtdeutsches  Institut  -­‐‑  Bundesanstalt  für  gesamtdeutsche  Aufgaben  (ed.),  Bestimmungen  
der  DDR  zu  Eigentumsfragen  und  Enteignungen  (Bonn,  1971),  p.  113.    
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soon   as   the   borders   were   open,   dozens   of   families   set   off   to   explore   their  
former   estates.5  In   the   previous   decades,   such   journeys   had   represented  
memorial   pilgrimages   to   ensure   the   survival   of   a   collective   memory   and  
strengthen  the  family’s  identity.  Now  they  held  a  different  purpose.  Expellee  
families   wanted   to   ascertain   what   had   become   of   their   land   and   explore  
possibilities  of   reacquisition  or   even   restitution.  Firmly   rooted   in   the   socio-­‐‑
political  and  constitutional  concepts  of  a  society   founded  on   the  sanctity  of  
private   property,   West   German   citizens   expected   nothing   less   than   full  
restitution.  Against   the   backdrop  of   the  Cold  War,   the   Federal  Republic   of  
Germany  had  prided  itself  for  decades  on  being  the  liberal  and  law-­‐‑abiding  
counter  example   for   the  suppressive  and   illicit   regime   in  Eastern  Germany.  
The   property   right   was   regarded   as   one   of   the   highest   values   of   West  
German  society,  even  guaranteed  by  Article  14  of  the  Basic  Law.  In  contrast  
to   nationalisation   and   collectivisation   in   the   Communist   East,   the   West  
German  post-­‐‑war  government  had  not   only  denounced   the   expropriations,  
but  simultaneously  paid  reparations   to  refugees  affected  by   it.6  In  doing  so,  
                                                                                                 
5  See  numerous  examples  such  as  Hans-­‐‑Georg  von  der  Marwitz,  Friedrich-­‐‑Carl  von  Ribbeck,  
Friedrich-­‐‑Carl  von  Hardenberg,  Ferdinand  von  Lochow,  Guido  zu  Lynar,  Alard  von  Arnim,  
Bernhard  von  Barsewisch;  See:  Feudale  Sozialarbeiter,  Die  Zeit,  14.02.2013;  Nach  1990  
kehrten  adlige  Familien  nach  Brandenburg  zurück  –  manche  sind  schon  wieder  weg,  Berliner  
Zeitung,  23.08.2001;  Alter  Adel,  neue  Pläne,  Tageszeitung,  01.08.2014;  Mit  den  Hardenbergs  
kam  die  Hoffnung  nach  Lietzen,  WELT  am  Sonntag,  18.02.2001;  Der  Adel  ist  zurück,  
Potsdamer  Neueste  Nachrichten,  11.12.2012;  Der  Adel  kehrt  nach  Brandenburg  zurück,  WELT,  
28.11.2005;  800  Jahre  in  der  Mark  –  Spuren  der  Familie  von  Arnim,  Berliner  Morgenpost,  
14.12.2003;  Helga  Calsow,  née  von  Winterfeld,  Bericht  über  den  ersten  Besuch  genau  44  
Jahre  nach  der  Vertreibung  vom  ehemaligen  Rittergut  Krieschow-­‐‑Wiesendorf  im  Kreis  
Cottbus,  in:  DAA,  FG  Win,  von  Winterfeld(t)scher  Familienverband,  (ed.),  Geschichte  des  
Geschlechts  von  Winterfeld(t),  6.  Teil,  7.  Band,  2009,  p.  37.  
6  Lothar  F.  Neumann,  Klaus  Schaper,  Die  Sozialordnung  der  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland  
(Frankfurt  a.  M.,  2008),  p.  281.  
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the   FRG   enmeshed   the   old   elites   into   a   post-­‐‑war   democratic   society,  
significantly  aiding  their  positive  integration.7    
With  this  in  mind,  it  must  have  come  as  a  shock  to  many  expellees  when,  on  
15   June   1990,   both   the   governments   of   the   FRG   and   the   GDR   concertedly  
announced,   “the   expropriations   under   occupation   law   or   on   the   basis   of  
sovereign   acts   by   occupying  powers   (45-­‐‑49)   are   no   longer   reversible”.8  The  
treaty  of   reunification,   signed  on  3  October  1990,   confirmed   this  procedure  
and  thereby  retrospectively  signed  off  on  the  Soviet  land  reform.    
To   understand   this   policy,   one   has   to   consider   the   government’s   unique  
point  of  departure.  On  the  one  hand,  when  confronted  with  reunification  in  
the   summer   of   1990,   the   government   was   perfectly   aware   of   the   wrath   a  
refusal  to  revert  the  land  reform  between  1945  and  1949  would  incur  among  
the  old  owners.  Any  such  refusal  would  be  interpreted  as  a  breach  of  Article  
14  of  the  Basic  Law,  guaranteeing  the  right  of  property.9  On  the  other  hand,  it  
also  recognised  that  a  policy  of  full  restitution  might  trigger  social  upheaval  
in   East   Germany.   Thousands   of   smallholding   families,   who   had   received  
land  during  the  land  reform,  would  need  to  be  forced  off  their  land  to  make  
                                                                                                 
7  Conze,  Von  Deutschem  Adel,  p.  194.  Hereto  see  also  the  section  “From  Marwitz  to  
Stauffenberg:  How  President  Heuss  Established  a  Link  between  Resistance  and  Nobility”  in  
chapter  II  of  this  thesis.  
8  Theodor  Schweisfurth,  The  International  Law  Commission’s  Articles  on  State  
Responsibility  and  the  German  Federal  Constitutional  Court,  in:  Ulrich  Fastenrath,  Rudolf  
Geiger,  Daniel-­‐‑Erasmus  Khan,  Andreas  Paulus,  Sabine  von  Schorlemer,  Christoph  Vedder  
(eds),  From  Bilaterism  to  Community  Interest  (New  York,  2011),  pp.  1298–1317,  here  p.  1304.  
See  full  German  version  in:  Werner  Weidenfeld  und  Karl-­‐‑Rudolf  Korte,  Handbuch  zur  
Deutschen  Einheit  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1999),  p.  405.  
9  Christoph  Rechberg,  Restitutionsverbot,  Die  Bodenreform  1945  als  Finanzierungsinstrument  für  
 die  Wiedervereinigung  Deutschlands  1990,  Eine  Dokumentation  (Munich,  1996),  p.  45  
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space   for   the   return   of   the   previous   owners.   The   Kohl   government   thus  
tacitly  welcomed  the  statement  of  the  de  Maiziere  government  in  April  1990,  
explicitly   requesting   that   the   Soviet   land   reform   be   sanctioned   as   an  
indispensable   prerequisite   for   German   reunification.10  The   West   German  
government   tried   to   sell   this   constitutionally   dubious   arrangement   to   its  
citizens  by   claiming  a  kind  of  geopolitical   force  majeure.   “The  Soviets  made  
the  preservation  of   these  measures  a  precondition  of  reunification.   […]  The  
unity  of  Germany  could  not  fail  because  of  this.”11    
Critical   observers,   however,   were   quick   to   point   out   that   the   Kohl  
government   was   in   reality  more   concerned   about   voting   behaviour   in   the  
rural   districts   of   the   GDR   than   about   the   opposition   of   the   Soviets.   With  
general   elections   approaching,   the   CDU  was   desperate   not   to   alienate   the  
East   German   populace. 12   A   flat-­‐‑out   restitution,   the   government   was  
convinced,  would   seriously   hamper   its   chances   in   the   planned   all-­‐‑German  
elections.  Millions  of  East  German  voters  would  have  regarded  a  revocation  
of  the  land  reform  as  a  betrayal  of  the  people.    A  mass  rejection  of  the  CDU  
by  the  GDR  populace  might  even  jeopardise  the  Kohl  government’s  plans  for  
German  unification.    There  was  an  additional  important  consideration.  From  
the  very  beginning,  the  West  German  government  had  identified  millions  of  
hectares  of  state-­‐‑owned  land  in  East  Germany  as  an  asset  that  could  be  used  
                                                                                                 
10  For  the  de  Maiziere  statement  see:  Helmut  Kohl,  Ich  wollte  Deutschlands  Einheit  (Berlin,  
1996),  pp.  337.  
11  See  Helmut  Kohl’s  speech  at  the  Bundestag  on  30.01.1991,  Bundespresse-­‐‑  und  
Informationsamt  der  Bundesregierung  vom  31.01.1991.  Cited  in:  Constanze  Paffrath,  Macht  
und  Eigentum,  Die  Enteignungen  1945–1949  im  Prozeß  der  Deutschen  Wiedervereinigung  
(Cologne,  2004),  p.  384.  
12  See:  Am  Anfang  der  Einheit  stand  eine  Lüge,  Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  29.01.2004.  
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to   refinance   the   enormous   cost   of   reunification.   Immense   proceeds   were  
expected   from   the   reprivatisation   of   arable   land   and   forestry.   The  
government   hoped   to   distract   attention   from   the   illegality   of   the   whole  
procedure  by  referring  to  the  conditions  supposedly  imposed  by  the  Soviets,  
conditions  that  had  to  be  met  to  achieve  reunification.13    
This   line   of   argument   quickly   came   unstuck   when   President   Gorbachev  
himself  announced  in  a  sequence  of  interviews  that  “the  topic  of  restitution  
of  expropriated  property”  had  “never  been  addressed  at  the  highest  level”.14  
The   former   Soviet   Foreign   Minister   Eduard   Shevardnadze   also   declared  
“there   were   no   preconditions   for   German   reunification”.15  Shevardnadze  
went   even   further.     He   revealed   that   he   had   offered   to   drop   the   contested  
passage  of  the  reunification  treaty,  but  had  been  overruled  by  both  the  West  
and  East  German  governments.16  In  retrospect,   it  becomes  apparent  that  the  
East  German  government  had  come  up  with  the  request  for  reasons  of  social  
tranquillity  while  the  West  German  government  was  particularly   interested  
in  the  popular  vote,  as  well  as  possible  future  revenue  from  the  divestment  
of  land.  The  Soviets  merely  played  along.    
                                                                                                 
13  Klaus  Schroeder,  Die  veränderte  Republik  –  Deutschland  nach  der  Wiedervereinigung  (Munich,  
2006),  pp.  182,  183.  
14  Michail  Gorbachev,  Die  Einheit  war  eine  Sache  der  Deutschen,  in:  Frankfurter  Allgemeine  
Zeitung,  17.03.1998;  See  also  Gorbachev’s  interview  with  the  British  historian  Norman  Stone  
in  1994  in  which,  for  the  first  time,  he  denied  any  allegations  that  the  Soviet  Union  had  ever  
demanded  a  prohibition  of  restitution,  See:  Filippo  Ranieri,  Die  Rückkehr  des  
Privateigentums  in  die  frühere  DDR:  die  deutsche  Justiz  zwischen  Rechtsgeschichte,  
Rechtsdogmatik  und  Rechtspolitik,  in:  Gerd  Bender  und  Ulrich  Falk  (eds),  Recht  im  
Sozialismus:  Analysen  zur  Normdurchsetzung  in  osteuropäischen  Nachkriegsgesellschaften  
(1944/45-­‐‑1989),  Volume  1:  Enteignung  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1999),  p.  207.    
15  Rechberg,  Restitutionsverbot,  p.  50.  
16  Gesprächsnotiz  Auswärtiges  Amt,  Zwei-­‐‑Plus-­‐‑Vier-­‐‑Gespräche  vom  17/18.08.1990,  cited  in:  
Rechberg,  Restitutionsverbot,  p.  45.  
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Whatever  the  underpinning  reason,  the  position  adopted  by  the  two  German  
partner   governments  was   hard   to   swallow   for   the  majority   of   landowners  
who  had  been  expropriated  between  1945  and  1949.  It  was  especially  difficult  
for  expellees  to  accept,  given  that  expropriations  that  had  occurred  after   the  
founding  of  the  German  Democratic  Republic  in  1949  generally  were  reversed  
after   reunification   in   1990.   Thus,   to   many,   reunification   felt   like   a   second  
expropriation.   For   decades,   thousands   of   expellees   had   yearned   for  
reunification,   confident   that   when   such   a   moment   arrived,   the   right   of  
property,  as  promised  by  the  constitution,  would  be  honoured  by  their  state  
which   for   decades   had   presented   itself   as   the   liberal   counterfoil   to   the  
Unrechtsstaat   in   the   East,   a   regime   that   had   caused   so  much   hardship   and  
misery  amongst  the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility.17    
The   old   landowners   lost   no   time   in   filing   constitutional   complaints.  
However,   over   the   next   two   decades,   the   Federal   Constitutional   Court  
repeatedly   rejected   a   series   of   class   actions   by   victims   of   the   Soviet   land  
reform   between   1945   and   1949,18  thereby   putting   a   definitive   end   to   the  
hopes  of  the  old  owners  to  obtain  restitution.19    
                                                                                                 
17  See:  Berlin-­‐‑Brandenburgische  Geschichtswerkstatt  e.V.  (ed.),  Adlige  Rückkehrer  im  Land  
Brandenburg  –  Ihr  heutiges  Engagement  und  das  Wirken  ihrer  Vorfahren  1806–2000  (Berlin,  2001),  
p.  42.  
18  BVerfG,  Beschluss  vom  18.  4.  1996  –  I  BvR  1452/90,  in:  Deutsches  Verwaltungsblatt,  Ausgabe  
12  (1996),  pp.  665–669;  Pressemitteilung  des  Bundesverfassungsgerichts  Nr.  78/79  vom  12.  
Dezember  1996,  online  at:  archiv.jura.uni-­‐‑
saarland.de/Entscheidungen/pressem96/BVerfG/enteign.html;  Thilo  Oldiges,  Das  
Bundesverfassungsgericht  in  der  Krise?,  Seminararbeit  (Berlin,  1996),  pp.  12–13.  
19  BVerfG,  Beschluss  des  Zweiten  Senats  vom  26.  Oktober  2004  –  2  BvR  955/00  –  Rn.  (1-­‐‑160),  
online  at:  www.bverfg.de/e/rs20041026_2bvr095500.html;  European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  
Inadmissibility  Decision  von  Maltzan  and  others,  von  Zitzewitz  and  others  and  MAN  
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Yet,   although   the   Federal   Constitutional   Court   had   repeatedly   rejected   the  
claims   for   restitution,   it   did   call   on   the   federal   government   to   financially  
compensate   the   claimants   for   their   losses  during   the  post-­‐‑war   land   reform.  
The   compensation   law   passed   in   1994,   however,   was   merely   a   goodwill  
gesture  rather  than  proper  compensation.  Any  asset  exceeding  the  value  of  a  
thousand  Reichsmark  at  the  time  of  expropriation  was  offset  by  five  per  cent  
of   the   actual   value   of   the   asset.20  At   the   same   time,  more   than   two  million  
hectares  of  reform  land  remained  in   the  possession  of   the  state,   forming  an  
enormous  cash  reserve   to  refinance   the  cost  of   reunification.21  The  only  real  
advantage   the   compensation   law   yielded   for   the   old   owners   was   a  
discounted  price  and  preferential  access  of  to  up  to  1,000  ha  of  reform  land.  
A  right  to  reacquire  specific  ancestral  land  was  not  guaranteed.  Considering  
the  enormous  importance  ancestral  land  had  to  noble  identity,  this  restriction  
ultimately  led  to  further  resentment  among  the  noble  returnees.  
The  majority  of  former  owners  found  it  very  difficult  to  make  peace  with  the  
new  situation.   In   the  beginning,  many  of   them  perceived   the  government’s  
conduct   as   “overt   injustice”   or   blamed   it   on   the   government’s   overriding  
interest  in  winning  the  general  election  in  the  East.  Others  even  went  as  far  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Ferrostaal  and  Alfred  Töpfer  Stiftung  v.  Germany,  Press  release  30.03.2005,  online  at:  
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-­‐‑press?i=003-­‐‑1304294-­‐‑1360416.  
20  Gesetz  über  die  Entschädigung  nach  dem  Gesetz  zur  Regelung  offener  Vermögensfragen  
und  über  staatliche  Ausgleichsleistungen  für  Enteignungen  auf  besatzungsrechtlicher  und  
besatzungshoheitlicher  Grundlage  (Entschädigungs-­‐‑  und  Ausgleichleistungsgesetz  –  
EALG),  Article  2,  Gesetz  über  staatliche  Ausgleichsleistungen  für  Entschädigungen  auf  
besatzungsrechtlicher  und  besatzungshoheitlicher  Grundlage,  die  nicht  mehr  rückgängig  
gemacht  werden  können  (Ausgleichsleistungsgesetzt)  §  2,  Section  2,  Bundesgesetzblatt,  1994,  
Part  1,  No.  65,  p.  2629.    
21  Bodenverwertungs-­‐‑  und  verwaltungs  GmbH,  Geschäftsbericht  2000  (Berlin,  2001),  p.  15.  
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as  accusing  the  government  of  handling  stolen  property  and  even  of  a  blatant  
“perversion  of  justice”.22  Many  potential  returnees  renounced  their  intention  
to  return  to  the  land  of  their  forefathers,  left  too  frustrated  and  disappointed  
by  the  whole  restitution  controversy.  Others  did  not  have  the  capital  to  buy  
back  dilapidated  estates  that  were  themselves  in  urgent  need  of  investment.  
Some  had  simply  become  estranged  from  the  rural  life  of  the  East  and  were  
unwilling   to   give   up   the   life   they   had   built   in   the   West.   However,   a  
significant   number   did   return   to   the   lands   east   of   the   Elbe   to   rebuild   the  
estates  and  continue  the  often  centuries-­‐‑old  family  history.23    
The  Reestablishment  of  the  Patrimonial  System  
Ancestral   land,   as   we   have   seen,   had   always   been   the   focal   point   of   the  
nobility’s   identity,   if   not   always   of   its   material   survival.   The   fiction   of  
continuity  was  rooted  in  the  idealised  bond  between  squire  and  land.  Many  
of   the  expelled  families  had  partly  grown  up  on  the  estates   in   the  East  and  
had  personal  memories  and  relationships  with  the  land  and  its  people.   It   is  
                                                                                                 
22  Preußisch  Blau:  Jörg  Thadeusz  besucht  den  Adel  in  Brandenburg  –  Familie  von  Lochow,  
Rundfunk  Berlin  Brandenburg  Fernsehen,  29.12.2013;  Matthias  von  Oppen,  wall  text,  exhibition  
“Heimat  Verpflichtet:  Märkische  Adlige  –  Eine  Bilanz  nach  20  Jahren”,  Brandenburgische  
Landeszentrale  für  Politische  Bildung,  11/2012  –  04/2013;  Friedrich  von  Ribbeck,  wall  text,  
“Heimat  Verpflichtet”;  Hans-­‐‑Georg  von  der  Marwitz,  wall  text,  “Heimat  Verpflichtet”.  
23  Estimates  are  very  difficult  to  obtain.  Some  newspaper  articles  mention  various  numbers  
in  the  low  hundreds.  What  makes  it  even  more  difficult  is  the  fact  that  not  every  noble  
returnee  belonged  to  the  traditional  East-­‐‑Elbian  elite  this  thesis  is  concerned  with.  Examples,  
such  as  Prince  Solms  or  the  Prince  of  Hannover  who  bought  back  large  estates  in  East  
Germany,  do  certainly  fit  into  the  category  of  noble  returnees,  but  neither  belonged  to  the  
traditional  East-­‐‑Elbian  elite  nor  had  their  ancestral  family  seat  in  the  area.  Those  estates  were  
simply  additional  property.  See:  Ein  bißchen  Kultur,  SPIEGEL,  27.04.1992;  Personal  
interview  with  Martina  Schellhorn,  the  curator  of  the  exhibition  “Heimat  Verpflichtet”,  on  
10.03.2015.  Schellhorn  referred  to  a  few  dozen  returnees  to  Brandenburg.  
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thus   hardly   surprising   that   so  many   noble   families   should   have   set   out   to  
return  to  their  old  estates.  Some  were  driven  by  the  “marching  orders  of  their  
forebears”24,   some   by   “the   responsibility   for   ‘their’   land   and   people”25  and  
others   felt   the   “obligation”26  to   follow   in   the   tradition   of   the   family   and  
continue  the  centuries  old  family  history.  Such  idealising  motives  constantly  
recur  throughout  the  accounts  of  noble  returnees.  
Another   key   incentive,   however,  was   clearly   the   desire   to   re-­‐‑establish   and  
revive   a   fitting   and   ‘traditional’   noble   way   of   life.   For   decades,   the   lost  
patrimonial   world   in   the   East   had   been   bemoaned   within   the   collective  
memory  of  the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility.  Even  though  most  of  the  noble  refugees  
had  started  over  in  the  west  and  had  become  integral  and  successful  parts  of  
West  German  democratic  society,  the  majority  still  longed  for  a  return  to  the  
estates   and   the   associated   hereditary   social   superiority   within   its   local  
communities.  Finally,  the  opportunity  to  acquire  a  sizeable  amount  of  land  at  
a   discounted   rate,   notwithstanding   the   complexities   of   the   restitution  
process,   was   financially   attractive.   Large   contiguous   areas   of   agricultural  
land  and  forestry,  on  sale  at  a  favourable  price,  have  hardly  ever  been  a  poor  
investment.    
                                                                                                 
24  Friedrich  von  Ribbeck,  wall  text,  “Heimat  Verpflichtet”.  
25  Hans-­‐‑Leopold  von  Winterfeld,  Das  Schicksal  der  Winterfeld(t)schen  Güter  nach  dem  Fall  
der  Mauer,  in:  DAA,  FG  Win,  von  Winterfeld(t)scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Geschichte  des  
Geschlechts  von  Winterfeld(t),  6.  Teil,  7.  Band,  2009,  p.  31.  
26  Peter  Becker,  Portrait  von  Rochus  Graf  zu  Lynar:  Über  Mosambique  und  Portugal  ins  
Spreewaldschloß,  online  at:  www.spreewaldoriginale.de/rzuylynar.html.  
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Reliable   numbers   of   how   many   families   returned   and   actually   stayed   are  
difficult  to  obtain.  Estimates  range  from  100  to  250  families.27  Just  as  little  is  
known  about  how  much   land  and  forest   they  reacquired  or  rented,  or  how  
much  they  invested  in  redeveloping  the  estates  and  reconstructing  the  manor  
houses.  Most  of  this  data  is  only  available  for  individual  cases.28  The  majority  
of  returnees  appear  to  have  made  full  use  of  the  purchase  clause  guaranteed  
in  the  compensation  law  of  1994,  allowing  them  to  procure  up  to  1,000  ha  of  
land   at   a   discounted   price.   With   time,   some   of   them   certainly   acquired  
additional   land,   though   the   average   most   likely   was   only   in   the   upper  
hundreds.   Most   of   the   families   returned   within   the   first   few   years   after  
reunification.   With   the   constitutional   complaints   still   pending,   the   often-­‐‑
difficult   ownership   situations   induced  many   to   initially   rent   their   ancestral  
land   before   buying   it   in   the   mid-­‐‑1990s.   Among   the   returnees   were   many  
prominent   names   of   East   Elbia.   Hans-­‐‑Georg   von   der   Marwitz   acquired  
around   900   ha   in   Friedersdorf. 29   Karl   Wilhelm   Graf   von   Finckenstein  
repurchased  Alt  Madlitz  and  the  surrounding  latifundia.  Gebhard  Graf  von  
Hardenberg  regained  several   thousand  hectares  of   the  originally  more  than  
7,000  ha  estate  at  Neu-­‐‑Hardenberg.30  Heinrich  Graf  von  Bassewitz   returned  
to  the  1,400  ha  estate  of  Gut  Dalwitz.31  Barbara  von  Oppen  reacquired  land  at  
                                                                                                 
27  See  footnote  26  of  this  chapter.  
28  The  families  keep  the  numbers  of  their  financial  investments  close  to  their  chest.  Some  
estimates  are  given  in:  Aufbau  Ost  –  Gefühl  von  Heimat,  SPIEGEL,  04.09.2006.  
29  Alter  Adel,  Neue  Pläne,  Tageszeitung,  01.08.2014;  Hans  Georg  von  der  Marwitz,  Biografien,  
Der  Bundestag,  online  at:  
www.bundestag.de/bundestag/abgeordnete18/biografien/M/marwitz_hans_georg/258776.  
30  Das  Erbe  der  Hardenbergs,  FOCUS,  30.09.1996;  For  the  pre-­‐‑war  size  of  the  estate  see:  Horst  
Mühleisen,  Patrioten  im  Widerstand  –  Carl  Hans  Graf  von  Hardenbergs  Erlebnisbericht,  
Vierteljahreshefte  für  Zeitgeschichte,  41:3  (1993),  pp.  422–423.  
31  Die  Enteignung  der  Gutsbesitzer,  NDR,  05.12.2009.  
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Kröchlendorff.32  Alongside  them,  many  other  prominent  families  such  as  the  
Arnims,  Bernstorffs  and  Bülows  returned  and  resettled.    
The   reception   of   the   old   squires   by   the   local   population   proved   to   be  
predominantly   negative,   often   anchored   in   old   prejudices   originating   from  
the  days  of  expropriation  and  expulsion.  For  decades,  the  nobility  had  been  
frowned   upon   in   the   former   workers’   and   peasants’   state.   The   returnees  
often  faced  open  hostility  in  the  East,  regardless  of  whether  their  families  had  
been  fascist  or  not.  “Counts  are  Junkers  and  responsible  for  the  exploitation  of  
the   rural   people”.33  Such   generalising   comments   were   daily   fare.   Count  
Hardenberg  remembered  people  demonstratively  ignoring  him,  remarking  –  
“into  the  air”  –  that  they  would  never  work  for  a  Count.34  Helmuth  Freiherr  
von   Maltzahn   experienced   a   similar   reception   from   the   head   of   the   local  
agricultural  co-­‐‑operative  who  unambiguously  advised  the  Baron  to  pack  his  
things   and   disappear.35  In   some   cases,   the   returnees   even   faced   threats   of  
open  violence.  The  mayor  of  Friedersdorf,  the  ancestral  estate  of  the  Marwitz  
family,   reported   that   there   had   been   talk   of   setting   fire   to   the   caravan   in  
which  Hans-­‐‑Georg   von  der  Marwitz  was   staying   during   the   restoration   of  
his  manor  house.36  Beatrix  Countess  Lynar  spoke  of  psychological  terror  and  
occasional  death   threats.37  In   the  GDR,   the  nobility  had  been   regarded  as   a  
                                                                                                 
32  Von  Geschichte  und  Gegenwart  der  von  Arnims  in  der  Uckermark,  Prenzlauer  Zeitung,  
11.09.2002.    
33  Geschichtswerkstatt  (ed.),  Adlige  Rückkehrer  im  Land  Brandenburg,  p.  42.  
34  Ibid.  
35  Gefühl  von  Heimat,  SPIEGEL,  04.09.2006.  
36  Geschichtswerkstatt  (ed.),  Adlige  Rückkehrer  im  Land  Brandenburg,  p.  42.  
37  Gefühl  von  Heimat,  SPIEGEL,  04.09.2006.  
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public   enemy,   and   for  many   inhabitants   of   the   region,   this  did  not   change  
after  1989.    
There  were  more  positive  encounters  that  reflected  the  high  expectations  and  
curiosity  of   the   local  population.   Ilsa-­‐‑Marie  von  Holtzendorff,   for   example,  
recounted   numerous   neighbourly   visits   encouraging   her   to   rebuild   the  
manor   house   and   revive   village   life.38  Many   elderly   people   who   still   had  
personal   memories   of   the   former   squires   welcomed   their   return   and   paid  
their  respects  to  the  returnees.39  Count  Bassewitz  even  claimed  that  without  
the  extraordinary  help  of  the  village  community,  he  would  have  most  likely  
left  Gut  Dalwitz  a  few  years  after  his  return.40  Similarly,  Friedrich-­‐‑Christoph  
von   Saldern   referred   to   the   significant   help   and   support   of   the   local  
farmers.41  Yet,   such   positive   receptions   do   seem   to   have   been   rare.   They  
generally   only   happened   in   areas   where   the   social   composition   of   the  
villages   had   not   changed   significantly.   Where   old   ties   and   individual  
positive  memories   of   the   expelled   squires  were   able   to   survive,   a   positive  
reception   after   reunification   was   possible.   In   areas   with   high   social  
fluctuation  and  many  newcomers,  however,   the  decades’  old  prejudice  of  a  
                                                                                                 
38  Preußisch  Blau,  Familie  von  Holtzendorff,  RBB,  28.12.2013.  
39  Helga  Calsow,  née  von  Winterfeld,  Bericht  über  den  ersten  Besuch  genau  44  Jahre  nach  der  
Vertreibung  vom  ehemaligen  Rittergut  Krieschow-­‐‑Wiesendorf  im  Kreis  Cottbus,  in:  DAA,  
FG  Win,  von  Winterfeld(t)scher  Familienverband  (ed.),  Geschichte  des  Geschlechts  von  
Winterfeld(t),  6.  Teil,  7.  Band,  2009,  pp.  38,  39;  Preußisch  Blau,  Familie  zu  Lynar,  RBB,  
26.12.2013;  See  also:  Erinnerungen  des  Hans-­‐‑Leopold  von  Winterfeldt,  Die  deutsche  
Wiedervereinigung  und  die  langwierige  Rückkehr  der  Familie  nach  Nieden  und  Damerow  
in  die  alt  angestammte  Heimat,  in:  DAA,  FG  Win,  von  Winterfeld(t)scher  Familienverband  
(ed.),  6.  Teil,  7.  Band,  2009,  p.  54.  
40  Die  Enteignung  der  Gutsbesitzer  –  Von  Uruguay  zurück  in  die  Heimat:  Heinrich  Graf  von  
Bassewitz,  NDR  1  Radio  MW,  15.12.2009.  
41  Geschichtswerkstatt  (ed.),  Adlige  Rückkehrer  im  Land  Brandenburg,  p.  102.  
249  
  
ruthless  and  exploitative  nobility  had  generally  fallen  on  fertile  ground  and  
significantly  complicated  the  integration  of  the  returnees.42  A  fortiori,   it  was  
of  utmost  importance  to  the  nobility  to  actively  engage  in  the  village  life  and  
thereby   help   to   reduce   these   old   prejudices   and   contribute   to   a   positive  
reintegration  into  the  social  community.      
From   the   very   beginning,   it   appears   that   the   nobility   indeed   tried   to   enter  
into   positive   social   partnerships   with   the   local   population,   while  
simultaneously  resuming  a  leading  role  in  the  community.  The  fact  that  the  
noble  returnees  usually  reacquired  fairly  large  estates  inevitably  put  them  in  
a   prominent   position   in   the   respective   village   communities.   They   often  
automatically  became  the  largest  employers,  and  thereby,  quickly  moved  to  
the   centre  of   economic   and   social   life.  Ultimately,   this   situation   led   to  new  
inter-­‐‑dependencies,  whether   desired   or   not.  On   the   one   hand,  many   locals  
economically   benefited   from   the   reestablishment   of   noble   estates   or   the  
cultural   and   social   activities   many   of   them   implemented.   Conversely,   a  
traditional  role  allocation  did  re-­‐‑emerge  rather  quickly,  as  the  squire  and  the  
local   population   fell   back   into   old   habits,   even   if   the   deference   and  
hierarchical   character  of   the  new  social   relations   lacked   the   intensity  of   the  
earlier  era.    
                                                                                                 
42  Beatrix  Gräfin  von  Lynar  vividly  described  how  the  long-­‐‑time  residents  generally  
welcomed  her  family’s  return  to  Lübbenau  in  the  early  1990s.  For  many  of  the  families,  
which  had  been  resettled  to  Lübbenau  after  the  Lynars’  expulsion,  however,  the  case  was  
different:    
”For  the  new  settlers  we  were  intruders.  They  said:  Watch  out!  If  the  count  returns,  he  will  




The  noble  returnees  went  to  considerable  length  to  expedite  this  process,  and  
thereby,   regain   their   traditional   position   in   the   village   community.   They  
achieved  this,  in  part,  by  presenting  themselves  as  humble  and  vigorous  men  
of  action  who  did  not  shy  away  from  hard  manual   labour.  We  come  across  
noblemen  living  in  caravans  in  the  shadow  of  their  ancestral  ruins,  or  putting  
up   temporary   sheds   near   the   construction   site,   to   oversee   the   project  
personally,   rather   than   handing   the   responsibility   to   contractors.   We   see  
young   barons   cleaning   clogged   cesspools   and   young   counts   tidying   up  
decayed   gardens   and   parks.43  This   openly   propagated   hands-­‐‑on   approach  
helped   to   overcome   old   prejudices   and   gain   acceptance   for   the   returned  
nobles  among  the  local  population.    
Additionally,  many   returnees   tried   to   engage   in,   and   furthermore,   actively  
promote,  communal  life  in  the  local  villages.  Many  offered  their  large  houses  
or  empty  farm  buildings  for  communal  and  cultural  events.  Hans-­‐‑Georg  von  
der  Marwitz   provided   an   old   barn   and   guidance   to   establish   a   communal  
centre   for   local   art   and   craftsmanship   at   Friedersdorf.   Bernhard   von  
Barsewisch  founded  an  association  which  funded  the  restoration  of  the  local  
manor   house   and   turned   it   into   a   regional   museum;   Karl-­‐‑Christoph   von  
Stünzner-­‐‑Karbe  regularly  opens  parts  of  his  manor  house  to  public   lectures  
and   concerts;   Hermann   von   Pückler   sponsored   a   kindergarten   in   Branitz;  
Count  Hardenberg  cordially  invited  the  entire  village  into  his  new  home  to  
obviate   probable   reservations;   and   Helmuth   von   Maltzahn   set   up   annual  
                                                                                                 




classical   concerts,   which   have   become   known   far   beyond   the   borders   of  
Mecklenburg.44    
These   initiatives   contributed   to   the   cultural   revival   of   the   East-­‐‑Elbian  
countryside.  More  importantly,  however,  they  facilitated  the  reintegration  of  
the  returnees   into  the   local  communities.  Strong  social  engagement  showed  
the  locals  that  the  noble  families  had  come  to  stay  and  were  not  only  focused  
on  enhancing  their  estates,  but  also  willing  to  contribute  to  the  development  
of   the  area.  Social  acceptance  thereby  grew  accordingly,  and  with   it  came  a  
gradual   return   to   the   traditional   social   pyramid.   The   old   families   often  
resumed   leading   positions   in   the   local   communities   and   started   to   shape  
public   life.   Mutual   trust   began   to   be   re-­‐‑established   and   quasi-­‐‑patrimonial  
relationships   resurfaced.  Many   nobles   took   over   honorary   positions   in   the  
local   communities   or   churches.   Barbara   von   Oppen   and   Gebhard   von  
Hardenberg   were   elected   into   the   local,   as   well   as   the   church,   councils.  
Hermann   von   Pückler   became   a   senator   of   the  University   of   Cottbus,   and  
Hans-­‐‑Georg   von   der   Marwitz   represents   his   constituency   in   the   German  
Bundestag.45     In   some   cases,   the   reawakening   of   paternalism   even   reached  
long-­‐‑lost  dimensions.  Shortly  after   their  return,   the  Solms  family  celebrated  
                                                                                                 
44  For  Marwitz  see:  www.kunstspeicher-­‐‑friedersdorf.de;  For  Barsewisch  see:  Der  Adel  kehrt  
nach  Brandenburg  zurück  –  Familien  bauen  Schlösser  auf  und  gründen  Museen,  WELT,  
28.11.2005;  For  Stünzner-­‐‑Karbe  see:  Preußisch  Blau,  Familie  von  Stünzner-­‐‑Karbe,  RBB,  
28.12.2014;  For  Pückler  see:  Mit  dem  Pendel  auf  der  Suche  nach  den  Ahnen  –  Der  
Aufschwung  nach  der  Wende:  Wie  Hermann  Graf  von  Pückler,  der  Urgroßneffe  des  
berühmten  Fürsten  von  Pückler,  seinen  Familiensitz  in  Branitz  mit  neuem  Leben  erfüllt,  
WELT  am  Sonntag,  10.12.2000;  For  Maltzahn  see:  www.ulrichshusen.de/de/festspielort.html.    
45  Die  Rückkehr  des  Blauen  Blutes,  online  at:  
www.vonarnim.com/presse/RueckkehrdesblauenBlutes.pdf;  Mit  den  Hardenbergs  kam  die  
Hoffnung  nach  Lietzen,  WELT,  18.02.2001;  Mit  dem  Pendel  auf  der  Suche  nach  den  Ahnen,  
WELT,  10.12.2000;  Alter  Adel,  Neue  Pläne,  Die  Tageszeitung,  01.08.2014.  
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their   four   hundred   year   presence   at   Baruth.   To  mark   this   special   occasion,  
the   current   count   and   countess   arrived   at   the   festivities   in   a   horse-­‐‑drawn  
carriage,  flanked  by  twenty  riders  and  cheered  on  by  the  local  population  of  
Baruth,  who   handed   them  presents   and  dutifully   paid   their   respects.46  Yet,  
such   examples   remain   the   exception.   The   majority   of   noble   returnees  
refrained  from  such  ostentatious  displays.  
A  New  Phase  of  History  Management  
In   resuming   a   dominant   position   in   their   local   communities,   the   nobility  
subtly   put   their   centuries-­‐‑old   power   to  work.   The   first   step   in   their  multi-­‐‑
dimensional  history  management  project  was  the  safeguarding  of  the  often-­‐‑
fragile   economic   base   of   the   new   estates.   Without   an   economically   self-­‐‑
sufficient   estate,   a   successful   and   permanent   return   to   East   Elbia   was  
impossible.   The   large  majority   of   the   returnees  were   by  no  means  wealthy  
capitalists  who  had   large   fortunes   at   their   disposal   to   allow   them   to   run   a  
deficient   estate.   On   the   contrary,   most   of   them   were   forced   to   take   up  
substantial   loans   in   order   to   rebuild   their   existence.   Economic   success  
became  the  ultimate  prerequisite  for  social  pre-­‐‑eminence.  Without  being  able  
to   offer   economic   stability   and   work   to   the   local   population,   no   kind   of  
patrimonial  relationship  would  be  feasible.  Many  of  the  returnees  enhanced  
and   diversified   their   estates   in   order   to   enlarge   their   product   range   and  
revive  the  local  economy.  These  enterprises  were  not  the  fruit  of  an  abstract  
and  timeless  economic  rationality;  they  were  deeply  shaped  by  each  family’s  
                                                                                                 
46  Geschichtswerkstatt  (ed.),  Adlige  Rückkehrer  im  Land  Brandenburg,  p.  193.  
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historical   awareness.   Family   histories   were   crucial   to   the   success   of   these  
projects.   The   returnees   set   up   businesses   that   were   directly   or   indirectly  
related   to   the   family   tradition   or   drew   heavily   from   the   family’s   previous  
achievements.    
Inspired   by   Theodor   Fontane’s   famous   poem   about   one   of   his   pear-­‐‑loving  
ancestors,  Friedrich-­‐‑Carl  von  Ribbeck  restored  the  dilapidated  distillery  and  
set   up   a   modest   pear-­‐‑brandy   production.47  The   eponymous   village   in   the  
Havelland   owes  much   of   its   popularity   as   a   tourist   attraction   to   Fontane’s  
description  of  the  affectionate  old  squire  who  handed  out  pears  to  the  local  
children   and   ensured   their   supply   beyond  his  death   by  having   a  pear   tree  
planted  on  his  grave.48  A  pear-­‐‑brandy,  distilled  by  a  direct  descendant  of  the  
famous  “Lord  Ribbeck  of  Ribbeck  in  Havelland”,  itself  quickly  became  one  of  
the  village’s  main  attractions.  Ribbeck  was  fully  aware  of  the  poem’s  touristic  
value  and  calculated  that  it  would  be  foolish  “not  to  use  the  marketing  push  
that   Fontane  provided”.49  By   choosing   to  distil   a   pear-­‐‑brandy,   von  Ribbeck  
cleverly  managed   to   establish   a   link  between   family  history   and   a  modern  
local  product.  Fontane’s  poem  enabled  the  customer  to  identify  the  brandy  as  
an   old   family   tradition,   associating   the   product   with   longevity,   reliability  
and  integrity.  It  was  a  priceless  marketing  asset.    
Ferdinand   von   Lochow   also   hoped   to   benefit   from   the   splendour   of   the  
family’s  long  history  in  the  area.  To  add  to  his  agricultural  business,  he  and  
                                                                                                 
47  Herr  von  Ribbeck  auf  Ribbeck  ist  wieder  zu  Hause,  Berliner  Zeitung,  21.01.2015;  Susanne  
Conrad  besucht  Familie  von  Ribbeck,  Landgut  Havelland,  ZDF,  27.07.2014.    
48  Theodor  Fontane,  Herr  von  Ribbeck  auf  Ribbeck  im  Havelland  (Landsberg,  2008).  
49  Ein  bißchen  Kultur,  SPIEGEL,  27.04.1992.  
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his  wife  opened  a  restaurant  called  the  ‘Rye-­‐‑King’  to  sell  their  farm  products,  
as  well  as  their  home  brewed  beer.50  The  Rye-­‐‑King  is  a  prominent  reference  
to  his   famous  ancestor,  Ferdinand  von  Lochow,  who  was  widely  known  as  
the   most   skilled   rye   cultivator   of   Prussia.51  Building   on   this   history,   the  
home-­‐‑brewed   rye   beer   and   the   restaurant   are   promoted   accordingly,   with  
marketing   content   constantly   referring   to   the   family’s   longstanding  
experience  in  the  business.  
Hubertus  Count  Hahn  von  Burgsdorff  followed  a  similar  approach  when  he  
restarted   the   production   of   a   traditional   local   bitter   orange   liqueur.  
Advertising   for   this   product,   which   is   supposedly   distilled   using  
“generation-­‐‑old  recipes”,  he  explicitly  associated  the  liqueur  with  the  history  
of  the  Hahn  family.  Countless  pictures  of  the  old  castle  and  orangery,  where  
the   fruit  –  “a  status  symbol  of  European  princes”52  –  had   traditionally  been  
grown,   provide   the   product   with   a   nimbus   of   historical   authenticity   and  
considerably   add   to   its   appeal.   In   such   cases,   though   the   effect   is   not  
precisely  measurable,  the  family  history  offers  credibility  to  the  product  and  
thus  contributes  to  its  success.    
The   various   hotels   that   have   been   established   in   old   manor   houses   and  
castles  also  draw  heavily  from  the  history  of  the  noble  families.  The  Lynars  at  
Lübbenau,   the   Stünzner-­‐‑Karbes   at   Sieversdorf   and   the   Thüngens   at   Groß  
Ziethen   have   all   dedicated   long   sections   of   their   websites   to   the   family  
                                                                                                 
50  Preußisch  Blau,  Familie  von  Lochow,  RBB,  20.12.2014.  
51  Jonathan  Harwood,  Politische  Ökonomie  der  Pflanzenzucht  in  Deutschland  ca.  1870–1933,  
in:  Susanne  Heim  (ed.),  Autarkie  und  Ostexpansion,  Pflanzenzucht  und  Agrarforschung  im  
Nationalsozialismus  (Göttingen,  2002),  p.  16.  
52  Alte  Pomeranze,  online  at:  www.alte-­‐‑pomeranze.de/geschichte/.  
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history.53  Often  rooms  are  named  after  famous  family  members  and  notable  
events   of   the   family   history   are   prominently   portrayed   throughout   the  
hotels.   The   chance   to   stay   in   historic   buildings,   especially   if   these   are   still  
owned   by   the   respective   family,   appears   to   retain   considerable   appeal,  
comparable  perhaps  to  the  massive  tourist  traffic  attracted  to  country  houses  
administered   by   the  National   Trust   in   Britain.54  The   presence   of   the   family  
adds  certain  flair  to  the  experience.  
In  conclusion,  all  these  small  businesses  borrow  heavily  from  the  respective  
family   histories.   The   noble   returnees   have   generally   been   rather   astute   in  
exploiting   their   family   histories   by   tapping   memories   and   anecdotes   to  
support  their  business  ventures  in  the  present.  Images  of  family  tradition  and  
expertise  are  designed  to  insinuate  the  longevity,   integrity  and  reliability  of  
the   product.   As   a   consequence,   these   small   businesses   receive   invaluable  
symbolic   starting   capital   and   thereby   significantly   help   the   families   to  
strengthen   their   position   in   the   local   community.      The   family   history   had  
always   been   a   tool   of   rehabilitation   and   collective   legitimation;   in   recent  
years,  it  has  acquired  commercial  value.  
As  already  discussed,  the  noble  returnees  showed  great  commitment  when  it  
came   to   rebuilding   old   estates,   and   entering   into   new   social   relationships  
with   the   local   communities.   They   also   invested   in   reconstructing   and  
                                                                                                 
53  Schloss  Luebbenau  im  Spreewald,  online  at:  www.schloss-­‐‑luebbenau.de;  Gutshaus  
Sieversdorf,  online  at:  www.gutshaus-­‐‑sieversdorf.de;  Schloss  Ziethen  im  Havelland,  online  
at:  www.schlossziethen.de.  
54  See:  Peter  Mandler,  The  Fall  and  Rise  of  the  Stately  Home  (London,  1997),  see  especially  the  
chapters:  Tourism  refined  and  The  Stately  Home  Business,  pp.  209–221  and  pp.  369–388;  
Also  see  the  chapter:  Tourism  and  Repair  Grants  1974–1998  in:  John  Cornforth,  The  Country  
Houses  of  England  1948–1998  (London,  1998),  pp.  207–241.  
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replenishing  their  popular  image  by  finding  outlets  to  legitimise  and  defend  
their  own  specific  narrative  of  the  past.  To  regain  popular  acceptance,  it  was  
vital   to   actively   counter   the   persistent   stereotype   of   the   cold-­‐‑hearted   and  
authoritarian   Junker.55  Many   of   the   returnees   thus   participated   in  what  we  
might   call   a   ‘history   offensive’,   emphasising   the   nobility’s   achievements  
across   the   centuries   and   rehabilitating   the   traditional   patrimonial   system,  
which  was  widely  regarded  as  the  root  of  all  social  injustice  in  East  German  
society.   One   popular   way   of   furthering   this   process   was   to   curate   small  
exhibitions   in   manor   houses   or   participate   actively   in   larger   travelling  
exhibitions  set  up  by  government  agencies  or  museums.    
At  Lübbenau,  the  Lynars  are  planning  to  set  up  a  small  museum,  similar  to  
the   one   which   existed   in   the   1930s.   The   aim   is   “to   offer   insights   into   the  
family  chronicle  of  the  counts  of  Lynar  and  the  eventful  history  of  their  castle  
Lübbenau”.56  Especially   for   the  Lynars,  who  met  with  steep  resistance   from  
the  local  population  upon  their  return  in  the  early  1990s,  such  an  endeavour  
provides  the  ideal  platform  to  inform  locals  as  well,  as  visitors,  of  their  side  
of  the  story,  and  thereby  gain  influence  over  the  interpretation  of  events  and  
opinions.  The  family  have,  for  the  first  time,  secured  a  platform  on  which  to  
present   for   public   consumption   the   atrocities   the   family   experienced   after  
their   involvement   in   the   military   resistance   against   Hitler,   and   their  
subsequent  expulsion  from  their  ancestral  estate  in  1945.    
                                                                                                 
55  Unfortunately,  a  detailed  study  about  the  connotations  and  applications  of  the  term  
“Junker”  is  still  missing.  For  an  extended  definition  see:  Reif,  Die  Junker,  in:  Francois  und  
Schulze  (eds),  Deutsche  Erinnerungsorte,  pp.  520–536.    




Whereas   the   museum   only   forms   a   small   part   of   the   castle   complex   at  
Lübbenau,   Bernhard   von   Barsewisch   restored   the   entirety   of   Wolfshagen  
castle   specifically   and   exclusively   to   house   a   museum   dedicated   to   rare  
porcelain,   and   the   history   of   the   surrounding   gentry. 57   For   years,   he  
campaigned   for   this  project,  and  also  personally  donated  generously   for   its  
reconstruction.  The  museum   is   intended  both   to  display   a   typical   Prussian  
pre-­‐‑1945   manor   house,   and   to   commemorate   the   destruction   of   noble   life  
after  the  Second  World  War.  Today,  it  houses  one  of  the  largest  collections  of  
portraits   of   local   squires   in   the   area.      The   Barsewisch   collection   actively  
engages   in   the   presentation   of   this   history,   is   conceived   with   the   aim   of  
shaping  a  new  and  more  positive  perception  of  the  nobility  and  its  heritage.    
Similarly,   Friedrich-­‐‑Christoph   von   Saldern   has   actively   promoted   the  
rehabilitation  of  the  history  of  his  family,  and  the  nobility  in  general.  In  1999,  
he   founded   a   “history-­‐‑club   for   the   Prignitz,   whose   main   purpose   is   to  
promote   ‘historical   truth’”. 58   Historical   truth,   however,   is   a   contentious  
matter.    What  von  Saldern’s  club  actually  propagates  is  a  portrayal  of  history  
as  he  and  his  sympathisers  see  it,  or  want  to  see  it.  It  is  nothing  less  than  an  
attempt   to   regain   the   prerogative   of   interpretation,   and   is   hence   a   classic  
example  of  history  management.    
Two   other   large   exhibitions   have   significantly   reshaped   the   nobility’s  
popular   image   in   Eastern   Germany.   In   2001,   the   Berlin-­‐‑Brandenburgische  
Geschichtswerkstatt,  a  charitable  organisation  designed  to  promote  research  
                                                                                                 
57  Schloss-­‐‑Museum  Wolfshagen  Prignitz,  online  at:  www.schlossmuseum-­‐‑wolfshagen.com.  
58  Geschichtswerkstatt  (ed.),  Adlige  Rückkehrer  im  Land  Brandenburg,  p.  105.  
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on   the   regional   history   of   Berlin   and   Brandenburg,   curated   an   exhibition  
about   noble   returnees   to   Brandenburg. 59   Building   on   this,   the  
Brandenburgische   Landeszentrale   für   politische   Bildung  mounted   another,  
even  larger,  exhibition  in  2012,  aiming  to  “acknowledge  the  achievements  of  
noble   returnees”. 60   Martina   Schellhorn,   the   exhibition’s   curator,   visited  
eleven   families   to   observe   and   record   the   progress   they   had  made   twenty  
years  after   their   return.  What   is   remarkable  about   these   interviews   is,  once  
again,   their  highly   compelling  narrative.  Whether   it   is   the   reasons   for   their  
return,  their  social  commitment  in  the  villages,  or  the  constant  references  to  
their  long  family  history  in  the  region,  reading  these  interviews,  one  gets  the  
impression   that   the   return   of   all   these   families  was   purely   driven   by   their  
responsibility  to  their  family  history  and  to  honouring  their  duty  to  society.  
As   observed   in   the   family   chronicles   and   autobiographies,   we   once   again  
come  across  a  significantly  glorified  narrative,  designed  to  control,  alter  and  
enhance   the  motivations,   and   hence   the   image,   of   the   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility.  
Unsurprisingly,   Martina   Schellhorn   revealed   that   following   her   second  
interview,   the   remaining   families  were   all  well-­‐‑aware   of   her   project   before  
they   had   even   been   approached,   suggesting   that   diligent   infra-­‐‑corporate  
communication  had  accompanied  the  whole  process.61    
The  exhibition  proved  to  be  a  great  success  and  “many  visitors  came  forward  
admitting  that  they  had  still  been  stuck  in  old  thought  patterns  and  clung  to  
                                                                                                 
59  Ibid.    
60  Martina  Schellhorn,  Märkische  Adlige  –  eine  Bilanz  nach  20  Jahren,  Brandenburgische  
Landeszentrale  für  politische  Bildung  (Potsdam,  2014),  p.  5.  
61  Personal  Interview  with  Martina  Schellhorn,  10.03.2015.  
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a  different  conception  of  history”.62  Ultimately,  however,  this  state  sponsored  
initiative  proved  to  be  much  more  than  simply  another  piece  in  the  puzzle  of  
noble  history  management.  It  also  signalled  to  the  noble  returnees  that  after  
decades  of  state  directed  ostracism,  and  the  controversies  over  restitution  in  
the   1990s,   that   the   government  was   finally   recognising   and   supporting   the  
nobility’s   engagement   in   and   return   to   East   Elbia.   This   notion   was  
powerfully  reinforced  when  the  former  Social  Democratic  Prime  Minister  of  
Brandenburg,   Manfred   Stolpe,   officially   labelled   the   anti-­‐‑noble  
measurements   of   the   SED   government   as   “unjust”   and   simultaneously  
praised  the  nobles’  contribution  to  the  “cultural  development  of  Prussia  and  
the   modernisation   of   its   agrarian   economy”.   Nowadays,   he   claimed,   the  
returnees  are  “important  partners  for  the  village  communities,  the  economy  
and  the  intellectual-­‐‑cultural  life”  of  the  area,  and  thereby,  they  are  becoming  
“important   development   aid   workers”   in   Eastern   Germany.63  Such   public  
acknowledgement   of   the   nobility’s   importance   to   the   rural   regions   of   East  
Germany  was  balm  for  the  noble  soul.    
Consequently,   the   importance   of   this   exhibition  was  manifold.  On   the   one  
hand,   it   offered   the   noble   returnees   a   sympathetic   platform   from  which   to  
relate   their  side  of  history  and  counteract  negative  narratives.  On   the  other  
hand,   it   showed   that   the  government  was  now  willing   to   contribute   to   the  
education  and  instruction  of  a  still  sceptical  East  German  population.  Due  to  
its   considerable   success,   the   exhibition   had   one   more   invaluable   effect;   it  
                                                                                                 
62  Ibid.  




increased   the   already   strong   public   interest   in   the   noble   returnees,   and  
resulted   in   numerous   television   documentaries   that   provided   the   nobility  
with  a  further  means  of  shaping  its  public  image.      
In   addition   to   rebuilding   the   nobility’s   social   standing   in   the   village  
communities,  numerous  noble  returnees  also  began  to  participate  in  a  larger  
enterprise,   which   was   designed   to   revitalise   the   nobility’s   trans-­‐‑regional  
public  image.  The  two  main  pillars  of  this  new  phase  of  history  management  
were   an   active   cooperation  with   the   press   and   strategic   collaboration  with  
television   productions   known   to   cast   the   nobility   in   a   positive   light.  
Journalists  and  publicists  have  an  enormous  impact  on  the  dissemination  of  
interpretations   of   history.   In   light   of   the   paramount   importance   of   mass  
media  and  public  opinion,   it   is  difficult   to  overestimate   the   role   journalists  
play   in   the   management   of   historical   issues   and   the   contemporary  
interpretation   of   history. 64   Maintaining   favourable   relationships   with  
journalists   thus   promises   to   yield   significant   advantages  when   it   comes   to  
constructing  and  legitimising  a  certain  narrative  for  public  consumption.    
From   the   very   beginning,   the   topic   of   restitution   received   substantial  
coverage   in   the   national,   as   well   as   regional,   press.   The   debates   about  
whether  the  land  reform  and  the  government’s  refusal  to  restore  confiscated  
property   to   the  old  owners  were   just  or  not,  catapulted  the  noble  returnees  
into   the   spotlight  of  public   interest.  The  numerous  decisions  of   the  Federal  
Court   of   Justice   remained   one   of   the   prevailing   topics   of   public   interest  
                                                                                                 
64  Conze,  Aufstand  des  preußischen  Adels,  in:  Vierteljahreshefte  für  Zeitgeschichte,  p.  485.  
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throughout   the   first   decade   after   reunification. 65   By   the   time   the   legal  
question  had  been  resolved,  several  noble  families  had  settled  in  the  East  and  
managed  to  re-­‐‑establish  themselves  in  the  local  communities.  Encouraged  by  
the   cultural   and   social   commitment   of   the   noble   returnees,   as   well   as   the  
publicity   these   stories   promised,   almost   every  major   national   and   regional  
newspaper  published  articles  concerning  committed  and  energetic  noblemen  
trying  to  rebuild  their  dilapidated  family  estates.      
The  noble   returnees  are  portrayed  as   courageous  “pioneers,   in  areas  which  
are   in   desperate   need   of   development   assistance”.66  As   “seigniorial   social  
workers”,   they  managed   to   increase   the   appeal   and  attraction  of   the  often-­‐‑
deserted  areas   in   the  East.67  Repeated   references   to  duty  and  responsibility,  
the  famous  noblesse  oblige,  continuously  resurface  in  these  articles.68  Friendly  
journalists  visit  the  restored  estates  and  take  tours  with  the  noble  returnees,  
waxing   lyrical   about   “re-­‐‑flourishing   landscapes”   in   otherwise   neglected  
surroundings.69  We  read  about  the  onerous  struggles  involved  in  reacquiring  
the   estates,   about   the   social   commitment   of   the   new   owners,   and   of   their  
sense  of  responsibility  towards  their  family  and  its  history.    
This  all  leads  to  the  question  of  why  journalists  buy  into  this  markedly  one-­‐‑
sided  approach.  Doubtlessly,  part  of  the  answer  can  be  found  in  an  unforced  
admiration  for  the  achievements  of  the  returnees.  Journalists  may  tend  to  be  
                                                                                                 
65  Am  Anfang  der  Einheit  stand  eine  Lüge,  Die  Zeit,  29.01.2004;  Späte  Hoffnung  für  die  Opfer  
der  Bodenreform,  FAZ,  09.11.2009;  Bodenreformfrage  endgültig  entschieden,  Handelsblatt,  
30.03.2005;  Opfer  verlieren  vor  Gericht,  STERN,  30.03.2005.  
66  Rückkehrer  und  Pioniere,  Berliner  Zeitung,  02.11.2011.  
67  Feudale  Sozialarbeiter,  Die  Zeit,  14.02.2013.  
68  Adel  verpflichtet,  Welt,  11.02.2001.  
69  Aufbau  Ost,  Gefühl  von  Heimat,  SPIEGEL,  04.09.2006.  
262  
  
less   invested   in   anti-­‐‑Junker   narratives   than   historians   or   sociologists,   for  
whom  the  Sonderweg  may  have  been  a  crucial  element  in  their  socialisation.  
The   journalist’s   chief   concerns  are   the  expectations  of   their   readers  and   the  
saleability  of  their  story.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  idea  of  a  forcefully  
expelled   nobleman   who   returns   to   his   ancestral   estate   and   restores   the  
dilapidated   ruins   of   the  manor   house,   in   the   process,   reviving   the   cultural  
and  social   life  of   the  village,  offers  a  highly  appealing  story.   Journalists  are  
often   quite   content   with   reading   these   exhibitions   and   collections   at   face  
value  and  accepting  the  narrative  on  offer.    
Once   again,   it   seems,   the   nobility   emerge   as   masters   of   visibility.   The  
conventional  techniques  of  self-­‐‑representation  are  still  in  evidence.  Ever  since  
the  increasingly  popular  Junker-­‐‑critique  around  the  turn  of  the  century,  the  
nobility  has  been  confronted  with  a  highly  critical  public  and  has  had  to  find  
ways   to   counter   popular   animosities   and   intervene   in   the   interpretation   of  
events  in  order  to  maintain  its  social  superiority.  The  success  of  their  efforts  
can   be   observed   in   those   numerous   newspaper   articles   that   report   on  
restored   churches,   sponsored   kindergartens   and   cultural   events   where   the  
noble  family  mingles  with  the  locals.  These  benefactions,  skilfully  presented  
to  journalists,  help  to  shape  the  image  of  an  altruistic  caste  eager  to  serve  the  
local   community.  We  might   thus   speak   of   an   implicit  mutual   arrangement  
between   press   and   noble   returnees.   A   rather   uncritical   press   –   concerned  
with   the   saleability   of   the   story   and   the  wishes   of   its   readers   –   provides   a  
platform   for   a   social   caste,   which   is   particularly   keen   on   influencing   the  
interpretation   of   history   and  willing   to   go   to   great   lengths   to   achieve   this  
goal.     This,   in   turn,   reveals  why   the  mass  media   is   so   ideally   suited   to   the  
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promotion  of  the  nobility’s  history  management.  It  is  willing,  before  the  eyes  
of  a  broad  readership,  to  buy  into  the  nobility’s  carefully  pruned  narratives  
of  its  own  history.  
Television,   too,   has   emerged   as   an   important   platform   for   noble   history  
management  since  the  reunification  of  Germany.    Television  became  a  mass  
medium  in  Germany  shortly  after  the  end  of  the  war.  Yet,  the  nobility  really  
only  discovered  television  as  a  medium  of  public  relations  towards  the  turn  
of   the   twentieth   century.   The   revival   of   Berlin   as   the   capital   of   the   united  
republic,  as  well  as  the  festivities  surrounding  the  300  year  anniversary  of  the  
foundation  of  the  Kingdom  of  Prussia  in  2001,  reignited  the  public’s  interest  
in  Germany’s   former  royal   families  and   its  nobility   in  general.  Live  reports  
from   the  great  European   royal  weddings  and  various  documentaries  about  
the   Hohenzollern,  Wittelsbacher   and   Guelphs   redirected   the   focus   on   this  
peculiar   elite.70  The   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility,   by   contrast,   made   only   sporadic  
appearances.   They   tended   to   crop   up   mainly   in   documentaries   on   the  
attempted   coup   of   July   1944,   in   productions   about   the   expulsions,   or   in  
documentaries  about  the  final  hours  of  the  war.71    
This  situation  changed  substantially  once  the  noble  returnees  had  firmly  re-­‐‑
established  themselves  in  East  Elbia.  Twenty  years  after  their  return,  the  first  
                                                                                                 
70  Die  frühen  Wittelsbacher,  BR-­‐‑Alpha,  03.03.2011;  Absolute  Fürstenherrschaft,  BR-­‐‑Alpha,  
31.03.2011;  Königliche  Dynastien:  Die  Hohenzollern  –  Eine  Dynastie  voller  Gegensätze,  ZDF,  
29.07.2014;  König,  Kaiser,  Bürger  –  Die  preußischen  Hohenzollern,  3  SAT,  27.12.2006;  Der  
Deutsche  Adel  –  Das  Erbe  des  Kaisers,  ARD,  30.06.2013;  Liebeshochzeit  in  Luxemburg,  ZDF  
Royal,  20.10.2012;  Livestream  zur  Hochzeit  von  Fürst  Albert  und  Charlene  Wittstock,  ZDF  
Royal,  21.04.2011;  Wallfahrt  zu  Diana,  ZDF,  22.08.1998;  Adel  ohne  Skrupel  –  die  dunklen  
Geschäfte  der  Welfen,  ARD,  18.08.2014.  
71  Die  Stunde  der  Offiziere,  ZDF,  29.06.2004;  Flucht  und  Vertreibung,  ZDF,  06.10.2011;  Der  
Sturm:  Die  Schlacht  um  Ostpreußen,  ZDF,  11.01.2005.  
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documentaries  about  the  nobility’s  return  to  their  ancestral  estates  have  gone  
to   air.72  Following   the  widely  well-­‐‑received   exhibition  Heimat   verpflichtet   in  
2012,   numerous   television   productions   picked   up   on   the   topic.73  Like   the  
newspaper   articles   discussed   previously,   these   programmes   presented  
viewers   with   an   untainted   story   of   success.   The   viewers   see   flourishing  
landscapes   and   hardworking   noblemen,   and   hear   descriptions   of   the  
families’   glorious   pasts.   Hans   Georg   von   der   Marwitz,   who   features   in  
several  documentaries,  shows  the  viewers  around  his  refurbished  estate.  He  
inspects  his   fields  with   the   film  crew  and,   in  a  powerful   improvised  scene,  
personally   comes   to   the   rescue   of   a   tractor   stuck   in   the  mud.  After   subtly  
explaining   the   challenges  he   faced  upon  his   return  and  his   commitment   to  
the  development  of  the  local  community,  his  attention  is  directed  to  the  long  
and  glorious  family  history,  best  exemplified  by  his  famous  ancestor,  Johann  
Friedrich  von  der  Marwitz,  who  famously  disobeyed  his  king’s  order  to  loot  
the  Saxon  castle   in  revenge   for   the  plundering  of  Charlottenburg  palace.   In  
recounting   his   ancestor’s   memorial   at   Friedersdorf,   the   interviewed   noble  
bridges  into  a  discussion  of  the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility’s  resistance  to  the  Third  
Reich.74  In  doing   so,   von  der  Marwitz   rehashes   all   the   fundamentals   of   the  
established   noble   history   management   strategy.   He   presents   himself   as   a  
hardworking   and   humble   squire   who   is   dedicated   to   the   wellbeing   of   his  
                                                                                                 
72  Die  Rückkehr  der  Junker,  Arte  Info,  03.01.2010;  Alter  Adel  –  neue  Aufgaben:  Hans  Georg  
von  der  Marwitz,  Deutsche  Welle,  11.03.2011.  
73  Preußisch  Blau,  Jörg  Thadeusz  besucht  den  Adel  in  Brandenburg,  RBB,  2013/2014;  
Landgut  Havelland,  ZDF,  27.07.2014;  Märchenhaft:  Schloss  Ulrichshusen,  ZDF,  06.08.2014.  
74  Alter  Adel,  Marwitz,  Deutsche  Welle;  Preußisch  Blau,  Familie  von  der  Marwitz;  EU-­‐‑
Geschenke  für  Großbauern,  ARD,  25.04.2013.  
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village,  while  simultaneously  living  up  to  the  burden  and  responsibility  that  
comes  with  the  long  standing  family  tradition  at  Friedersdorf.    
Yet,   Hans   Georg   von   der   Marwitz   is   by   no   means   the   only   versatile   and  
media-­‐‑savvy   member   of   his   caste.   Throughout   many   documentaries,   we  
encounter  noblemen  who   conform   to   this   familiar   criterion.  Ferdinand  von  
Lochow   greets   the   television   host   from   his   tractor,   before   guiding   him  
through   the  renovated  rooms  of  his  manor  house.75  While  showing  viewers  
around   her   restored   castle   Ulrichshusen,   Alla   von   Maltzahn   explains   the  
family  portraits  and  indicates  her  affiliation  to  Martin  Luther,  thereby  subtly  
referring   to   the   antiquity   and   distinction   of   the   family. 76   Anecdotes   of  
expulsion  and  the   loss  of  Heimat  prompt  viewer  compassion  and  sympathy  
and  help   the  audience   to   identify  with   the  destinies  of   the  noble   returnees.  
The   evocative   depiction   of   unpretentious   noblemen   organising   popular  
festivities  for  the  village  community  serves  a  similar  purpose.    
Finally,   the   noble   returnees   never   tire   of   pointing   out   their   families’  
traditional  aversion  for  the  Nazis.  Almost  every  interviewee  decorates  his  or  
her   family  history  with   tales  of   some  kind  of   relationship  with   the  military  
resistance,   individual   resistive  action,  or  at   least   a   strongly  developed  anti-­‐‑
Nazi  attitude.  A  large  portion  of  the  documentaries  about  the  Lynars  and  the  
Hardenbergs  deals  with  their  forefathers’  involvement  in  the  1944  coup.77  We  
see   Hans   Georg   von   der   Marwitz   drawing   parallels   between   his   famous  
                                                                                                 
75  Preußisch  Blau,  Familie  von  Lochow;  Die  Rückkehr  der  Junker,  Ferdinand  von  Lochow,  
Arte,  08.01.2010.  
76  Märchenhaft:  Schloss  Ulrichshusen,  ZDF,  06.08.2014.  




ancestor  who  disobeyed  Friedrich  II  and  the  decision  of  the  noble  officers  to  
try  to  kill  Hitler.78  Friedrich  von  Ribbeck  hints  at  his  father’s  resistance  to  the  
Nazi  regime  and  the  alleged  expropriation  of  the  estate,  while  Count  Pückler  
refers   to   his   family’s   instinctive   loathing   for   the   regime.79  All   these   subtle  
references  collectively  construct  a  favourable  narrative  of  the  nobility’s  past  
in  order  to  legitimise  and  renew  their  claim  to  social  primacy  in  the  present.80    
Within  this  process,  however,  one  must  not  forget  that  many  of  these  topics  
and  scenes  are,   to  a  degree,   strategically  stage-­‐‑managed  by   the  writers  and  
producers   of   the   television   documentaries.   Producers   often   pursue   an  
agenda   of   their   own   when   they   fit   the   nobility   into   a   generic   format.   As  
Anuschka  Rother,  the  author  of  a  piece  regarding  Helmut  von  Maltzahn  and  
Ulrichshusen  castle,  indicated,  journalists  often  have  neither  the  time  nor  the  
inclination   to   question   the   self-­‐‑portrayal   of   the   nobility.   “Often   the   main  
purpose  of   such  a  vignette   is  not  a  critical  analysis  but   rather   to  encourage  
the  viewers  to  visit  the  castle  and  cater  to  their  desires  for  the  still  unbroken  
fascination  of  noble  life.”81  Susanne  Conrad  of  the  ZDF  confirmed  this  notion  
by  stating  that  “most  of  this  uncritical  approach  is  owed  to  the  format”.  Her  
piece  about   the  Ribbeck   family  “was  mainly   intended   to   show  her  viewers  
beautiful  and  placid  facets  of  the  German  countryside.  We  wanted  to  portray  
                                                                                                 
78  Preußisch  Blau,  Familie  von  der  Marwitz;  Alter  Adel,  Marwitz,  Deutsche  Welle.  
79  Landgut  Havelland,  ZDF,  27.07.2014;  Preußisch  Blau,  Familie  von  Pückler,  RBB,  
25.12.2014.  
80  As  comparison  see  the  nobility’s  attempt  to  distance  itself  from  National  Socialism  in  the  
autobiographies  and  family  chronicles  in  chapters  III  &  IV.  




the  kind  Lord  Ribbeck,  who  gave  out  pears  to  children.  A  critical  assessment  
of  the  family’s  return  to  East  Elbia  would  not  have  fitted  into  our  program”.82  
Hence,  as  much  as   the  noble  returnees  want   to  voice   their  side  of   the  story  
and  are  eager  to  promote  their  ultimate  agenda,  the  producers  are  happy  to  
play  along  in  return  for  evocative  and  attractive  clichés.  Stories  of  a  glorious  
past,   an   unbroken   bond   to  Heimat,   and   successful   reestablishment   despite  
enormous  obstacles,  are  ideally  suited  to  attracting  high  numbers  of  viewers.  
For  example,  in  the  case  of  the  Ribbeck  documentary,  the  trans-­‐‑generational  
prominence  and  popularity  of  the  Fontane  poem  encouraged  the  producers  
to   use   Lord   Ribbeck   as   the   “ideal   drawing   card   to   attract   viewers”. 83  
Furthermore,  there  is  no  indication  that  the  initiative  for  these  documentaries  
emanates   from   the   nobility.   On   the   contrary,   the   television   stations,   fully  
aware  of   their  viewers’  persistent  desire   to  get   a  glimpse  of   the  glamorous  
and   elitist   life   of   the   nobility,   seem   to   be   the   driving   force   behind   these  
productions.  Yet,  the  noble  families,  having  realised  the  enormous  potential  
of  these  formats,  happily  make  themselves  available  and  warmly  receive  the  
production  companies  into  their  homes.    
In   contrast   with   newspaper   articles,   television   documentaries   have  
propagated   potent   and   lasting   images.   Powerful   photo   archives   of   the  
horrors   and   destruction   of   the   war   and   the   communist   era,   paired   with  
depictions   of   hardworking   returnees   carefully   renovating   manor   houses,  
restoring  parks  and  rebuilding  churches,  have  helped  to  form  lasting  positive  
                                                                                                 




associations.   It   is   worth   noting   that,   to   an   even   greater   extent   than   print  
journalists,   documentary   film   crews   are   susceptible   to   strategies   of  
domestication   through   hospitality.   Hosting   a   film   crew   for   an   extended  
period   of   time   significantly   facilitates   the   cultivation   of   personal  
relationships  between  nobility  and  creators,  thus  enhancing  the  likelihood  of  
favourable  coverage.  The  result   is  vividly   illustrated   in  a  statement  by   Jörg  
Thadeusz,  the  writer  of  a  multi-­‐‑episode  documentary  about  noble  returnees  
to   Brandenburg:   “Once   more,   I   am   impressed   by   these   people’s   sense   of  
tradition  on  the  one  hand  and  their  creative  power  on  the  other.  Effortlessly,  
they  incorporate  traditional  values  into  their  current,  contemporary  life,  thus  
preserving  them  without  appearing  even  slightly  antiquated.  On  top  of  that,  
the  élan  with  which  these  families  rebuild  what  has  been  destroyed  by  war  
and  mismanagement   deserves  my  highest   respect.”84  The  most   enthusiastic  
in-­‐‑house   advocate   of   the   nobility’s   historically   legitimated   pre-­‐‑eminence  
could  scarcely  have  put  it  more  forcefully  than  this.    
Conclusion    
This  chapter   illustrates  how  skilfully   the  noble  returnees   to  East  Elbia  have  
made  use  of   their  multifarious   family  history   in   the  aftermath  of   the   fall  of  
the  Berlin  Wall  in  order  to  re-­‐‑establish  themselves  as  a  social  elite  in  the  areas  
of   the   former  German  Democratic  Republic.  When   the  Wall   came  down   in  
November  1989  and  the  communist  system  collapsed  almost  overnight,   the  
noble   estates   between   the   rivers   Elbe   and   Oder   once   again   seemed   to   be  
                                                                                                 
84  Jörg  Thadeusz,  Preußisch  Blau,  online  at:  www.rbb-­‐‑online.de/preussischblau.  
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within  reach.  The  prospect  of  substituting  their  largely  bourgeois  lifestyle  in  
Western  Germany  with  a   return   to  a   traditional  noble   life  on   the  estates   in  
East  Elbia  was  highly  appealing  to  large  parts  of  the  expelled  nobility.  With  
reunification   looming,   the   former   squires   expected   nothing   less   than   full  
restitution.  The  government,  however,  quickly  quashed  these  expectations.  It  
needed   the   revenue   expected   from   selling   the   land   to   partly   offset   the  
extreme  costs  of  reunification.  After  protracted  legal  battles,  the  government  
eventually  granted  former  owners  the  right  to  purchase  land  at  a  discounted  
rate.  A  significant  number  of  noble  families  made  use  of  this  provision  and  
bought  back  parts  of  their  ancestral  estates.    
The  nobles  quickly  went  to  work  to  re-­‐‑establish  themselves  as  a  driving  force  
in   the   rural   communities.  They  became   involved   in   local   councils,   initiated  
cultural   events   and   often   opened   their   renovated   manor   houses   to   the  
interested   public.   Furthermore,   they   systematically   exploited   their   specific  
family   histories   for   business   purposes.   Many   of   them   launched   small  
enterprises  which  directly  borrowed  from  the  particular  family’s  rich  history,  
thereby   transforming   symbolic   capital   into   commercial   value.   Small  
breweries,  distilleries  or  ‘country  house  hotels’  were  set  up  as  profitable  side  
businesses,   but   also   as   visible   expressions   of   a   family’s   endurance.   These  
products  not  only  generated  revenue,  but  also  symbolised  the  continuity  of  a  
family’s  history,  a  concept  that  lies  at  the  heart  of  noble  identity.    
At   the   same   time,   beyond   the   microcosm   of   their   local   communities,   the  
noble  returnees  also  engaged  in  a  larger  enterprise  designed  to  revamp  their  
trans-­‐‑regional   image.   They   founded   museums   and   curated   circulating  
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exhibitions  in  an  attempt  to  revive  the  commemoration  of  their  ancient  caste  
and   reclaim   the   prerogative   of   interpretation   of   collective  memory.   Key   to  
their  success   in   this  endeavour  was   their  close  cooperation  with   the  media.  
The  protracted  restitution  debate,  which  flared  up  repeatedly  throughout  the  
1990s   in   the   press,   had   once   more   lifted   the   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility   into   the  
public   spotlight.   Across   countless   newspaper   articles   and   television  
documentaries   noblemen   and   -­‐‑women   catered   to   the   desires   of   a   highly  
amenable   audience.   They   transfigured   their   return   to   East   Elbia   into   a  
romantic  homecoming,  guided  and  inspired  by  family  duty  and  tradition.  In  
doing  so,  the  nobility  significantly  contributed  to  a  successful  transformation  
of   its   public   image   in   Eastern   Germany,   to   which   end   ‘the   exploitative  
Prussian  Junker’  has  been  replaced  by  the  ‘seigniorial  social  worker’.85  
                                                                                                 
85  Feudale  Sozialarbeiter,  Die  Zeit,  14.02.2013.  
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A  Case  Study:  The  Hohenzollern  
Introduction  
The  compensation  law  of  1994  was  designed  to  partially  indemnify  the  large  
landowners   whom   had   been   expropriated   between   1945   and   1949,   while  
minimising  the  damage  to  the  social  settlements  established  by  the  post-­‐‑war  
expropriations.  However,   it   also   included  a   small  yet   important   restriction.  
Article  2,  §  1,  Section  4  explicitly  excluded  anybody  who  had  provided   the  
National   Socialist   system   with   “substantial   assistance”.1  The   main   concern  
was  ensuring  that  nobody  who  had  assisted  the  regime  or  had  profited  from  
it   would   benefit   from   taxpayers’   money.   The   initial   idea   seemed   entirely  
logical,  yet   its   implementation  proved  to  be  delicate.  It  opened  the  door  for  
rulings  that  were  more  dependent  on  interpretation  than  on  facts.  The  main  
question  was  how  to  define  “substantial  assistance”  and  what  fell  within  its  
scope.  Did  membership   in   the  NSDAP  qualify   for   substantial   assistance   or  
did  it  require  a  prominent  party  post?  Did  published  statements  in  support  
of   Hitler   or   his   movement   amount   to   substantial   assistance?      What   of  
symbolic  gestures,  such  as  participation  in  a  state  ceremony  (Staatsakt)?    
The  most  prominent  and  vivid  example  of  this  procedure  in  action  is  the  case  
of  the  Hohenzollern  family,  the  former  ruling  dynasty  of  the  kings  of  Prussia  
and  the  German  emperors.  In  this  special  case,  compensation  was  dependent  
                                                                                                 
1  Entschädigungs-­‐‑  und  Ausgleichleistungsgesetz  (EALG),  Article  2,  §  1,  Section  4,  
Bundesgesetzblatt,  1994,  Part  1,  No.  65,  p.  2629.    
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on  moral  assessments  of  the  actions  of  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm  –  the  head  of  
the   house   and   incumbent   of   the   family   fortune   at   the   time   of   the   family’s  
expropriation  in  1945  –  before,  during  and  after  the  Nazi  seizure  of  power.  
This   chapter   will   therefore   be   a   study   of   a   specific   East-­‐‑Elbian   family’s  
history   management.   In   examining   this   case,   I   will   show   not   only   how   a  
prominent   noble   family   deployed   techniques   of   history   management,   but  
also   illustrate   how   the   legislative   environment   in   Germany   essentially  
obliges   some   families   to   engage   in   the  process   of   influencing,   shaping   and  
controlling   the   interpretation   of   their   family   history.   In   this   case,   history  
management  is  not  only  a  matter  of  reputation  building,  but  also  of  economic  
interest,   especially   in   cases,   such   as   that   of   the  Hohenzollern,   in  which   the  
family   in   question   aspires   to   maintain   a   high   public   profile   through  
charitable  work.  Furthermore,   this  chapter  will  assess  the  dangers  that  may  
arise   if   the  process  of  a   family’s   strategic  history  management  becomes   too  
publicly   transparent,   and   what   ramifications   this   poses   for   public  
perceptions  of  an  entire  family.    
The  Hohenzollern,  due  to  their  elevated  status  as  former  rulers  of  Germany  
and  Prussia,  might  not  immediately  appear  as  typical  representatives  of  the  
East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility.  Yet,  the  momentous  upheavals  of  the  twentieth  century  
somewhat   decreased   the   traditional   boundaries   between   the   ruling   family  
and   the   nobility,   leading   to   a   gradual   convergence.   The   abolition   of   the  
monarchy  in  1918  and  the  loss  of  East  Elbia  in  1945  –  the  vast  majority  of  the  
Hohenzollern’s   landed   interest  was   situated   in   the   areas   relinquished   after  
the  Potsdam  Conference  –  eliminated  both  the  royal  family  and  the  nobility  
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as   powerful   political   lobbies.   This   irrevocable   loss   of   social   and   political  
supremacy   turned   the   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility   into   what   Michael   Seelig   has  
termed   a   Gesinnungsgemeinschaft,   in   other   words,   a   social   group   that  
distinguishes  and  separates  itself  from  other  social  formations  by  virtue  of  its  
commitment   to   certain   principles   (Geisteshaltung). 2   In   that   respect,   the  
Hohenzollern  were  no  exception.  In  the  absence  of  any  real  social  or  political  
influence,   the   former   royal   family   relegated   itself   into   the   ranks   of   the  
‘ordinary’   East-­‐‑Elbian   noble   families,  more   concerned  with   private   success  
than  with  public   influence.   This   is   proven   accurate   since   the  Hohenzollern  
shared  with  the  rest  of  the  nobility  the  formative  experience  of  expulsion  and  
expropriation,  and  were  forced  to  start  over  in  the  west.    
Inevitably,  perhaps,   in  view  of   the  history  of   this   family  at   the   apex  of   the  
East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility   and   of   the   Prussian/German   state,   the   public   focus  
directed  towards  the  Hohenzollern  family  was  more  intense  and  required  an  
even   more   diligent   history   management   than   in   the   case   of   other   noble  
families.  Despite  its  distinctive  features,  this  family  is  ideally  suited  for  a  case  
study  in  noble  history  management.      
Hohenzollern  History  Management  in  the  Twentieth  Century  
Throughout   the   second   half   of   the   twentieth   century,   the   Hohenzollern  
family  have  been  active  managers  of  their  own  history.  After  the  expulsion  in  
                                                                                                 
2  Michael  Seelig,  Alltagsadel:  Der  ehemalige  ostelbische  Adel  in  der  Bundesrepublik  1945/49-­‐‑1975  
(Cologne,  2015),  p.  234.  Elisabeth  Gräfin  von  Plessen  described  the  same  process  by  referring  
to  the  expelled  nobles  as  ‘Weltanschauungsbesitzer’.  See:  Elisabeth  Plessen,  Mitteilungen  an  
den  Adel  (Zürich,  1991).    
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1945,   and   with   it,   the   family’s   loss   of   any   political   power,   the   leading  
members   of   the   family   made   use   of   the   entire   spectrum   of   history  
management   techniques   in   order   to   protect   and   foster   the   Hohenzollern  
reputation.   They   heavily   restricted   access   to   their   family   archive   and   filed  
lawsuits   against   critical   voices   that  might   challenge   their   carefully   curated  
reputation;   they   repeatedly   engaged   in   the   production   of   autobiographies,  
articles   and   booklets   to   promote   their   interpretation   of   the   family’s   recent  
history;  and  they  constantly  supplied  the  yellow  press  with  powerful  images  
and   heart-­‐‑warming   home   stories   in   an   effort   to   portray   the   family’s  
continuous  celebrity  status.  
The  expropriation  of  the  vast  majority  of  their  assets  after  the  Second  World  
War,  as  well  as  the  establishment  of  two  separate  German  republics,  not  only  
forced  the  family  to  become  acquainted  with  a  rather  bourgeois  lifestyle,  but  
also   destroyed   any   remaining   hope   of   a   restoration.   Yet,   the  Hohenzollern  
never   contemplated   the   idea  of  withdrawing   into   a   strictly  private   life.  On  
the   contrary,   they   did   everything   in   their   power   to   defend   their   own  
interpretation  of  the  family’s  role   in  recent  history,  and  to  remain  visible   in  
the  public  eye,  just  in  case  Germany’s  desire  for  a  monarchy  might  one  day  
rekindle.  In  the  early  1950s,  Crown  Princess  Cecilie  as  well  as  her  son,  Prince  
Louis  Ferdinand,  who  had  succeeded  his   father,  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm,  as  
head  of  the  house  in  1951,  published  lengthy  autobiographies.    
Cecilie’s  memoirs  were  a  collection  of  shallow  anecdotes  about  her  life  with  
Crown   Prince   Wilhelm.   She   eulogised   the   crown   prince’s   immaculate  
character,   his   undying   comradeship,   enormous  dedication   to   technical   and  
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social   progress,   as   well   as   his   jaunty   nature.3  She   fantasised   about   their  
glamorous   life   in   the  pre-­‐‑war  era,  and  about   their  magical  wedding,   lavish  
dinner   parties   and   numerous   state   visits   to   India,   Vienna,   London   and  
Cairo.4  In   sharp   contrast   to   this   endless   string   of   joyful   anecdotes,   Cecilie  
almost  entirely  refrains  from  commenting  on  the  momentous  implications  of  
the  Third  Reich.  On  the  few  occasions  she  does,  she  is  eager  to  point  out  that  
the  crown  prince  not  only  never  played  an  active  political  role   in  the  Third  
Reich,   but   also,   that   he   had   been   opposed   to   the   regime.5  Overall,   these  
memoirs   serve   as   a   classic   example   of   selective   noble   remembrance  
literature.   The   pre-­‐‑war   era   is   remarkably   transfigured,   the   Nazi   era  
studiously   ignored,   and   the   post-­‐‑war   period   is   portrayed   as   an   era   of  
unjustified  suffering.    
Louis  Ferdinand’s  autobiography  is  subtler   than  that  of  his  mother,  Cecilie,  
and  not  as  much  of  a  transfiguration  of  reality.  It  is  a  rather  balanced  account  
of  his  early  life,  which  was  dominated  by  extended  periods  abroad.  He  spent  
years   in   South  America,   as  well   as   some   time  working   for  Henry   Ford   in  
Detroit.  In  credible  fashion,  he  also  accounts  for  his  distant  attitude  towards  
the   Nazi   regime,   which   culminated   in   loose   contacts   to   the   military  
resistance.   At   the   same   time,   Louis   Ferdinand   also   subtly   worked   on   the  
reputation  of  his  father  and  grandfather.  By  means  of  lengthy  vignettes  of  his  
personal   experiences  with   both   of   them,   he   tries   to   detach   the   focus   from  
their  political  endeavours  and  portray  them  as  loving  and  caring  fathers  who  
                                                                                                 
3  Cecilie  von  Preussen,  Erinenrungen  an  den  deutschen  Kronprinzen  (Berlin,  2001),  pp.  107–108.  
4  Ibid,  pp.  33–53.  
5  Ibid,  pp.  107,  108.  
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were   predominantly   concerned   with   the   wellbeing   of   their   family   and  
people.  He  praises   his   father’s   jovial   and   endearing  nature,  which   allowed  
him   to   “conquer   the   hearts   of   the   people   by   storm”. 6   He   depicts   his  
grandfather  as  a  devout,  steadfast  character  who  “endured  his  destiny  with  
exemplary   dignity,   wisdom   and   serenity”.7  Thereby,   he   not   only   creates  
empathy   for   the   Kaiser   and   the   crown   prince,   but   also   contributes   to   a  
“humanisation”   of   these   historic   figures.   The   widely   held   image   of   the  
warmongering   Kaiser   and   his   dashing   radical   right-­‐‑wing   son   are   here  
replaced  with  an  image  of  dedicated,  caring  and  indulgent  private  citizens.      
Only   a   few   years   later,   Duchess   Viktoria-­‐‑Luise   of   Brunswick,   the   Kaiser’s  
only   daughter,   joined   her   nephew   and   sister-­‐‑in-­‐‑law   in   the   defence   of   the  
family’s   legacy.   In   her   lengthy   autobiography,   The   Kaiser’s   Daughter:   The  
Memoirs   of   HRH   Princess   Viktoria   Luise,   she   came   to   the   rescue   of   her   ill-­‐‑
reputed   father.   “Nobody,”   she   tells   her   audience,   “could   escape   the  
spontaneous   kindness   of   his   nature.”   She   rhapsodises   about   the   “Kaiser’s  
veracity   and   candour,   his   pristine   character,   as   well   as   his   humanity   and  
chivalry”.8  She  depicts  the  Kaiser  as  a  man  of  progress  who,  “unlike  most  of  
his  contemporaries,  had  grasped  the  magnitude  of  transition”  that  Germany  
had   been   exposed   to   at   the   turn   of   the   century,   and  paints   the   image   of   a  
prudent   and   peace-­‐‑loving   monarch   who   tried   everything   in   his   power   to  
prevent   the   First   World   War.9  In   the   end,   as   one   of   the   chapter   headings  
                                                                                                 
6  Louis  Ferdinand  Prinz  von  Preussen,  Im  Strom  der  Geschichte  (Munich,  1993),  p.  32.  
7  Ibid,  p.  206.  
8  Herzogin  Viktoria  Luise  von  Braunschweig,  Ein  Leben  als  Tochter  des  Kaisers  (Hanover,  
1966),  p.  198.  
9  Ibid,  pp.  126,  134.  
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insinuates,   the   Kaiser   foundered   due   to   the   “envy   of   the   gods”.   She   also  
rigorously   defends   her   father   against   the   accusation   that   the   Kaiser   had  
abandoned  his  people  in  1918  and  fled  into  exile.  According  to  her,  the  entire  
abdication   had   been   an   intrigue   of   Hindenburg   and   the   General   Chief   of  
Staff  who  had   sacrificed  Wilhelm   II   in  order   to  achieve  better  peace   terms.  
The   Kaiser,   she   notes,   “wanted   to   pull   his   troops   together   and  march   for  
Berlin”.10    
These   eulogies   on   the   family’s   recent   past   reached   a   substantial   audience.  
Within  one  year,  more  than  100,000  copies  of  Viktoria-­‐‑Luise’s  memoirs  were  
sold.11  This   enormous   success   inspired   the  Duchess   to   produce   another   six  
anecdotal   treatises   over   the   next   ten   years. 12   Louis   Ferdinand’s  
autobiography  also  saw  numerous  reprints  over  the  years.  Both  works  were  
also   translated   into   English   and   published   abroad.13  The   royal   authors   did  
everything  in  their  power  to  increase  the  circulation  of  their  memoirs.  Louis  
Ferdinand   hosted   several   “publication-­‐‑parties”   and   presented   his   work   to  
interested   readers.   Viktoria-­‐‑Luise   went   on   various   promotional   tours  
throughout  Germany,  personally  signing  thousands  of  copies.14  Furthermore,  
                                                                                                 
10  Ibid,  p.  206.  
11  See:  Tante  vorn,  SPIEGEL,  16.12.1968.    
12  Herzogin  Viktoria  Luise  von  Braunschweig,  Im  Glanz  der  Krone  (Hanover,  1966);  Herzogin  
Viktoria  Luise  von  Braunschweig,  Bilder  der  Kaiserzeit  (Hanover,  1969);  Herzogin  Viktoria  
Luise  von  Braunschweig,  Vor  100  Jahren  (Hanover,  1970);  Herzogin  Viktoria  Luise  von  
Braunschweig,  Deutschlands  letzte  Kaiserin  (Hanover,  1971);  Herzogin  Viktoria  Luise  von  
Braunschweig,  Im  Strom  der  Zeit  (Hanover,  1974);  Herzogin  Viktoria  Luise  von  
Braunschweig,  Die  Kronprinzessin  (Hanover,  1977).  
13  Robert  Vacha  (ed.),  The  Kaiser’s  Daughter  –  Memoirs  of  H.R.H.  Viktoria  Luise,  Duchess  of  
Brunswick  and  Lüneburg,  Princess  of  Prussia  (London,  1977);  Louis  Ferdinand,  Prince  of  
Prussia,  The  Rebel  Prince  (Chicago,  1952).  
14  Tante  vorn,  SPIEGEL,  16.12.1968.  
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the  Hohenzollern  family  quickly  grasped  the  importance  of  the  mass  media.  
Prior   to   full   publication,   all   the   royal   authors   published   excerpts   of   their  
works   in   large   German   magazines.   This   procedure   not   only   significantly  
increased   the   outreach   of   their   rather   one-­‐‑sided   encomia,   but   also   had   the  
welcome   side   effect   of   supplementing   the   rather   meagre   revenues   of   the  
former  ruling  family.15      
In   the   1980s,   further   members   of   the   house   felt   obliged   to   interpret   the  
family’s   entanglement   in   the   history   of   the   twentieth   century.   In   1985,  
Friedrich   Wilhelm,   the   eldest   son   of   Louis   Ferdinand,   published   a   very  
benevolent   interpretation   of   his   family’s   role   in   the   interwar   period. 16  
Although   significantly  more   scholarly   and   critical   in   its   approach   than   the  
previous  autobiographies,  this  work  was  “an  expression  of  piety  rather  than  
a   relentless   confrontation   with   the   often   inconvenient   truth”.17  Instead   of  
illuminating   the   myriad   of   connections   between   his   family   and   Nazi  
dignitaries,   the   princely   author   uses   the   well-­‐‑established   technique   of  
sacrificing   one   family   member   to   save   the   rest.   He   portrayed   August  
Wilhelm,  a  son  of   the  Kaiser  and  high-­‐‑ranking  SA-­‐‑General,  as  a  misguided  
character  and  isolated  figure  within  an  otherwise  fairly  Nazi-­‐‑critical  family.  
Any  possible  culpability  is  thereby  offloaded  onto  the  alleged  outsider  in  an  
effort  to  preserve  the  larger  narrative  that  the  Hohenzollern,  as  a  whole,  kept  
their  distance  from  National  Socialism.    
                                                                                                 
15  See:  Einer  hat  Geld  gebraucht,  SPIEGEL,  07.04.1954.  
16  Friedrich  Wilhelm  Prinz  von  Preussen,  Das  Haus  Hohenzollern  1918–1945  (Munich,  1985).  
17  John  C.  G.  Röhl,  Review  of:  Willibald  Gutsche,  Ein  Kaiser  im  Exil  (Marburg,  1991),  in:  
Historische  Zeitschrift,  258,  No.  2  (1994),  pp.  546–548.  
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Wilhelm-­‐‑Karl,   another   grandson   of   the   Kaiser,   also   actively   helped   to  
construct   a   more   favourable   perception   of   his   grandfather’s   legacy.   In   an  
extended   essay   entitled  Memories   of   my   Imperial   Grandfather,   he   styles   the  
Kaiser   as   “the   most   important   monarch”   of   his   time   and   emphasised   his  
deep   commitment   to   scientific   progress,   religious   tolerance   and   political  
reforms.  At  the  same  time,  he  refuses  to  ascribe  to  his  grandfather  significant  
responsibility  for  the  downfall  of  the  empire:  “It  is  unhistorical  and  unfair  to  
encumber   one   man   with   the   burdens   and   failures   of   an   entire   era”. 18  
Wilhelm-­‐‑Karl  also  came  to  the  rescue  of  the  Kaiser  when  the  historian  John  
C.   G.   Röhl   published   his   first   study   of   Wilhelm’s   reign. 19   In   a   large  
newspaper   article   in   Die   Zeit   Wilhelm-­‐‑Karl   determinedly   rejected   Röhl’s  
“abhorrent   accusations”   that   the   Kaiser   had   substantially   been   responsible  
for   the   outbreak   of   the   First   World   War.   Once   again,   he   reiterated   his  
glorifying  theses  of  his  previous  essay  and  reproached  Röhl  for  painting  an  
utterly  “distorted  image”  of  the  Kaiser.20  
Besides   meticulously   restoring   the   reputation   of   their   forebears,   the  
Hohenzollern   also  went   to  great   lengths   to  defend   their   role   as  Germany’s  
primary  aristocratic  family  and  remain  in  the  public  spotlight.  As  something  
of  a  royal  family  in-­‐‑waiting,  the  Hohenzollern  had  to  fulfil  a  wide  spectrum  
of  representative  tasks  in  order  to   justify  their  distant  hopes  for  restoration.  
As  early  as  1952,  Louis  Ferdinand  and  his  wife,  Kira,  founded  the  Prinzessin  
Kira  von  Preußen  foundation,  designed  to  support  displaced  children.  Every  
                                                                                                 
18  Wilhelm-­‐‑Karl  Prinz  von  Preussen,  Erinnerungen  an  meinen  kaiserlichen  Großvater,  in:  
Wilhelminische  Studien,  3  (2004),  p.  20.    
19  John  C.  G.  Röhl,  Kaiser,  Hof  und  Staat:  Wilhelm  II.  und  die  deutsche  Politik  (Munich,  1987).  
20  Er  führte  kein  Operettenregiment,  Die  Zeit,  13.05.1988.  
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year,   the   couple   organized   a   gala   concert   to   raise   funds,   and   subsequently  
hosted  hundreds  of  children  for  an  extended  summer  break  on  Hohenzollern  
Castle  in  Hechingen.21  Numerous  other  princes  and  princesses  were  involved  
in   charitable   organisations   over   the   years.   Prince  Oskar,   as  well   as   his   son  
and   grandson,   presided   over   the  German   branch   of   the  Order   of   St.   John.  
Prince  Friedrich-­‐‑Wilhelm  headed  the  foundation  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Gedächtnis  
Kirche.   Prince  Georg   Friedrich   is   a  member   of   the   board   of   trustees   of   the  
Deutsche  Stiftung  Denkmalschutz.    
The   family   knew   how   to   satisfy   the   public’s   desire   for   powerful   images.  
When   Louis   Ferdinand’s   daughter,   Marie-­‐‑Cecilie,   married   the   Duke   of  
Oldenburg   in   1965,   the  wedding  was  meticulously   exploited   to   cement   the  
family’s   celebrity   status.   On   the   day   before   the   ceremony,   in   the   newly  
restored  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Memorial  Church  in  Berlin,  the  parents  of  the  bride,  
together   with   the   bridal   couple,   staged   a   press   conference   to   which   more  
than  250  journalists  were  invited.  A  camera  team  filmed  the  entire  wedding  
and   a   publishing  house  paid   the   alleged   sum  of   100,000  Deutschmarks   for  
the  exclusive   rights   to   the  official  wedding  photo.22  A  similar   spectacle  was  
staged  ten  years  later  when  Louis  Ferdinand’s  future  successor,  Prince  Louis  
Ferdinand   Jr.,   married   Countess   Donata   zu   Castell-­‐‑Rüdenhausen.23  There  
followed  a  drip-­‐‑feed  of   less  spectacular  stories.   In  the  tabloid  Quick,  we  see  
Louis  Ferdinand  hosting  flabbergasted  journalists  who  could  not  believe  that  
                                                                                                 
21  See:  Die  Geschichte  der  Prinzessin  Kira  von  Preussen  Stiftung,  online  at:  
https://www.preussen.de/de/familie/prinzessin_kira_stiftung/geschichte_der_stiftung.html.  
22  Unsere  Antwort  auf  die  Rolling  Stones,  Die  Zeit,  10.12.1965.  
23  See:  Hochzeit  von  Prinz  Louis  Ferdinand  (jr.)  im  Mai  1975,  YouTube  video,  3:16,  posted  
by:  “royalisttoday”,  24.08.2009,  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DwsrGoynw4U.    
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the  prince  personally   regaled   them  with   food   and  drinks.   “By  doing   so  he  
does   not   forfeit   an   inch   of   his   dignity   and   transcendence,”   the   magazine  
concluded.24  In  the  magazine  Bunte,  Louis  Ferdinand  initiates  readers  into  his  
private   life   as   a   family   patriarch.25  His   son,   Louis   Ferdinand   Jr.,   shows   the  
press   around   the   family   estate   in  Bremen  and  almost   every   anniversary  or  
engagement  was  widely  covered  in  the  yellow  press.26    
The  driving  idea  behind  these  efforts,  both  to  shape  the  interpretation  of  the  
family’s  role  in  the  formative  events  of  the  twentieth  century  and  to  win  the  
sympathy   of   a   broad   public,   was   the   hope   –   however   distant   –   of   a  
monarchical  restoration.  The  Hohenzollern  were  fully  aware  of  the  fact  that  a  
return   to   the   throne   could   not   be   achieved   by   means   of   a   solely   political  
process,  but  had  to  be  closely  supported  by  an  overwhelming  public  desire  
for  the  reestablishment  of  a  parliamentary  monarchy.  Over  the  years,  Louis  
Ferdinand   had   reiterated   this   awareness   in   numerous   interviews.   “If   the  
majority  of  the  German  people,”  he  proclaimed,  “would  ask  me  to  take  over  
I  would  not  elude  responsibility.”27  
When  a  redraft  of  the  German  constitution  was  widely  discussed  in  the  wake  
of  German  reunification  in  the  autumn  of  1990,  these  distant  hopes  received  
                                                                                                 
24  Unverzichtbare  Kaiserkrone,  SPIEGEL,  18.11.1968.  
25  Tina  Rohowski,  Das  Private  in  der  Politik:  Politiker-­‐‑Homestories  in  der  deutschen  
Unterhaltungspresse  (Wiesbaden,  1999),  p.  75.  




27  Frank  Lothar  Kroll,  Geschichtswissenschaft  in  politischer  Absicht:  Hans-­‐‑Joachim  Schoeps  und  
Preußen  (Berlin,  2010),  p.  64;  See  also:  Zeugen  des  Jahrhunderts,  Prinz  Louis  Ferdinand  von  
Preußen  im  Gespräch  mit  Friedrich  Müller,  ZDF,  1986.    
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new  impetus.  As  if  to  remind  the  newly  reunified  nation  of  its  glorious  past  
under   the   rule   of   the   Hohenzollern,   Louis   Ferdinand   carefully   staged   the  
family’s   symbolic   return   to   Brandenburg.   The   centrepieces   of   this  
homecoming  were  two  simple  coffins,  which  contained  the  mortal  remains  of  
two  of  Prussia’s  greatest  kings.  At  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War,  when  
the  Red  Army  stood  at  the  gates  of  Berlin,  the  coffins  of  Frederick  Wilhelm  I  
and  his  son  Frederick  II,  had  been  evacuated  from  Potsdam  to  a  potash  mine  
in   Eichsfeld.   American   soldiers   retrieved   them   and   brought   them   to  
Marburg,   from   where   they   were   ultimately   transferred   to   Hohenzollern  
Castle  in  Hechingen  in  1952.28  There  they  remained  until  the  summer  of  1991.  
On  17  August,  exactly  205  years  after  the  death  of  Frederick  II,  his  coffin  was  
retrieved  from  the  family  crypt  in  Hechingen  and  loaded  on  a  special  historic  
train.  Escorted  by  a  guard  of  honour  of  the  German  army,  the  coffin  arrived  
in  Potsdam  where  it  was  received  by  the  music  corps  of  the  First  Hanoverian  
Panzer  Division.  Thousands  of  spectators  lined  the  streets  and  followed  the  
coffin  from  the  train  station  to  the  park  of  Sanssouci  Castle.29  In  the  shadow  
of  Prussia’s  most  celebrated  king,  Louis  Ferdinand  tried  to  offer  the  reunited  
nation  a  constitutional  alternative  loaded  with  glamour  and  tradition.    
The   meticulously   orchestrated   ceremony,   however,   aroused   considerable  
criticism  in  the  press.  Historians  like  Hans  Mommsen  criticised  the  event  as  a  
“constructed   preservation   of   tradition”   (aufgesetzte   Traditionspflege)   from  
                                                                                                 
28  Henning  Köhler,  Helmut  Kohl  –  Ein  Leben  für  die  Politik  (Cologne,  2014),  p.  763.  




which   an   “awry   nationalism”   (verquerer   Nationalismus)   might   emerge. 30  
Pointing   to   the   participation   of   Chancellor   Kohl,   Sebastian   Haffner   even  
feared  a  second  “Day  of  Potsdam”,  reminding  his  readers  of  21  March  1933  
when  Goebbels  and  Hitler  tried  to  fuse  the  new  National  Socialist  Germany  
with   the   prestige   of   the   old   Prussia.31  Those   fears,   however,   were   entirely  
unfounded.  More  than  seventy  years  after  the  Kaiser’s  abdication,  neither  the  
Bundestag   nor   the   public   seriously   thought   about   recalling   the  
Hohenzollern.   A   new   constitution   was   never   drafted.   Instead,   the   former  
GDR   was   simply   incorporated   into   the   Federal   Republic   and   President  
Richard  von  Weizsäcker  remained  head  of  state.  
The  Restitution  Process  after  German  Reunification  
Reunification  did  not  usher  in  a  restoration  of  the  monarchy,  but  it  did  have  
enormous  consequences  for  the  Hohenzollern  in  a  different  respect.  The  vast  
majority   of   the   family’s   pre-­‐‑war   possessions   had   been   situated   east   of   the  
river  Elbe.  Roughly  two  thirds  of  these  properties  were  located  in  the  areas  
relinquished   to   Poland   and   Russia   in   the   summer   of   1945.   The   remaining  
third,  however,  lay  in  the  former  German  Democratic  Republic.32  This  meant  
that   a   host   of   former   assets   and   landed  properties  were   once   again  within  
reach.   Yet,  what   originally   seemed   a   purely   legal   issue   soon   turned   into   a  
struggle   for   the   prerogative   of   interpretation   of   the   Hohenzollern’s   family  
history.    
                                                                                                 
30  Aktion  Sarg  und  Asche,  SPIEGEL,  12.08.1991.  
31  Ibid.  
32  Wenn  ich  Kaiser  wär,  SPIEGEL,  10.04.1957.  
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As   we   have   already   seen   in   the   previous   chapter,   the   German   legislature  
refused   to   return   properties   that   had   been   expropriated   by   the   Soviet  
Occupational  Administration  between  1945  and  1949.  On  the  one  hand,   the  
government  needed  these  assets   to  offset,   if  only  partially,   the  extreme  cost  
of  reunification.  On  the  other  hand,  it  feared  possible  upheavals  if  it  were  to  
drastically   alter   the   social   post-­‐‑war   settlements   in   the   former   German  
Democratic   Republic.33  As   consequence,   the   government   decided   to   pay   a  
nominal  compensation  to  former  landowners  and  allowed  them  to  buy  land  
at  a  discounted  price.  The  Hohenzollern,  however,  were  unwilling  to  accept  
this   provision   and   filed   a   lawsuit   at   the   administrative   court   in  Potsdam.34  
Unsurprisingly,   the   court   quashed   this   claim   in   1999,   referring   to   the  
“crystal-­‐‑clear   legal   situation”.35  The  Hohenzollern   responded   by   requesting  
compensation  under  the  terms  of   the  1994  compensation  law.  The  resulting  
proceeding  dragged  on   for  almost  one  and  a  half  decades.  The  duration  of  
the   case   was   partly   owed   to   the   enormous   number   of   claims   filed   after  
reunification.   Thousands   of   applicants   tried   to   attain   compensation   for  
properties  expropriated  after   the  war.  Every  day  the  post  officers  delivered  
“washing  baskets  full  of  documents”  to  the  relevant  government  agencies.36  
In  Brandenburg  alone,  more  than  250,000  applications  for  more  than  638,000  
                                                                                                 
33  See  the  section  The  Problem  of  Restitution  in  chapter  V  of  this  thesis.  
34  Numerous  other  former  landowners  also  filed  lawsuits.  See  exemplary:  BVerfG,  Beschluss  
des  Zweiten  Senats  vom  26.  Oktober  2004  –  2  BvR  955/00  –  Rn.  (1-­‐‑160),  online  at:  
www.bverfg.de/e/rs20041026_2bvr095500.html;  European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  
Inadmissibility  Decision  von  Maltzan  and  others,  von  Zitzewitz  and  others  and  MAN  
Ferrostaal  and  Alfred  Töpfer  Stiftung  v.  Germany,  Press  release  30.03.2005,  online  at:  
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-­‐‑press?i=003-­‐‑1304294-­‐‑1360416.  
35  Der  Adel  soll  jetzt  Geld  zurückbekommen,  Tagesspiegel,  25.02.2014.  
36  Amt  für  offene  Vermögensfragen  wird  aufgelöst,  Märkische  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  29.12.2015.  
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properties   were   submitted.37  The   other   reason   for   the   lengthiness   of   the  
proceedings  was   the   complexity   of   the  Hohenzollern   case.   The   family   laid  
claim   to   sixty-­‐‑four   castles,   villas   and   estates   in   Brandenburg,   among   them  
such   illustrious   properties   as   Rheinsberg   Castle,   Krongut   Bornstedt,   Villa  
Liegnitz,   Villa   Ingelheim,   Villa   Quandt   and   Lindstedt   Castle.   Under   the  
terms   of   the   law,   an   expropriated   family   was   eligible   for   a   five   per   cent  
compensation   of   the   original   value   of   the   property   at   the   time   of  
expropriation   in   1945.   In   the   case   of   the   Hohenzollern,   the   combined  
property   value   eventually   amounted   to   42.7   million   Deutschmark.   This  
equated  to  a  compensation  fee  of  roughly  1.2  million  euros.  38  Since  all  these  
claims  had   to  be   reviewed  and  assessed   individually,   it  was  not  until   2010  
that  the  process  finally  picked  up  pace.    
It   might   appear,   at   first   glance,   as   if   the   legal   struggle   between   the  
Hohenzollern  and  the  German  state  over  the  right  to   inherit  real  estate  and  
other   properties   expropriated   by   the   Soviet   occupation   authorities   and   the  
communist   regime   after   1945   should   fall   outside   the   remit   of   a   study   of  
nobiliary  history  management.    Firstly,  the  adjudication  of  restitution  cases  is  
a   product   of   legal,   rather   than   historical,   deliberation.      And   second,   the  
process  of  achieving  decisions  in  this  area  is  usually  conducted  behind  closed  
doors,  in  courts  and  government  offices;  it  thus  lacks  the  dimension  of  public  
                                                                                                 
37  Statistiken  zu  offenen  Vermögensfragen  ab  1992,  online  at:  
http://www.badv.bund.de/DE/OffeneVermoegensfragen/Statistik/start.html;jsessionid=  
4ED3C18191E7E507A2B8F544FCCF3D0B.intranet1;  Personal  correspondance  with  Reinhard  
Bodenstab  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  Brandenburg.  
38  Ein  23  Jahre  alter  Antrag,  Potsdamer  Neueste  Nachrichten,  25.02.2014;  Keine  Steuermillion  
für  Hohenzollern,  Potsdamer  Neueste  Nachrichten,  15.01.2016;  Schlösser  in  Brandenburg:  Kein  
Geld  für  die  Hohenzollern,  Tagesspiegel,  14.01.2016.  
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resonance   and  memory   that   is   crucial   to   the   kind   of   history   management  
explored  in  this  thesis.    If  I  include  a  discussion  here,  this  is  for  two  reasons.    
The   first   is   that   the   1994   law   established   a   nexus   between   historical  
interpretation   and   legal   decision-­‐‑finding   that   was   highly   unusual   in   the  
context  of  German  and  European   law.     The   compensation   law   included  an  
important  restriction,  which  implied  that  compensation  could  not  be  granted  
if  the  beneficiary  or  his  heirs  could  be  showed  to  have  provided  the  National  
Socialist   system   with   “substantial   assistance”.   In   2010,   the   Office   for   the  
Settlement  of  Open  Property  Issues  (Landesamt  für  offene  Vermögensfragen)  
signalled   to  Georg   Friedrich  Prince   of   Prussia,  who   by   then,   had   inherited  
the   claims   from   his   grandfather,   Louis   Ferdinand,   that   there   might   be   an  
issue  with  the  assessment  of  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm’s  demeanour  during  the  
Third   Reich,   and   asked   the   family   to   provide   exculpatory   evidence.39     The  
campaign   for   restitution   thus   became   nolens   volens   intertwined   with   the  
question  of  how  the  family’s  political  behaviour  during  the  gravest  crisis  of  
the   twentieth   century   should   be   interpreted.      And   this,   in   turn,   was   a  
question  for  historians,  not  lawyers.    The  second  reason  is  that  although  the  
process  was  supposed  to  be  confidential,  the  high  visibility  and  status  of  the  
former   ruling   family   made   this   impossible.   The   question   of   whether   the  
Hohenzollern   family  would  be   compensated   for   the   expropriations,   and   to  
what  extent,  became  a  public  scandal.      
                                                                                                 
39  Dr.  Eckart  Putzier,  Vermerk,  Berlin,  10.02.2011,  p.  2.  Unpublished  memorandum  of  the  




The  restitution  issue  endowed  the  history  management  of  the  Hohenzollern  
family  with  a  new  dimension.  Whereas  their  main  concern  hitherto  had  been  
to  rebuild  their  reputation  in  order  to  consolidate  their  status  as  the  primary  
German  noble  family  and  heirs  to  a  vacant  German  throne,  the  request  from  
the   Office   for   the   Settlement   of   Open   Property   Issues   established   a   nexus  
between  history  management  and  economic  interest.  The  armature  of  history  
management  was  now  mobilised  to  secure  not  only  symbolic,  but  also  real,  
capital.    
The  Office  for  the  Settlement  of  Open  Property  Issues  did  not  contest  the  role  
of   the   original   claimant,   Louis   Ferdinand   Prince   of   Prussia,   in   the   Third  
Reich.   He   had   spent   most   of   the   1930s   abroad,   and   thereafter,   had   been  
closely  associated  with  the  military  resistance  against  Hitler.  Yet,  at  the  time  
of   expropriation   in   1945,   the   family’s   assets   had   been   in   the   possession   of  
Crown   Prince   Wilhelm,   Louis   Ferdinand’s   father.   His   involvement   in   the  
Third  Reich  left  room  for  interpretation.  Consequently,  as  part  of  their  efforts  
to   refute   the   accusations   against   the   crown   prince,   the   Hohenzollern  
commissioned   an   external   historian,   Professor   Christopher   Clark   from  
Cambridge   University,   to   evaluate   the   contested   points.   The   choice   of   a  
foreign   historian   might   be   surprising   at   first,   but   the   German   media  
environment   was   prone   to   polarisation   around   issues   like   this.      Like   fox  
hunting  in  Britain,   the  question  of  restitution  in  a  high-­‐‑profile  case   like  this  
was  likely  to  serve  as  lightning  rod  for  political  antagonisms  and  symbolise  
broader   ideological   commitments   and   attitudes.      To   some   extent,   the  
historical  profession,  too,  was  organized  in  large  ideological  camps  affiliated  
with  the  dominant  political  parties.    The  Bielefeld  School,  as  we  have  already  
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seen,  was  likely  to  take  a  very  hostile  view  of  the  historical  role  played  by  the  
Hohenzollern   and,   in   such   a   divided   landscape,   even   a  more   sympathetic  
response  might  be  open  to  the  charge  of  partisanship.    The  choice  of  a  foreign  
historian  was   thus   attractive,   and  Clark  was   known   for   a   study  of   the   last  
Kaiser,  Wilhelm   II,  which,  while   critical   of   his   comportment   in   office,   had  
striven  to  achieve  a  balanced  assessment  of  his  political  impact.      
Did  the  Crown  Prince  Provide  the  National  Socialist  Movement  with  
Substantial  Assistance?  
Appraisal  Professor  Christopher  Clark  
The  Hohenzollern  granted  Clark  access  to  their  family  archive  and  asked  him  
briefly  to  address  four  distinct  but  interconnected  problems.  The  first  related  
to  the  actions  taken  by  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  the  National  Socialist  
movement.  The  main  question  was  whether  these  actions  “were  designed  to  
improve   the   conditions   for   the   establishment,   the   development   or   the  
extension  of   the  National   Socialist   system  or   to   suppress   resistance   against  
this   system”,   and   if   “these   actions   actually   had   this   effect”.   The   second  
question  revolved  around  the  issue  of  whether  the  crown  prince  undertook  
“such   actions   only   occasionally   or   incidentally,   or   […]   with   a   degree   of  
consistency”.  The  third  question  related  to  what  benefit  the  National  Socialist  
regime  drew  from  the  crown  prince’s  actions.  The  fourth  question  concerned  
the   prince’s   own   intentions:   “Did   Crown   Prince   Wilhelm   act   on   the  
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presumption   that  his   behaviour   could   result   in   a   significant   benefit   for   the  
National  Socialist  regime?”40    
To  illuminate  these  points,  Clark  examined  a  sequence  of  key  events  that  had  
been  specifically  contested  by  the  Office  for  the  Settlement  of  Open  Property  
Issues.  He  did  this  by  means  of  a  chronological  case-­‐‑by-­‐‑case  discussion.  The  
first  contested  point  was  a  statement  by  the  crown  prince,  published  by  the  
Telegraphen-­‐‑Union  on  3  April  1932,  in  which  the  prince  declared  his  support  
for  Adolf  Hitler  and  encouraged  his   readers   to  vote   for  Adolf  Hitler   in   the  
final  ballot  of   the  presidential  election  on  10  April  1932.  “Since  I  consider  a  
closed  national  front  absolutely  necessary,  I  shall  vote  for  Adolf  Hitler  in  the  
second   election.”41  Although   this   letter   of   support   was   without   a   doubt  
intended  to  bolster  the  National  Socialist  campaign,  Clark  argued,  there  was  
no   evidence   whatsoever   that   this   recommendation   had   any   substantial  
effects  on  the  voting  behaviour  of  the  German  people.  There  were  no  signs  in  
the  press  that  anybody  believed  Hitler’s  electoral  success  was  even  in  small  
degree  owed   to   the  crown  prince’s   intervention.  Clark  pointed  out   that   the  
crown   prince’s   popularity   had   been   extremely   diminished   by   his   flight   to  
Holland   in  1918.  Even   in   royalist   circles,  he  noted,   the  prince  “was  viewed  
with  scepticism”  and  monarchism  was  no  longer  exclusively  focused  on  the  
persons   of   the   exiled   Kaiser   or   his   temporarily   exiled   son,   who   had   only  
returned   to   Germany   in   1923. 42   Already   during   the   war,   Paul   von  
                                                                                                 
40  Professor  Sir  Christopher  Clark,  Did  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm  provide  the  National  Socialist  
system  with  substantial  assistance?  (Cambridge,  2011),  p.  2.    
41  See:  Klaus  Jonas,  The  life  of  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm  (London,  1961),  p.  177;  Paul  Herre,  
Kronprinz  Wilhelm  –  Seine  Rolle  in  der  deutschen  Politik  (Munich,  1954),  p.  209.  
42  Clark,  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm,  p.  8.  
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Hindenburg  had  substantially  usurped   the  public   role  of   the  Kaiser,   taking  
on   the   function   of   an   “Ersatzkaiser”,   and   among   conservative   circles   in   the  
Reich,   he   retained   this   status   as   Reichspräsident.   Clark   agreed   with   the  
historian  Lothar  Machtan,   author  of   a   fine   study  of   another  of   the  Kaiser’s  
sons,  that  the  crown  prince  was  not  a  “moving  force”  capable  of  swaying  the  
public,  but  a  mere  “parade-­‐‑horse”.43  
The   second   point   addressed   by   the   appraisal   is   a   letter   Crown   Prince  
Wilhelm   wrote   to   the   minister   of   defence   (Reichswehrminister),   Wilhelm  
Groener,   in  April  1932.44  Therein,   the  crown  prince  emphatically  demanded  
that   Groener   revoke   a   ban   on   paramilitary   organisations   such   as   the   SA.  
According   to   the   crown   prince,   such   formations   represented   “valuable  
human   potential”   (wunderbares   Menschenmaterial),   which   would   be   vitally  
needed  to  defend  Germany’s  borders   in  the  east.  Especially  referring  to  the  
absence   of   universal   military   service   in   Germany   at   the   time,   the   crown  
prince  was  worried  that  in  case  of  a  war,  the  Reichswehr  might  instead  have  
to  rely  on  “similar  formations  on  the  left”  which  could  exploit  this  situation  
to   commit   “acts   of   sabotage”.45  This   document   raised   issues   of   a   different  
order,   in   the  sense  that   it   related  not   to   the   impact  of  a  public  utterance  on  
the  political  choices  of  unspecified  groups  of  people,  but  rather  to  an  effort  to  
intervene   in   politics.   Clark   emphasised   the   reactionary   orientation   of   the  
letter,  but  expressed  scepticism  about  its  impact  on  the  recipient.    Dogged  by  
failing   health   and   troubled   by   political   intrigues   of   General   Kurt   von  
                                                                                                 
43  Machtan,  Der  Kaisersohn  bei  Hitler,  pp.  242–244.  
44  Printed  in:  Friedrich  Wilhelm  Prinz  von  Preußen,  Das  Haus  Hohenzollern  1918–1945  




Schleicher   and   his   circle,   Groener   resigned   in   May   1932,   without   having  
shown  any   sign  of   revoking   the  ban  on  paramilitary  organisations.   In   fact,  
the   ban   remained   in   place   until   after   the   resignation   of   Reich   Chancellor  
Brüning  in  June  1932.  It  was  subsequently  rescinded  by  the  newly  appointed  
Reich   Chancellor   Franz   von   Papen.   Neither   in   the   collapse   of   the  
government,   nor   in  von  Papen’s  decision   to   lift   the  ban,  Clark   argued,  did  
the  crown  prince  play  any  appreciable  part.46    
Another   critical   point   raised   by   the   Office   for   the   Settlement   of   Open  
Property  Issues  was  a  letter  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm  wrote  to  Adolf  Hitler  on  
25   September   1932.   In   it,   the   crown   prince   criticised  Hitler   for   driving   his  
party  into  “a  position  of  ever-­‐‑sharper  opposition  and  popular  sedition”,  but  
also  attempted  to  coax  Hitler  into  accepting  a  role  in  government  –  even  if  it  
were  not  the  chancellorship  –  and  adopting  a  more  flexible  approach,  so  as  to  
bring   “his   wonderful   movement   out   of   opposition”.47  Yet,   even   this   direct  
intervention   of   the   crown   prince,   Clark   argued,   remained   entirely  
unsuccessful,  as  the  reply  of  Hitler  three  days  later  made  clear.  Hitler  made  
no  concessions  whatsoever  to  the  prince’s  standpoint;  he  refused  flat  out  to  
accept   a   subordinate  position  or   to   join   any   sort   of   coalition.48  The  prince’s  
appeal   should  be   read  as  yet   another  articulation  of  what  Karl   Jaspers  had  
once   called   the  Zähmungskonzept;   the  deluded  notion  widely   entertained   in  
conservative   and   reactionary   circles   that   the   right  would   be   immeasurably  
                                                                                                 
46  Clark,  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm,  p.  9.  
47  Letter  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm  to  Adolf  Hitler,  Berlin,  25.09.1932,  GStA,  BPH,  Rep.  54  Nr.  
137–1.  




strengthened   if  Hitler   could   incorporate   into  a   coalition   that  would  be   in  a  
position   to  make   use   of   the   popular   appeal   of   the  NSDAP,  while   keeping  
Hitler   under   political   control.   As   so   often,   Clark   pointed   out,   the   crown  
prince  had  gravely  overestimated  his  political  influence  and  his  efforts  once  
more  bore  no  fruit.49    
  Clark   gave   focused   special   attention   to   the   impact   of   the   crown   prince’s  
behaviour  during  the  state  ceremony  known  as  the   ‘Day  of  Potsdam’  on  21  
March  1933.    The  prince’s  presence  at  this  event  raised  a  third  issue,  namely,  
whether   he   had   performed,   in   a   symbolic   capacity,   a   crucial   regime-­‐‑
consolidating   role.     He   had   not   been   officially   invited   to   Potsdam   and   his  
father,  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II,  had  urged  him  not  to  attend.50  But  he  turned  up  at  
Potsdam’s  Garrison  Church   nonetheless   and   took  up   a   prominent   position  
behind   the   empty   throne   inside   the   church.   Unlike   his   brother,   August  
Wilhelm,   who   wore   the   uniform   of   a   SA-­‐‑General,   the   crown   prince   was  
dressed   in   the   uniform   of   the  Death’s  Head  Hussars   (Totenkopf-­‐‑Husaren),   a  
regiment  he  had  commanded  before  the  First  World  War.51  In  his  assessment  
of   the  choreography  of   the  event,  Clark  once  more  pointed   to   the  marginal  
importance   of   the   crown   prince   in   the   proceedings.   He   argued   that   the  
attention  of  the  public  and  the  semiotic  weight  of  the  ceremony  were  focused  
on  Reich  President  Paul   von  Hindenburg   rather   than  on   the   crown  prince.  
Not  only  did  the  hoary  Field  Marshall  embody  the  traditions  and  glory  of  the  
                                                                                                 
49  Clark,  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm,  p.  9.  
50  Sigurd  von  Ilsemann,  Der  Kaiser  in  Holland  –  Monarchie  und  Nationalsozialismus  1924–1941  
(Munich,  1968),  p.  215.  
51  For  a  detailed  description  of  the  ‘Day  of  Potsdam’  see:  John  Zimmermann,  Der  Tag  von  
Potsdam,  in:  Michael  Epkenhans  and  Carmen  Winkel  (eds),  Die  Garnisonskirche  Potsdam.  
Zwischen  Mythos  und  Erinnerung  (Freiburg,  2013),  pp.  69–90.  
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old   Prussia,   but   he   was   also   the   man   in   power.   The   photographs   widely  
circulated   in   the   press   in   the   following   days   centred   on   Hindenburg   and  
Hitler;  the  crown  prince  was  largely  ignored.52  In  the  long  article  covering  the  
event  in  the  NSDAP  party  daily  Völkische  Beobachter,  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm  
was  merely  mentioned   as   having   been  present.53  As   for   the   crown  prince’s  
intentions   in   participating   in   the   Day   of   Potsdam,   an   event   meticulously  
orchestrated  by  Goebbels  with  the  clear  purpose  of  anchoring  the  new  Nazi  
movement   in   the   splendour   of   the   old   Prussia,   this   reflected   the   crown  
prince’s  deluded  belief  that  the  Nazis  might  yet  reinstate  him  as  emperor  of  
Germany.   Another   private   factor   was   the   crown   prince’s   jealousy   of   his  
much   more   popular   younger   brother,   August   Wilhelm,   who,   as   Lothar  
Machtan  put  it,  “appeared  to  be  well  on  his  way  to  usurping  the  hereditary  
rank  of  crown  prince  by  means  of  a  Nazi  political  career”.54  
Among  the  other  interventions  that  had  come  under  critical  scrutiny  were  a  
few   articles   the   crown   prince   had   published   in   the   domestic   and   foreign  
press.   On   10   November   1933,   in   a   piece   called   Novembertage,   the   crown  
prince   praised   Hitler’s   successful   efforts   in   defeating   the   radical   left. 55  
Germany,  the  prince  argued,  was  deeply  indebted  to  its  Führer  and  ought  to  
settle   its   account   with   its   leader   by   supporting   Hitler   in   the   upcoming  
plebiscite  on  Germany’s  withdrawal  from  the  League  of  Nations.  While  there  
could   be   no   doubting   the   generally   supportive   orientation   of   the   article,  
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Clark   argued,   there   was   no   reason   to   suspect   that   its   effect   had   been  
anything   but   minimal.   Firstly,   Hitler’s   popularity   had   reached  
unprecedented   heights   by   the   end   of   1933,   thanks   to   the   first   signs   of  
economic  recovery.    Secondly,  the  plebiscite  had  also  been  supported  by  far  
more  influential  players  than  the  crown  prince,  such  as  Reich  President  von  
Hindenburg,   as  well   as   economic   and   church   leaders.   Ballot  manipulation  
was   a   further   factor   in   the   government’s   success.   Consequently,   Clark  
concluded,  “the  importance  of  the  crown  prince’s  intervention  would  appear  
to  be  negligible”.56    
Much   the   same   could   be   said,   Clark   argued,   of   two   further   published  
statements   by   the   crown   prince.   In   an   article   called   Ewiges   Preußentum   in  
early   January   1934,   the   crown   prince   celebrated   the   Prussian   tradition   of  
“conservative   wisdom   of   state”   and   stressed   that   Prussia   had   repeatedly  
reinvented   itself   in  a   series  of   revolutions   from  above.   In  Hitler,   the   crown  
prince   saw   the   best   guarantee   that   this   “bold   and   wise   spirit   of   eternal  
Prussian  legacy”  would  continue.57  But  the  article  was  more  a  transfiguration  
of   Prussia;   its   support   for  National   Socialism  was   limited   and   conditional;  
this  was   a   “very   sotto   voce   intervention  whose   impact   is   unlikely   to   have  
been   significant”.58   At   the   same   time,   the   crown   prince   seems   to   have  
published  his  only  article  in  the  British  press.59  In  it,  he  stated  that  Hitler  had  
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57  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm,  Ewiges  Preußentum,  Berlin,  01.1934,  GStA,  I.  HA  Rep.  100  A  Nr.  
388/2.  
58  Clark,  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm,  p.  10.  
59  A  handwritten  note  on  the  surviving  transcript  of  this  article  mentions  the  “London  
International  Press  Ltd.”  as  the  source  of  publication.  If  and  which  newspapers  actually  
published  this  article,  however,  is  unfortunately  not  retraceable.  Major  newspapers  such  as  
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saved  Germany  from  Bolshevism  and  tried  to  reassure  the  British  people  that  
“the  German   people   are   far   from   assuming   an   aggressive   attitude   to   their  
neighbours”.60  In  the  case  of  this  article,  the  chief  concern  related  to  whether  
the  prince  had  played  an   important   role   in   consolidating   the  new  regime’s  
international   position.         But   here,   the   impact   of   the   prince’s   intervention  
appeared  to  be  minimal  –  no  major  newspapers  picked  up  the  story.61    
As   to   the   question   of   whether   the   services   rendered   by   the   crown   prince  
were  sustained  with  any  degree  of  “consistency”,  Clark  was  sceptical  as  well.  
Although   Crown   Prince   Wilhelm   was   involved   in   various   attempts   to  
convince  Hitler   and   the  NSDAP   to   enter   into  a   coalition  of  national   forces,  
“these  interventions  were  sporadic  and  driven  in  the  main  by  self-­‐‑interest”.62  
Once   the   crown  prince   realised   that   the  Nazis  were  not   at   all   interested   in  
restoring   him   as   emperor   of   Germany,   “his   interest   in   serving   the   regime  
largely  evaporated”.63  It  was  a  notable  fact  that  the  crown  prince  (unlike  his  
brothers)   never   joined   the   NSDAP.   He   did   for   a   brief   period   become   a  
member   of   the   National   Socialist   Motorists’   Corps   (NSKK),   after   the  
Stahlhelm   (which   the   crown   prince   was   affiliated   with)   had   been  
incorporated   into   the  SA.  After   a  quarrel  with  his   commanding  officer,   the  
crown  prince,  however,  left  this  organisation  in  1936.64  To  be  sure,  the  crown  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
The  Times,  the  Manchester  Guardian  or  the  Daily  Telegraph  did  neither  publish  nor  
comment  on  it.  See:  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm,  London  International  Press  Ltd.  On  12.12.1933,  
GStA,  I.  HA,  Rep.  100  A,  Nr.  388/2.  
60  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm,  London  International  Press  Ltd.  On  12.12.1933,  GStA,  I.  HA,  Rep.  
100  A,  Nr.  388/2.  
61  Clark,  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm,  p.  13.  
62  Ibid,  p.  11.  
63  Ibid.  
64  Jonas,  The  Life  of  Crown  Prince  William,  pp.  191–192.  
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prince  had  sent  birthday  telegrams  on  Hitler’s  and  Goering’s  birthdays  and  
had  wired  Hitler   to   congratulate   him   on   his   victorious   campaigns   against  
Czechoslovakia  and  France.    “These  communications  doubtless  expressed  an  
authentic   enthusiasm   for   the   exploits   of   the   regime,”  Clark   acknowledged,  
but  could  not  be   interpreted  as  “continuing  service   to   the  regime  or  even  a  
consistent   activism   in   its   support.”65  These   telegrams  might   also   have   been  
driven  by  the  looming  threat  of  expropriation,  Clark  suggested,  referring  to  a  
letter   of   Crown   Prince  Wilhelm   to   Hermann   Goering   in   which   the   prince  
begged   Hitler’s   Reichsmarschall   to   prevent   a   partial   expropriation   of  
Hohenzollern  land  in  Silesia.66    
With   regard   to   the   intentions   of   Crown   Prince   Wilhelm,   the   appraisal  
concluded   that   the   crown  prince  was  a  person  of   reactionary   temperament  
who   favoured   a   hard   policy   against   the   left,   even   if   this   involved   the  
deployment  of  violence  and  other  extra-­‐‑constitutional  means,  and  favoured  a  
policy   directed   towards   absorbing   the   National   Socialist   movement   into   a  
broad   right-­‐‑wing  coalition.     He  had  no  principled  objection   to   the  NSDAP.    
But   his   behaviour   had   not   been   oriented   to   the   consistent   support   of   the  
party  either  before,  during  or  after  the  seizure  of  power.    Rather,  “the  crown  
prince  acted  above  all  on  the  presumption  that  his  behaviour  could  result  in  
a  significant  benefit  to  himself.”67  His  paramount  goal  was  the  restoration  of  
a  Hohenzollern  monarchy  with  himself  on  the  throne.  To  the  crown  prince,  
National  Socialism  was  a  means  to  an  end.  Clark’s  main  line  of  argument  is  
                                                                                                 
65  Clark,  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm,  pp.  11–12.  
66  Letter  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm  to  Hermann  Goering,  Potsdam  29  June  1939,  BA,  R43/4063,  
Fiche  3,  fo.  99–101.    
67  Clark,  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm,  p.  14.  
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thus  based  on  the  contention  that  the  crown  prince  “was  a  marginal  figure  in  
the   politics   of   the   late   Weimar   Republic   and   in   the   early   phase   of   the  
regime’s   consolidation   of   power”. 68   Clark   observed   that   Crown   Prince  
Wilhelm  “did  on  a  few  occasions  act  on  the  presumption  that  his  behaviour  
could   result   in   significant   benefit   for   the   National   Socialist   regime”,   but  
argued  that  due  to  his  political  irrelevance  and  “incapacity  to  act  effectually  
in   a   complex   and   fast   evolving   political   environment”,   his   actions   had  
neither   substantial   impact   on   the   establishment   nor   the   stabilisation   of   the  
National   Socialist   system.69  It   followed   that   the  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm  had  
provided  the  regime  with  intermittent  support,  but  that  he  had  not  provided  
the  National  Socialist  regime  with  substantial  or  consistent  assistance.    
In  the  summer  of  2011,  the  Hohenzollern  submitted  Clark’s  appraisal.  After  
further  years  of  research  in  the  archives  and  discrete  negotiations,  the  Office  
for   the   Settlement   of   Open   Property   Issues   signalled   its   approval   of  
compensation   in   December   2013.   Its   preliminary   decision   agreed   in   large  
parts  with   the   argumentation   of   the   external   appraisal   and   concluded   that  
Crown  Prince  Wilhelm  had  not  “substantially  assisted”  the  National  Socialist  
movement.   Consequently,   his   heirs   would   be   eligible   for   compensation  
under   the   terms   of   the   1994   compensation   law   (Ausgleichsleistungsgesetz).70  
The  final  decision,  normally  a  formality,  lay  with  Brandenburg’s  ministry  of  
finance.      
                                                                                                 
68  Ibid.  
69  Ibid.  
70  Bescheidsentwurf  bzgl.  Ansprüche  SKH  Herrn  Georg  Friedrich  Prinz  von  Preußen  auf  im  
heutigen  Bundesland  Brandenburg  gelegene  Immobilien,  Landkreis  Oder-­‐‑Spree,  Amt  zur  
Regelung  offener  Vermögensfragen,  18.12.2013,  Hausarchiv  des  vormals  regierenden  
preußischen  Königshauses  (Berlin).  
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In   January   2014,   however,   there   was   a   reshuffle   in   Brandenburg’s   cabinet  
and   Christian   Görke   replaced   the   long-­‐‑time   minister   of   finance,   Helmuth  
Markow.   Görke,   the   head   of   the   far-­‐‑left   party   DIE   LINKE,   personally  
intervened  to  block  the  Hohenzollern  restitution  process.  DIE  LINKE,  as  the  
successor  party  of  the  SED  (Sozialistische  Einheitspartei)  took  a  dim  view  of  
any   measures   likely   to   place   in   question   –   even   morally   –   the   post-­‐‑war  
expropriations.  The  party’s  manifesto  still  defends  the  post-­‐‑war  land  reform  
as   a  necessary   tool   “to  protect   the  workers   from   seigniorial   exploitation”.71  
Görke   and   his   entourage   were   determined,   in   particular,   to   prevent   any  
compensation  payments  from  finding  their  way  into  the  hands  of  Germany’s  
former  ruling  family.  Their  voters,   they  feared,  would  not   tolerate   financial  
compensation  for   the  most  prominent  representative  of   the  traditional  class  
enemy.  Overnight,  Görke  declared   the  decade-­‐‑long  work  of  Brandenburg’s  
Office   for   the   Settlement   of   Open   Property   Issues   null   and   void   and  
rescinded   its  preliminary  decision.   Instead,  he  appointed  a   further   external  
historian  to  deliver  a  counter-­‐‑appraisal.72  
Appraisal  Dr  Stephan  Malinowski  
As   its  expert  witness,   the  ministry  of   finance  of  Brandenburg  appointed  Dr  
Stephan   Malinowski,   a   lecturer   of   modern   European   history   at   the  
                                                                                                 
71  Woher  wir  kommen,  wer  wir  sind,  Programm  der  Partei  DIE  LINKE,  online  at:  
https://www.die-­‐‑linke.de/partei/dokumente/programm-­‐‑der-­‐‑partei-­‐‑die-­‐‑linke/i-­‐‑woher-­‐‑wir-­‐‑
kommen-­‐‑wer-­‐‑wir-­‐‑sind/.    
72  Entschädigung  für  Hohenzollern:  Görke  greift  ein,  FOCUS,  15.03.2014;  
Hohenzollernzahlung  wird  geprüft,  Märkische  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  25.02.2014;  Streit  um  die  
Rolle  der  Hohenzollern,  Neue  Zürcher  Zeitung,  05.03.2014.  
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University   of   Edinburgh.   Malinowski   is   known   for   his   ground-­‐‑breaking  
study   of   the   German   nobility’s   role   in   the   Third   Reich   in   which   he  
emphasised   not   only   a   large   degree   of   collaboration   between   the   German  
nobility   and   the   National   Socialist   movement,   but   also   a   profound  
congruence   of   political   interests   and   social   values.73  In   this   study,   he   also  
touched  upon  the  Hohenzollern’s  role   in   the  Third  Reich,  attributing   to   the  
crown   prince   not   only   a   radical   right-­‐‑wing   mentality,   but   also   a   distinct  
willingness   to   collaborate   with   the   Nazi   regime. 74   Malinowski’s   critical  
attitude  towards  the  nobility  in  general,  and  the  crown  prince  in  particular,  
thus   perfectly   qualified   him   to   deliver   a   counter-­‐‑appraisal   on   behalf   of  
Christian  Goerke.      
Dr   Malinowski   was   supplied   with   a   copy   of   Clark’s   early   appraisal   and  
provided   with   a   catalogue   of   eight   specific   questions.   The   first   two   were  
concerned  with  the  consistency,  intentions  and  impact  of  the  crown  prince’s  
support   towards   National   Socialism.   The   third   related   to   possible  
memberships   of   the   crown   prince   in   National   Socialist   organisations.   The  
fourth  asked   to  depict  “successful   forms  of   support   throughout   the  year  of  
1932”,   whereas   the   fifth   concerned   the   consequences   of   Wilhelm’s   public  
appearance  during   the  Day  of  Potsdam.  The   last   three  questions   related   to  
possible  financial  contributions  to  National  Socialist  organisations,  letters  to  
                                                                                                 
73  Malinowski,  Vom  König  zum  Führer.  
74  Ibid,  p.  506–509.  
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Hitler   and   other   NS-­‐‑functionaries   and   connections   to   the   military  
resistance.75  
Malinowski   did   not   address   these   questions   sequentially,   but   divided   his  
appraisal   into   four   main   sections.   First,   he   dealt   with   the   consistency   of  
Crown  Prince  Wilhelm’s   actions   vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis   the  National   Socialist  movement.  
Second,   he   addressed   the   crown   prince’s   status   and   importance   within  
German   society.   Thereafter,   he   examined   Wilhelm’s   role   in   the   National  
Socialist   takeover,   before   concluding   with   an   assessment   of   his   intentions  
and  the  impact  of  his  actions.    
Consistency  of  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm’s  Actions  
After  a  brief  introduction  into  the  current  state  of  research,  the  appraisal,  in  
bullet  point   form  and  partly  annotated,   lists   eighty-­‐‑five  occasions  designed  
to  illuminate  the  crown  prince’s  contact  with  representatives  of  the  National  
Socialist   movement.   This   section   meticulously   registers   every   letter   or  
telegram   the   crown   prince   wrote   to   Nazi   functionaries,   every   article   he  
published   in   the  national  and   international  press,  every  effort  of   the  crown  
prince  to  intervene  on  behalf  of  the  National  Socialist  movement,  as  well  as  
every  public  appearance  that  might  be  seen  as  an  expression  of  support  for  
the  NSDAP.76    
                                                                                                 
75  Stephan  Malinowski,  Gutachten  zum  politischen  Verhalten  des  ehemaligen  Kronprinzen  
(Wilhelm  Prinz  von  Preußen,  1882–1951)  (Edinburgh,  2014),  p.  2.  
76  Malinowski,  Gutachten,  pp.  8–42.    
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The  aim  was  to  convey  the  impression  of  frequent  and  consistent  interaction  
between  the  crown  prince  and  the  dignitaries  of  the  Third  Reich  before  and  
after  their  ascension  to  power.  Like  Clark,  Malinowski  characterised  Crown  
Prince  Wilhelm  as  a   typical   representative  of   the  arch-­‐‑reactionary  and  anti-­‐‑
republican   far   right   of   the   1920s,   but   he   added   that   the   prince   had   sought  
contact  with  Hitler  and  his  movement  as  early  as  1926  in  an  effort  to  explore  
the  options  of  merging  the  nationalistic  right  wing  forces  and  overthrow  the  
Weimar   Republic.77  Malinowski   interpreted   the   interventions   discussed   in  
Clark’s   appraisal   (recommendation   to   vote   for   Hitler   in   the   presidential  
election,   letter   to  minister  of  defence  Wilhelm  Groener,   letter   to  Hitler,  Day  
of   Potsdam,   articles   in   the   domestic   and   foreign   press)   as   demonstrating  
consistent   support   for   the   National   Socialists,   but   he   also   focused   on   less  
prominent  episodes,  such  as  Wilhelm’s  regular  visits  to  the  home  of  Viktoria  
von  Dirksen,  whose  political  salon  represented  one  of  the  key  intersections  of  
conservatives  and  National  Socialists  in  Berlin.78  Rumours  in  the  Berlin  press  
in  1930,  according  to  which  the  crown  prince  was  contemplating  entering  the  
NSDAP,   are   cited   as   evidence   of   Wilhelm’s   proximity   to   the   National  
Socialist   movement.79  The   same   is   true   for   Wilhelm’s   membership   in   the  
Society  for  the  Study  of  Fascism  (Gesellschaft  zum  Studium  des  Faschismus),  which  
was  headed  by  his  cousin,  Carl  Eduard  Duke  of  Saxe-­‐‑Coburg  and  Gotha.80  If  
considered   jointly,   Malinowski   argued,   these   instances   formed   a   bigger  
                                                                                                 
77  Ibid,  p.  12.    
78  Ibid,  p.  13;  For  a  more  detailed  description  of  Victoria  von  Dirksen  see:  d’Almeida,  High  
Society  in  the  Third  Reich,  p.  39.  
79  Malinowski,  Gutachten,  p.  14.  
80  Ibid,  p.  19.  
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picture   of   continuous   contact   between   the   crown   prince   and   the   National  
Socialist  party.    
Additionally,  the  Malinowski  appraisal  referred  to  Goering’s  participation  in  
the  crown  prince’s  fiftieth  birthday  celebration  at  Cecilienhof  Castle  in  spring  
1932,   as  well   as   to  Wilhelm’s  participation   in  a   state   funeral   for   the   former  
head   of   the   SA-­‐‑Sturm   33   and   pardoned   murderer,   Hans   Maikowski,   in  
January   1933.81  Malinowski   also   submitted   a   detailed   survey   –   including   a  
wide  array  of  photographic  evidence  –  of  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm’s  frequent  
appearances   at   military   parades   of   the   Stahlhelm   before   and   after   it   was  
absorbed  into  the  SA,  as  well  as  numerous  congratulatory  telegrams  he  sent  
to   Goering   and  Hitler   over   the   years.82  The   enormous   extent   of   social   and  
political   interaction   in   those   years   –   of  which   none   had   ensued   under   any  
constraint   –   Malinowski   argued,   were   unambiguous   proof   of   the   crown  
prince’s  continuous  and  uninterrupted  support  for  the  regime.    
Relevance  of  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm  
Thereafter,   the  appraisal   addressed   the   social   and  political   relevance  of   the  
crown   prince   (in   an   attempt   to   assess   the   impact   of   Wilhelm’s   actions).  
Malinowski  insisted  on  the  enormous  intrinsic  importance  of  the  office  of  the  
German   crown   prince.   The   significance   of   this   position,   he   claimed,   was  
                                                                                                 
81  Ibid,  pp.  20,  24;  For  a  more  detailed  description  of  Hans  Maikowski  see:  Sven  Reichardt,  
Vergemeinschaftung  durch  Gewalt.  Das  Beispiel  des  SA-­‐‑“Mördersturms  33”  in  Berlin-­‐‑
Charlottenburg  zwischen  1928  und  1932,  in:  Herbert  Diercks  (ed.),  Entgrenzte  Gewalt.  
Täterinnen  und  Täter  im  Nationalsozialismus  (Bremen,  2002),  pp.  20–36.  
82  Malinowski,  Gutachten,  pp.  30–33,  40,  41.  
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entirely   independent   of   the   personal   skills   of   the   incumbent.   Unlike   an  
ordinary   politician,   who   had   to   gradually   earn   his   status   and   build   his  
reputation,   the   crown   prince   was   born   into   a   position   of   superiority   and  
prominence,   which   was   almost   impossible   to   forfeit.   The   actions   of   the  
candidate   for   the  most  powerful   throne  of   continental  Europe,  Malinowski  
argued,   would   inevitably   have   significant   ramifications   and   consequently  
had   to   be   assessed   along   different   lines   than   those   of   “an   unemployed  
assistant  baker  in  Oberstdorf”.83    
Malinowski   also   stressed   the   crown   prince’s   position   at   the   apex   of   the  
German  nobility,  a   formation  whose  political   influence  was   in  decline  after  
the   First   World   War,   but   whose   social   influence   remained   largely   intact.  
Especially   the   symbols,   traditions   and   charisma   of   the   old   ruling   class  
survived  the  upheavals  of  the  revolutionary  years.  Combined  with  the  ability  
to  defend  tight  and  powerful  networks  and  maintain  access  to  the  corridors  
of  power,  the  nobility  remained  a  vital  factor  in  the  political  landscape  of  the  
Weimar   Republic.84  The   crown   prince,   Malinowski   claims,   epitomised   this  
position  of  power  like  no  other  when  he  –  dressed  in  his  Death  Head  Hussar  
uniform   –   publically   paid   homage   to   the   new   rulers   during   the   Day   of  
Potsdam,   and   secretly   intervened  on  behalf   of   the   SA   in   a  private   letter   to  
Reichswehrminister  Groener.    
Thus,  Malinowski  argued  that  despite  Wilhelm’s   flight   to  Holland  after   the  
First  World  War  and  his  often  critically  viewed  personal  life  –  factors  which  
                                                                                                 




certainly   diminished   his   reputation   and   popularity   in   royalist   circles   and  
beyond   –   the   crown   prince   still   remained,   at   least   on   a   symbolic   level,   a  
highly  influential  public  figure.    
The  Crown  Prince’s  role  in  the  Nazi  Takeover  
In   his   discussion   regarding   the   National   Socialist   takeover   in   1933,  
Malinowski   insisted   above   all   on   the   paramount   importance   of   backroom  
diplomacy.   The   Nazis’   ascent   to   power,   he   argued,   was   essentially  
orchestrated   behind   the   scenes   by   means   of   private   channels   of  
communication   for   which   acquaintances,   recommendations   and   access   to  
certain   milieus   were   crucial.   Crown   Prince   Wilhelm,   though   not   a   power  
broker  of  the  calibre  of  von  Papen  or  von  Schleicher,  had  unrestricted  access  
to  Weimar’s   corridors   of   power,   and   therefore   belonged   to   the   inner   circle  
responsible  for  lifting  Hitler  into  the  Reich  Chancellery.85    
According   to   Malinowski,   the   crown   prince’s   role   in   this   endeavour   is  
exemplified   in   the   proceedings   surrounding   the   presidential   election   of  
spring   1932.   Prior   to   his   recommendation   to   vote   for   Hitler   in   the   second  
ballot,   the   crown   prince   had   entertained   the   idea   of   running   for   president  
himself.   In   that  case,  he  expected  Adolf  Hitler,  Franz  Seldte  (Stahlhelm)  and  
Paul   von  Hindenburg   to  withdraw   from   the   race   and   rally   behind   him   in  
order   to  defeat   the  only   remaining   candidate,  Ernst  Thälmann,   the  head  of  
the   German   Communist   Party   (KPD).   Thereafter,   Wilhelm   intended   to  
                                                                                                 
85  Ibid,  p.  54,  55.  
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restore  the  Hohenzollern  monarchy  and  played  with  the  idea  of  appointing  
Hitler   as   his   chancellor.   “If   I   am   nominated   for   the   election   of   Reich  
President,  you  [Hitler]  shall  be  my  Chancellor.“86  This  scenario,  Malinowski  
argued,   not   only   showed   that  Wilhelm   remained   a   key   player   in  Weimar  
politics,  but  also  invalidated  the  claim  that  Wilhelm  only  cooperated  with  the  
Nazis   in   order   to   regain   his   throne.   Malinowski   instead   asserted   that  
Wilhelm  specifically  envisaged  a  revived  monarchy  along  the  Italian  model  
of  Mussolini,  where  the  monarchy  remained  officially  in  place,  but  a  strong  
Führer   headed   the   state.   Hitler,   therefore,   was   not   a   tool   in   the   crown  
prince’s  grand  plans  of   restoration,  he  argued,  but  an  essential  piece  of   the  
puzzle. 87   Wilhelm’s   plans   of   a   Führer-­‐‑monarchy   only   became   obsolete,  
Malinowsky   suggests,   because   the   Kaiser   forbade   his   son   to   run   for  
president.   Nevertheless,   the   crown   prince   continued   thereafter   to   endorse  
Hitler  publicly  in  the  hope  that  Hitler  would  re-­‐‑establish  him  as  emperor  of  
Germany,  and  therefore  offered  all  the  symbolic  weight  his  position  as  crown  
prince  still  offered.  According  to  Malinowski,  this  weight  was  still  significant  
and  Wilhelm’s  recommendation  that  the  Germans  vote  for  Hitler  “caused  a  
great  stir”.88    
The   appraisal   also   ascribed   special   importance   to   the   efforts   of   the   crown  
prince  –  thanks  to  letters  to  Groener  and  Hitler  in  1932  –  to  mediate  between  
                                                                                                 
86  Gerhard  Granier  (ed.),  Magnus  von  Levetzow:  Seeoffizier,  Monarchist  und  Wegbereiter  Hitlers.  
Lebensweg  und  ausgewählte  Dokumente  (Boppard  am  Rhein,  1982),  p.  174.  
87  Malinowski,  Gutachten,  p.  15.  
88  Ibid,  p.  17;  Malinowski  borrowed  this  observation  from  Klaus  Jonas’  biography  of  the  
crown  prince  –  Klaus  Jonas,  Der  Kronprinz  Wilhelm  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1962),  p.  230.  Jonas,  
however,  does  not  provide  any  source  for  this  statement.  The  fact  that  Wilhelm’s  election  
recommendation  “caused  a  great  stir”  seems  to  be  his  own  assumption.    
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the  National   Socialist  movement   and   conservative   circles.   The   diminishing  
electoral   success   in   the  autumn  of   1932  especially   showed   that   the  NSDAP  
was   unable   to  win   the  Chancellery  without   forming   a   coalition  with   other  
right   wing   forces.   Even   in   March   1933,   the   NSDAP,   despite   large-­‐‑scale  
manipulation,  had  not  exceeded  44  per  cent  of  the  popular  vote.  The  process  
of  Gleichschaltung   by  which   the  party   established   itself   as   the  unchallenged  
holder  had  not  yet  been  achieved.  Goebbels  and  Hitler  were  still  desperate  to  
win  over  the  old  elites.  With  this  in  mind,  they  staged  the  Day  of  Potsdam  in  
an   effort   to   bring   about   a   “marriage   between   the   Prussian   past   and   the  
National   Socialist   future”.89    The   crown  prince,   as   the  key   representative  of  
the   imperial   house,   Malinowski   suggested,   was   at   the   centre   of   this  
masquerade. 90   Placed   behind   a   vacant   throne,   dressed   in   his   imperial  
uniform   of   the   Death   Head   Hussars,   Wilhelm   was   staged   as   the   ‘wing  
commander’   of   Goebbels’   meticulously   planned   fusion   of   Prussia   and  
Nazism.91  This  staging,  Malinowski  emphasised,  was  essential  for  the  success  
of   the  Day  of  Potsdam.  The   event  was  not   about   showcasing   a  united  NS-­‐‑
state,   but   rather   a   merger   of   the   Ancièn   Regime   and   National   Socialism.  
Instead  of  large  swastika  flags,  the  traditional  flag  of  the  empire  dominated  
the  streets  of  Potsdam.  The  SA  marched  in  line  with  the  army  and  Hitler  and  
Goebbels   appeared   in   civil   attire.   Hitler   bowed   in   front   of   Hindenburg,  
                                                                                                 
89  Anna  von  der  Goltz,  Hindenburg.  Power,  Myth  and  the  Rise  of  the  Nazis  (Oxford,  2009),  p.  
176.  
90  Malinowski  based  this  argument  on  the  assumption  that  the  Nazis  had  in  fact  invited  the  
crown  prince.  The  statement  of  the  Kaiser’s  adjutant  Sigurd  von  Ilsemann,  that  the  crown  
prince  had  not  officially  been  invited  [Sigurd  von  Ilsemann,  Der  Kaiser  in  Holland  –  Monarchie  
und  Nationalsozialismus  1924–1941  (Munich,  1968),  p.  215]  is  simply  rejected  by  Malinowski  
as  “highly  improbable”;  See:  Malinowski,  Gutachten,  p.  61.    
91  Malinowski,  Gutachten,  p.  62.  
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symbolically  accepting  the   junior  role   in  government.  Yet,   for   this  spectacle  
to  work,  those  representatives  of  the  old  empire  had  to  participate  who  were  
capable   of   endowing   the   new   leaders   with   the   respectability   of   the   old  
Prussia;   namely   Hindenburg,   and   especially   the   crown   prince,   as   the  
representative   of   the   imperial   family.  According   to  Malinowski,   the   crown  
prince  and  his  brothers,  who  also  attended  the  ceremony  as  members  of  the  
Stahlhelm   (Prince   Eitel   Friedrich   and   Prince   Oskar)   and   the   SA   (Prince  
August-­‐‑Wilhelm),  vitally  contributed  to  the  successful  fusion  of  the  old  elites  
and   the   NS   regime,   and   thereby   willingly   and   decisively   fostered   the  
consolidation  of  National  Socialist  power.92    
Furthermore,   the   enactment   of   the  Day   of   Potsdam   sent   another   powerful  
message   to   large  parts  of   the  nobility   and  other   conservatives  who  had  up  
until  now  remained  sceptical  about  National  Socialism.      It  was  designed   to  
illustrate   that   the   revolutionary  days   of   violent   street   riots   had   irrevocably  
come   to   an   end.   Instead,   the  National   Socialist  movement  would   return   to  
civilised   cooperation   and   unity  with   the   forces   of   the   old   empire.   For   this  
message   to   have   the   desired   effect,   Malinowski   states,   the   crown   prince’s  
involvement  was  essential.93    
Thus,   Malinowski   claimed,   Crown   Prince   Wilhelm   contributed   to   Hitler’s  
eventual  success  on  two  different  levels.  On  the  one  hand,  he  interceded  on  
Hitler’s   behalf   in   important   government   circles,   and   on   the   other   hand,   he  
lent  his  respectability  and  symbolic  capital,  bestowed  on  him  by  birth,  to  the  
                                                                                                 
92  Ibid,  p.  64.  
93  Ibid,  p.  67.  
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National   Socialist  movement.   In   the   end,   “the   crown   prince   did   not   bring  
about  or  navigate  the  coalition”  of  the  old  elites  and  National  Socialism,  “but  
he  did  everything  in  the  power  of  a  fallen  crown  prince  to  promote  it”.94    
     
                                                                                                 
94  Ibid,  p.  69.  
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Impact  of  Wilhelm’s  Actions  
As  we  have  seen  above,  Malinowski  regards  Wilhelm  as  a  highly  influential  
go-­‐‑between  whose  position  as  heir   to   the  German  throne  guaranteed  him  a  
natural  public   influence.  Yet,   assessing   the   impact   of  his  numerous   actions  
vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis   the   National   Socialist   movement,   Malinowski   argues,   is   highly  
complicated.  In  the  field  of  historical  analysis,  it  is  often  almost  impossible  to  
establish   a   causal   chain   between   action   and   impact.   Thus,   instead   of  
examining   every   individual   action   of   the   crown   prince   separately,  
Malinowski   rather   tries   to   depict   the   crown   prince’s   general   impact   by  
assessing,   for   example,   the   reactions   of   the   press   or   high  Nazi   officials,   as  
well  as  his  visibility  in  the  public.    
Malinowski  cites  numerous  newspaper  articles   in   the  domestic  and   foreign  
press  to  underline  the  continuous  interest  of  the  media  in  the  crown  prince’s  
person.  He  mentions   countless  articles   in   the  French,  American  and  British  
press  which  extensively  dealt  with  the  question  of  a  monarchical  restoration  
throughout  the  spring  and  summer  of  1932.  The  London  Times  and  the  Daily  
Telegraph  apparently  interpreted  the  appearance  of  Wilhelm  and  his  brothers  
at   a   Stahlhelm   rally   in   September   1932,   where   150,000   men   in   uniform  
paraded  on  the  field  of  Tempelhof  (Tempelhofer  Feld),  as  a  clear  indication  of  a  
future   war   of   aggression   and   restoration   of   the   Hohenzollern   family.95  
(Surprisingly,  Malinowski   cites   the  German  newspaper  Vossische  Zeitung   in  
this   context.   The   original   article   of   the  London  Times   on   5   September   1932,  
                                                                                                 
95  Ibid,  p.  80.  
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however,   rather   regards   the  Stahlhelm  rally  and   the  prominent  appearance  
of  various  leading  members  of  the  government,  as  well  as  the  crown  prince,  
as  a  “rebuke  to  the  Nazis”.  There  is  neither  any  mention  of  a  restoration,  nor  
of  a  war  of  aggression.96)  Furthermore,  Malinowski  mentions  articles   in   the  
foreign   press,   which   once   again   discussed   the   scenario   of   a   monarchical  
restoration   following   Hitler’s   appointment   as   Reich   Chancellor   in   January  
1933.97  Various  foreign  and  domestic  newspapers  apparently  also  picked  up  
on   an   article   the   crown   prince   wrote   in   the   spring   of   1933   in   which   he  
rejected  allegations  of  mistreatment  of  German  Jews.98    
Malinowski   also   names   Goebbels’   and   Hitler’s   fear   of   the   crown   prince’s  
charisma   as   an   indication   of   Wilhelm’s   influence.   According   to   Goebbel’s  
diaries,  Hitler  saw  in  the  crown  prince  one  of  the  very  few  individuals  who  
might  be  able  to  defeat  him  in  the  presidential  election  in  1932.99  “During  this  
crucial   phase   of   the   struggle   for   power,”  Malinowski   argued,   “it   is   almost  
impossible   to   attribute   more   importance   to   a   single   individual.” 100  
Additionally,   Hitler’s   decree   to   discharge   all   male   members   of   formerly  
ruling   princely   families   from   military   service   in   the   spring   of   1940  
(Prinzenerlass),  Malinowski  notes,  has  to  be  seen  as  an  expression  of  this  fear.  
Following  the  death  of  Prince  Wilhelm,  the  eldest  son  of  the  crown  prince,  on  
                                                                                                 
96  Rally  of  the  Stahlhelm  –  Big  Imperial  Display  –  Rebuke  to  Nazis,  The  Times,  05.09.1932.  
97  In  this  context  Malinowski  cites  an  article  in  the  German  newspaper  Der  Aufrechte,  which  
provided  a  short  overview  of  the  international  press  coverage:  Wenn  der  Kaiser  
wiederkäme!  Was  würde  “Europa”  dazu  sagen?,  Der  Aufrechte,  20.12.1932.  
98  Malinowski,  Gutachten,  p.  81;  Surprisingly,  Malinowski  does  not  provide  any  citations  
clarifying  which  foreign  and  domestic  newspapers  picked  up  on  this  article.  
99  Elke  Fröhlich  (ed.),  Die  Tagebücher  von  Joseph  Goebbels,  Teil  I,  Aufzeichnungen  1923  -­‐‑1941  
(Munich,  2005),  p.  294.  
100  Malinowski,  Gutachten,  p.  73.  
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the  Western  Front  on  26  May  1940,  more  than  50,000  people  spontaneously  
lined   the   streets   during   his   funeral   at   Potsdam.101  Hitler   regarded   this   as   a  
clear   indication   of   the  Hohenzollern’s   remaining   potential   drawing   power,  
which  might  theoretically  threaten  his  sole  authority.        
Finally,   the   appraisal   refers   to   the   uninterrupted   public   visibility   of   the  
crown  prince.  His  countless  appearances  at  Stahlhelm  rallies,  state  funerals,  
SA   parades,   events   of   the  NSKK   (Nationalsozialistisches   Kraftfahrerkorps)  
and   speeches   of   Hitler   demonstrate   that   the   crown   prince,   at   least   on   a  
symbolic   level,   was   a   welcome   guest   whose   presence   at   public   events  
supplied   the   National   Socialist   movement   with   much   needed   credit.   To  
illustrate  the  symbolic  and  political  impact  of  such  appearances,  Malinowski  
referred   to  an   instance   in  1926  when   the  participation  of   the   son  of  Crown  
Prince  Wilhelm  in  a  military  manoeuvre  of  the  Infantry  Regiment  9  resulted  
in   a   veritable   scandal.   The   symbolic   and   charismatic   potential   of   a  
Hohenzollern   Prince   alongside   a   noble   dominated   elite   formation   of   the  
army  was  perceived  as  a  vital  threat  to  the  Weimar  Republic,  and  ultimately,  
resulted   in   the   dismissal   of   the   head   of   the   Supreme   Army   Command,  
General  Hans  von  Seeckt.  Thus   the   symbolic  power  of   the   imperial   family,  
Malinowski  argued,   remained  considerable   throughout   the   interwar  period  
and   serves   as   a   helpful   indicator   to   assess   the   impact   of   Crown   Prince  
Wilhelm’s  actions  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  the  National  Socialist  regime.102    
                                                                                                 
101  Herre,  Kronprinz  Wilhelm,  pp.  228–230;  Gerd  Heinrich,  Geschichte  Preußens.  Staat  und  
Dynastie  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1984),  pp.  515–517.  
102  Malinowski,  Gutachten,  p.  79.  
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Overall,  Malinowski   came   to   the   conclusion  which  Brandenburg’s  minister  
of   finance,   Christian   Goerke,   had   asked   for.   Malinowski   unequivocally  
asserted   that   Crown   Prince   Wilhelm   not   only   intentionally,   but   also  
consistently,   provided   the   National   Socialist   regime   with   substantial  
assistance  before,  during  and  after   its   ascension   to  power.  Furthermore,  he  
concluded  that  although  the  crown  prince  cannot  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  
key   instigators   of   the   events   that   led   to   Hitler’s   appointment   as   Reich  
Chancellor   in   January   1933,  his   actions  nevertheless  had  a   lasting   effect   on  
the  establishment  and  consolidation  of  the  NS-­‐‑regime.    
Comparison  of  Clark  and  Malinowski  
Unsurprisingly,  as  expert  witnesses  of  opposing  sides,  Clark  and  Malinowski  
drew   significantly   diverging   conclusions.   To   understand   these   diversions,  
however,  one   firstly  has   to   look  at  how  these  conclusions  were  drawn.  The  
first  point  that  immediately  comes  to  mind  when  reading  these  appraisals  is  
the   significant   discrepancy   in   terms   of   length   and   depth.  Whereas   Clark’s  
review  confined  itself  to  fifteen  pages,  Dr  Malinowski  spread  his  arguments  
over   ninety-­‐‑five   pages.   The   reason   for   this  marked  disparity   can   be   traced  
back  to  the  fundamentally  different  job  descriptions  the  two  expert  witnesses  
were   initially   presented   with.   Professor   Clark   was   commissioned   by   the  
Hohenzollern  family  to  assess  a  series  of  six  distinct  points,  which  had  been  
specifically   contested   by   the   Office   for   the   Settlement   of   Open   Property  
Issues.      In  particular,  he  was  asked   to  examine  whether   the  crown  prince’s  
election   recommendation   for   Hitler,   his   letters   to   Groener   and   Hitler,   his  
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involvement   in   the  Day   of   Potsdam,   and   his   articles   in   the  German   press,  
qualified   as   intentional   and   consistent   support   of   the   National   Socialist  
movement   and   whether   these   specific   actions   actually   had   the   effect   of  
improving   the   establishment,   the   development   or   the   consolidation   of   the  
National   Socialist   system.   Clark’s   appraisal   is   therefore   a   rather   short   and  
concise  analysis  of  a  limited  source  body,  a  fact  that  he  explicitly  notes  in  his  
introduction.    
Dr  Malinowski,   however,  was   instructed   to   compose   a   comprehensive   and  
complete   inquiry   of   all   the   crown   prince’s   actions   vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis   the   National  
Socialist   system   throughout   the   interwar   period   –   or   anything   that   might  
relate  him  to  the  National  Socialist  movement  –   in  an  effort   to  construct  an  
interpretation  which  would  allow  the  minister  of  finance,  Christian  Goerke,  
to  reject  the  Hohenzollern’s  claim  for  compensation.  In  this  context,  it  is  also  
worth  mentioning  that  Dr  Malinowski  was  not  only  not  limited  in  the  scope  
of   his   research,   but   had   also   been   provided   with   Clark’s   appraisal   in  
advance,  a  fact  which  allowed  him  to  thoroughly  and  specifically  challenge  
and  counter  Clark’s  arguments.103    
Although  both  appraisals  come  to  fundamentally  differing  conclusions,  there  
are  actually  various  points  in  which  both  expert  witnesses  partly  agree.  Both  
describe   Crown   Prince   Wilhelm   as   “a   man   whose   political   outlook   was  
essentially  reactionary,  and  who  was  willing,  like  many  other  figures  on  the  
ultra-­‐‑conservative   spectrum,   to   collaborate  with   the  NSDAP”.104  Clark  does  
                                                                                                 
103  Ibid,  p.  2.  
104  Clark,  Crown  Prince  Wilhelm,  p.  7  
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not   deny   that   Crown   Prince   Wilhelm   at   times   “believed   that   he   had  
something   of   importance   to   offer   the   National   Socialists”105  and   therefore  
deliberately   supported   the   National   Socialist   movement.   Clark   also   rejects  
the  claims  of  the  apologetic  literature,  which  tried  to  suggest  that  the  prince  
entertained  a  “principled  opposition  to  the  regime  or  even  an  inner  distance  
from  the  regime’s  objectives”.106    
Both  appraisals  also  partly  concur  in  their  assessment  of  the  motives  behind  
the   crown  prince’s   actions.  Clark   considers  Wilhelm’s   actions   to  have  been  
largely   driven   by   self-­‐‑interest,   particularly   by   the   “belief   that   it   would   be  
possible   to   use   the   NSDAP   as   a   means   […]   of   securing   an   imperial  
restoration”.107  Yet,   at   the   same   time,   Clark   regards   this   idea   as   utterly  
unrealistic   and   an   expression   of   a   drastic-­‐‑overestimation   of   the   crown  
prince’s  own  importance.  It  was,  he  contended,  a  notion  “so  far-­‐‑fetched  that  
it   suggests   a   tendency   towards   delusions   of   grandeur”. 108   Although  
Malinowski   also   sees   an   imperial   restoration   at   the   heart   of   Wilhelm’s  
motives,   he   is   unwilling   to   discount   this   as   a   pipedream.   In  Malinowski’s  
eyes,  the  crown  prince  was  a  key  player  in  Weimar  politics,  who  supposedly  
followed  a  deliberate  plan  as  part  of  which  the  National  Socialist  movement  
was  not  simply  a  means  to  an  end,  but  would  play  a  crucial  role  in  the  state  
that   would   result.   According   to   Malinowski   Wilhelm   not   only   wanted   to  
‘hire’  Hitler  and  his  movement  –  which  would  have  been  a  classic  example  of  
the   Zähmungskonzept   –   but   rather,   intended   to   establish   a   new   Führer-­‐‑
                                                                                                 
105  Ibid,  p.  14.  
106  Ibid.  
107  Ibid.  
108  Ibid,  p.  7.  
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monarchy   along   the   fascist   model   installed   in   Italy.109  Thus   where   Clark  
regards   the   crown   prince   as   a   delusional   fantasist,   unable   to   grasp   the  
dangers   and   magnitude   of   a   collaboration   with   the   National   Socialist  
movement,   Malinowski   considers   him   a   calculating   and   convinced   fascist  
whose   master   plan   envisaged   the   erection   of   a   National   Socialist   empire  
under  his  own  leadership.      
These   diverging   perceptions   of   the   crown   prince   ultimately   lead   us   to   the  
point  where   both   appraisals   fundamentally   diverge,   namely   the   impact   of  
Wilhelm’s  actions.  Clark  depicts   the  crown  prince  as  an   insignificant   figure  
in  the  political  landscape  of  the  early  1930s,  whose  flight  to  Holland  after  the  
First  World  War   and   numerous   scandals   surrounding   his   private   life   had  
lastingly  destroyed  his  reputation.  In  the  final  years  of  the  Weimar  Republic,  
he  argues,  Hindenburg  had  long-­‐‑since  taken  over  the  role  of  Ersatzkaiser  and  
redirected   the  monarchical   focus   in   large  parts   of  German   society.   Even   in  
the   case   of   a   Hohenzollern   restoration,   a   question   that   continuously  
resurfaced   in   the   public   debate   throughout   the   interwar   period,   numerous  
voices   demanded   skipping   the   crown   prince   and   instead   lifting   his   eldest  
son,   Wilhelm,   or   Alexander,   the   son   of   August-­‐‑Wilhelm,   onto   the   vacant  
throne.110  Wilhelm’s   actions,   Clark   therefore   argued,   particularly   since   they  
were  restricted  mainly  to  symbolic  gestures,  had  no  substantial  impact  on  the  
establishment  or  consolidation  of  the  National  Socialist  system.    
                                                                                                 
109  Malinowski,  Gutachten,  pp.  12,  13.  
110  See  exemplary:  MM  –  Der  Montag  Morgen,  13.2.1933;  Gubener  Zeitung,  29.3.1933.  
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Malinowski,   on   the   contrary,   sees   in   the   crown   prince   a   major   force   in  
German   politics.   He   mainly   relates   this   to   Wilhelm’s   inherited   status   as  
crown  prince  to  the  most  powerful  throne  of  continental  Europe.  According  
to   him,   the   potential   charisma   of   the   former   imperial   family   remained  
significant   throughout   the   interwar   period.   The   numerous   occasions   in  
which   the   crown   prince   directly   or   symbolically   endorsed   the   National  
Socialist   regime,   he   claimed,   not   only  provided   the   young  movement  with  
much  needed  credibility,  but  helped  to  lower  reservations  against  it  at  home  
and  abroad.      
In  the  end,  this  entire  debate  about  substantial  assistance  remains  a  question  
of   interpretation.  Both  appraisals   come  up  with  sound  and  comprehensible  
analyses  of  Wilhelm’s  actions  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  the  National  Socialist  movement.  The  
main   issue,   however,   is   that   the   consequences   of   his   actions   are   not  
specifically  quantifiable.  Wilhelm  certainly  did  not  commit  any  major  crimes  
that  would  qualify  him  as  a  major  offender  during  the  Third  Reich.  He  was  
not  a  political   tactician,  such  as  Hugenberg  or  von  Papen,  who  lifted  Hitler  
into   the   Chancellery.   Wilhelm   also   never   fully   devoted   himself   to   the  
National  Socialist   ideology,  nor  did  he  play  any   significant  political   role   in  
the  Third  Reich,  a  path  that  his  brother  August-­‐‑Wilhelm  willingly  followed.  
As  for  the  place  of  the  Prussian  crown  prince  against  the  larger  background  
of   German   princely   collaboration   with   the   regime,   it   is   safe   to   say   that  
Wilhelm   appears   as   one   of   the   most   politically   reticent   and   least  
compromised  personalities.111  As  a  go-­‐‑between  and  political  propagandist  for  
                                                                                                 
111  Jonathan  Petropoulos,  Royals  and  the  Reich,  passim,  especially  pp.  167–169.  
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the   Nazi   regime,   however,   he   prominently   endorsed   Adolf   Hitler,   very  
visibly   participated   in   numerous   rallies   and   publically   spoke   out   against  
defamations  of  the  movement.  Yet  the  1994  compensation  law  specifies  that  
actions  intended  to  enhance  the  establishment  of  the  regime  or  to  consolidate  
it   thereafter   are   not   in   themselves   sufficient   to   qualify   as   substantial  
assistance.   The   decisive   factor   is   the   effect   that   these   actions   actually   had.  
And   therein   lies   the   rub:   in   this   case,   a   lasting   effect   can   neither   be  
established  nor  denied.  In  such  situations,  the  penal  law  generally  refers  to  a  
concept  known  as  “in  dubio  pro  reo”,  allowing  the  defendant  to  walk  free  if  
his  culpability  cannot  be  verified  beyond  doubt.    
The  Rejection  of  the  Hohenzollern  Claim  
By  August,  when  Malinowski  submitted  his  appraisal,  the  Hohenzollern  had  
already  hit  the  news.    In  January,  2014,  someone  within  either  the  Office  for  
the  Settlement  of  Open  Property  Issues  (Amt  für  offene  Vermögensfragen)  or  
from   the   Ministry   of   Finance,   entrusted   with   overseeing   restitution  
procedures,   leaked   the   news   that   a   report   had   just   been   received   by   the  
Office  for  the  Settlement  of  Open  Property  Issues  on  the  Hohenzollern  case  
and   that   a   decision   in   their   favour   had   been   reached.112  This   triggered   a  
cascade  of   negative   commentary   in   the  press.      ‘The  Kaiser-­‐‑Clan  Bleeds   the  
People   Dry   Again!’   roared   the   Berliner   Kurier. 113      ‘Money   for   the   Old  
Monarchs’  was  the  title  of  a  piece  in  Neues  Deutschland,  a  socialist  organ  that  
                                                                                                 
112  Entschädigung  für  Hohenzollern  –  Talleur  kritisiert  Behördenleck,  26.02.2014,  online  at:  
http://www.presseportal.de/pm/57699/2674041.  
113  Kaiser-­‐‑Clan  lässt  Volk  nochmal  bluten,  Berliner  Kurier,  24.02.2014.  
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had  been   the  official   newspaper  of   the   SED  under   the  German  Democratic  
Republic.114     The   Märkische   Allgemeine   Zeitung   prominently   discussed   the  
“deep   entanglement   between   the   former   imperial   family   and   the   Nazi  
regime”.115  It   also   printed   an   interview  with   the   local   politican   Lutz   Boede  
from   the   left-­‐‑wing   initiative   “Potsdam   without   Garnisonskirche”   who  
suggested   that   the   Office   for   the   Settlement   of   Open   Property   Issues  
“relativized  the  culpability  of  the  Hohenzollern  family”.116  And  the  historian  
Wolfgang  Wippermann  demanded  in  the  Deutschlandfunk  “anti-­‐‑democrats  
shall  not  be  rewarded  for  their  deeds”.117  
In  the  following  month,  as  we  have  seen,  Brandenburg’s  Minister  of  Finance,  
Christian  Görke,  rescinded  the  decision  and  reopened  the  appraisal  process.  
This  not  only  let  to  jubilant  comments  in  the  leftist  press  -­‐‑  “No  money  for  the  
Prussian   Prince   (Preussenprinz)”,   “For   now   Prince   Georg-­‐‑Friedrich   has   to  
bid   farewell   to   the  anticipated  money   rain”118  –  but  also   lifted   the   case   into  
the  focus  of  the  national  press.  Large  daily  newspapers  such  as  the  Focus  and  
Die   Welt   now   covered   the   case.119  The   Märkische   Allgemeine   Zeitung   even  
initiated   a   survey   asking   its   readers   wether   the   Hohenzollern   should   be  
                                                                                                 
114  Moneten  für  die  alten  Monarchen,  Neues  Deutschland,  26..02.2014.  
115  Der  Sündenfall  des  Hauses  Hohenzollern,  Märkische  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  21.02.2014.  
116  Familie  erhebt  Anspruch  -­‐‑  Hohenzollern  haben  Recht  auf  Millionenentschädigung,  
Märkische  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  21.02.2014.  
117  Hohenzollern  –  Antidemokraten  nicht  für  ihr  Handeln  belohnen,  Deutschlandfunk  Kultur,  
26.02.2014.  
118  Vorerst  kein  Geld  für  den  Preussenprinz,  Neues  Deutschland,  17.03.2014;  Millionen  
eingefroren  –  Kaiser-­‐‑Clan  kriegt  kein  Geld,  Berliner  Kurier,  17.03.2014.  




compensated.  Out  of  more  than  ten  thousand  votes  only  thirty-­‐‑two  percent  
were  in  favour  of  it.120    
There   was   also   mounting   political   pressure   from   the   Green   Party   in  
Brandenburg,   who   presented   a   minor   interpellation   to   parliament  
demanding  that  the  Hohenzollerns  not  be  compensated  for  the  property  they  
had   lost.121     The   Brandenburg   Greens,   a   group   at   the   leftmost   end   of   the  
spectrum  of  German  Green  politics,  declared  that  it  was  “outraged”  to  hear  
of  the  possible  restitution  of  Hohenzollern  properties.  In  their  eyes,  “Crown  
Prince  Wilhelm  and  other  princes  –  as  prominent  participants  in  the  Day  of  
Potsdam   –   had   been   important   Steigbügelhalter   of   Adolf   Hitler”.122  Public  
pressure   was   amplified   by   the   fact   that   another   unidentified   source,   most  
likely   from  within  the  ministry  of   finance,   in  August  2014,  and  hence  more  
than   a  month   before   the  Office   for   the   Settlement   of  Open  Property   Issues  
finished   its   final   report,   leaked  Malinowski’s   appraisal   to   the   press.123  The  
left-­‐‑wing   newspaper   Der   Spiegel   opened   with   an   article   that   not   only  
disclosed   Malinowski’s   conclusions,   but   also   proposed   a   rejection   of   the  
Hohenzollern  claim.  The  Hohenzollern  restitution  question,  Spiegel  journalist  
Klaus  Wiegrefe   claimed,  was   “a   veritable  Historikerstreit”.      It   turned   after  
                                                                                                 
120  Sollten  die  Hohenzollern  für  Enteignungen  entschädigt  werden?,  Märkische  Allgemeine  
Zeitung,  17.03.2014  
121  Kleine  Anfrage  25.03.2014,  Mögliche  Entschädigungszahlungen  an  Erben  des  Hauses  
Hohenzollern,  online  at:  http://www.gruene-­‐‑fraktion-­‐‑brandenburg.de/im-­‐‑parlament/kleine-­‐‑
anfragen/moegliche-­‐‑entschaedigungszahlungen-­‐‑an-­‐‑erben-­‐‑des-­‐‑hauses-­‐‑hohenzollern/?L=0.  
122  Hohenzollern  haben  Recht  auf  Millionen-­‐‑Entschädigung,  Märkische  Allgemeine,  21.02.2014;  
Brandenburgische  Geschichtsvergessenheit  –  Streit  um  die  Rolle  der  Hohenzollern,  Neue  
Zürcher  Zeitung,  05.03.2014.  
123  Hohenzollern  erstatten  Strafanzeige,  Neues  Deutschland,  13.09.2014;  Steuergelder  für  




all,   on   the   “capital   question”   of   Germany   recent   history:   “how  Hitler   had  
managed   to   rise   from   homeless   man   in   Austria   to   the   leader   of   Europe’s  
most   important   industrial   power”.      In   the   light   of   the   expertise   presented,  
Wiegrefe  went  on,  the  result  was  foreseeable:  “The  claim  of  the  former  royal  
family   for   compensation   by   the   taxpayer   will   most   likely   be   rejected.”124  
Other   newspapers   published   similar   articles   in   the   following   days.   The  
Potsdamer   Neueste   Nachrichten   prominently   highlighted   Malinowski’s  
conclusion   that   the   crown   prince   had   significantly   contributed   to   the  
enhancement   of   the   Nazis’   respectability   and   had   decreased   reservations  
against   the   regime   at   home   and   abroad.125  And   the   Märkische   Allgemeine  
Zeitung  stated   that  “Prussia’s  dynasty  had  been   too  heavily  entangled  with  
the  Nazi-­‐‑leaders”  in  order  to  be  eligible  for  compensation.126    In  August  2015,  
Malinowski  entered   the  public  debate  personally  with  an  article   in  Die  Zeit  
that  ran  under  the  title:  ‘The  Brown  Crown  Prince’.    In  it,  he  summarised  the  
arguments  of  his  appraisal  adding   that   the  only  possible   judgement  on   the  
basis  of  the  evidence  must  fall  against  the  Hohenzollern.127  
In   the  end,   the  Office   for   the  Settlement  of  Open  Property   Issues  bowed   to  
the   political   and   public   pressure   and   withdrew   its   original   decision   from  
December  2013  in  which  it  had  signalled  its  approval  of  the  Hohenzollern’s  
claim.  Its  final  report,  published  in  January  2016,  adopted  Malinowski’s  line  
                                                                                                 
124  Prinz  mit  Schuss,  SPIEGEL,  08.09.2014.  
125  Hohenzollern  wohl  ohne  Entschädigung,  Potsdamer  Neueste  Nachrichten,  08.09.2014.  
126  Preußen-­‐‑Dynastie  und  Nazi-­‐‑Führer  zu  sehr  verstrickt:  Entschädigung  für  Hohenzollern  
ungewiss,  Märkische  Allgemeine,  08.09.2014.  
127  Der  braune  Kronprinz,  Die  Zeit,  30,08.2015  
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of  argument;128  a  financial  compensation  was  not  granted.  The  Hohenzollern  
were  unwilling  to  accept  this  ruling  and  have  since  filed  a  lawsuit  against  the  
decision  at  the  administrative  court   in  Potsdam.  It  was  decided  to  augment  
the   earlier   expert   testimony  with   a   further   appraisal   by  Professor  Wolfram  
Pyta.      Pyta   appears   to   have   found   exactly   what   the   Hohenzollerns   need.    
Whereas  Clark  and  Malinowski  focused  on  symbolic  and  rhetorical  gestures  
by   the   prince,   coming   to   opposed   views   on   their   significance,   Pyta   has  
focused  his  attention  on  the  precise  nature  of  the  prince’s  involvement  with  
conservative   circles   close   to   the   government   at   the   end   of   the   Weimar  
Republic.     His   investigations   have   already   thrown   up   evidence   suggesting  
that   the  crown  prince  was   involved   in  a   last  minute  attempt   to  prevent   the  
appointment   of   Hitler   as   Reich   Chancellor.   In   February   2016,   the  
Hohenzollern  leaked  information  to  the  press,  prompting  the  publication  in  
Die   Welt   of   an   article   entitled:   ‘How   the   Prussian   Crown   Prince   tried   to  
Prevent  Hitler’.    According  to  this  article  the  crown  prince  was  at  the  centre  
of  an   intrigue   in   January  1933  designed  to  divide   the  NSDAP  and  side-­‐‑line  
Hitler.   Reich   Chancellor   Kurt   von   Schleicher   and   the   crown   prince  
apparently   intended   to   convince   the  moderate  wing   of   the  NSDAP,   under  
the   leadership   of   Gregor   Strasser,   to   break   with   Hitler   and   join   into   a  
coalition   government   with   “pragmatic   representatives   of   the   Social  
Democratic  unions”  under  the  leadership  of  Schleicher.129  Hitler’s  inability  to  
                                                                                                 
128  See:  Bescheidsentwurf  bzgl.  Ansprüche  SKH  Herrn  Georg  Friedrich  Prinz  von  Preußen  
auf  im  heutigen  Bundesland  Brandenburg  gelegene  Immobilien,  Landkreis  Oder-­‐‑Spree,  Amt  
zur  Regelung  offener  Vermögensfragen,  24.09.2014,  Hausarchiv  des  vormals  regierenden  
preußischen  Königshauses  (Berlin).  
129  So  wollte  Preußens  Kronprinz  Hitler  verhindern,  Welt,  11.02.2016.  
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accept  anything  but  total  power130  would  have  inevitably  led  to  a  breakup  of  
the  NSDAP.     Although  Strasser  was  by  no  means  a  democrat,  but   rather  a  
fascist  along  the  lines  of  Mussolini,  he  neither  shared  with  Hitler  the  radical  
hatred  for   the  Jews,  nor  did  he   intend  to  start  another  world  war.131  This   in  
turn   would   seem   to   support   Clark’s   claim   that   the   nature   of   the   prince’s  
relationship   with   National   Socialism   was   conditional   and   instrumental,  
rather  than  founded  on  consistent  support  for  the  party  or  its  ideology.  
If   the   above   scenario   was   to   be   confirmed,   this   could   have   tremendous  
implications   on   the   upcoming   trial.   In   a   similar   case,   the   Federal  
Administrative   Court   of   Germany   ruled   that   any   substantial   assistance  
provided   by   the   defendant   could   –   in   special   cases   –   be   neglected   if   the  
defendant   had   undeniably   been   involved   in   an   attempt   to   prevent   or  
overthrow  the  regime,  even  if  this  attempt  might  not  have  been  successful.132  
In   that   case,   the   whole   debate   surrounding   the   impact   of   Crown   Prince  
Wilhelm’s   actions  might   be   rendered   void.   A   final   ruling,   however,   is   not  
expected  for  several  years.    
As   the  Hohenzollern   case   reveals,   the   legislative   environment   in  Germany  
obliges   some   families   to   engage   in   history   management.   If   they   do   not  
manage  their  history,  someone  else  will,  and  the  financial  implications  can  be  
                                                                                                 
130  See  for  example  Hitler’s  reply  to  the  crown  prince’s  in  September  1932  in  which  Hitler  flat  
out  refused  Wilhelm’s  request  to  join  a  coalition  government.  Letter  Adolf  Hitler  to  Crown  
Prince  Wilhelm,  Munich,  28.09.1932,  GStA,  BPH,  Rep.  54  Nr.  137–2.  
131  So  wollte  Preußens  Kronprinz  Hitler  verhindern,  Welt,  11.02.2016.  
132  Entschädigung  für  Enteignung  eines  Ritterguts  eines  Enkels  des  Reichskanzlers  von  
Bismarck?,  Pressemitteilung  Bundesverwaltungsgericht,  Nr.  57/2009,  BVerwG  5  C  1.09,  




substantial.  This  is  especially  true  for  areas  in  East  Germany,  which  are  still  
governed   by   DIE   LINKE,   the   successor   party   of   the   former   German  
Democratic   Republic’s   Socialist   Unity   Party   (SED).   In   East   Germany,   the  
nobility   was   expropriated,   expelled   and   publicly   stigmatised.   For   decades  
after   the   war,   their   history   was   portrayed   as   a   succession   of   exploitation,  
suppression   and  military   aggression.   This   state-­‐‑sponsored  management   of  
the  nobility’s  history  was  designed   to   justify   their   expulsion  and   legitimise  
the   expropriations.  More   than   two  decades   after   the   fall   of   the   communist  
system   in   East   Germany,   the   salience   of   such   narratives   is   scarcely  
diminished.      As   the   intervention   of   Brandenburg’s   minister   of   finance  
demonstrated,   representatives   of   the   far   left   are  not   only  willing   to  defend  
these  narratives,  but  also  to  take  concerted  action  when  they  are  challenged.    
How  differently  restitution  cases  can  be  handled  if  there  is  neither  public  nor  
political  pressure  exerted  can  be  observed  in  another  formerly  East  German  
state.   In   Thuringia,   a   province   that   has   been   governed   by   the   Christian  
Democrats   (Christlich  Demokratische  Union,  CDU)  between  1990  and  2014,  
the   government   took   a  much  more   liberal   and  unbiased   approach  when   it  
came   to   compensating   former   princely   families   expropriated   between   1945  
and  1949.  Here,  Dr   Jürgen  Aretz,   state   secretary   in   the  Ministry  of  Science,  
Research  and  Art  (Ministerium  für  Wissenschaft,  Forschung  und  Kunst),  was  
specially  assigned  to  handle  the  often  highly  complicated  restitution  cases.  In  
discrete   negotiations,   Dr   Aretz   reached   compromise   settlements   with  
numerous   old   noble   families.   Among   them   were   the   princely   houses   of  
Sachsen-­‐‑Weimar   Eisenach,   Sachsen-­‐‑Meiningen   and   Saxe   Coburg   and  
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Gotha.133  The  princely  house  of  Reuß  also  found  a  compromise  with  the  city  
of   Gera.134  In   this  way,   lengthy   and   protracted   legal   battles  with   uncertain  
outcomes  which,  as  illustrated,  can  often  take  decades,  could  be  avoided.    
Conclusion  
As  demonstrated  throughout  this  thesis,  history  management  can  be  a  very  
powerful   tool   for   fostering   and   improving   a   family’s   reputation   in   the  
present.   For   a   family   to   be   successful   in   such   an   endeavour,   they   cannot  
arouse  the  suspicion  that  they  are  strategically  attempting  to  manipulate  the  
record.   Their   efforts   must   remain   subtle   and   discrete.   Autobiographies,  
family  chronicles  and  carefully  staged  home  stories  are  ideally  suited  in  this  
context,   since   they   allow   the   protagonist   subliminally   to   convey  his   or   her  
own  interpretation  of  history  without  being  exposed  to  substantial  scholarly  
critique.   Even   more   important,   however,   is   the   control   of   focus   and  
information.  Active  history  management  allows  people  not  only  to  influence  
which  parts  of   their   family  history   they  wish   to  address,  but  also   to  decide  
how  much   information   they   are   willing   to   disclose.   The   key   to   successful  
history  management  is  directing  the  focus  of  attention  towards  the  beneficial  
                                                                                                 
133  Nur  über  das  Schloss  Burgk  wird  noch  verhandelt,  Thüringische  Landeszeitung,  15.01.2015;  
Thüringer  Landtag  billigt  Einigung  mit  Weimarer  Adelshaus,  Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  
04.07.2003;  Also  see:  Hellmut  Seemann,  Restitution  –  Nur  Last  oder  auch  Lust  der  
Wiedervereinigung.  Ein  kritischer  Erfahrungsbericht  aus  der  Klassikstiftung  Weimar,  in:  
Cornelia  Munzinger-­‐‑Brandt  (ed.),  Museumsgut  und  Eigentumsfragen  (Halle,  2012),  p.  21  (pp.  
15–24).  
134  Streit  um  Status  der  Geraer  Silbermöbel,  Der  Tagesspiegel,  27.09.2006;  Tauziehen  um  die  
Immobilien  des  Thüringer  Adelsgeschlechts  Reuß,  Welt,  14.06.2005.  
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aspects  of  one’s  family’s  past,  while  either  marginalising  compromising  facts  
or  removing  them  altogether  from  the  field  of  vision.    
An   engagement  with   the   past,   however,   can   be   dangerous  when   a   family  
loses  control  over  the  process,  manifested  in  the  case  of  the  Hohenzollern.  As  
illustrated,   the  moralising   dimension   of   the   1994   compensation   law   forced  
the  Hohenzollern   to   address   a   section   of   their   family’s   past,  which,   under  
normal  circumstances,  they  most  likely  would  have  been  eager  to  avoid.  Due  
to  the  magnitude  of  the  crimes  committed  during  the  Second  World  War  and  
the  enormous  level  of  complicity  among  the  German  population,  the  history  
of   the   Third   Reich   –   even   seventy   years   after   its   downfall   –   hangs   like  
Damocles’   sword   over   the   German   nation.   Unless   a   family   has   been  
prominently   involved   in   the   resistance   against   the  Nazi   regime,   the   Third  
Reich   is   not   a   topic   suited   to   generating   positive   symbolic   capital.   It   is   a  
reputational  minefield,  which  is  to  be  evaded  where  possible.        
Nevertheless,   from   the   Hohenzollern’s   perspective,   the   restitution   process  
initially   appeared   to   be   controllable.   According   to   usual   practice,   the  
restitution  case  started  out  as  discrete  and  impartial  negotiations  between  the  
Hohenzollern   and   the   Office   for   the   Settlement   of   Open   Property   Issues.  
After   years   of   research,   the   competent   government   agency   signalled   its  
approval   of   restitution.   Only   when   Brandenburg’s   minister   of   finance  
intervened  and  dragged   the  case   into   the  public  sphere  did   things  begin   to  
get  out  of  hand  for  the  Hohenzollern.  They  were  all  of  a  sudden  confronted  
on  two  fronts.  They  faced  significant  political  opposition,  as  well  as  a  largely  
hostile   media,   which   turned   this   initially   private   inquiry   into   a   highly  
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politicised   public   controversy   about   the   family’s   conduct   during   the   Third  
Reich.   The   negative   implications   of   this   situation   were   twofold.   A  
compensation  for  their  material   losses  suffered  after  the  Second  World  War  
was  rejected.  More  importantly,  however,  the  detailed  coverage  in  the  press  
of  the  crown  prince’s  activities  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  the  National  Socialist  movement  led  
to   a   veritable   PR-­‐‑disaster.   Leading   German   newspapers   published   large  
articles,  citing  Malinowski’s  evaluation  of   the  crown  prince,  and  portraying  
the  Hohenzollern  as  a  family  who  had  actively  and  willingly  assisted  the  rise  
of   Adolf   Hitler.   Die   Zeit   called   Wilhelm   “The   Brown   Crown   Prince”,   the  
SPIEGEL   styled   him   the   “The   Dorky   Prince”   (Prinz   mit   Schuss)   and   the  
Märkische  Allgemeine  Zeitung  referred  to  Wilhelm’s  conduct  during  the  Third  
Reich  as  the  “capital  sin  of  the  house  Hohenzollern”  (Sündenfall  des  Hauses  
Hohenzollern).135  Thus,   this   case   vividly   demonstrates   that   if   a   family   is  
forced  to  react   to  external  pressure  rather   than  proactively  orchestrate   their  
own  history  management,  the  entire  process,  which  originally  was  intended  
to  improve  the  family’s  standing,  can  significantly  backfire.      
This   is   further   exemplified   by   the   family’s   reaction   to   the   critical   articles  
published   in   the   press   just   before   the   Office   for   the   Settlement   of   Open  
Property   Issues   finalised   its   verdict   in   September   2014.   The   Hohenzollern  
filed   a   lawsuit   for   ‘betrayal   of   secrets’   (Geheimnisverrat),   claiming   that   the  
information   the  article   referred   to  had  been   illegally  handed   to   the  press.136  
Furthermore,   they  attempted   to  obtain  a  preliminary   injunction  against   the  
                                                                                                 
135  Der  braune  Kronprinz,  Die  Zeit,  30,08.2015;  Prinz  mit  Schuss,  SPIEGEL,  08.09.2014;  Der  
Sündenfall  des  Hauses  Hohenzollern,  Märkische  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  21.02.2014.  
136  Steuergelder  für  Kaisernachfahren?,  SPIEGEL,  14.12.2014.  In  this  context,  the  closest  
English  equivalent  to  “Geheimnisverrat”  is  probably  “contempt  of  court”.    
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land   Brandenburg   to   prevent   them   from   commenting   on   the   restitution  
procedure.137  Their  initial  idea  was  to  prevent  the  public  debate  from  getting  
out  of  control.  Instead,  this  approach  caused  considerable  public  indignation  
and   negative   reactions   in   the   press.138  The   Hohenzollern   were   accused   of  
trying   to   bend   the   historical   truth   and   muzzle   the   press.139  Nothing   could  
better  illustrate  the  delicate  endeavour  of  history  management.    
                                                                                                 
137  Entschädigung  für  enteignete  Schlösser  in  Brandenburg  abgelehnt:  Keine  Steuermillionen  
für  Hohenzollern,  Potsdamer  Neueste  Nachrichten,  15.01.2016.  
138  Millionen  eingefroren:  Kaiser  Clan  will  Geld  für  Berliner  Grundstücke,  Berliner  Kurier,  
15.12.2014;  Hohenzollern  wohl  ohne  Entschädigung,  Potsdamer  Neueste  Nachrichten,  
07.09.2014;  Preussen-­‐‑Prinz  bittet  Berlin  zur  Kasse,  Hohenzollerische  Zeitung,  16.12.2014;  
Preußen  Dynastie  und  Nazi-­‐‑Führer  zu  sehr  verstrickt:  Entschädigung  für  Hohenzollern  
ungewiss,  Märkische  Allgemeine,  07.09.2014;  Der  braune  Kronprinz,  Die  Zeit,  27.08.2015;  Der  
Sündenfall  des  Hauses  Hohenzollern,  Märkische  Allgemeine,  24.02.2014.  
139  Keine  Steuermillionen  für  Hohenzollern,  Potsdamer  Neueste  Nachrichten,  15.01.2016;  
Hohenzollern  versuchen  es  mit  Maulkorb,  Märkische  Allgemeine,  15.01.2016;  Kein  Geld  für  




This  dissertation  is  about  the  constructability  of  the  past.  It  has  examined  the  
efforts   of   the   East-­‐‑Elbian   nobility   to   refurbish   its   image   and   its   historical  
identity  after  the  Second  World  War.  Like  other  groups  from  the  areas  most  
affected  by  the  fighting  in  1944  and  1945,  the  nobilities  of  East  Elbia  struggled  
to  gain  lost  ground  after  their  mass  expulsion  to  the  West.    They  reconstituted  
their   commercial   networks   and   used   what   remained   of   their   inside  
connections   to   industry,   forestry,   diplomacy,   the   arts   and   agriculture   to  
rebuild  their   independence  and  prosperity.  At  the  same  time,  however,  they  
worked   hard   to   repair   their   reputation.      This   had   always   been   an   elite  
intensely  conscious  of  reputational  capital  –  a  resource  sometimes  captured  in  
the   neuralgic   concept   of   ‘honour’.      As   this   thesis   has   shown,   they  
demonstrated  remarkable  ingenuity,  determination  and  collective  purpose  in  
purging   their   corporate   past   of   contaminants,   recuperating   the   ideals   of  
independence   and   social   responsibility   that   supposedly   justified   their  
elevated   social   status,   and   merging   the   canon   of   noble   ‘virtue’   with   the  
political  ones  that  sustained  the  official  rhetoric  of  the  Federal  Republic.    They  
helped  to  establish  the  military  coup  as  the  defining  aspect  of  the  anti-­‐‑Hitler  
resistance  and  the  foundation  of  the  new  Germany.     They  succeeded  having  
this   coup   recognised   not   just   as   a   noble   achievement,   but   also   as   an  
unforgettable  historical  expression  of  noble  attributes.     They  took  part  in  the  
transfiguration   of   the   German   east   into   a   lost   Heimat   with   a   claim   to   the  
sympathy   of   all   sensitive   Germans.      They   secured   their   own   collective  
identity   through  a  myriad  of   idealisations  of   their   family  histories.     Further,  
those  with  a  claim  to  estates  in  the  territory  of  the  former  German  Democratic  
Republic   deployed   the   resources   accumulated   through   these   efforts   to   re-­‐‑
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establish   themselves   as   a   landed   elite   wielding   an   authority   supposedly  
bestowed   by   history.     Nothing   could   illustrate  more   clearly   the   tight   nexus  
between  managing  the  past  and  flourishing  in  the  present.  
Such  efforts  to  manage  their  own  history  are  by  no  means  a  unique  feature  of  
the  East-­‐‑Elbian  nobility.   For  decades   after   the  war,   especially   large  German  
corporations,  as  well  as  government  agencies,  tried  systematically  to  trivialise  
their   entanglement   with   the   Third   Reich.   Scholars   were   regularly   denied  
access  to  corporate  archives,  compromising  files  mysteriously  disappeared  in  
the   shredder,   and  sponsored  commemorative  publications  blatantly   ignored  
the  complicity  of   large  parts  of  Germany’s  heavy  industry  in  Hitler’s  war  of  
exploitation.  
In   1970,   in   celebration   of   its   centenary,   the  Deutsche   Bank   commissioned   a  
450-­‐‑page  monograph,  which  devoted  less  than  twenty  pages  to  the  period  of  
the  Third  Reich.  There  was  no  mention  of  the  bank’s  large-­‐‑scale  involvement  
in   the   ‘Aryanization’   process,   its   expansion   into   Eastern   Europe   during   the  
Second   World   War,   or   the   financing   of   enterprises   responsible   for   the  
construction   of   Auschwitz.891  Instead,   the   chronicle   bemoaned   the   lack   of  
investment   opportunities   during   the   war   and   the   difficulties   faced   by   the  
bank  in  fulfilling  its  credit  targets.892  Daimler  Benz  also  studiously  ignored  its  
large-­‐‑scale  use  of   forced  labour  throughout  the  Third  Reich.  As  late  as  1986,  
an  official  two-­‐‑volume  chronicle  of  the  company’s  100-­‐‑year  history  dedicated  
as  little  as  two  pages  to  this  highly  sensitive  topic.893  Other  large  corporations,  
                                                                                                 
891  See  especially  the  chapter  Foreign  Expansion  in:  Harold  James,  The  Nazi  Dictatorship  and  the  
Deutsche  Bank  (Cambridge,  2004),  pp.  108–189;  Also  see  the  chapter  Deutsche  Bank  Abroad:  
“Aryanization”,  Territorial  Expansion,  and  Economic  Reordering  in:  Harold  James,  The  Deutsche  
Bank  and  the  Nazi  Economic  War  Against  the  Jews  –  The  Expropriation  of  Jewish-­‐‑Owned  Property  
(Cambridge,  2001),  pp.  127–195.  
892  Fritz  Seidenzahl,  100  Jahre  Deutsche  Bank  1870–1970  (Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1970),  pp.  357–374.  
893  Die  Herren  nahmen  nur  die  Kräftigsten,  SPIEGEL,  07.04.1986.  
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such   as   Degussa,   Volkswagen   and   the   Dresdner   Bank,   also   went   to   great  
length  to  curtail  their  roles  as  “willing  supporters”  of  the  Nazi  regime.894    
Similar  behaviour  is  also  well-­‐‑known  for  government  agencies.  For  decades,  
Germany’s   Federal   Intelligence   Agency   (Bundesnachrichtendienst,   BND),  
deliberately   concealed   its   practice   of   hiring   highly   compromised   war  
criminals   during   the   formative   years   of   the   Federal   Republic.   Its   founder,  
Reinhard  Gehlen,  a  former  Nazi  general  responsible  for  counter-­‐‑espionage  on  
the  eastern  front,  had  not  only  offered  shelter  to  hundreds  of  former  Nazis  in  
his  headquarters  in  Pullach,  but  also  used  the  services  of  former  Gestapo  and  
SS   personnel,   such   as   Klaus   Barbie   to   support   anti-­‐‑communist   regimes   in  
South  America.895  In   fact,   every   tenth   employee   of   the   BND  had   previously  
worked   for   Himmler’s   SS.896  For   years,   the   BND   systematically   prevented  
historians  and  journalists  access  to  its  archive  under  the  pretext  of  protecting  
its  agents.897  Even  as  late  as  2007,  the  agency  still  shredded  more  than  250  files  
of  former  members  of  the  Gestapo,  SD  and  SS  in  an  attempt  to  disguise  their  
post-­‐‑war  careers  in  the  BND.898    
The  Foreign  Office  (Auswärtiges  Amt,  AA)  pursued  an  even  more  forthright  
strategy.  Throughout  the  Third  Reich,  it  had  been  a  crucial  link  in  Hitler’s  war  
of  exploitation  and  annihilation.   It  had  not  only  strategically   tried  to  restrict  
Germany’s   loss   of   reputation   in   the   wake   of   the   Nazis’   policy   against   the  
                                                                                                 
894  Dresdner  Bank  im  Dritten  Reich:  Hitlers  willige  Banker,  SPIEGEL,  17.02.2006;  Der  Führer  
und  sein  Tüftler,  SPIEGEL,  04.11.1996.  
895  See:  Peter  Hammerschmidt,  Deckname  Adler:  Klaus  Barbie  und  die  westlichen  Geheimdienste  
(Frankfurt  a.  M.,  2014),  pp.  197–222.  
896  NS-­‐‑Verbrecher  im  BND:  Eine  zweite  Entnazifizierung,  Frankfurter  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  
18.03.2010.  
897  See  exemplary  the  interviews  with  the  historian  Peter  Hammerschmidt:  Geheimakte  
Barbie,  der  Freitag,  25.02.2012;  Ausgeprägte  antikommunistische  Haltung:  Wie  
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898  BND  vernichtete  Personalakten  früherer  SS-­‐‑Leute,  SPIEGEL,  29.11.2011.  
331  
  
Jews,   but   it   had   also   actively   supported   the   planning,   preparation   and  
execution   of   the   Final   Solution. 899   Yet,   after   the   Second   World   War,   it  
constructed  the  myth  of  the  clean  Foreign  Office  as  “untainted  by  the  crimes  
of   the   Third   Reich   and   a   centre   of   anti-­‐‑Nazi   opposition”.900  In   an   official  
brochure   in   1979,   the   Foreign  Office   encapsulated   its   role   during   the   Third  
Reich  in  a  few  sentences:  “The  AA  tenaciously  resisted  the  plans  of  the  Nazi  
regime   without   being   able   to   prevent   the   worst.   For   a   long   time   the   AA  
remained  an  ‘apolitical’  agency  and  was  known  to  the  National  Socialists  as  a  
stronghold  of  opposition”.901  On  top  of   this  blatant   transfiguration  of   its  role  
in  the  Third  Reich,  the  Foreign  Office  –  like  the  BND  –  also  restricted  access  to  
its   archives. 902   Independent   scholarly   research,   which   might   tarnish   the  
carefully  composed  image  of  an  isolated  bastion  of  anti-­‐‑Nazi  resistance,  was  
not  desired.    
Unlike   the   nobility,   however,   these   corporations   and   government   agencies  
eventually  changed  their  strategy.  From  the  late  1980s,  they  began  actively  to  
acknowledge   their  entanglement   in   the  Third  Reich.   In  1985,  Deutsche  Bank  
acquired   the   Flick   conglomerate.   In   the   course   of   this   transaction,   the   bank  
unexpectedly   transferred   five   million   Deutschmark   to   the   Jewish   Claims  
Conference   (JCC).   For   years,   Flick   had   refused   to   pay   compensation   for   its  
large-­‐‑scale   use   of   forced   labour   during   the   Second   World   War.   By  
clandestinely   settling   the   JCC’s   claim,   Deutsche   Bank   hoped   to   avoid   a  
protracted   debate   in   the  German   press.   This   attempted   cover   up,   however,  
had  the  exactly  opposite  effect.  The  press  widely  picked  up  on  the  story,  and  
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(2011),  p.  72.  
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an   intensive  public  debate   about  Germany'ʹs   exploitation  of   foreign  workers  
during   the   Second  World  War   ensued.903  Although   only   reluctantly,   and   by  
no  means  voluntarily,   this  public  pressure  gradually  encouraged  Germany'ʹs  
large  corporations  and  government  agencies  to  have  their  involvement  in  the  
crimes  of  the  Nazi  regime  examined  by  external  historians.904  Over  time,  they  
realised   that  a   transparent   re-­‐‑appraisal  of   the  company’s  history,  even  of   its  
darkest  chapters,  could  actually  lead  to  positive  publicity  in  the  long  run.    
The   nobility,   in   contrast,   remains   unwilling   to   comprehensively   reappraise  
the   true   dimensions   of   its   complicity   in   the   Third   Reich.   “To   this   day,   the  
collective  memories   of   these   families   appear   to   be   trapped   in   a  mindscape,  
which  does  not  allow  any  stain  on  their  ‘shield  of  honour’.  This  is  especially  
surprising  since  nowadays   the  realisation  should  have  manifested   itself   that  
especially  the  concerted  attempt  to  repel  or  divert  culpability  will   inevitably  
leave  even  more  severe  stains.”905  To  be  sure,  the  nobility  is  not  exposed  to  the  
kind  of  public  pressure   that  has  been  brought   to  bear  on   large  corporations  
and  government  agencies.  The  nobility  is  neither  accountable  to  shareholders,  
nor  consumers,  nor  an  electorate.  In  the  absence  of  any  real  political  or  social  
power,   the   nobility’s   societal   role   has   been   reduced   to   a   kind   of   low-­‐‑level  
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collective   celebrity   status.   As   supposedly   apolitical   figures,   they   serve   as   a  
beacon   for  how   life   can  be   lived,  unburdened  by   the  mundane  worries   and  
tasks  of  a  meritocratic  society.906  The  great  majority  of  the  population  today  is  
less  interested  in  the  nobility’s  fateful  role  in  the  great  crises  of  the  twentieth  
century   than   in   romantic   images   of   fairy-­‐‑tale   weddings,   glamorous   home  
stories   or   contemporary   scandals.   In   order   to  maintain   this   celebrity   status,  
and   therefore,   at   least   a   residual   degree   of   social   elitism,   the   nobility   will  
doubtless  continue  to  construct  a  hearth  of  fables  and  legends  over  which  to  
warm  its  hands,  rather  than  excavate  its  troubling  corporate  past.    
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